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FOREWORD
I  have w r i tte n  in  t h i s  th e s is  th e  s to ry  o f  American o ffen s iv e  
s tr a te g y  on the  n o rth e rn  f ro n t ie r  in  th e  l a s t  f u l l  year o f  the  War o f  
1812. I  chose to  co n cen tra te  on one y e a r ,  1814, because i t  enabled 
me to  a ttem pt a thorough s tu d y  of th e  p rocess o f  American s tr a te g y -  
making and s tra tegy-im plem en ta tion  v a th in  a lim ite d  number o f pages j 
because i t  o ffe red  a  convenient means o f  a s se s s in g  the  development 
o f  s tr a te g y  fo r th e  whole war; and because h is to r ia n s  have paid l e s s  
a t t e n tio n  to  th e  l a s t  year o f  th e  war th an  th ey  have to  th e  f i r s t  
two. Moreover, 1814 marked a  tu rn in g  p o in t in  bo th  American and 
B r i t i s h  s tra te g y , and i t  was perhaps th e  most c r i t i c a l  y e a r  o f th e  
war; Madison d esp a ired  o f ach iev ing  conquest and th e  se ttlem en t o f  
m aritime issu e s  th rough m il i ta ry  d e c is io n , w hile th e  d e fe a t of 
Napoleon perm itted  th e  B r i t i s h  to  launch an o ffe n s iv e  war in  North 
America.
My theme i s  th e  p lace  o f  1814 s tra te g y  in  American h is to ry ,  
and th e  in te r re la te d n e s s  o f  t h a t  s tr a te g y  w ith n a tio n a l  p o lic y , com­
mand p a tte rn s ,  a d m in is tra t io n , l o g i s t i c s ,  and t a c t i c s .  The emphasis 
I  have g iven  to  t a c t i c s  may seem in o rd in a te  to  some re a d e rs ,  but th e  
b a t t l e s  were im portan t f a c to rs  in  th e  e v o lu tio n , success, and meaning 
o f  s tr a te g y .  American war le a d e rs  in  1814 p laced  g re a te r  s t r e s s  on 
th e  d e s tru c tio n  o f  B r i t i s h  fo rc e s  th an  th ey  had in  p revious y ea rs , 
and th e  r e s u l t in g  b a t t l e s  n o t only decided  th e  f a t e  o f  th e  c o n tin e n t,  
bu t symbolized th e  contemporary meaning o f th e  o ffe n s iv e ; th e  s a lv a ­
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t io n  o f n a tio n a l  p re s t ig e  and th e  re v iv a l  o f  n a tio n a l  p rid e .
The m il i ta ry  h is to ry  o f  war i s  l a rg e ly  and unavoidably w ritte n  
in  term s o f  success o r  f a i l u r e ,  v ic to ry  o r  d e fe a t. The United S ta te s  
was not d e fea ted  in  th e  War o f 1812, but n e ith e r  was i t  v ic to r io u s . 
None o f th e  avowed g o a ls  o f  th e  war were won through d ec is io n  on the  
b a t t l e f i e l d ,  save ending the  In d ian  "menace" to  westward expansion 
and r e t r ie v in g  some measure o f t h a t  in ta n g ib le  but im portant sense 
o f  what contem poraries c a lle d  n a tio n a l  c h a ra c te r ,  honor, and g lo ry . 
W hether B r i ta in  resp ec ted  th e  power o f th e  United S ta te s  more because 
o f  th e  war—o r  in  s p i te  o f i t —-is  a d eb a tab le  q u e s tio n .
Wars do have a  way o f s e t t in g  t h e i r  own co n d itio n s  and g e ttin g  
o u t o f hand, and t h e i r  p e rp e tra t io n  lead s  to  r e s u l ts  not f u l l y  fo rseen . 
The War o f 1812 d id  c o n tr ib u te  m easurably to  the  awakening o f  n a tio n ­
a lism , to  th e  achievement o f economic independence, and to  hundreds 
o f  o th e r  good and bad p sy ch o lo g ica l, s o c ia l ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  and economic 
changes. I f  th e  o b jec t o f  war i s  to  p lace th e  n a tio n  in  a s tro n g e r  
p o s it io n ,  t h i s  one was s u c c e ss fu l.  These consequences, however, 
were not th e  d i re c t  r e s u l t  o f  m il i t a ry  v ic to ry .  Conquest was th e  
m il i ta ry  aim , and m i l i t a r i ly  th e  United S ta te s  f a i l e d .  The sense of 
m il i t a ry  f a i l u r e  pervades a l l  w ritin g  about th e  war, whether i t  be 
m il i t a ry ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  d ip lo m atic , o r  b io g ra p h ica l h is to r y .
What went wrong? For a  v a r ie ty  o f  reasons, no s a t is fa c to r y  
answer i s  a v a ila b le . The most obvious one i s  th a t  f a i l u r e  i s  more 
d i f f i c u l t  to  ex p la in  th a n  su ccess . Another i s  th a t  a  f u l l - s c a le  syn­
th e s i s  o f th e  war has not been w r itte n  s in c e  Henry Adams' a ttem p t in  
th e  l a te  n in e te e n th  c e n tu ry . And l a s t ly ,  more monographs a re  needed
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on se v e ra l  a sp ec ts  o f  the  m r ;  th e  ex te n t o f popular support; methods 
o f r e c ru it in g ;  th e  impact o f  finance on m il i ta ry  o p e ra tio n s ; the  p e r­
formance o f supply  fu n c tio n s  from day to  day; th e  ro le  o f  Congress; 
and th e  B r i ti sh  war e f f o r t—to  name o n ly  a few.
A p a r t i a l  ex p lan a tio n  o ffe red  in  most h is to ry  books i s  th a t  
American war le a d e rs  lacked a " s tr a te g ic  sense"; namely, th e y  chose 
the  wrong o b je c t iv e s . %  fin d in g s , however, a re  th a t  th e y  d id possess 
a s t r a te g ic  sense and d id  know vriiich o b jec tiv e s  were im portan t, b u t 
they  always f a i l e d  to  a d ju s t  m il i ta ry  means to  m il i ta ry  and p o l i t i c a l  
ends. T his f a i l u r e  in  1814 would i ro n ic a l ly  c o n tr ib u te  t o  th e  r e s to ­
ra t io n  o f  n a tio n a l  honor, th e  awakening o f American na tio n a lism , and 
th e  r e v iv a l  of American am bitions.
Judged from th e  p e rsp ec tiv e  o f  la rg e r  and more d e s tru c tiv e  
wars, th e  War o f  1812 appears r a th e r  p a th e tic  and in s ig n if ic a n t .  In  
i t s  day, however, i t  rep resen ted  th e  maximum e f f o r t  o f th e  Republic, 
which was not to  encounter eq u iv a len t dangers t o  n a tio n a l  s e l f -  
p re se rv a tio n  u n t i l  the  C iv il  War. The d e s tru c tio n  and f e r o c ity  o f  
the  f r o n t ie r  war seemed g re a t  to  th e  men of th e  tim e. The goals o f  
the  U nited S ta te s  and the  impact o f th e  s tru g g le  on the  coun try  d i s ­
closed  th e  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f th e  war i n  th e  ev o lu tio n  o f American h i s ­
to ry  and c u ltu re .  I t  i s  my hope th a t  t h i s  d isc u ss io n  c o n tr ib u te s  to  
a b e t t e r  understanding  o f th e  War o f 1812 and o f  American h is to ry . To 
th e  b e s t  o f my knowledge, i t  i s  the  o n ly  work th a t  seeks to  exp la in  
th e  g e n e sis , fo rm u la tio n , adop tion , and im plem entation o f  s tra te g y  on 
th e  n o rth e rn  f r o n t ie r .  Most h i s to r ie s  o f  th e  war do d isc u ss  s tra te g y , 
but th e y  t r e a t  i t  a s  though i t  were th e  product o f  u n id e n tif ie d  cosmic
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fo rc e s ,  r a th e r  th an  o f men t ry in g  to  accom plish t h e i r  aims in  the  
face  o f  d i f f i c u l t  circum stances and re a c tin g  to  com plicated e v en ts .
I  am g r e a t ly  indebted  to  T. Harry W illiam s, an a r t i s t i c  
w r i te r  and le c tu re r  and a profound sch o la r  o f  war and American h is to ry ,  
fo r  id e a s , c r i t ic i s m s ,  and d i re c t io n .  For t h e i r  a s s is ta n c e  and sug­
g e s tio n s  through c o n v e rsa tio n s , correspondence, and k indness, I  am 
o b lig a ted  to  P ro fesso rs  Stephen E. Ambrose, Reginald A, Bowler,
Reginald Horsman, John L. Loos, B url Noggle, and Sydney F. Wise. Dr. 
H erbert L. O erte r, vrtio generously  gave o f h is  tim e , drew th e  fo llow ­
ing  maps from my sk e tch es: "The N orthern F ro n tie r ,"  "N iagara F ro n tie r ,"
and "B a ttle  o f  Chippawa," To Linda, fo r  her a id ,  com fort, p a tie n c e , 
id e a s , c r i t ic is m s ,  and ty p in g  o f  th e  m anuscrip t—deepest g r a t i tu d e .
I  would a ls o  l ik e  to  thank th e  s ta f f s  o f  th e  U.S. N ational 
A rchives, th e  L ib ra ry  o f Congress, and th e  P u b lic  Archives o f Canada, 
in  a d d itio n  to  th o se  o f  th e  l ib r a r i e s  o f  L ouisiana S ta te  U n iv e rs ity , 
Queen's U n iv e rs ity  i n  O ntario , th e  Royal M ilita ry  College o f Canada, 
and Miami U n iv e rs ity  o f  Ohio fo r  t h e i r  h e lp . P a rt o f th e  research  
was made p o ss ib le  through th e  Clyde C. W arrick Memorial Fund Grant 
o f  th e  H is to ry  Department and a g ran t from th e  Graduate School, bo th  
o f  L ouisiana S ta te  U n iv e rs ity . The e d ito r s  o f  M ilita ry  A ffa ir s  iiave 
k in d ly  allow ed me to  in co rp o ra te  in to  th e  t h e s i s  my a r t i c l e  on the  
b a t t l e  o f  Chippawa, rev ised  p o rtio n s  o f  which appear in  Chapters I ,
V II, and V III.
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ABSTRACT
American grand s tr a te g y  in  th e  War o f  1812 was to  conquer th e  
Canadas. I t  was a means o f winning m aritim e concessions and r e t r ie v in g  
n a tio n a l  honor, and i t  was an end w ith regard  to  d es tro y in g  th e  B r i t i s h  
f u r  t ra d e , subduing h o s t i le  In d ia n s , and fo s te r in g  American expansion. 
In  1814, however, m il i ta ry  d e fe a t and growing B r i t i s h  s tre n g th  led  
P re sid e n t James Madison to  d e sp a ir  o f achieving  conquest. The cap­
tu re  o f I'fontreal, which he regarded  as  e s s e n t ia l  t o  th e  conquest o f  
th e  Canadas, seemed out o f  reach ; he was deeply  concerned about th e  
r e v iv a l  o f  B r i t i s h  in flu en ce  among the  Northwest In d ian s; and he 
g re a t ly  fea red  th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  B r i t i s h  in vasion  from th e  north  and 
along th e  A tla n tic  seaboard. In  a d d itio n , th e  end o f th e  war in  
Europe promised to  remove th e  most im portant avowed reasons fo r  con­
t in u in g  the  Canadian war: th e  m aritim e d isp u te s ,  Madison th e re fo re
iiKived toward compromise on th e  m aritime iss u e s  as European and fro n ­
t i e r  m il i ta ry  developments dim inished h is  enthusiasm  fo r a  war o f 
Canadian conquest.
American m il i t a ry  s tr a te g y  in  1814 was o s te n s ib ly  designed 
to  conquer Upper Canada and d e s tro y  rem aining B r i t i s h  in flu e n ce  among 
th e  In d ian s , The p lan  o f  cançaign vdiich Madison and h is  Cabinet 
adopted in  June c a lle d  fo r  a m ajor th ru s t  through th e  N iagara penin­
su la ,  a naval ex p ed itio n  a g a in s t Fort M ichilim ackinac, and a  holding 
a c tio n  along th e  S t .  Lawrence R iver. The Cabinet p lan , however, con­
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ta in e d  a l l  the  weaknesses o f  p rev ious p lans, A reasoned c o n s id e ra tio n  
o f  what p o lic y  g o a ls  were d e s ira b le  and o b ta in ab le  w ith  American m ili­
t a r y  power was lac k in g ; sc a rc e  manpower and n av a l reso u rces  were com­
m itted  t o  d isp e rsed  o ffe n s iv e s ; combined and jo in t  o p e ra tio n s  were 
contençdated which proved im possib le  to  c o o rd in a te ; and lo g i s t i c a l  
p rep a ra tio n s  were haphazard.
In  p a r t ,  th e  weaknesses o f  th e  plan were due to  in h eren t 
d i f f i c u l t i e s  which th e  Americans faced  in  f ig h t in g  an o ffen s iv e  
n o rth e rn  war, American le a d e rs  functioned  w ith in  an i n e f f ic i e n t  com­
mand and a d m in is tra tiv e  system  th a t  m il i ta te d  a g a in s t th e  development 
o f  sound s t r a te g ic  p lans and th e  su c ce s s fu l conduct o f  m il i t a ry  opera­
t io n s  o v e r long and d i f f i c u l t  l in e s  o f  communication. The weaknesses 
o f  the  p lan  a lso  stemmed from p e rso n a l f a i l in g s ,  American s t r a te g i s t s  
betrayed  a p e rs i s te n t  i n a b i l i t y  to  a p p re c ia te  o b jec tiv e  l im ita t io n s  
and a d ju s t  l im ite d  m il i t a ry  means to  m il i ta ry  ends. Much o f th e  
r e s p o n s ib il i ty  r e s te d  on M adison's sh o u ld e rs . He had allowed s t r a te g ic  
th in k in g  and m il i t a ry  p rep a ra tio n s  t o  d r i f t ,  and f in a l ly  th e  C abinet 
met and sim ply form alized  th e  d r i f t  w ith  i t s  p lan .
P o l i t i c a l l y ,  American s t r a te g i s t s  lab o red  under M adison's 
f a i lu r e  t o  a p p re c ia te  th e  p o s s ib i l i t i e s  of conquest on th e  N iagara 
f ro n t ie r  and h is  exaggerated  concern about Northwestern In d ian s ,
Madison regarded th e  Cabinet ' s p lan  o f  campaign as d efensive  r a th e r  
th an  o f fe n s iv e . Aware t h a t  th e  o r ig in a l  avowed reasons f o r  th e  war 
were fad in g  in  s ig n if ic a n c e  and a p p a re n tly  abandoning hopes o f ach iev ­
in g  annexation  m i l i t a r i l y ,  Nfeidison could  see l i t t l e  e ls e  to  do b u t 
p ro te c t  vdiat remained of American h o ld in g s . He was more in te r e s te d
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in  d estro y in g  B r i t i s h - In d ia n  connections in  th e  Northwest th an  he was 
in  making a supreme e f f o r t  in  th e  N iagara p en in su la . The war becaine 
an experiment i n  prolonged h o s t i l i t i e s  w ith no apparent purpose but 
to  sa lv ag e  n a tio n a l  p r e s t ig e ,  M adison's d ip lom atic  a t t i tu d e s  and h is  
d efen siv e  m il i t a ry  mood had the  e f f e c t  o f denying s o re ly  needed naval 
support to  th e  Niagara o ffe n s iv e  and d isp a tch in g  i t  t o  M ichilim ackinac, 
Inadequate l o g is t i c a l  p rep a ra tio n s  and the  ag g ress iv en ess  o f 
G enerals Jacob Brown and W infield S co tt le d  t o  the t a c t i c a l l y  success­
fu l  b u t s t r a te g i c a l ly  u n su ccessfu l b a t t l e s  o f  Chippawa and Lundy's 
Lane, which clim axed th e  d e fe a t o f  th e  American 181A o ffe n s iv e . But 
the  superb performance o f  American reg u la rs  i r o n ic a l ly  co n trib u te d  to  
the  r e s to ra t io n  o f  American p ride and the  r e v iv a l  o f  American am bitions, 
Madison and o th e r  Americans thus regarded  th e  o ffe n s iv e  as a n a tio n a l  
success.
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I  doubt whether th e re  has ever been a strenuous p a c i f i s t  
who has not been fa sc in a te d  by war and v io le n c e .
—H, S tu a r t  Hughes, H is to ry  as A rt and as  Science
Of a l l  th e  c iv i l iz e d  s ta t e s  o f  Christendom, we a re  perhaps 
th e  l e a s t  m il i t a ry ,  though not behind the  forem ost a s  a 
w arlike  one,
—Dennis Hart Mahan, Outpost
T h ree-fo u rth s  o f  th o se  th in g s  upon which a c tio n  in  war 
must be c a lc u la te d , a re  hidden more o r l e s s  in  th e  clouds 
o f g re a t  u n c e rta in ty ,
—G lausew itz, On War
T a c tic s  i s  o f te n  a  more d e c is iv e  f a c to r  th an  s tr a te g y ,
—T. H arry W illiam s, "The M ilita ry  Leadership o f  North and
South"
Most m il i t a ry  au th o rs  a re  ap t to  confuse th e  r e a d e r 's  mind 
by overcrowding t h e i r  s to ry  w ith  d e t a i l s ,
—G eneral M arbot, Adventures
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COMMAND AND HOUSEKEEPING: THE SYSTEM
S tra te g y  i s  an a n c ie n t word, derived  from th e  Greeks. But 
i t  was n o t u n t i l  th e  appearance o f  such i n f lu e n t i a l  t r e a t i s e s  as  
Jo m in i's  Art o f  War and G lau sew itz 's  On War in  the  1830‘s th a t  i t  
became an in d isp en sab le  p a r t  o f m il i t a ry  ja rg o n . Although th e  word 
was not in  the  vocabulary  o f  P re s id e n t James I'dadison and h is  contem­
p o ra r ie s ,  they  n e v e rth e le s s  chose m il i ta ry  a im s, t r i e d  to  co o rd in a te  
s tr a te g ic  ends and m il i t a ry  means, and form ulated "p lan s  o f canç>aign" 
—ju s t  a s  Sargon o f  Akkad o r  A t t i l a  th e  Hun, who were no t versed  in  
th e  use  o f  th e  word e i t h e r .  The n e c e s s i ty  o f  making c e r ta in  m il i t a ry  
command d e c is io n s , vdiich a re  today  subsumed under th e  terra s tr a te g y ,  
has been co n stan t throughout h i s to r y .  S tra te g y , to  borrow Richard 
M. L eigh ton’s comment on l o g is t i c s ,  " is  an a n c ie n t word and a s t i l l  
more a n c ie n t th in g ,
O r ig in a lly  s tr a te g y  ineant o n ly  th e  " a r t  o f th e  g eneral" o r  
"g en e ra lsh ip ."  Jom ini succeeded in  d i f f e r e n t ia t in g  between i t  and 
t a c t i c s .  But on th e  o th e r  hand, w ith  th e  emergence o f  m il i ta ry  
s t a f f  schools in  th e  n in e te e n th  c e n tu ry  and th e  experience o f two 
world wars in  th e  tw e n tie th , s t r a te g y 's  meaning has been broadened
Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, G lobal L o g is tic s  and S tra te g y . 
1940-1943. S er. I ,  Vol. IV o f  The United S ta te s  Army i n  World War I I . 
ed. Kent Roberts G reen fie ld  (Washington, 1955), 3»
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
to  in c lu d e  a vdde range o f  command d ec is io n s  made by g e n e ra ls , admi­
r a l s ,  a i r  commanders, p re s id e n ts ,  and prime m in is te rs .  These p e r ta in  to  
p lanning  and p rep a ra tio n  f o r  war and b a t t l e ,  th e  o rg an iza tio n  o f th e  
n a tio n 's -  re so u rc e s , and th e  d i re c tio n  o f  the  armed fo rces  in  war. Some 
th e o re t ic ia n s ,  in  an a ttem pt to  d e sc r ib e  th e  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  a t  which 
s t r a te g ic  d e c is io n s  a re  made, have d is t in g u ish e d  "grand s tra te g y "  from 
"pure, o r  m il i t a ry  s tr a te g y ."  The a ttem p t has no t been e n t i r e ly  suc­
c e s s fu l ,  ye t i t  i s  sometimes u se fu l t o  employ th e  concept o f  grand 
s tr a te g y  to  " r e f e r  to  th e  v e ry  h ig h es t le v e ls  o f  d ec is io n  making a f f e c ­
t in g  th e  most b a s ic  and e s s e n t ia l  d isp o s i tio n s  fo r  th e  conduct o f  a  
war."^ The German d ec is io n  in  World War I  to  d e fe a t F rance f i r s t  
and R ussia  second and th e  A llie d  d e c is io n  in  World War I I  to  d e fe a t 
Germany f i r s t  and Japan second were examples o f  grand s t r a t e g y .^
Such vas th e  n a tu re  a lso  o f  th e  American d ec is io n  to  invade 
the  Canadas in  1812, vrtiile th e  plan o f  how th e  Canadas were to  be 
conquered with American armed fo rces  was th e  m il i ta ry  s tr a te g y .
What fo llo w s i s  an  exam ination o f th e  command and ad m in is tra tiv e  
system w ith in  which m il i t a ry  s tra te g y  was form ulated and implemented. 
Grand s tr a te g y  w i l l  be considered  in  a  l a t e r  ch a p te r .
B e rn a rd  B rodie, "S tra te g y ,"  I n te rn a t io n a l  Encyclopedia o f  
the  S o c ia l  Sciences ( 1968) ,  X7, 281. The au th o r  i s  a c cep tin g  only 
one d e f in i t io n  o f  grand s tr a te g y .  There a re  o th e rs ;  e .g . ,  B. H. 
L id d e ll  H a r t 's :  "The ro le  o f  grand s tr a te g y  . . , i s  to  co -o rd in a te
and d i r e c t  a l l  th e  resources o f  a n a tio n , o r  a  band o f n a tio n s , 
towards th e  a tta in m en t o f  th e  p o l i t i c a l  o b jec t o f  the  w ar."
S tra te g y . P raeger Paperbacks (New York, 1967), 335-37. The author 
fe e ls  t h a t  H a r t 's  d e f in i t io n  more a p t ly  d e sc r ib es  a d m in is tra tio n  
and l o g is t i c s .
^ In  th e  form er case  th e  S c h lie f fe n  P lan  was th e  m il i ta ry  
s tr a te g y .
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The War o f 1812 was the  f i r s t  war waged under th e  C o n stitu ­
t io n ,  and no form al s tra tegy-m aking  in s t i t u t io n s  e x is te d  beyond 
th e  o f f ic e  o f  th e  P re sid e n t as Commander-in C h ief. H is execu tive  
heads, th e  S e c re ta r ie s  o f  War and Navy, were t e c h n ic a l ly  ad m in istra ­
t iv e  fu n c t io n a r ie s .  The ta s k  o f th e  g en e ra l s ta f f ,  id iich Congress 
c re a te d  in  1813, was not to  plan s tr a te g y  and co o rd in a te  o p e ra tio n s , 
but to  perform th e  "housekeeping fu n c tio n s  o f  th e  arm y."^  Congress 
d id n o t rev ive th e  o f f ic e  o f  g e n e ra l - in -c h ie f ,  vdiich George Vfeshing- 
to n  f i l l e d  du rin g  th e  R evolu tion , u n t i l  a f t e r  th e  war. No o th e r  
se c tio n  o f th e  army o r , indeed , no one in  th e  army, was fo rm ally  
charged w ith th e  ta s k  o f  studying s tra te g y  o r  making p lan s .
The p a tte rn  o f (m ili ta ry )  s tra tegy-m aking  th a t  emerged was 
an ad hoc arrangement in v o lv in g  th e  P re s id e n t,  h is  S e c re ta r ie s ,  and 
th e  se n io r  f i e l d  g en e ra ls  and n aval commanders. T heir ro le s  were 
never p ro p erly  defined  o r  understood, and th e  p a tte rn  was alm ost 
t o t a l l y  lack in g  in  co o rd in a tio n  and system. The p rocess o f  s tr a te g y -  
making was d i f f e r e n t  each y ea r, and th e  s a fe s t  g e n e ra l iz a tio n  th a t  
can be made i s  t h a t  each o f  th ese  lea d e rs  p a r t ic ip a te d  in  one way o r 
a n o th er in  every  major s t r a te g ic  d e c is io n .
I t  was u su a lly  M adison's p ra c t ic e  to  e s ta b l is h  p r io r i t y  
o b je c t iv e s ,  bu t to  s o l i c i t  p lans o f  campaign from th e  S e c re ta ry  o f 
War, o r  from th e  f ie ld  g e n e ra ls  th rough  the  S e c re ta ry  o f  War.
Madison determ ined the  p la n  o f campaign fo r  1812 a f t e r  co n su ltin g
^Leonard D. W hite, The J e ffe rs o n ia n s :  A Study in  A dnm iistra-
t iv e  H is to ry . 1801-1829. Free P ress Paperback (New York, 1965),
237.
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w ith S e c re ta ry  o f  War W illiam  E u s tis ,  S e c re ta ry  o f th e  Navy Paul 
Ham ilton, and th e  two g e n e ra ls  who commanded th e  f i r s t  o ffe n s iv e ,
Henry Dearborn and W illian  H ull. The fo rm ulation  o f s tr a te g y  in  1813 
was a more complex procedure , but a f t e r  Madison se t th e  prime o b je c t iv e s  
—rec a p tu re  o f  D e tro i t  and cap tu re  o f  Kingston o r M ontreal—p lan s o f  
campaign emerged from th e  correspondence and c o n v ersa tio n s  between 
S e c re ta ry  o f War John Armstrong and Major G enerals W illia n  Henry 
H arrison , Henry Dearborn, James W ilkinson, and Wade Hampton. Madison 
then  gave approval to  th e  p lan s  and withdrew from th e  nex t and most 
d i f f i c u l t  phase o f  s tr a te g y  development: im plem entation .
The command and a d m in is tra t iv e  system , as a th in g ,  p laced 
severe  l im ita t io n s  on th e  su c ce ss fu l im plem entation o f  s tra te g y . The 
perso n a l f a i l in g s  o f  th e  in d iv id u a ls  who o pera ted  w ith in  i t  were more 
s ig n i f ic a n t  in  th e  end, bu t th e  system  re ta rd e d  th e i r  a b i l i t y  to  
b rin g  th e  su p e rio r  power o f  th e  U nited S ta te s  to  bear f u l l y  a g a in s t  
B r i t i s h  North America. R e sp o n s ib i li ty  and a u th o r i ty  were d iv ided  
among to o  many p e rso n s. Every o ffe n s iv e  involved  jo in t  fo rces , b u t 
no o f f ic e  o r agency ex is te d  to  co o rd in a te  them a t  the  h ig h es t o r  
lowest l e v e l .  A s tr a te g y  adopted in  Washington u su a lly  proved in a p p l i ­
cab le  in  th e  f i e l d :  o r ig in a l  e s tim a tes  o f enemy s tre n g th  turned  o u t 
to  be in a c c u ra te ;  th e  fo rc e s  a llo c a te d  to  implement th e  p lan  were 
u su a lly  inadequate  and lac k in g  in  s u f f ic ie n t  t ra n s p o r ta t io n  v e h ic le s ;  
th e  f i e l d  gen e ra l might a l t e r  th e  p lan  a t  th e  l a s t  m inute; and th e  
naval commander might re fu se  to  co o p e ra te . E lih u  Root was only one of 
many s tu d e n ts  o f  American m il i t a ry  h is to ry  who observed: "We a re
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w arlike  enough, b u t not m i l i t a r y .”^ The command and a d m in is tra tiv e  
system in  th e  War o f  1812 r e f le c te d  American h i s to r y  and c u ltu re :  i t
was cumbersome and in e f f ic i e n t  and, th e re fo re ,  in  R oot's se n se , un m ili­
ta ry .
Since 1789 i t  had been th e  ta s k  o f th e  S e c re ta ry  o f  War to  
implement p lans o f  campaign i n  co o p era tio n  w ith th e  g en e ra l in  the  
f i e ld .  The ro le  o f  th e  S e c re ta ry  o f War was in d isp e n sab le , b u t i t  
was la r g e ly  th a t  o f  a  c h ie f  Q uarterm aster and Commissary G eneral, As 
such, he co o rd in a ted  supply a sp ec ts  o f  s tr a te g y  between th e  l i t t o r a l  
and th e  f r o n t ie r .  In  th e  In d ia n  campaigns, s tr a te g y  c o n s is ted  in  
sending g en era ls  l i k e  Mad Anthony Wayne in to  th e  w ilderness w ith a 
s p e c if ic  m ission to  perform: d estro y  th e  power o f  uncooperative
In d ia n s , 'Wayne's c o n tr ib u tio n  to  s tr a te g y  was i n  determ ining  the  
b e s t ro u te  o f march in  o rder to  be a b le  to  supply h is  l i t t l e  army, 
f in d  In d ian  v i l l a g e s ,  and make co n tac t w ith Ind ian  w a rr io rs . I t  
was a l l  v e ry  sim ple and a l l  v e ry  vague, and the  most im portan t m atte rs  
to  a tte n d  to  were t a c t i c s  and supply, which, o f co u rse , p resen ted  
enough problem s.^  But th e  demands on s tr a te g y  im plem enters were 
much g r e a te r  in  th e  War o f 1812: th ey  had to  put la rg e r  a rm ies in to
th e  f i e l d ;  make ex ten s iv e  l o g i s t i c a l  p re p a ra tio n s ;  decide whether 
p laces  o r  arm ies were th e  b e s t  o b je c t iv e s ;  and co o rd in a te  o ffe n s iv e  
o p e ra tio n s  on a thousand-m ile  f r o n t ie r .
^Quoted in  Marcus C u n lif fe ,  S o ld ie rs  and C iv il ia n s :  The M a rtia l
S p i r i t  i n  America, 1775-1865 (Boston, 1968), 29.
^See Ema R isch , Q uarterm aster Support o f  th e  Army: A H isto ry
o f  the  Corps, 1775-1939 (iVashington, 1962), 84-110,
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There was no q u es tio n  th a t  th e  S e c re ta ry  o f  War should con­
tin u e  to  serve a s  th e  a d m in is tra t iv e  head o f  th e  housekeeping branches 
o f  th e  anry . But in  th e  absence o f  a  c e n tr a l ,  c o o rd in a tin g  m il i t a ry  
command, i t  was found n ecessary  t h a t  he a lso  had to  se rv e  as c h ie f  o f 
s t a f f  and g e n e ra l - in -c h ie f ,  E u s tis  f a i l e d  to  perform th e se  q u a s i-  
C o n s titu tio n a l  ta s k s  and was fo rced  to  re s ig n . " I t  was ty p ic a l  o f  
h is  perform ance," one h i s to r ia n  n o ted , " th a t  on th e  day war was 
d e c la re d , he o rd ered  H ull to  hurry  from Dayton to  take  command a t  
D e tro i t  but n eg lec ted  to  inform  him t h a t  war had b e g u n .A r m s t r o n g ,  
who came to  th e  o f f ic e  i n  February 1813, was a man o f s tro n g  c h a ra c te r  
w ith m il i ta ry  p re te n tio n s ,  and he w i l lin g ly  assumed a l l  th e  powers 
i t  o f fe re d , Armstrong o f te n  issu ed  o rders which Madison had not 
d i r e c t l y  sa n ctio n ed , but i t  was u n tru e  th a t  he was in o rd in a te ly  
am bitious and consp ired  to  become a  "generalissim o,"®  His most se rio u s  
t ra n s g re s s io n  was in  fo rc in g  General H arrison  to  re s ig n  and cla im ing  
th e  c r e d i t  fo r  a p p o in tin g  Andrew Jackson to  f i l l  th e  vacancy. He 
follow ed the  s t r a te g i c  g u id e lin es  vdiich Madison s e t  down, and i f  he 
seemed to  exceed h is  a u th o r i ty ,  i t  was only because th e  boundaries o f 
th a t  a u th o r i ty  had not been p re c is e ly  d e fin ed , o r  because Madison was 
such a  weak Commander-in-Chief, S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  James Monroe was 
A rm strong 's c h ie f  c r i t i c ,  b u t Wien he tem p o rarily  occupied the  o f f ic e  
o f  S e c re ta ry  o f  War in  th e  w in ter o f  1812 to  1813 and th e  f a l l  and
"^Russell F, W eigley, H is to ry  o f  th e  United S ta te s  Army 
(New York, 1967), 119.
^ Irv in g  B ran t, James I&dison: Commander in  C h ief. 1812-1836
(New York, 1961), VI, 257,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
w in te r  o f  1814 to  1815, h is  performance was s im ila r  to  A rm strong's 
—he in i t i a t e d  p lans o f  campaign and a c te d  as a  g e n e ra l - in -c h ie f ,  
A rm strong 's m istakes sprang from human, i n t e l l e c tu a l  e rro r s  r a th e r  
th an  from c o n s p ir a to r ia l  i n te n t ,^
One g re a t  d i f f i c u l ty  w ith  th e  command arrangement was th a t  
th e  S e c re ta ry  o f  Vfer was in  Washington and th e  campaigns were fought 
hundreds o f  m iles  away. The most se rio u s  problem was th e  la g  in  com^ 
m unications between V/ashington and th e  f r o n t ie r ;  a  l e t t e r  could tak e  
as  long  as two weeks to  c ross th e  d is ta n c e . The S e c re ta ry  o f  War was 
unable  to  keep a b re a s t o f  ra p id ly  changing events on th e  f r o n t ie r ,  
and h is  p lan s  and suggestions might be o u t o f  d a te  before  th e y  could 
be pu t in to  e f f e c t .  I t  was d i f f i c u l t  enough t ry in g  to  in te r p r e t  th e  
s tre n g th  and in te n t io n s  o f  th e  enemy, b u t ano ther dim ension o f th e  
fog o f  war a f f l i c t e d  th e  Am ericans: th e  whereabouts and in te n t io n s
o f a  commander o r  th e  S e c re ta ry  might be unknown to  th e  o th e r .  The 
fog could r e s u l t  from th e  lag  i n  communications o r  from th e  commander's 
m is in te rp re ta t io n  o f  a  w r i tte n  o rd e r , which could n o t be sp e ed ily  
c l a r i f i e d .  Few Americans a t  th e  tim e , c iv i l i a n  o r  m il i t a ry ,  knew 
how to  w rite  a  c le a r  and concise  d i r e c t iv e ,
The c e n tr a l  a u th o r i ty  o f  th e  faraway S e c re ta ry  had o th e r  
ban e fu l e f f e c t s .  Each o f  th e  n in e  m il i t a ry  d i s t r i c t s  had i t s  own
% ee T, Harry W illiam s, Americans a t  War; The Development o f  
th e  American M ilita ry  System. C o l l ie r  Books (New York, 1962), 36-37.
^^Moreover, few i f  any good maps o f  th e  n o rth e rn  f r o n t ie r  
e x is te d , vrtiich a d v e rse ly  a ffe c te d  p lans made in  W ashington. The Corps 
o f  E ng ineers, which might have drawn ac cu ra te  maps, was preoccupied 
c o n s tru c tin g  f o r t i f i c a t i o n s .  For an amusing anecdote, see Benson J ,  
Lossing , The P i c to r ia l  Field-Book o f  th e  War o f 1812 (New York, 1869), 
f n . 3 , 793.
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commanding g en era l viio rep o rted  d i r e c t ly  to  the  S e c re ta ry . D i s t r i c t  
commanders found i t  extrem ely d i f f i c u l t  t o  respond to  changing 
ev en ts , because t h e i r  ac tio n s  must be approved by th e  S e c re ta ry , 
o r  the  P re s id e n t,  and were v e ry  o ften  dependent on th e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  
. o f  tro o p s o r  t ra n s p o r ta tio n  beyond t h e i r  immediate j u r i s d ic t io n .
P lans developed in  W ashington, which proved in ap p lica b le  in  th e  f i e l d ,  
cou ld  not be a d ju s te d  in  tim e in  order t o  accom plish the  p redeterm ined 
aim s. The system was not e n t i r e ly  r ig i d ,  but i t  tended to  dismay 
f i e l d  commanders, s t i f l e  coopera tion  between d i s t r i c t s ,  and r e ta rd  
speedy a c t io n .  But i t  could work the o th e r  way to o :  th e  d i s t r i c t
commander might f e e l  th a t  circum stances w arranted a  change i n  p lan s , 
and he co u ld  claim  t h i s  r ig h t  on the b a s is  o f  immediate knowledge. 
However necessa ry  a  change in  p lan s , vdiether s l ig h t  o r  s ig n i f ic a n t ,  
t h e  d e c is io n  was i r r e v e r s ib le  and re s u l te d  in  a l t e r in g  p rev io u s ly  
determ ined s tr a te g y .  Dearborn’s d ec is io n  in  A p ril  1613 to  a tta c k  
York in s te a d  o f K ingston, was one of th e  more momentous o f such 
changes in  s tr a te g y ,  and i t  was based on a  gross ov erestim ate  o f  the  
Kingston g a rr iso n . I f  the  te le g ra p h  had been inven ted  f i f t y  y ea rs  
e a r l i e r ,  th e  s i tu a t io n  would n o t have been so bad. ̂  ^
The problems a r is in g  o u t o f the  c e n tr a l  a u th o r i ty  o f  th e  
S e c re ta ry  o f  War were p a r t i c u l a r ly  acute  i n  M ilita ry  D is t r i c t  No. 9, 
com prising New York n o r th  o f th e  Appalachians and a l l  o f  Vermont.
I t  was one o f  th e  l a r g e s t  d i s t r i c t s ,  and i t s  n o rth e rn  border extended 
from  th e  Connecticu t R iver to  th e  w estern t i p  o f New York—th e
11 The d i s t r i c t s  were c re a te d  in  May 1813. American S ta te  
P apers; M il ita ry  A f f a i r s . (W ashington, 1832), I ,  385-88,
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lo n g es t and most im portan t se c tio n  o f  the  m il i t a ry  f r o n t ie r .  Because 
o f  i t s  s iz e  and im portance th e re  were two se p a ra te  and independent 
f i e ld  d iv is io n s  w ith in  i t —th e  L eft w ith headquarters a t  Sackets 
Harbor, and th e  ALght w ith  head q u arters  a t  P la ttsb u rg , For any m il i ­
t a r y  o p e ra tio n  undertaken  by one d iv is io n ,  i t  was necessary  th a t  th e  
o th e r  cooperate  in  o rder t o  p revent th e  B r i t i s h  from redeploying  
t h e i r  tro o p s  a lo n g  th e  f r o n t ie r .  The co o p era tio n  could range from 
coord ina ted  o ffe n s iv e s  t o  a  mere awareness on th e  p a rt o f  one g e n e ra l 
o f th e  o th e r 's  a c t i v i t i e s .  But each o f  th e  d iv is io n a l  commanders 
was a  m ajor g e n e ra l ,  w ith th e  se n io r  having q u es tio n ab le  a u th o r i ty  
over th e  o th e r , and thus th e  job o f  c o o rd in a tio n  f e l l  t o  the  S e c re ta ry  
o f  War, L e tte rs  between d iv is io n a l  commanders had to  be channeled 
through W ashington, and by th e  tim e some s o r t  o f  coopera tion  was 
agreed upon th e  a c tu a l  m i l i t a ry  s i tu a t io n  which o r ig in a lly  in sp ire d  
the need fo r  coopera tion  had changed. I t  was more o f te n  th e  case 
th a t  no co o p era tio n  was a ttem pted , and th e  S e c re ta ry  o f  V/ar would 
combine w ith one major g e n e ra l to  th e  ex c lusion  and ignorance o f th e  
o th e r .  Thus th e  Aight D iv isio n  might not know i/Aat th e  L eft D iv isio n  
was d o i n g . W i l k i n s o n 's  and Hampton's a b o rtiv e  combined o ffe n s iv e  
a g a in s t M ontreal in  1813 was a n o to rio u s  case o f  command confusion . 
Problems o f co o rd in a tio n  were n o t, o f  course, confined t o  D is t r i c t  
No, 9 , f o r  the  w estern  h a lf  o f  the  no rth e rn  f r o n t ie r  was in  D i s t r i c t  
No, 8 (Kentucky, Ohio, In d ian a , M ichigan, I l l i n o i s ,  and M isso u ri) .
W ritings o f  James Madison. U,S, Congress ed, (New York, 1884), I I I ,  
417-19.
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Isaac  Brock, th e  B r i t i s h  hero o f  1812, found h is  ta s k  o f  d e fe a tin g  
H u ll 's  o ffen s iv e  ag a in s t F o rt Malden much e a s ie r ,  because th e  Americans 
had not co o rd in a ted  o p e ra tio n s  in  bo th  d i s t r i c t s .
14any o f th e  problems r e s u l t in g  from geograph ical d i s t r ib u t io n  
o f  command might have been a l le v ia te d  through th e  c re a t io n  o f th e  
o f f ic e  o f  g e n e ra l- in -c h ie f  fo r  n o rth e rn  a rm ies . For unexplained 
reaso n s, Madison never gave th e  m atte r  s e rio u s  c o n s id e ra tio n . Perhaps 
Republicans opposed th e  c re a t io n  o f  th e  grade o f  l ie u te n a n t  g en e ra l 
and th e  o f f ic e  o f  commanding g en e ra l on the  grounds o f  p r in c ip le d  
f e a r  o f  m il i ta ry  d ic ta to r s h ip .  Perhaps Madison was re lu c ta n t  to  
tak e  th e  s te p , because such an appointm ent would exacerbate  the  
p e rso n a l r iv a l r i e s  between am y  o f f ic e r s  and th e  r iv a l ry  between Mon­
roe and Armstrong. One reason  Monroe informed Madison in  1813 th a t  
he would re fu se  t o  accept a  m il i ta ry  command was because he dreaded 
th e  thought o f  se rv in g  under Armstrong, When Armstrong recommended 
th e  appointm ent o f  a  commanding g en e ra l in  December 1813* Monroe c r i t i ­
c ized  th e  p roposa l on th e  grounds t h a t  Armstrong was g rasp in g , ambi­
t io u s ,  and bent on securing  th e  appointm ent fo r  h i m s e l f , B u t  even 
had a l ie u te n a n t  g en e ra l commanded a l l  n o rth ern  arm ies, th e  problem o f 
communication between th e  f r o n t ie r  and Washington would have rem ained. 
The issu e  which S e c re ta ry  o f  War John C, Calhoun faced a f t e r  th e  war 
might have c re a ted  a d d it io n a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s ;  vdio commanded th e  army.
^^B rant, James Madison, VI, 166, 226,
14W eigley, H is to ry  o f  th e  U.S. Army. 138,
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e x aspera ted  by slow communications, suggested in  1814 th a t  i t  would 
be a  good id ea  i f  Armstrong would d i re c t  o p e ra tio n s  from Albany.  ̂^ But 
i t  would o n ly  have r e s u l te d  in  communication problems between th e  Secre­
t a r y  a t  Albany and th e  P resid en t i n  W ashington. B esides, th e  S e c re ta ry  
o f  War was re sp o n s ib le  f o r  a l l  o f  th e  o th e r d i s t r i c t s  i n  the  co u n try , 
and he could o n ly  perform  h is  n a tio n a l  d u tie s  from Washington,
D istance  from th e  f ro n t ie r  th u s  l im ite d  th e  S e c re ta ry  o f  War 
in  h is  command ca p ac ity  o f  co o rd in a to r  o f o p e ra tio n s . But th e  most 
s e r io u s  l im ita t io n  on h i s  powers was lack  o f  co n tro l o ver the  n a v a l 
fo rc e s  o f th e  n a tio n , which was, o f  course , th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  o f  th e  
S e c re ta ry  o f  th e  Navy. Cooperation between naval and m il i t a ry  commanders 
involved  a com plicated four-way correspondence which u s u a lly  proved 
u n s a tis fa c to ry ,  and which in  1814 would be c a ta s tro p h ic .
One s tre n g th  o f  th e  command system w ith  resp ec t to  th e  im ple­
m entation  o f  s tr a te g y  was th a t  th e  S e c re ta ry  o f  War was a lso  in  e f f e c t  
th e  Q uarterm aster G eneral and th e  Commissary G eneral. He combined in  
th e  o f f ic e ,  i f  he so chose (and Armstrong d id ) ,  the  job  o f  c h ie f  s t r a ­
t e g i s t  under th e  P re sid e n t and c h ie f  supply o f f ic e r .  But the S ecre­
t a r y  o f  War was overburdened w ith a d m in is tra t iv e  d u t ie s ,  which 
p robab ly  a ff e c te d  h is  performance a s  s t r a t e g i s t .  In  1812 Congress 
re fu se d  to  c re a te  two a s s i s ta n t  s e c re ta ry s h ip s  o f war, and the 
S e c re ta ry  and h i s  tw enty o r  so copying c le rk s  ha.d to  oversee th e
In v asio n  o f th e  Niagara Peninsula  . . . by G eneral Jacob Brown, in  
J u ly  and August. 1814. ed . Ernest A. Gruikshank, N iagara H is to r ic a l  
S o c ie ty  P u b lic a t io n s . No. 33 (1920), 21. H ere a fte r  c i t e d  as Brown's 
Documents. T h is  work i s  th e  p u b lished  e d it io n  o f p a rt o f  Brown's 
O f f ic ia l  L e t te r  Book No. 1 , 12 Apr 1814 to  23 Dec 1815 (M anuscript 
D iv is io n , L ib ra ry  o f Congress),
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claim s o f  p e n sio n e rs, th e  g ran tin g  o f  m il i ta ry  land w arran ts , th e  
a c t i v i t i e s  o f  In d ian  a g e n ts , th e  d e c is io n s  o f  co u rts  m a r t ia l ,  and the  
a f f a i r s  o f th e  A djutant and In sp ec to r G eneral, the  Q u arterm aster 
G eneral, th e  Commissary G eneral, and th e  Paym aster,
In  a d d it io n  to  onerous and time-consuming r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s ,  
he had to  cope w ith  the  m anifold in te r n a l  in c o n s is te n c ie s  o f th e  
system . Before March 1813, fo r  example, th e  Q uarterm aster G eneral and 
th e  Commissary G eneral d u p lic a te d  one a n o th e r 's  fu n c tio n s . I t  was th e  
duty o f  th e  Q u a rte rm a s te r 's  Department "to  purchase m il i t a ry  s to r e s ,  
camp equipage and o th er a r t i c l e s  r e q u is i t e  f o r  th e  tro o p s ."  But i t  
was th e  duty o f th e  Commissary G eneral o f Purchases " to  conduct th e  
procuring  and p ro v id in g  o f  a l l  arm s, m il i ta ry  s to re s ,  c lo th in g , and 
g e n e ra lly  a l l  a r t i c l e s  o f  supply r e q u is i te  f o r  th e  m il i t a ry  s e rv ic e ."  
To f u r th e r  com plicate th e  m atter o f  supply. S e c re ta ry  o f  War E u s tis  
in  May 1812 a u th o rized  th e  Q uarterm aster G eneral to  provide th e  tro o p s 
with s u b s is te n c e . By law t h i s  was th e  fu n c tio n  o f p r iv a te  c o n tra c to rs  
and o u t o f  th e  hands o f th e  Q uarterm aster G eneral. The S ec re ta ry  o f 
War had th e  d i f f i c u l t  job o f  sp e c ify in g  th e  k inds o f  su p p lie s  p u r­
chased by each departm ent i n  v a rio u s  c ircum stances and areas o f  th e  
f r o n t ie r .
In  March 1813 Congress c re a te d  a g e n e ra l s t a f f  o f  the  a rn y , 
vdiose fu n c tio n  was "housekeeping" under th e  o v e ra l l  a u th o r i ty  o f  th e  
S e c re ta ry  o f War, The l e g i s la t io n  provided th e  War Department w ith  
an A dju tan t and In sp e c to r G eneral, a  Q uarterm aster G eneral, a Com­
m issary General o f  Ordnance, a Commissary G eneral o f P urchases, a
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Paym aster, and a  Topographical E ngineer, w ith  t h e i r  a s s i s ta n t s ,^ ^ The 
new arrangem ent p re c is e ly  d efin ed  th e  d u tie s  o f  each departm ent and 
c le a red  up th e  confusion  surrounding  th e  d u p lic a tio n  o f th e  fu n c tio n s  
o f th e  Q u artennaste r and Commissary Departm ents, The l a t t e r  purchased 
a l l  m il i t a ry  s to r e s  and th e  form er tra n sp o rte d  and issu ed  them . Sub­
s is te n c e  was l e f t  in  th e  hands o f  p r iv a te  contractors,^*^
The immediate im pact, however, was n i l .  Although th e  c re a t io n  
o f  a g e n e ra l s t a f f  was an im portan t event fo r  th e  fu tu re  development 
o f  army command, th e  reform  f a i le d  to  in tro d u ce  a d d it io n a l  c e n t r a l i ty  
in to  th e  a d m in is tra tiv e  system  o r  r e l ie v e  th e  S e c re ta ry  o f  h i s  admin­
i s t r a t i v e  burdens. The g en e ra l s t a f f  d id  n o t c o o rd in a te  th e  a c t i v i ­
t i e s  o f  th e  many a s s i s ta n t  q u a rte rm aste rs  and com m issaries in  each 
o f  th e  m il i t a ry  d i s t r i c t s ,  and t h a t  job f e l l  to  th e  S e c re ta ry  o f War, 
The concep tion  o f  g en e ra l s t a f f  o p e ra tin g  a s  a u n if ie d ,  co o rd in a tin g  
body was lac k in g ,^ ^  Indeed , the  heads o f  th e  v a rio u s  housekeeping 
departm ents were not a l l  in  Washington—th e  Commissary G e n era l's  
h ead q u arters  was in  P h ila d e lp h ia , and th e  Q u arterm aster G e n era l's  in  
A lbany, In  e f f e c t  th e  l a t t e r  was an a s s i s ta n t  q u a rte rm aste r  to  th e  
S e c re ta ry  o f  War in  l iL l ita ry  D i s t r i c t  No, 9 ,
One h i s to r ia n  o f  supply i n  th e  War o f  1812 has concluded th a t  
d e s p ite  th e  i n e f f ic ie n c ie s  o f  th e  a d m in is tra tiv e  system , no campaign
S upport. 141-42, 152-53.
^^American S ta te  Papers: M ilita ry  A f fa ir s .  I ,  428, 431,
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f a i l e d  fo r  want o f  s u p p l i e s . I n  one sense th e  g e n e ra l iz a tio n  i s  
c o r r e c t ,  f o r  no g e n e ra l launched h is  campaign u n le s s  a modicum of 
su p p lie s  was on hand. But th e  g e n e ra l iz a tio n  does not ta k e  se v era l 
obvious in te r r e l a t e d  e f f e c ts  o f  th e  system  in to  account: th e  burdens
i t  placed on th e  S e c re ta ry  o f  War and th e  f ie ld  g en era l; i t s  e f fe c t  
on th e  h e a lth  and m orale o f  th e  tro o p s ; i t s  c o s t;  th e  d e la y  e n ta i le d  
i n  launching  campaigns; and th e  i n a b i l i t y  o f th e  a d m in is tra tiv e  and 
t r a n s p o r ta t io n  system  to  sup p o rt la rg e  a rm ies.
I d e a l ly ,  once th e  government adopted  a s tr a te g y , th e  Secre­
t a r y  o f  War could is s u e  o rd ers  to  th e  Commissary G eneral i n  P h ila ­
d e lp h ia  to  prepare  s u f f ic ie n t  amounts o f  c lo th in g , guns, and ammuni­
t i o n .  He cou ld  in s t r u c t  th e  c o n tra c to r  to  make d e p o s its  o f  food a t  
convenient depots in  th e  d i s t r i c t .  O rders could be sent to  th e  
r e sp e c tiv e  a s s i s ta n t  q u a rte rm aste rs  to  tra n s p o r t  th e  m a te r ie l  to  th e  
ap p ro p r ia te  p o in t o r  p o in ts  on th e  f r o n t ie r ,  to  c o n s tru c t barracks 
f o r  th e  tro o p s ,  and t o  p repare  means o f  t ra n s p o r ta tio n  fo r  th e  o f fe n -
But th e  system  never worked id e a l ly .  F r ic t io n s  would develop . 
C lo th ing  m ight not be ready on tim e; su p p lie s  cou ld  get l o s t  along 
th e  way th rough  t h e f t ,  damage, o r  sloppy bookkeeping; th e  wagons
 ̂̂ M arguerite M. McKee, "Serv ice o f  Supply in  th e  War of 
1812" (4 th  P aper), Q uarte rm aster Review. VII (Sept-O ct 1927), 32.
20Joseph Wheaton to  Monroe, 14, 22, 31 Dec 1812, R eg is te red  
L e t te r s  Received, Records o f th e  O ffice  o f  the  S e c re ta ry  o f  War, 
Record Group 107 (N a tio n a l A rch iv es) , H ere a fte r  c i te d  as  Reg.
L t r s .  Reed., RG 107 (NA).
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and the  m a te ria ls  fo r  co n s tru c tin g  b a rrack s  might not be re a d i ly  a v a il ­
a b le .  The c o n tra c to r  o r an a s s i s ta n t  qu a rte rm aste r  might req u ire  
a d d it io n a l  funds, because th e  cost o f  su p p lie s  and food had been under­
e s tim a ted , p ric e s  had r is e n ,  o r  banks would n o t accept Treasury n o te s .  
U n til th e  funds were p rovided , de lay  in  supply ing  th e  army could fo rce  
a  change in  p lan s , and a change in  p lan s  would cause fu r th e r  d e la y .
Only th e  gen era l could  know how many vreigons o r  boa ts would be req u ired  
fo r  th e  campaign, b u t th ey  might not be a v a ila b le  because th e  S ecre­
t a r y  o f  War had n o t a u th o rize d  th e i r  pu rchase. But th en  th e  g e n e ra l 
m ight n o t know how many b o a ts  were req u ired  because he d id  not know 
how many tro o p s  he would have.
Only a modicum o f su p p lie s , c lo th in g , and s h e l te r  was n eces­
s a ry  to  launch a campaign, b u t sho rtag es  a d v e rse ly  a ffe c te d  th e  h e a lth  
and m orale o f  t ro o p s ,  delayed m o b iliza tio n , and re ta rd e d  r e c r u i t in g .  
During th e  w in ter o f  1812 t o  1813, i+OO men d ied  o f pneumonia a t  G reen- 
bush a lo n e , because o f  inadequate  s h e l t e r ,  f u e l ,  c lo th in g , and m edical 
c a re .  Troops on th e  Niagara f ro n t  d u rin g  th e  same p e rio d  rece ived  
b read  r a t io n s  a d u lte ra te d  w ith  p la s te r  o f  P a r is ,
Every campaign was a d v e rse ly  a ffe c te d  by  th e  su pp ly  problem, 
H arrison  spent alm ost tw elve months t ry in g  to  b r in g  up su p p lie s  and 
secure  t ra n s p o r ta t io n .  F in a lly  Armstrong ordered  him to  abandon h i s  
planned overland  in v asio n  u n t i l  Gonanodore O liv er Perry won c o n tro l  
o f  Lake E r ie .  In  1812 supply  p rep a ra tio n s  delayed  D earborn 's con-
W illiam  Cheever t o  Armstrong, 6 Jy 1814, ib id .
^% earbom  t o  Morgan Lewis, [ ? ]  Dec 1812 ( i t r .  180), Dearborn 
Letterbook No. 2 (New York H is to r ic a l  S o c ie ty ) ; James Ifenn, M edical 
Sketches o f  th e  Campaigns o f  1812. 13. 14 . . , (Dedham, M ass., 1816), 
73 .
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tem plated  o ffen s iv e  a g a in s t M ontreal, and vdien th ey  were completed 
to  the  s a t i s f a c t io n  o f th e  g e n e ra l, th e  subsequent "campaign" bogged 
down fo r  want of adequate t r a n s p o r ta t io n ,^ ^
The a d m in is tra tiv e  system i t s e l f ,  th a t  i s ,  th e  c ra z y  q u i l t  
s tru c tu re  o f  a d m in is tra t io n , was not e n t i r e ly  to  blame. American 
m il i t a ry  ad m in is tra tio n  has contained  gross in e f f ic ie n c ie s  in  a l l  
o f  our "su ccess fu l"  wars. Aside from human f a i l in g s ,  th e  most impor­
t a n t  cause fo r  d e la y  was th e  d i f f ic u l ty  o f  t ra n s p o r ta t io n  through 
bad weather and o ver th e  poor roads o f  th e  f r o n t ie r .  I t  r e s t r i c te d  
th e  flow  o f su p p lie s  to  th e  f ro n t ie r  and dim inished th e  o ffe n s iv e  
punch o f  th e  o ffe n s iv e . T ra n sp o rta tio n  a lso  ra is e d  the  c o s t  o f 
supply t o  enormous f ig u re s , and due to  th e  shaky f in a n c ia l  s tru c tu re  
o f  th e  government, in creased  co s t meant fu r th e r  d e lay  o r th e  f a i lu re  
to  d e liv e r  th e  guns, ammunition, o r c lo th in g  needed. Some c o s ts  o f  
t ra n s p o r ta tio n  could  have been reduced had th e  army provided i t s  
own tea m ste rs , wagons, and h o r s e s , B u t  th e  p ra c t ic e  o f  h ir in g  
team sters  and re n tin g  means o f  t ra n s p o r ta tio n  was an o ld t r a d i t i o n  
rooted  in  Anglo-Saxon c u ltu re  and would remain in  e f f e c t ,  a lb e i t  in  
m odified form, throughout th e  n in e te e n th  c en tu ry .
Next to  supp ly , th e  most c r i t i c a l  "o b je c tiv e "  problem fac in g  
American s t r a te g i s t s  was t h a t  o f  m obiliz ing  enough manpower to  
conquer th e  Canadas, Although the  t o t a l  number o f  tro o p s employed 
during th e  war—527,654—was very  la rg e ,  only  63,179 ( in c lu d in g
^^Dearborn to  Lewis, 3 Sept 1812 ( I t r ,  6 5 ), to  E u s t is ,  
24 Nov 1812 ( I t r ,  107), Dearborn L etterbook No, 2 ,
^SlcKee, "S erv ice  o f  Supply" (4 th  P aper), 31.
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d u p lic a te s )  served fo r  tw elve o r more months. Most o f  th ese  were 
re g u la rs  who e n lis te d  f o r  perio d s  o f  one t o  f iv e  y e a rs ,  A few were 
F ed e ra l v o lu n te e rs—m ilitiam en  who v o lun teered  in  th e  se rv ice  o f  the 
United S ta te s  fo r  tw elve months. The common m i l i t i a ,  as co n tra s te d  
w ith  th e  v o lu n te e rs , comprised th e  bulk o f  th e  fo rce  employed and 
to ta le d  458,463. They served fo r  periods ranging  from one to  twelve 
m onths, but th e  m a jo rity  o f them from one to  s ix  m onths.
The a c tu a l  number o f tro o p s  a v a ila b le  fo r  o ffe n s iv e  o p e ra tio n s  
a g a in s t  the  Canadas d u ring  any one year was very sm a ll. In  1814 th e  
t o t a l  number o f  re g u la rs  in  th e  army fo r  th e  whole y e a r  came to  
38 ,186, But in  June, when th e  Cabinet dev ised  the  p lan  o f campaign, 
o n ly  20,000 re g u la rs  were organized in  t h e i r  reg im en ts, and o n ly  a 
l i t t l e  over h a l f  o f  th e s e  were deployed along  the  Canadian b o rd e r.
The r e s t  were s ta t io n e d  in  the  South , in  th e  West, and along th e  
A t la n tic  c o a s t .  During th e  same y ea r the  s ta t e s  c a l le d  up 197,653 
m i l i t i a ,  but except fo r  a few v o lu n te e rs , th e s e  were used d e fe n s iv e ly . 
Out o f  th e  t o t a l ,  46,469 were from New York and served  in te rm it te n tly  
fo r  sh o rt p e rio d s  on th e  f ro n t ie r  w ith in  American t e r r i t o r y ,  and
100,000 from P ennsylvania , Maryland, and V irg in ia  were employed to  
r e p e l  th e  B r i t i s h  in  th e  Chesapeake Bay a re a ,^ ^  The common m i l i t i a ,  
i t  seems safe  t o  say, never c ro ssed  th e  b o rd er during  th e  e n ti r e
Emory Upton, The M ilita ry  P o licy  o f  the  U nited S ta te s  
(W ashington, 1917), 122-37; I4arvin A. K reidberg and Merton G, 
Henry, H is to ry  o f  M ilita ry  M obilization  in  th e  United S ta te s  
Army, 1775-1945 (W ashington. 1955). 50; C. F . Hamilton. "The 
Canadian M il i t i a :  U n iversal S e rv ic e ,"  Canadian Defence Quar­
t e r l y ,  V (Apr 1928), 288-89, See John F, C a llan  ( e d , ) .  The 
M ilita ry  Laws o f  th e  U nited S ta te s  , . , (P h ila d e lp h ia , 18^3), 
fo r  manpower l e g i s la t io n .
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war, e i t h e r  because they  p e rso n a lly  re fu sed  o r because c o n s t i tu t io n a l  
q u es tio n s—vdiich were not s e t t l e d  u n t i l  182? (M artin  v s . M ott)— 
arose o v e r t h e i r  employment in  a fo re ig n  war. I t  m attered  l i t t l e  i n  
any c a se , s ince th e  common m i l i t i a 's  sh o rt term  o f  se rv ic e  and s ta t e  
o f  d i s c ip l in e  and t ra in in g  would have made them u se le ss  a s  components 
o f an invading  army. More s e r io u s ly , o f  the  10,110 v o lu n tee rs  em­
ployed during  th e  war, on]^y a  sm all percentage served fo r  t h e i r  f u l l  
twelve months, and a  sm alle r p ercen tage crossed  th e  border—fo r  th e  
same p e rso n a l and c o n s ti tu t io n a l  reaso n s as th e  common m i l i t i a .
The United S ta te s  Army has t r a d i t i o n a l l y  been composed o f 
r eg u la rs  and c i t i z e n - s o ld i e r s .  Manpower p o lic y  has ebbed and flowed 
in  an o ld  and co n tinu ing  deb a te  reg ard in g  which component to  s t r e s s ,  
how to  r a i s e  th e  tro o p s , and how to  t r a i n  and employ them. W riting 
in  th e  second h a l f  o f  the  n in e te e n th  cen tu ry , Emory Upton, th e  f i r s t  
major a n a ly s t  o f  American manpower p o lic y , c r i t i c i z e d  Madison fo r 
p lacing  in o rd in a te  re l ia n c e  upon c i t i z e n - s o ld i e r s .  Upton favored an 
army made up alm ost e n ti r e ly  o f  re g u la rs .  A c tu a lly , Madison and 
o th er war le a d e rs ,  recogn iz ing  the  o ffe n s iv e  i n u t i l i t y  o f  th e  common 
m i l i t i a ,  co n cen tra ted  t h e i r  e f f o r ts  on ra is in g  a  reg u la r  army of 
competent p ro p o rtio n s  augmented by F ed e ra l v o lu n te e rs . H is to r ian  
R u sse ll F. W eigley, a modem c r i t i c  o f  Uptonian a n a ly s is ,  has taken  
Madison t o  ta sk  f o r  p lac ing  to o  much s t r e s s  on reg u la rs  and not 
enough on v o lu n te e rs .  Weigley*s model o f  su c ce ss fu l manpower p o lic y  
in  th e  n in e te e n th  cen tu ry  i s  th e  C iv il  War, in  which th e  mass arm ies
^ ^ e ig le y .  H is to ry  o f  th e  U.S. Army. 118.
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But Madison faced  d i f f i c u l t i e s  t h a t  were v i r t u a l l y  insurm ount­
a b le ; an in h e r i te d  and in e f f ic ie n t  manpower system ; o p p o s itio n  in  
Congress; th e  weakness o f  th e  F ed era l government; and th e  s p i r i t  o f 
th e  tim e s. In  th e  absence o f n a t io n a l  d r a f t  law s, most m ilitiam en  
chose to  serv e  in  th e  common m i l i t i a  r a th e r  than  v o lu n te e r f o r  Fed­
e r a l  s e rv ic e . Even had th is  n o t been th e  c ase , c o n s t i tu t io n a l ,  
f in a n c ia l ,  l o g i s t i c a l ,  and t a c t i c a l  co n s id e ra tio n s  ru le d  out th e  
c re a t io n  o f  a  mass c i t i z e n - a m y .  M il i t i a ,  whether common o r  volun­
t e e r ,  were expensive to  equip and m ain tain  because o f  t h e i r  sh o rt 
term s o f s e rv ic e . The weaknesses o f  th e  supply system  and th e  d i f f i ­
c u l t i e s  o f  t r a n s p o r ta t io n  lim ite d  th e  s iz e  o f  o ffe n s iv e  arm ies . The 
t a c t i c s  o f  th e  tim e c a lle d  fo r  w e ll- tra in e d  arm ies capable o f  d e fe a t­
in g  th e  to u g h , v e te ra n , re g u la r  B r i t i s h  Army, I r r e g u la r  t a c t i c s  
would have req u ired  mass armi.es, which were im possib le to  r a i s e  and 
su p p o rt. In  i t s  g e n e ra l o u t l in e s ,  American manpower p o lic y  i n  th e  
War o f 1812 was th e  o n ly  one p o s s ib le . Any o th er system  would have 
req u ired  a re v o lu tio n  in  every a sp ec t o f  American c u ltu re —p o l i t i c a l ,  
economic, id e o lo g ic a l ,  and s o c ia l .
C r itic ism s  o f  American m i l i t i a  a s  u n re l ia b le  and u n sk il le d  
f ig h tin g  men a re  f a m ilia r  and a c c u ra te . But th e  common m i l i t i a  
s a t i s f a c to r i l y  performed th e i r  t r a d i t i o n a l  ta s k  as lab o re rs  behind 
th e  lin e s  and home d efense fo rc e s  during em ergencies. The v o lu n te e r  
m i l i t i a ,  though sm all in  number, played an  inç>ortant ro le  in  a t  
l e a s t  th re e  campaigns: H a rr iso n 's  Northwestern o ffe n s iv e ; Brown's
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in v as io n  o f th e  Niagara pen in su la  i n  1814; and Ja ck so n 's  Ind ian  cam­
paign and d efense o f New O rleans, I t  may have been th e  c ase , as 
Uptonians have suggested , t h a t  more re g u la rs  could have been ra is e d  
had th e  m i l i t i a  i n s t i t u t i o n  been n o n -e x is te n t .  But th e  c r i t ic i s m  
r e s t s  on an unproven assum ption: t h a t  th o se  men who jo in e d  th e  volun­
te e r s  would have e n lis te d  in  th e  r e g u la r  army in s te a d . I t  i s  more 
probable th a t  th e  number o f  men who e n lis te d  i n  th e  r e g u la r  army rep re ­
sen ted  th e  maximum number o f  th a t  c la s s  o f  men d isposed  to  serve a s  
r e g u la rs .  On th e  b a s is  o f  in fo rm ation  a v a ila b le ,  a  s a fe  g e n e ra l iz a ­
t io n  i s  th a t  most re g u la rs  jo ined  f o r  s o c ia l  and p e rso n a l r a th e r  th an  
p a t r i o t i c  rea so n s .
Although th e  re g u la r  army was sm all, th e  United S ta te s  could  
u s u a lly  p lace  more men in  th e  f i e ld  th an  th e  B r i t i s h  a t  any p o in t on 
th e  f r o n t ie r  except M ontreal, The manpower problem m ight not have 
been so c r i t i c a l  had American re g u la rs  been given  t r a in in g  comparable 
to  t h e i r  B r i t i s h  c o u n te rp a rts ,  and t h i s  i s  where, i t  seems, th e  s y s ­
tem f a i l e d .  At G ry s le r 's  Farm (November 1813) 2,500 h a lf - tr a in e d  
American re g u la rs  could o n ly  mimic European t a c t i c s ,  and th ey  suc­
cumbed to  th e  f i r e  and d i s c ip lin e  o f  800 B r i t i s h  and Canadian regu­
l a r s .
M ilita ry  t a c t i c s  had to  conform to  th e  te c h n o lo g ic a l l im i t a ­
t io n s  o f  th e  dominant weapon o f th e  tim e—th e  m uzzle-loading , smooth­
bore, f l i n t l o c k  m usket. Though i t s  .70 c a l ib e r ,  one-ounce, s o f t  lea d
28,'C u n lif fe , S o ld ie rs  and C iv i l i a n s . 111-20.
Border: Upper Canada and th e  War o f  1812. ed , M orris Zaslow (Toronto ,
1964), 61-83.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
b a l l  had g re a t  sto p p in g  and k i l l in g  power, th e  musket was in a c c u ra te , 
l im ite d  i n  range, and slow to  re lo a d . Beyond 300 yards o n ly  an e x p e rt 
could h i t  a  m an-sized t a r g e t .  A gainst a  la rg e  mass o f  t ro o p s  the  
e f f e c t iv e  k i l l in g  range was about 250 y a rd s , but even a t  100 yards a  
reg im en ta l v o lle y  m ight s t r i k e  only f iv e  men o f th e  enemy reg im ent.
To load and f i r e  th e  s in g le -s h o t  weapon req u ired  a t  le a s t  tw elve 
sep ara te  movements i n  a s tan d in g  p o s it io n .  W e ll-d r ille d  tro o p s  could 
a t  b est d e liv e r  th re e  o r  fo u r rounds p e r  m inute. Under b a t t l e f i e ld  
co n d itio n s  th e  musket m is fired  every s ix  p u lls  on th e  t r i g g e r ,  fo r  
th e  f l i n t  might wear, th e  powder dampen, o r  th e  touchhole c lo g . Sol­
d ie r s  s c a t te r e d  haphazard ly  on an open f ie ld  and f i r in g  in d iv id u a lly  
had l i t t l e  chance o f  k i l l in g  enough o f  th e  enemy to  a t t a in  d ec is io n  
in  b a t t l e .  Before re lo ad in g  th e y  might be tram pled by c a v a lry  or 
bayoneted by  enemy in fa n try  advancing in  mass. Massed m usketeers, 
i n  c lose  f i l e s  o f two o r th re e  ranks, a ffo rd ed  m utual p ro te c tio n  and 
p a r t ly  overcame in ac c u ra te  and delayed f i r e  with th e  volume and weight 
o f  t h e i r  v o lle y s . To fu n ctio n  e f f e c t iv e ly  under f i r e ,  th e  men in  th e  
unwieldy form ations o f  th is  age o f w arfare  needed a  c e r ta in  amount o f  
group e la n , d i s c ip l in e ,  and s k i l l  in  maneuvering and f i r in g  sh o u ld er- 
t o -sh o u ld e r—q u a l i t ie s  m issing in  r e c r u i t s  or h a lf - tr a in e d  s o ld ie rs ,
h e lp fu l:  A, F. Becke, An In tro d u c tio n  t o  th e  H is to ry  o f T a c tic s .
1740-1905 (London, 1909V; Jean C o lin . The" Transform ations o f  War, 
t r a n s .  L, G, R, Pope-Hennessy (London, 1912); V incent J ,  E sposito  
and John R, B itin g , " In tro d u c tio n ,"  A ^ l i l i ta r v  H is to ry  and A tlas  
o f  th e  Napoleonic Wars (New York, 1964) ; W alter M U Ï s ,  and
Men: A S tudy in  American M il i ta ry  H is to ry  (New York, 193571 
Robert 3 , Quimby, The Background o f Napoleonic W arfare (New York, 
1 9 5 7 ),
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The m i l i t i a  rece iv ed  l i t t l e  o r no tra in in g  and served fo r  
s h o rt  p eriods o f  tim e, and, th e re fo re , lacked  f ig h tin g  s k i l l  and ex­
p e rie n c e . M il i t i a  t r a in in g  was reserved  to  th e  s ta t e s ,  and th e  Fed­
e r a l  government had no c o n tro l over i t .  The government could not pro­
v ide o f f ic e r s  o f  In s t ru c t io n ,  sp e c ify  p e rio d s  of in s t r u c t io n ,  o r  com­
p e l  compliance with th e  courses o f  in s t ru c t io n  o ffe re d  in  th e  in fa n try  
manuals. The p e rio d ic  m il i t ia  in s t r u c t io n  th a t  u n q u a lif ied  s ta t e  
o f f ic e r s  provided amounted to  l i t t l e  more th an  p o l i t i c a l  r a l l i e s  and 
parade m usters.^^
No form al procedures e x is te d  to  t r a i n  re g u la r  r e c r u i t s  befo re  
th e y  a rr iv ed  a t  the  f ro n t  u n t i l  May 1813, idien Congress adopted th e  
Rules and R egulations o f  th e  Army, vdiich Armstrong may have been in ­
s tru m en ta l in  d ra f t in g .  The Rules charged each d i s t r i c t  commander to  
ap p o in t r e c r u it in g  p a r t i e s ,  e s ta b l is h  lo c a l  and p r in c ip a l  rendezvous 
d e p o ts , and see to  th e  tra in in g  o f  th e  r e c r u i t s .  Teams from each 
regim ent would scour c e r ta in  a re a s  fo r  r e c r u i t s ,  conduct p h y s ica l 
exam inations, weed out th o se  men w ith such d e fic ie n c ie s  as "so re  legs"  
o r " sc a ld  head ,"  compile l i s t s  o f  names and ph y sica l d e s c r ip tio n s , 
d i s t r ib u t e  th e  f i r s t  in s ta llm e n t o f  th e  bounty, and th en  forward th e  
r e c r u i t s  to  th e  p r in c ip a l  rendezvous, Wiere th ey  were supposed to  
rec e iv e  basic  t r a in in g .  According to  the  R u les , th e  in s t r u c t io n  o f 
tro o p s  was "governed by circum stances, as t o  tim e, p la c e , and f r e ­
quency; o f which the commanding g en e ra l w i l l  j u d g e . R a r e l y ,  how-
^^W hite, J e ffe rso n ia n s . 534-35; James R ipley Jacobs, The 
Beginning o f th e  U.S. A. my. 1783-1812 (P rin ce to n , 1947), 381-82.
^^American S ta te  Papers; M ilita ry  A f f a i r s , I ,  42?. The 
d i s t r i c t  commander shared r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  w ith  s ta te  o f f i c ia l s  fo r  
r a i s in g  and t r a in in g  v o lu n tee rs  and assumed f u l l  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  
equip ing  them. K reidberg and Henry, M ilita ry  M o b iliza tio n . 48.
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e v e r, d id  American gen e ra ls  f in d  th e  c ircum stances a p p ro p r ia te . In  
1814 Armstrong accused General H arrison , vdio commanded D i s t r i c t  No, 8 , 
w ith coiqalete f a i lu re  t o  assem ble, c lo th e , t r a i n ,  o rg an ize , o r  equip 
th e  r e c r u i t s  f o r  h is  r e g i m e n t s , A s i d e  from p e rso n a l i r r e s p o n s ib i l i ty ,  
th e  f a i lu r e  may have been due to  u n fa m ilia r i ty  w ith  th e  system , p reoc­
cu p a tio n  w ith o th e r  im portan t m a tte rs , o r  th e  s c a r c i ty  o f  q u a lif ie d  
i n s p e c t o r s , L i n e  o f f ic e r s ,  lAo might have f i l l e d  th e  vacuum, 
regarded  t r a in in g  as th e  job o f th e  s t a f f ,  whereas t h e i r  job was on 
th e  l in e ,  f ig h t in g ,
There were a few l in e  o f f ic e r s  who attem pted  to  t r a i n  t h e i r  
tro o p s . Colonel E leazar H ipley, fo r  example, gave some in s t r u c t io n  
to  h is  own 2 1 st Regiment, which he r e c ru ite d  in  New Hampshire,
B rig ad ie r  G eneral George McClure e s ta b lish e d  a r e c r u i t  t r a in in g  camp 
on th e  Niagara fro n t in  December 1813 under th e  command o f L ieu tenan t 
David R i d d l e , B y  1814, w ith an in f lu x  o f  good g e n e ra l o f f ic e r s  in to  
th e  army and growing f a m i l ia r i ty  w ith th e  system , improvements in  
t ra in in g  began to  tak e  p lac e . Major G enerals Jacob Brown and George 
Iz a rd , who shared  command o f D i s t r i c t  No, 9> were in te n t  on p rovid ing  
as much t r a in in g  as  p o ss ib le .
^^Armstrong to  Brown, 20 Je 1814, M ilita ry  Book, RG 10?
(NA),
^^K reidberg and Henry, M ilita ry  M o b iliza tio n . 52,
^%rown to  Armstrong, 8 My 1814, Brown's Documents (ed , 
C ruikshank), 14.
^^W illiam S tone, L ife  o f  General Jacob Brown , , . (New 
York, 1847), 151-59,
Kreidberg and Henry, M ilita ry  M o b iliza tio n , 52,
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But the  q u a li ty  o f  t r a in in g  was g e n e ra lly  poor, Monroe no ted  
in  l a te  1814 th a t  th e re  e x is te d  "no uniform  system  o f d i s c ip l in e  . . . 
in  t r a in in g  the  arm ies o f  th e  United S ta te s ,  e i t h e r  in  l i n e ,  by b a t t a l ­
io n , o r  c o m p a n y . G e n e r a l  Alexander Smyth had published  a "system  
o f  d i s c ip l in e ,"  o r  a  d r i l l  manual, in  1812, but most American g e n e ra ls  
agreed upon i t s  inadequacy, and the  A dju tant and In sp e c to r General 
rep laced  i t  in  1813 with one w r itte n  by  the  e d i to r  o f  th e  P h ila d e l-
was incom plete, p o o r ly  i l l u s t r a t e d ,  u n p ro fe ss io n a l, in c o n s is te n t ,  and 
g e n e ra lly  u se le s s  f o r  the  sy stem atic  t ra in in g  o f  th e  army. In  answer 
t o  a War Department query o f  February 1814, vrtiether Duane's book 
should be a lte re d  o r  d isca rd ed , a l l  o f  th e  ranking  f ie ld  o f f ic e r s  
questioned  recommended the  l a t t e r  a l t e rn a t iv e .  The War Department 
accepted  th e  o f f i c e r s '  op in io n s , but no d r i l l  r e g u la tio n s  appeared in  
1814 to  rep la c e  D u a n e 's .^
More was needed than  a  good d r i l l  book, however. The American 
o f f ic e r s  had complained about Duane's and Sm yth's handbooks, because 
th e  a u th o rs  had n o t defined  t h e i r  term s p re c is e ly  or included  enough 
diagram s. The o f f i c e r s '  c r i t ic is m s  were te x tu a l ,  having to  do w ith  
th e  c o n sis ten cy  and com pleteness o f th e  c o n te n ts . The r e a l  f a i lu r e
^^Smyth, R egulations f o r  the  F ie ld  E x e rc ise s, Ifeneuvres, and 
Conduct o f  th e  I n fa n try  o f th e  United S ta te s  (P h ila d e lp h ia . 1812) :
Duane. Hand Book f o r  In fa n try  (P h ila d e lp h ia . 1813). O rig in a lly  p u b lished  
in  1812, Duane's Hand Book went through nine e d it io n s  by 1814.
major o b jec tio n  was th a t  no one was q u ite  su re  which 
e d it io n  o f  th e  Hand Book to  u s e . J ,  De B, Walbach to  Armstrong,
1 Apr 1814, U nreg iste red  L e t te r s  Received, RG 107 (M ). H e rea fte r  
c i te d  as Unreg, L t r s ,  Reed., RG 10? (NA),
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was th a t  th e  manuals ex h ib ited  l i t t l e  understand ing  o f  the  t a c t i c a l  
innov atio n s  vdiich had come in to  being du rin g  the  Napoleonic w ars: 
th e  two-deep B r i t i s h  " th in  red  l in e " ;  th e  use o f  dense swarms o f 
sk irm ish e rs ; and th e  v a rio u s  shapes and s iz e s  o f th e  French colonne 
d 'a t t a q u e . They lac k e d , in  o th e r  words, a  f u l ly  developed t a c t i c a l  
d o c tr in e .
The words " l in e "  and "column" d escrib ed  th e  b asic  combat 
form ations o f  th e  p e rio d . The l in e  o f b a t t l e  fo r  a  six-company, 
F rench b a t ta l io n  o f approxim ately  690 p r iv a te s  had a  depth o f  th re e  
ran k s  and a f ro n t  o f  230 f i l e s .  I t  was b o th  an o ffe n s iv e  and a 
d efen siv e  fo rm ation . The th i r d  rank loaded and passed  muskets to  
th e  second rank  and f i l l e d  gaps i n  the  l in e  due to  b a t t l e  lo s s e s .  
Columns were formed in  various ways: on a  half-com pany, vdiole-
company, o r  two-company f ro n t .  The French Ordonnance du Prem ier 
A oût, 1791 s tre s se d  th e  l a t t e r  a s  th e  column of a t t a c k ,  because i t s  
shallow er d ep th  f a c i l i t a t e d  ra p id  deployment in to  l i n e .  One " d iv i ­
sio n "  (two companies a b re a s t in  a th ree -d eep  l in e )  le d  th e  column, 
and the  o th e r  two follow ed in  th e  same o rd e r ,  w ith a  d is ta n c e  o f  
th re e  paces between each d i v i s i o n , C o l u m n s  a ffo rd ed  g re a te r  ma­
n e u v e ra b i li ty  than  l in e s  as fonnations o f  march and o f  rea d in e ss , 
e s p e c ia lly  i n  broken coun try . They avoided th e  n e c e s s i ty  o f  occa­
s io n a l ly  having to  h a l t ,  d ress ran k s , and r e a lig n , a s  was th e  case 
w ith  an advancing l in e  o f  b a t t l e .  Once on th e  d e s ire d  spot i n  th e
Règlement Concernant L 'E x ercise  e t  Les tfenoeuvres de 
L 'I n fa n te r ie !  (new ed, w ith n o te s ; P a r is .  1816). I .  236-39, See 
Quimby, Napoleonic W arfare, chap, x i i i ,  f o r  d e ta i ls  o f  th e  Ordinance, 
and 129, fo r  Jacques G u ib e rt 's  though ts on th e  deployment o f  v a rio u s  
ty p e s  of columns.
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f i e l d ,  th e  column deployed to  engage th e  enemy in  f i r e  combat. In  
l in e  each company could b r in g  i t s  muskets to  bear over an extended 
f ro n t ,  b u t in  column o n ly  th e  f i r s t  two ran k s o f th e  lead in g  d iv is io n  
could f i r e .  The term  colonne d 'a tta q u e  d i f f e r e n t ia te d  t h a t  form ation 
from a long column o f march, and i t  was not in tended  to  p e n e tra te  an 
enemy l in e ,  though i t  could  i f  c ircum stances were fav o ra b le j fo r  
example, i f  th e  enemy l in e  had been weakened by a r t i l l e r y  o r  s k i r ­
m ishing f i r e . ^
l ig h t  in fa n t ry  and r if le m e n , o r  t i r a i l l e u r s . thrown ou t in  
f ro n t  o f  advancing columns d e liv e re d  th e  sk irm ish ing  f i r e .  Men o f 
a g i l i t y ,  stam ina, courage, and marksmanship—who were s p e c ia lly  
t r a in e d  in  t h i s  mode o f f ig h t in g — skirm ish ers  were a  major a s s e t  to  
l in e  in f a n t ry  i n  d i f f i c u l t  t e r r a i n .  O perating  on th e  f lan k  o r  in  
advance o f  th e  c lo s e - f i le d  l in e  and column and tak in g  cover when 
n e c essa ry , th ey  r id d le d  an enemy form ation  w ith a c c u ra te ,  in d iv id u a l 
m usketry and prepared  th e  way fo r  a  massed in fa n try  a tta c k .
The B r i t i s h  response to  th e  French column a tta c k ,  preceded 
by heavy a r t i l l e r y  and sk irm ish ing  f i r e ,  was to  form a  tw o-rank l in e  
behind th e  c r e s t  o f  a low h i l l ,  unexposed to  enemy a r t i l l e r y  and 
in fa n t ry  f i r e ;  to  cover th e  l in e  w ith  a h ea v ie r  sc reen  o f  sk irm ish ers  
than  th e  enemy; and to  p ro te c t  th e  f lan k s  o f  th e  l in e  w ith c a v a lry , 
a r t i l l e r y ,  woods, o r  swamps. I f  a l l  went w e ll,  th e  B r i t i s h  sk irm ish e rs  
would sc reen  th e  l in e  by hold ing  th e  t i r a i l l e u r s  in  check u n t i l  the
^ F o r  th e  e rro rs  o f  C harles Oman and th e  "column v e rsu s  lin e "  
co n tro v e rsy , see  Quimby, Napoleonic W arfare. 326-44. For r e la te d  
q u e s tio n s , see A. M. J .  H y att, "The O rig ins o f  Napoleonic W arfare: A
Survey o f  I n te r p re ta t io n s ,"  M l i t a r y  A f fa ir s .  XXX (W inter 1966-67), 
177-85.
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French columns came up, drove th e  B r i t i s h  sk irm ish e rs  b ack , and 
deployed in to  a th ree -d eep  l i n e .  But by then th e  French columns o r  
l in e s  were w ith in  range o f th e  B r i t i s h  line ,. The two-deep fo rm ation , 
enab ling  every  man to  f i r e ,  made maximum use o f  m usketry, and i t s  
f ro n t  was o n e -th ird  w ider th an  a th re e -d e e p  l in e  o f  th e  same number 
o f  m e n .^
French and B r i t i s h  t a c t i c a l  d o c tr in e  d i f f e re d  p r im a ri ly  in  
t h a t  the  B r i t i s h  s tr e s se d  defen se  w ith  th e  two-deep l in e ,  and th e  
French s tr e s se d  th e  a t ta c k  w ith  columns and th re e -d e e p  l i n e s .  Both 
s tre s se d  th e  in d is p e n s a b i l i ty  o f  sk irm ish e rs . T h e ir  d o c tr in e s  were 
s u ite d  to  t h e i r  n a tio n a l  g e n iu s , the  numbers o f  men a v a ila b le ,  and 
th e  t r a in in g  a ffo rd e d . The extended o rd e r  o f  th e  th in  re d  l in e ,  f o r  
example, rendered  i t  an unmanageable form ation  f o r  a l l  b u t th e  most 
h ig h ly  t r a in e d  and experienced  o f f ic e r s  and men, whom th e  B r i t i s h  
Army possessed  in  g re a te r  p ro p o rtio n  th a n  th e  French, Moreover, th e  
two-deep l i n e  enabled th e  B r i t i s h  to  make maximum t a c t i c a l  use o f 
sc a rc e  manpower re so u rc e s .
Both Sm yth's and Duane's d r i l l  manuals s tr e s se d  th e  column 
o f  a tta c k  and th e  th re e -d e e p  l i n e ,  Sm yth's column was th e  sm all 
column o f d iv is io n s  f o r  a regim ent o f  e ig h t  companies. There was 
no mention in  h is  book, however, o f th e  use o f  sk irm ish e rs .  Duane's 
column was a ls o  a reg im en ta l one, but w ith  only a  single-com pany 
f r o n t .  Although he r e f e r re d  t o  the  use o f  t i r a i l l e u r s  in  p reparing  
th e  way fo r  th e  charge o f th e  column, h i s  book con tained  no in s t r u c -
^Om an, S tu d ie s  in  Napoleonic Wars (New York, 1929), 99»
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
t io n s  fo r  t h e i r  t r a in in g ,  and indeed , he m entioned them o n ly  once,^^ 
Smyth and Duane had o n ly  c u r s o r i ly  summarized some o b so le te  European 
d r i l l  m anuals, which s tre s se d  th re e -d e e p  l in e s  and sm all columns o f  
d iv is io n s ,  b u t which lacked in s t r u c t io n s  fo r  th e  use o f sk irm ish e rs .
The B r i t i s h  and French d r i l l  manuals were d e ta i le d  works w ith  
ex ten siv e  i n s t r u c t io n s  fo r  in f a n t ry  fo rm ations, t o  vdiich experienced  
o f f ic e r s  co u ld  e a s i ly  adapt t h e i r  n a tio n a l  t a c t i c a l  d o c tr in e  during 
t r a in in g .  A fte r  1801 th e  two-deep l in e  became th e  standard  in fa n try
t io n s  fo r  th e  E xercise  o f Riflem en and L ight In fa n try  and In s t ru c t io n s  
f o r  Their Conduct in  th e  F ie ld  (1798) served  as th e  b as is  f o r  th e  
t r a in in g  o f  sk irm ish e rs . The French p e rfe c te d  t h e i r  t a c t ic s  as th e  
^^evolutionary and Napoleonic w ars progressed .
The Americans, however, were am ateurs in  th e  a r t  o f  European 
w a rfa re . Duane, fo r  example, c r i t i c i z e d  th e  French Ordinance fo r  
s tr e s s in g  a  th re e -d e e p  in s te a d  o f  a two-deep l i n e ,  because he r e a l iz e d  
t h a t  the  tw o-deep l i n e  had g r e a te r  firepow er c a p a b i l i ty .  N ev e rth e less , 
he concluded th a t  th e  " h a b itu a l  re g u la tio n  should be the  dep th  o f t h r e e ;  
because in  a  la rg e  b a t ta l io n  th e  voice cannot be heard  a t  th e  ex trem i-
^^^Philadelphia Aurora. 5 Feb 1812.
^^Eike th e  em pire, th e  two-deep l in e  came in to  be in g  in  a 
f i t  o f  absentm indedness. I t  was long i n  use b e fo re  rec e iv in g  o f f i c i a l  
s a n c tio n . O f. John W. F o rtescu e , H is to ry  o f th e  B r i t i s h  Army (London, 
1915), IV, P t .  I I ,  921, and J .  F. C. F u l le r ,  B r i t i s h  Light In fa n try  
i n  th e  E ig h teen th  Century (London, 1925), 157. J .  Mackay Hitsman,
The In c re d ib le  War o f  1812 (Toronto, 1965), 31, c la im s th e  two-deep 
l i n e  rece iv ed  o f f i c i a l  san c tio n  in  1809, but Quimby, Napoleonic 
W arfare. 339, says 1824.
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t i e s  [o f  th e  two-deep l in e ] ," ^ ^
Duane was a c iv i l ia n ,  b u t American army o f f ic e r s  had le s s  
m il i t a ry  knowledge th an  he. The army s in c e  th e  Revolution had been 
sm all in  numbers and had done th e  major p a r t  of i t s  f ig h tin g  a g a in s t 
th e  In d ia n s , The r e s e r v o ir  o f  q u a lif ie d  o f f ic e r s  was puny, and none, 
except R evo lu tionary  ve te ran s  l ik e  Dearborn and W ilkinson, whose 
m il i t a ry  s k i l l s  had faded over th e  y e a rs , had seen more th an  1,000 
men under arms a t  one tim e. Between 1802 and 1812 West P o in t M ilita ry  
Academy had graduated only  e ig h ty -n in e  c a d e ts ,  and only  s ix ty -n in e  o f  
th o se  were i n  th e  army when th e  war began. The u n tra in ed  and inex­
p erienced  American o f f ic e r s  were l i t t l e  q u a li f ie d  to  in s t r u c t  th e  new 
r e c r u i t s  o f  th e  re g u la r  army in  th e  t a c t i c s  o f  Napoleonic w arfare .
What knowledge th ey  possessed  was based on o b so le te  European d r i l l  
m anuals, S teu b en 's  B lue Book, and N ationa l In te l l ig e n c e r  re p o r ts  o f 
European e v e n ts .  On an open f i e l d ,  th e re fo re ,  th e  Americans who 
rece iv ed  some s o r t  o f  t ra in in g  confronted  th e  B r i t i s h  w ith  a  th re e -  
deep l in e  and a  column o f  d iv is io n s  w ithout sk irm ish e rs . Although 
Americans o c c a s io n a lly  employed m ilitiam en  as  sk irm ish e rs , i t  was not 
a c o n s is te n t  p o lic y . Their prim ary  fu n c tio n s  were to  g a rr iso n  o u t­
p o s ts ,  r e p a i r  roads and b r id g e s , guard p r is o n e rs ,  s c o u t, and f ig h t  
e q u a lly  in experienced  Canadian m i l i t i a .  As sk irm ishers  th ey  lacked th e  
cohesion  o f  t ra in e d  l ig h t  t ro o p s . No g en e ra l made any a t te n p t  to  
t r a i n  v o lu n te e rs  as sk irm ish e rs  o r  to  employ, them sy s te m a tic a lly  in
P h ila d e lp h ia  Aurora, 6 and 7 M(y and 30 Apr 1812, Sound 
communications was indeed  a  problem, b u t th e  po in t was th a t  Americans 
would have so few men on th e  f i e l d  th a t  i t  would n o t m atter vdiether a 
th ree -d eep  o r  a two-deep l in e  was employed. The B r i t i s h  d id  not com­
p la in ,  For f i e ld  communication problems in  th e  C iv il  War, see 
W illiam s, "Badger C olonels and th e  C iv il  War O ff ic e r ,"  W isconsin 
Magazine o f  H is to ry . XLVII (Autumn 1963), 35-46.
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t h a t  c a p a c ity . Americans had even fo rg o tte n  th e  p ra c t ic e  in  th e  War 
o f  th e  R evolution o f g a th e rin g  th e  l ig h t  companies o f  reg u la r  r e g i ­
ments in to  independent b a t ta l io n s  f o r  s p e c if ic  m issions and sk irm ish ­
ing du ty .^^  T a c tic a l  d o c tr in e  was so undeveloped th a t  Americans 
lacked  a proper a p p re c ia tio n  o f a f ig h tin g  t a c t i c  \diich had o r ig in a te d  
in  th e  New World, There was, o f c o u rse , a f a in t  awareness of s k i r ­
m ish e rs ' u se fu ln e ss , and Congress even c re a ted  four R if le  Regiments, 
but th e s e  were to o  few, u n tra in ed , and d isp e rsed  over th e  e n ti r e  
f r o n t ie r .
Although th e re  a re  no s tu d ie s  o f th e  B r i t i s h  command and 
a d m in is tra tiv e  system  as  i t  functioned  in  th e  Canadas, a  few sim ple 
comparisons a re  p o ss ib le . The B ritish -C an ad ian  system was r e l a t i v e ly  
e f f i c i e n t  and v e ry  " m ilita ry "  in  R ootian te rm s, but fo re ig n  and unde­
s ir a b le  to  Americans, G overnor-in-C hief and L ieu tenan t General George 
P révost was th e  Commander-in-Chief o f  B r i t i s h  fo rces in  th e  North 
American p ro v in ces . He was d i r e c t l y  re sp o n s ib le  to  S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  
E a rl B ath u rs t in  London, vdio issu ed  government p o licy  and c o n tro l le d  
th e  flow  o f B r i t i s h  men and equipment to  N orth America. As th e  Com­
m ander-in-C hief w ith  h is  own s ta f f  and as th e  c iv i l ia n  head o f th e  
weak p ro v in c ia l  governm ents, he was supreme in  m il i ta ry  m atters  and 
alm ost eq u a lly  so in  c iv i l i a n  m a t t e r s . T h e  amount o f  troops 
W hitehall sen t him and th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  th a t  W hitehall could o v e rru le
C o n tin en ta l Army," American H is to r ic a l  Review. XXXI (Apr 1926), 454-61.
th e  A d m in is tra tio n  Problem jji  th e  P en in su la . 1809-1814 (London, 
1957), 31-33.
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him l im ite d  h is  powers. But th e  demands o f war forced P rév o st to  
form ulate d efensive  s tr a te g y  and to  make immediate command d e c is io n s , 
and th e  d is ta n c e  o f  America from London forced th e  B r i t i s h  government 
to  give him fre e  r e in .  This was the  ca se , fo r  example, when in  1812 
Prévost determ ined to  s t r e s s  th e  defense o f Lower Canada, M ontreal, 
and Quebec over defense  o f Upper Canada. The government i n  London 
approved th e  s tr a te g y  and d id  what i t  could to  send him rein fo rcem ents, 
As the G ovem or-in-G hief o f th e  p ro v in ces , Prévost appoin ted  
m il i t ia  o f f ic e r s  and c a lle d  them d uring  em ergencies. As th e  m il i t a ry  
commander he led  th e  m i l i t i a  in  the  f i e l d .  P révost su p p lied , moved, 
and m aintained h is  fo rces  through h is  m il ita ry  s t a f f .  The A djutant 
General issu ed  P ré v o s t’s o rd e rs  along vdth th e  Q uarterm aster G eneral, 
The Q uarterm aster G eneral q u a rte red  and encamped th e  tro o p s ,  routed  
th e  marches of th e  army, and d e liv e re d  and issu e d  camp equipment.
The Commissary G eneral p rocured , accum ulated, and issued  food, 
fo rag e , and means o f  t ra n s p o r t .  The commanding o f f ic e r  o f  the  Royal 
A r t i l l e r y  was th e  c h ie f  ordnance o f f i c e r  and su p p lied  ammunition 
and arms to  a l l  c a te g o r ie s  o f  tro o p s , Although P rév o st' s s ta f f  
was not a  u n if ie d , co ord ina ted  body, i t s  in d iv id u a l  members were 
competent men who knew t h e i r  p a r t i c u la r  d u t ie s .  L i t t l e  confusion 
seems to  have a r i s e n ,  and P révost ' s a d m in is tra t iv e  btmiens in  m atte rs
H yatt, "Defence o f  Upper Canada in  1812," (unpublished 
I 'fe s te r 's  t h e s i s ,  C arle to n  U n iv e rs ity , 1961), 24-29 .
^ ^ l i l i t i a  Law of 1808, The Documentary H is to ry  o f  th e  Cam­
paign on th e  N iagara F ro n tie r  . . . ,  ed . Cruikshank (W elland,
1902-1908), I I I ,  3 -5 . H e re a fte r  c i te d  a s  Documentary H is to ry .
^^Ward, W elling ton ' s Headquart e r s . 31-34, 76-79.
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of supply were not as onerous a s  th o se  o f  th e  American S e c re ta ry  o f 
War. Moreover, command and a d m in is tra t io n  fo r  both  s id e s  u s u a lly  
broke down du rin g  o ffe n s iv e  o p e ra tio n s , and one o f th e  most im portant 
advantages P révost enjoyed—though i t  d id  not seem so a t  th e  tim e— 
was th a t  fo r  most o f th e  war he fought on th e  d e fen siv e ,
American arms th re a te n e d  Lower and Upper Canada, and, th e re ­
fo re ,  P ré v o st*s immediate re s p o n s ib i l i ty  w ith  re sp e c t to  th e  defense 
o f  B r i t i s h  N orth America encompassed an a re a  comparable to  o n ly  two 
o f th e  m il i t a ry  d i s t r i c t s  o f th e  United S ta te s —No. 8 and No. 9» With 
head q u arters  a t  M ontreal o r  Quebec, P révost was p h y s ic a l ly  removed 
from only th e  upper p rov ince , and d i f f i c u l t i e s  a r i s in g  out o f  slow 
communications became im portant only  in  th e  defense o f  Upper Canada. 
P rév o st was i n  th e  th e a te r  of o p e ra tio n s  and he could  make a l l  th e  
d e c is io n s . I f  th ey  concerned Upper Canada, only one o r two l e t t e r s  
had to  be se n t between M ontreal and K ingston. The c i v i l  ad m in istra ­
t o r  and m il i t a ry  commander o f th e  fo rces  i n  Upper Canada—vriao was 
L ieu tenan t General Gordon Drummond a f t e r  December 1813—was sub­
o rd in a te  to  P rév o st, b u t w ith in  h is  own d i s t r i c t  h i s  c iv i l  and 
m il i t a ry  powers were s im ila r  to  th o se  o f h i s  commander. He, to o , 
had h is  own s t a f f  and could  c a l l  ou t th e  m i l i t i a .  With an o rd er 
from Prévost o r  w ith P révost ' s approva l f o r  h is  own su g g estio n s, 
Drummond could m arshal a l l  th e  c i v i l  and m il i t a ry  power a t  h i s  d i s ­
p o sa l and p e rso n a lly  b r in g  i t  t o  bear in  th e  f i e ld .
The command problems o f Drummond and P révost were sim pler 
th an  those o f  th e  Americans, and t h e i r  l o g i s t i c a l  departm ents were
^^ M ilitia  Law o f  1808, Documentary H isto ry  (ed . C ruikshank), 
I I I ,  3 -5 .
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more e f f i c i e n t .  I f  th e  B r i t i s h  f a i le d  to  nrave men and su p p lie s  to  
th e  a re a s  vdiere th ey  were needed, i t  was not because o f t h e i r  admin­
i s t r a t i v e  system , bu t because th ey  had n o t th e  men and su p p lie s  to  
move. Lower Canada could grow and r a i s e  enough food and c a t t l e  fo r  
th e  tro o p s  s ta t io n e d  w ith in  i t ,  and d e f ic ie n c ie s  were conçiensated 
fo r  by c o n tra c tin g  w ith  American producers in  New York and Vermont, 
who c a rr ie d  on an i l l i c i t  t ra d e  acro ss  th e  b o r d e r , U p p e r  Canada, 
however, cou ld  b a re ly  support i t s  p o p u latio n  and could not ad eq u ate ly  
feed  i t s  t ro o p s . S upp lies had to  be se n t from Lower Canada, whose 
s to c k p ile s  were consequently  d im in ished . Unless th e  B r i t i s h  con­
t r o l l e d  th e  lak es  and sen t th e  su p p lie s  by sh ip . Upper Canada could 
n o t rece iv e  a l l  i t  needed, fo r  lan d  tra n s p o r t  was d i f f i c u l t  and 
expensive, and wagons, h o rses , and s le ig h s  were l a c k i n g , O n l y  by 
e x tra o rd in a ry  e x e rtio n s  was Upper Canada ab le  to  support th e  m il i t a ry  
fo rc e s  w ith in  i t .  Yet B r i t i s h  supply agencies opera ted  under one 
g re a t  advantage; B r i t i s h  tro o p s  fought on the  d e fe n s iv e , a  c o n d itio n  
vdiich s u b s ta n t ia l ly  s im p lif ie d  t ra n s p o r ta t io n  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,
B r i t i s h  North America was alm ost eq u ally  devoid o f  manpower 
reso u rces  in  comparison w ith th e  United S ta te s ,  The p o pu lation  o f 
a l l  o f  th e  prov inces was about 500,000; t h a t  o f Upper Canada, which 
had to  bear th e  b run t o f  American power, was approxim ately  80,000,
The fo u r m ainland provinces co u ld  m obilize  20,000 to  25,000 men.
^^Prevost to  B a th u rs t, 27 Aug 1814, C o lon ia l O ffice  42, Vol. 
157, M anuscript Group 11 (P ub lic  Archives o f  Canada). H e rea fte r  
c i t e d  as C ,0 , 42/157, MG 11 (PAC),
^^rummond to  P rév o st, 2 5 -Jan 1814, C, S e r ie s ,  Vol. 682,
HG 8 (PAG). H e re a fte r  c ite d  a s  C 682, RG 8 (PACK
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Upper Canada had 11,000 m ilitiam en , but o n ly  4,000 were a v a ila b le  fo r  
a c tu a l  s e rv ic e ;  th e  r e s t  were e i th e r  too  o ld , p h y s ic a l ly  u n f i t ,  o r 
occupied in  r a is in g  food.^^
The p o p u latio n  o f B r i ta in  was f i f t e e n  m illio n , and h e r  land 
fo rc e s  t o ta l e d  approxim ately 1 ,100 ,000 . Only 300,000 o f th e s e  were 
overseas tro o p s ;  th e  r e s t  belonged to  th e  home army. A fter  1808 
th e r e  were fo u r  main arm ies s ta t io n e d  abroad  in  I n d ia ,  S i c i l y ,
E urope, and th e  West In d ie s ,  each  numbering 25,000 o r  more. Other 
t ro o p s  g a rriso n ed  v a rio u s  p o s ts  from h a l t a  to  A f r i c a . E n g a g e d  in  
a world-wide s tru g g le  w ith th e  France o f  Napoleon, B r i ta in  could  
a f fo rd  to  send only a  few regim ents to  George P ré v o s t. In May o f 
1812 th e re  were 5,600 B r i t i s h  re g u la rs  i n  both Canadas; in  December, 
8 ,700 .^^  As th e  war w ith  America con tinued , B r i t i s h  reg u la rs  
t r i c k le d  in to  the  Canadas so t h a t  in  th e  f i r s t  months o f 1814,
10,000 re g u la rs  were i n  th e  upper and low er p r o v in c e s .^  Follow­
in g  N apoleon's a b d ic a tio n  in  1814, th ey  began to  stream  in to  North 
America, b u t by then  th e  American war was alm ost o v e r.
The f ig h t in g  a b i l i t y  o f  th e  B r i t i s h  "Tonmy" was probably  
th e  most im portan t s in g le  f a c to r  c o n tr ib u tin g  to  P révost ' s success­
f u l  defense o f  th e  Canadas, B r i t i s h  Army in s t r u c t io n  was g e n e ra l ly  
good, and th e  Napoleonic Wars had produced a  r e s e rv o ir  o f  capable
A. L, B urt, The United S ta te s .  G reat B r i ta in  and B r i t i s h  
North America . . . (New Haven, 1940), 180, 319; Ham ilton, 
"Canadian M i l i t i a , "  290.
^^Brown to  Armstrong, 24 Feb 1814, Reg. L t r s .  Heed., RG 10?
(NA).
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le a d e rs  by 1812. With th e  a id  o f  good d r i l l  se rg ean ts  and d r i l l  
manuals, a r i s to c r a t i c  o f f ic e r s  t r a in e d  and d is c ip lin e d  t h e i r  s o c ia l  
in fe r io r s  u n t i l  th ey  could  march anywhere i n  any d i r e c t io n  when th e  
s i tu a t io n  demanded, though with l e s s  speed th a n  the  French in  
columns and th ree -d eep  l i n e s .  The q u a li ty  o f  t ra in in g  was not 
s o le ly  dependent on th e  commanding o f f i c e r .  Each c a p ta in  was r e ­
sp o n sib le  fo r  th e  t r a in in g  o f  h is  conçany, each l ie u te n a n t  fo r  h is  
p la to o n , each se rg ean t f o r  h is  men. The red co a t was s tead y  as a  
rock i n  combat, and, because he rece iv ed  l i v e  ta r g e t  p ra c t ic e ,  
was renowned f o r  h is  a b i l i t y  to  d e l iv e r  ra p id  and a c cu ra te  v o lle y s . 
The l i g h t  tro o p s  were w e ll acquain ted  with sk irm ish in g  t a c t i c s ,
The B r i t i s h  were l e s s  l ik e ly  than  th e  Americans and th e  
French to  maneuver in  column when i n  c lo se  c o n tac t w ith  th e  enemy. 
Defense and firepow er were th e i r  f o r t e  owing to  superb cohesion 
and f i r e  d i s c ip l in e .  In  th e  b a t t l e s  o f  G ry s le r 's  Farm and Lundy's 
Lane, a s  in  th e  b a t t l e s  o f  th e  Ib e r ia n  P en insu la , th e  B r i t i s h  
deployed f i r s t  in to  l in e  on favorab le  ground to  rece iv e  th e  
Americans, and th e n  a tta c k ed  a f t e r  t h e i r  own f i r e  had d iso rg an ized  
American fo rm atio n s . In  th e  only o th e r  b a t t l e  o f  th e  war fought 
between B r i t i s h  and American re g u la rs  who employed European t a c t i c s  
on open f ie ld s —th e  b a t t l e  o f  Chippawa—th e  B r i t i s h  commander, 
Phineas B ia ll ,  departed  from  th is  procedure and l o s t .
Among th e  troops re c ru ite d  w ith in  B r i t i s h  North America 
the  q u a l i ty  v a r ie d . The m ajo rity  o f  men were organized in to  th e
Jac W elle r, W ellington i n  th e  P en in su la . 1808-181A 
(London, 1962), 25-26; R ichard G lover, P en to su la r  P re p a ra tio n ; 
The Reform of th e  B r i t i s h  Army, 1795-18Ô9 (Cambridge, 1963). 
111- 142 .
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sed en ta ry  m i l i t i a  u n i ts ,  vdio served  fo r  sh o rt p e rio d s , rece ived  
h a rd ly  any t r a in in g  a t  th e  annual county m u sters , and were only  
c a lle d  out d u ring  emergencies w ith in  t h e i r  own d i s t r i c t s .  The 
sed en ta ry  m i l i t i a  o rg an iz a tio n  served  to  m obilize  every  man capab le  
o f  defending th e  Canadas, As such, i t  functio n ed  p r im a rily  as a 
r e s e rv o ir  from which th e  b e s t  men were d ra f te d  in to  and r e c ru ite d  fo r  
th e  p ro v in c ia l  re g u la r  reg im ents and th e  lo n g -se rv ic e , q u a s i- re g u la r  
u n i ts .  The b e tte r- th a n -a v e ra g e  m ilitiam en  who remained in  th e  seden­
ta r y  u n i ts  were organized  in to  " f la n k  com panies," which o ften  became 
a tta c h ed  to  th e  re g u la r  reg im en ts . The p ro v in c ia l  re g u la rs  in  u n i ts  
such a s  th e  104th Foot from  New Brunswick and th e  G lengarry L ight 
In fa n try  from e a s te rn  Upper Canada were under re g u la r  B r i t i s h  Army 
d is c ip lin e ,  and th ey  could serve anyvriiere on th e  c o n tin e n t. The 
Incorpora ted  M il i t ia  Regiment was an example o f  a lo n g -se rv ic e , 
q u a s i- re g u la r  u n i t .  I t  was composed o f v o lu n tee rs  from Upper 
Canada su b je c t t o  th e  m i l i t i a  laws o f  the  p rov ince , b u t i t  was 
organized  fo r  th e  d u ra tio n  o f th e  war and used in  th e  vario u s  
d i s t r i c t s  o f  Upper Canada, so th a t  i t s  s tandard  o f ex cellen ce  ap­
proached th a t  o f  th e  r e g u la rs .  S ev e ra l Embodied M il i t i a  u n i ts  were 
kept i n ta c t  fo r  co n s id e rab le  p e rio d s  o f tim e and served in  a lo c a l  
c a p ac ity , rep la c in g  re g u la rs  sent to  th re a te n e d  a re a s .
The dozen p ro v in c ia l  re g u la r  regim ents augmented th e  B r i t i s h  
re g u la r  fo rce  in  North America by alm ost o n e - th ird . The long- 
se rv ic e  u n i ts  provided th e  B r i t i s h  w ith a  competent re se rv e  s tre n g th  
th a t  could  be r e l i e d  on du rin g  em ergencies. The sed en ta ry  m i l i t i a  
were r a r e ly  used in  b a t t l e  and th en  o n ly  tem p o ra rily , b u t th e  
o rg an iza tio n  served  to  m obilize  th e  men d e s tin e d  fo r  th e  more
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capable u n i ts o "Thus th e  manpower o f  the  B r i t i s h  provinces was used 
to  th e  l a s t  ounce," and w e ll su ite d  to  t h e i r  defense,
I t  i s  tem pting to  a sc r ib e  American o ffe n s iv e  f a i lu r e s  to  th e  
o b je c tiv e  s i tu a t io n —to  th e  command and ad m in is tra tiv e  system, to  
tra n s p o r ta tio n ,  to  the  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  the o ffe n s iv e , t o  th e  r e l a t i v e  
e ff ic ie n c y  o f th e  B r i t i s h .  But th e  most im portan t f a i lu re s  were 
human. P ersonal f a i lu re s  co n tr ib u te d  to  f r i c t i o n s  in  th e  system. 
Morgan Lewis, who f i l l e d  th e  post o f  Q uarterm aster G eneral fo r  most 
o f th e  war, was u su a lly  unw illin g  to  make d e c is io n s  o r assume r e ­
s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  w ithout A rm strong 's approva l, even reg a rd in g  such 
sm all b u t e s s e n t ia l  m atte rs  as p rov id ing  b a rra c k s  fo r  th e  troops o r  
moving a  regim ent from one end o f h i s  d i s t r i c t  to  th e  o th e r .  Dear­
born, who commanded the  d i s t r i c t  u n t i l  the  m iddle of 1813, u su a lly  
had to  work th rough  Armstrong or a c t  as  h is  own quarte rm aste r 
g e n e ra l, Many o f  the  a s s i s ta n t  q u a rte rm as te rs  and comm issaries 
undoubtedly f a i l e d  to  perform  t h e i r  ta s k s  p ro p erly , and some con­
t r a c to r s  and s u t l e r s  d e l ib e ra te ly  s e t  out to  ch eat th e  government 
and th e  tro o p s . Host American g e n e ra ls  bordered on th e  incom petent. 
I t  was n o t so much th a t  th e y  lacked m il ita ry  knowledge, but ra th e r  
th a t  th e y  were unable to  meet and overcome c r i s e s ,  even th e  sm a lle s t ,  
Armstrong and Monroe l e f t  much to  be d esired  a s  S e c re ta rie s  o f VJar, 
14adison labored under g re a t p o l i t i c a l  and c o n s ti tu t io n a l  d i f f i c u l ­
t i e s  and he was se rio u s ly  i l l  fo r  most o f 1813» but he was n o t, in
Ham ilton, "Canadian M i l i t i a , "  288-300; George F , G, S ta n le y , 
"The C o n trib u tio n  o f the  Canadian M il i t i a  During the  War," A fter 
Tippecanoe , . , ,  ed. P h i l ip  P. Mason (East Lansing, 1963)» 28-49,
^ % isch . Q uarterm aster S upport. 135-80,
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s p ite  o f  th e  o b s ta c le s ,  even a  mediocre Commander-in-Chief. The w orst 
choices fo r  g e n e ra lsh ip s  were M adison 's, Much could have been accom­
p lish ed  w ith in  th e  system had he been a Polk who c o n s ta n tly  superv ised  
s u b o rd in a te s , was in to le ra n t  o f  m istak es , and fo rced  co o p era tio n ,^^  
One o f th e  most im portan t f a c to rs  c o n tr ib u tin g  t o  l o g i s t i c a l  
f a i lu r e s  was improper p lann ing . The government l a id  down plans o f  
campaign so la te  i n  the  y e a r ,  fo r  example, t h a t  th e  c o n tra c to r  had 
to  buy food item s when th ey  were in  g re a t  demand and p r ic e s  had 
a lread y  r i s e n , A m e r i c a n  s t r a te g i s t s  could have taken in to  accoun t, 
more th an  they  d id ,  the  f r i c t i o n s  o f  th e  system in  o rd er to  dev ise  a 
s tra te g y  th a t  could be implemented, l^iadison r a r e ly  a ttem pted  to  coor­
d in a te  m il i ta ry  and naval p lan s  through h is  C ab ine t, bu t p re fe rre d  to  
work w ith  each o f  h is  S e c re ta r ie s  in d iv id u a lly .  The f a i l u r e  in  1812 
to  recognize  the n e c e s s i ty  o f  naval power on th e  Great Lakes as an 
in d isp en sab le  ad ju n c t to  m il i t a ry  power may have been due in  p a rt to  
t h i s  p ra c t ic e ,  which a lso  d id  not ten d  to  f a c i l i t a t e  th e  fu sio n  o f  
s tra te g y  and p o lic y . One im portan t in g re d ien t was alm ost always 
m issing from th e  s tr a te g y  approved a t  th e  h ig h es t le v e ls  o f  govern­
ment: a  reasoned co n s id e ra tio n  of th e  l o g i s t i c a l  fa c to rs  which
would in flu e n ce  i t s  im plementation in  r e la t io n  to  what p o lic y  goals 
were d e s ira b le  and o b ta in ab le  through m il ita ry  v ic to ry , Madison 
regarded th e  war a s  one fo r  lim ite d  p o lic y  g o a ls ,  but h i s  m il ita ry  
aims were t o ta l —th e  conquest o f  a l l  o f  B r i t i s h  North America,
^^For d i f f e r in g  views on M adison,see C u n lif fe , "Madison,"
The U ltim ate  D ecision; The P resid en t a s  Commander-in-Chief. ed. 
E rnest R, May (New York, 196o), 21-53.
^^E lbert Anderson t o  Armstrong, 2 Jan 1813, Reg, L trs ,  R eed., 
RG 107 (NA).
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FOR WANT OF A NAIL: TRANSPORTATION AND STRATEGY
Sound lo g is t i c s  i s  th e  b a s is  o f  a l l  su c ce ss fu l s t r a te g ic  p lan s . 
The r e a l  genius o f N apoleon 's march a c ro ss  th e  Alps in  1800, fo r  exam­
p le ,  was h i s  tra n s p o r t  and supply  arrangem ents under udiat seemed im­
p o ss ib le  c ircu m stan ces , r a th e r  th an  th e  choice o f  th e  S t .  Bernard pass 
a s  th e  ro u te  o f  march, "Votre p lus grand t r a v a i l  dans t o u t  c e c i s e ra  
d 'a s s u r e r  vos su b s is ta n c e s ,"  he to ld  B e r th ie r .^  In  th e  p r e - r a i l ro a d  
e ra  t ra n s p o r ta t io n  was th e  p reoccupation  o f m i l i t a ry  commanders. The 
War o f 1812, e s s e n t ia l ly  a  f r o n t ie r  war, was an o u tstan d in g  example 
o f  th e  importance o f  t ra n s p o r ta tio n .
In  1812 th e re  was a d e a rth  o f m anufactures in  th e  reg ion  n o r th ­
w est o f  th e  A ppalachians. Consequently , most m i l i t a ry  su p p lie s  fo r  
arm ies on th e  n o rth e rn  f r o n t ie r  had to  be procured  south o f  th e  Ohio 
R iver and e a s t  o f  th e  m ountains. The sources o f  sm all arm s, ordnance, 
gunpowder, ammunition, m edicine, h o s p ita l  s to r e s ,  c lo th in g , and camp 
equipage were f a r  away along th e  A tla n tic  c o a s t .  Long l in e s  s tre tc h e d  
to  th e  n o rth e rn  f r o n t ie r  from Washington, B altim ore, H arpers F e rry , 
P h ila d e lp h ia ,  New York C ity , S p r in g f ie ld , and Boston—th e  c e n te rs  o f  
American communications and supply—through New York, Pennsylvania,
th e  H is to ry  o f  Id ea s . XVIII (Ja n  1957), 89-90,
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Numerous po st ro ad s , m ig ra tio n  p a th s , droving  t r a i l s ,  and 
t r a c e s  lin k ed  th e  l i t t o r a l  w ith  th e  n o rth e rn  f r o n t ie r .  Most were 
" n a tu ra l  highways" t h a t  follow ed p r im itiv e  In d ian  and anim al t r a i l s  
th rough  mountain p asses  and r iv e r  v a lle y s .  Mountains o ffe re d  l i t t l e  
re s is ta n c e  t o  westward m ig ra tio n , but p resen ted  o b s ta c le s  to  commerce 
and m il i t a ry  supply ,^  The q u a li ty  and number o f  roads r e f le c te d  th e  
d e n s ity  o f p o p u la tio n ; "Where th e re  i s  no a g r ic u ltu r e ,"  a  comm ercial- 
minded contem porary observed , " th e re  a re  no ro ad s , and w ithout ro a d s , 
th e re  can be l i t t l e  commerce."^ Highway improvements, however, 
u s u a lly  lagged behind p o p u la tio n  growth, and a Canadian h i s to r ia n  o f  
t r a n s p o r ta t io n  found t h a t  a road  in  th e  United S ta te s ,  a s  in  the  
Canadas, was " in te rp re te d  as any th ing  from a b r id l e  path  t o  a macadam 
highway."^ Only a few o f them could be con sid ered  prim ary  ro u te s
^Prim ary sources o f: Small arm s—H arpers F erry , V a.; Spring­
f i e l d ,  Mass, Ordnance—Orange C t . ,  N .Y .; M orris C t . ,  N .J .;  P ittsb u rg h , 
Pa. Ammunition—V ir a in ia ; Southampton, Mass. Gunpowder—W ilmington, 
D el. Woolen and c o tto n  c lo th —New England (C onn.); New York; New 
Je rse y ; B altim ore, Md.; Washington C t . ,  P a .;  Rhode I s la n d , C lo th ing  
—P h ila d e lp h ia , Pa. Shoes—P h ila d e lp h ia ; M ass.; B altim ore; New
York C ity . C u r t is  P. N e tte ls ,  The Emergence o f  a  N ationa l Economy. 
1775-1815 (New York, 1962), 270-83; Tench Coxe Report, Annals o f 
Congress. 13 th  Cong., 2nd s e s s . ,  1814, Vol. I I ,  App., 2570-2642 (w ith  
s t a t i s t i c a l  ta b le s  in  American S ta te  P ap ers : F inance. I I ,  663-812),
For c lo th in g  supply, see  R isch, Q uarterm aster Support. 144-52.
^C harles 0 . P a u llin  ( e d . ) .  A tla s  o f  th e  H is to r ic a l  Geography 
o f th e  United S ta te s  (W ash in^on , 1932), P la te  138J> John M elish,
"Map o f  the  S ea t o f  VJar in  North Am erica," M il ita ry  and Topograph­
i c a l  A tlas  o f  th e  U nited  S ta te s  (P h ila d e lp h ia , 181 5) ; B a lth a sa r 
H. Meyer, H is to ry  o f T ra n sp o rta tio n  in  th e  United S ta te s  befo re  
I860 (W ashington, 1917), 3 -7 .
G eo rg e  S criba  to  Samuel Osgood, in  "Turnpike Roads in  New 
York," American S ta te  Papers: M iscellaneous. I ,  873.
^G. P . T. Glazebrook, A H isto ry  o f  T ran sp o rta tio n  in  Canada 
(Toronto , 1938), 118.
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between th e  th e a t e r  o f  o p e ra tio n s , o r th e  n o rth e rn  f r o n t ie r ,  and th e  
c o a s t .  When p r a c t ic a b le ,  t ra n s p o r ta tio n  moved on th e  i n te r n a l  r iv e r s ,^  
though upstream  t r a v e l ,  rap id s , and f lu c tu a tin g  le v e l s  hindered  easy  
and dependable w ater c a r r ia g e .  Even th e  Ohio R iver "had i t s  seaso n al 
highs and low s, in flu en ced  by changes o f  depth  d u rin g  th e  open season 
and by w inter i c e  f lo e s ,"  b esid es  i t s  o th e r  hazards such as rap id s  
and concealed lo g s .^
The most d i re c t  ro u te  from Washington to  sou thern  Ohio f o l ­
lowed a  course s im ila r  t o  the  postw ar Cumberland o r  N ationa l Road.
I t  went along th e  path o f  th e  Potomac to  Cumberland, M aryland, by 
Braddock 's Road to  B row nsville on th e  Monongahela, th en  to  Wheeling 
on th e  Ohio R iv e r, From Wheeling, Z ane 's Trace a rched  southward 
v ia  Z a n e sv ille  to  C h ill ic o th e  on th e  S c io to  River i n  s o u th -c e n tra l  
Ohio, Roads ra d ia te d  northw ard from Z a n e sv ille  to  C leveland and 
Upper Sandusky and westward from C h ill ic o th e  to  Urbana and C in c in n a ti ,  
S ev e ra l t r a i l s  from C in c in n a ti,  Urbana, Dayton, Upper Sandusky, and 
Sandusky led  through no rth w estern  Ohio, o r  th e  a re a  n o rth  o f  th e  
In d ian  boundary l in e ,  tow ard th e  Black Swamp and D e tro i t ,  b u t th ey  
were un ifo rm ly  d read fu l,®  Roads 
and p o in ts  a long  the Ohio R iver.
the  amount o f  t r a n s p o r ta t io n ,  w hether by lan d  o r w a te r ,"  "Rules and 
R egulations f o r  th e  Army fo r  1813," American S ta te  P apers; M ilita ry  
A f f a i r s . I ,  429.
o f th e  most fav o rab le  seaso n s,"  Ralph H, Brown, H is to r ic a l  Geog­
raphy o f  th e  United S ta te s  (New York, 1948), 198,
®Melish, "I'hp o f  th e  Seat o f  War," M ilita ry  and Topograph­
i c a l  A t la s ; N e t te ls ,  N a tio n a l Economy. 305-306,
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The bulk o f  t r a f f i c  between P h ila d e lp h ia  and n o r th e a s te rn  
Ohio passed through H arrisburg  and P itts b u rg h , The road  from H a rr is ­
burg on th e  Susquehanna to  P ittsb u rg h  th readed  west through th e  
mountains by th e  ro u te  o f o ld  F o rb e s 's  Hoad, P itts b u rg h , a hub o f  
w estern t r a f f i c  and a  growi.ng m anufacturing c e n te r ,  had overland access 
t o  '«Wheeling and S te u b en v ille  on th e  Ohio R iver, northw est to  Canton 
and C leveland, and n o rth  to  E r ie ,  Pennsylvania, C aptain P e r ry 's  n av a l 
base  in  1813. An e a s ie r  ro u te  to  E r ie  was by w ater up th e  Allegheny 
R iver and French Creek to  Le Boeuf, from where th e re  was a portage  o f 
s ix te e n  m iles  fo r  th e  l a s t  l e g ,^  Along the  sou thern  shore  o f  Lake 
E r ie  a road  led  w est from B uffalo  through E rie  and C leveland to  
Sandusky, a t  th e  mouth o f th e  bay o f th e  same name. But l ik e  a l l  
roads on th e  f r o n t ie r ,  i t  plowed through f o re s ts  and swamps, ran  
in to  unbridged stream s, and was one "continuous mudhole,"^® Even on 
th e  w e ll- tra v e le d  ro u te  between H arrisburg  and P itts b u rg h , th e  o n ly  
means o f t ra n s p o r t in g  su p p lie s  during  th e  w in te r  months was by pack- 
horse,^^
The l in e s  t o  P la ttsb u rg , S ackets Harbor, and B u ffa lo , th e  
b ases  o f o p e ra tio n s  in  n o rth e rn  and w estern  New York, were b e t t e r ,  
though f a r  from id e a l .  V essels o f e ig h ty - to n  disp lacem ent could s a i l  
up th e  Hudson to  Albany, a fo c a l  po in t o f  no rth e rn  and w estern  t r a f f i c  
th rough New York, Water t ra n s p o r t  could  be e ffe c te d  w ith  com parative
fac in g  830; N e tte ls .  N ationa l Economy. 305-30^,
^^O liver W, Holmes, "The Turnpike E ra ,"  Conquering th e  
W ilderness, Vol. V o f  H is to ry  o f th e  S ta te  o f New York, ed . 
A lexander G, F lick  (New York, 1934), 28&.
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ease up the  R iver t o  Lake Oneida and then  w ith  some d i f f i c u l ty
down th e  rap id s  and f a l l s  o f th e  Oswego R iver no rth  to  Lake O n ta rio . 
Large v e sse ls  made the  fo rty -m ile  passage from Oswego to  S ackets 
Harbor, th e  American n a v a l base on Lake O n ta rio . The Champlain w ater 
ro u te  toward M ontreal involved  a sh o rt but d i f f i c u l t  portage from the 
upper Hudson to  Lake George, th en  in to  Lake Champlain to  P la ttsb u rg , 
th e  northernm ost American base on th e  Albany-M critreal l in e .^ ^  The 
only steam boat used to  t ra n s p o r t  American men and su p p lie s  in  th e  
War o f  1812 p l ie d  Lake Champlain.^ ̂
Roads from  New York C ity , M assachusetts, and C onnecticut to  
th e  n o rth e rn  f r o n t ie r  converged on Albany. "The g re a t  n o rth ern  
ro ad ,"  a  tu rn p ik e  o f vary in g  q u a li ty ,  s k ir te d  th e  w estern  shore  o f  
Lake Champlain through P la ttsb u rg  to  th e  town of Champlain, t h i r t y  
m iles south o f  M ontreal. Between P la ttsb u rg  and S acke ts Harbor a 
road passed th rough  what was known as  the  "w ild  Chateaugay wood" and 
the  sp a rs e ly  populated  a re a  south o f  th e  S t .  Lawrence River and no rth
Beginning o f th e  U.S. Army. 374. Supplies from the  c o a st bound fo r  
no rth e rn  New York went t o  New York C ity  and th en  by commercial packet 
up th e  Hudson to  Albany. R isch, Q uarte rm aster Support. 154.
^^Risch found "no evidence th a t  th e  Q u arte rm aste r 's  D epart­
ment tra n s p o r te d  any su p p lie s  in  steam boats during  th e  War o f  1812." 
Q uarterm aster Support. 155. But see  Dearborn to  Joseph B loom field,
28 Aug 1812 ( I t r .  186), Dearborn Letterbook No. 1j and George Iza rd  
to  Armstrong, 9 1814, O f f ic ia l  Correspondence w ith  th e  Department
o f War , . . o f  Ma.ior G eneral I ^ r d  . . . j j i  . . . 1814 and 1815. 
comp. Iza rd  (P h ila d e lp h ia , 1816), 4 .  H ere a fte r  c i te d  as  ( i z a r d 's )  
O f f ic ia l  Correspondence. Moreover, th e  Albany packets were probab ly  
steam boats. See B rant, James Madison. VI, 225. Some o r  a l l  o f  
the  thousands o f  B r i t i s h  reg u la rs  sen t to  America in  1814 went 
by steam boat from Quebec t o  near S t .  Ours, 60 m iles below M ontreal. 
D iary o f  a P en in su la r  V eteran , 19 Aug 1814 e n try , pp. 54-55,
MS (Q ueen's U n iv e rs ity ) .
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o f th e  Adirondacks, making communications between th ese  two advanced 
bases on the n o rth e rn  f r o n t ie r  very  d i f f i c u l t . Another tu rnp ike  from 
Albany followed th e  Moha\dc through U tica  to  Canandaigua, a t  the  
w estern end o f  th e  Finger Lakes re g io n . At U tica  i t  branched o f f  to  
lead  through Rome to  the mouth o f th e  Salmon R iv e r, But between 
Home and Sackets Harbor th e  roads were very b ad , fo rc in g  Americans 
to  send th e i r  ordnance and s to re s  by th e  Mohawk water r o u te .  From 
Canandaigua, th e  Genesee Road, o f p o o rer q u a li ty  than  th e  easte rn  
tu rn p ik e , led  w est to  B atav ia  and B uffalo  on th e  Niagara f ro n t ie r .   ̂̂  
Some t r a v e le r s  rep o rted  th a t  i n  speed o f  t r a v e l  th ese  "roads 
compared favorab ly  with th o se  of o th e r  c o u n tr ie s ,"  Stagecoaches 
from P h ila d e lp h ia  to  P ittsb u rg h , B u ffa lo , or M ontreal—l ik e  those 
from P a r is  to  Geneva, B ase l, o r S tra ssb u rg —averaged over s ix ty  
m iles a day. But th e  m ajo r ity  o f t r a v e le r s ,  b o th  fo re ig n  and n a tiv e ,  
were c r i t i c a l  o f  th e  ro ad s . Most w itn esses  c re d i te d  r a p id  r a te s  o f  
t r a v e l  i n  the  U nited S ta te s  to  l ig h t e r  coaches and re c k le s s  d r iv in g  
and were "amazed th a t  th e  c a rr ia g e s  were not more o fte n  wrecked,"^^ 
Armies, however, d id  not use l ig h t  coaches to  tra n s p o r t  
su p p lie s .  The t a s k  o f moving long t r a i n s  o f  wagons to  th e  f ro n t ie r  
p resen ted  immensely g re a te r  problems th an  th o se  encountered in  
c a rry in g  a few passengers from New York to  B u ffalo  in  a stagecoach . 
Over lo n g  d is ta n c es  and g e n e ra lly  poor roads, supply t r a i n s  encoun-
"Tum pike E ra ,"  Conquering th e  W ilderness (ed . F l ic k ) .  263-64; 
A lfred  T, Mahan, Sea Power i n  i t s  R e la tio n s  t o  th e  War o f  1812 
(Boston, 1919), I .  362; Brovm. M irror fo r  Americans (New York. 
1943), 175; N e t te ls ,  N a tio n a l Economy. 253,
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t e r e d  the  in e v i ta b le  " f r i c t i o n  o f  war," and p rogress by h ea v ily  
loaded  wagons was co n sid e rab ly  le s s  th an  s ix ty  m iles a day. "Every 
th in g  i s  v e ry  simple in  War," w rote th e  g re a t  stu d en t o f  war, Karl 
von C lausew itz , "but th e  sim p lest th in g  i s  d i f f i c u l t .  These d i f f i ­
c u l t i e s  accum ulate and produce a  f r i c t i o n  . . . .  In c id en ts  tak e  
p lac e  upon which i t  was im possib le  to  c a lc u la te ,  t h e i r  c h ie f  o r ig in  
be ing  chance. . . . Through th e  in flu en ce  o f an i n f i n i t y  o f  p e tty  
circum stances . . . th in g s  d isap p o in t u s , and we f a l l  sh o rt o f  th e  
mark."^^
The case  o f A ss is ta n t  Q uarterm aster C aptain Joseph Wheaton 
was ty p ic a l  o f  hundreds o f  o th e rs  in  th e  War o f 1812. His 133 
wagons l e f t  P i tts b u rg h  on 21 November 1812 bound w ith  su p p lie s  fo r  
W illiam  Henry H a rr iso n 's  headquarters a t  Upper Sandusky, over 250 
m ile s  away. In  th e  m iddle of December VJheaton had to  s top  a t  
Canton, Ohio, fo r  r e p a i r s .  The "deep roads th e  bad b ridges and 
worse c ro ss in g s  with th e  a d d it io n  o f  frozen  ground," he wrote th e  
S e c re ta ry  o f  War, had se r io u s ly  damaged h i s  wagons and worn and 
broken the shoes o f h i s  anim als— 300 h orses and se v e ra l oxen. Try­
ing  to  adhere to  schedu le , Wheaton had been forced to  leave P i t t s ­
burgh w ithout many o f  th e  necessary  r e p a i r  item s. Although he had 
th rough  g re a t  e x e rtio n  prepared 1,000 s e ts  o f  ho rseshoes, th e  
a s s i s ta n t  q u a rte rm as te r  a t  P ittsb u rg h  had sen t them down th e  Ohio 
iliv e r  to  C in c in n a ti j u s t  before  W heaton's d ep artu re  and w ithout h is  
knowledge. .Mow, sh o rt o f  horseshoes, n a i l s ,  a x le s ,  and ch a in s , out 
o f  food and fo ra g e , and having t o  purchase th e  n ecessary  item s in
77-79.
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th e  neighborhood, Vftieaton's p ro g ress  was delayed  a f u l l  week. "With 
th e  road swept o f  p ro v is io n s  o f  ev ery  kind by those  who have gone 
b e fo re  me and by some whose wanton conduct has se t an example," th e  
p r ic e  o f  every a r t i c l e  had r is e n  enormously.^ ^
Once leav in g  Canton h is  t ro u b le s  were not o v e r. Fourteen 
m iles o u t, one o f  h is  team ste rs  caught h is  le g  between a wagon wheel 
and a  t r e e ,  s tr ip p in g  th e  sk in  from h is  th ig h .  Wheaton had to  
re tu rn  to  Canton fo r  a d o c to r , and he and th e  physic ian  worked 
through th e  n ig h t  to  mend th e  wound as b es t th ey  co u ld . In  th e  
meantime, "p ioneers"  from th e  detachment o f  Pennsylvania m i l i t i a  
accompanying th e  t r a i n  had to  cu t a  new road fo r  tw elve m ile s, p a r t  
o f  th e  s ta t e  road  having been found im passable . On December 19, 
s e v e ra l days a f t e r  leav in g  Canton, IVheaton f in a l ly  a rr iv e d  a t  
W ooster, t h i r t y  m iles d i s ta n t  through mud, m ire , and f r u s t r a t io n .
The l a s t  tw elve m iles had been so d i f f i c u l t  th a t  Wheaton was de­
layed  an o th er f u l l  day to  make r e p a i r s .
On December 27 th e  t r a i n  reached M ansfield , f i f t y  m iles from 
i t s  d e s t in a tio n .  Three days were spent making more r e p a i r s  and pro­
cu rin g  corn from th e  Mohigan R iver se ttle n fâ n t, e ig h teen  m iles o f f  
th e  main road . En ro u te  from Canton, Wheaton had purchased and 
h ire d  a d d it io n a l  teams in  o rd er to  c o lle c t  th e  pub lic  s to re s  which
(NA). kJheaton p a id  as much as $0.625 a b u sh e l fo r  c o m , $2.50 f o r  
o a ts ,  and $20 a  to n  fo r  hay. In  1818 the  p r ic e  of th e s e  item s a t  
Z a n e sv ille  was $0.335 to  $0.50 a b u sh e l fo r  c o m , $0.25 to  $0.335 
fo r  o a ts ,  and $9 to  $10 f o r  hay d e liv e re d . Percy W. B idw ell and 
John I .  F a lco n er, H is to ry  o f  A g ricu ltu re  in  th e  N orthern United 
S ta te s .  1620-1860 (Washington, 1925), 176.
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the  Q u arterm aster ' s Department had p rev io u s ly  dep o sited  in  magazines 
along th e  ro u te . The consumption o f  hay and corn  by h i s  now n e a r ly  
500 anim als was trem endous, req u ir in g  almost h a l f  o f th e  horses to  
ca rry  fo rage  a lo n e .
IVheaton ' s t r a i n  f i n a l ly  a r r iv e d  a t  Upper Sandusky on 5 Jan ­
uary 1813, f o r ty - s ix  days a f t e r  lea v in g  P itts b u rg h . D esp ite  t r i b u l a ­
tio n s  and d e lay s , Wheaton was proud o f  h is  accom plishm ent. The 
journey  u su a lly  to o k  o th e rs  sev en ty -th ree  days.^®
Supply was not o n ly  ted io u s  b u t expensive over th e s e  long 
l in e s  o f  communication th rough  the  sp a rse ly  populated h in te r la n d .
To tra n s p o r t  cannon from th e  A tla n tic  coast t o  Lake E rie  in  1813, 
the  government p a id  from $1,100 to  $1,600 over th e  o r ig in a l  cost o f  
$400 p e r  cannon. The h igh  c o s t o f t ra n s p o r ta t io n  ra is e d  th e  p r ic e  
o f pork fo r  th e  D e tro i t  f r o n t ie r  up t o  $127 p e r  b a r r e l ,  f lo u r  to  $100 
per b a r r e l ,  and o a ts  to  $60 per b u s h e l . P a r t  o f the  in creased  
expense was due t o  th e  lo s s  o f  su p p lie s  and h o rses  a long th e  way, b u t 
th e  r e s t  simply t o  the  expense o f t ra n s p o r t in g  su p p lie s  over long 
d is ta n c e s , very slow ly , under d i f f i c u l t  c o n d itio n s . Horses had t o  be 
bought o r  h ire d , tea m ste rs  p a id , fo rag e  and food purchased , and eq u ip -
p rec ise  d a te s  were e x tra p o la te d  from IVheaton's somewhat im precise 
account. Wheaton to  Monroe, 14, 22, and 31 Dec 1812, Reg. L trs . 
Reed., RG 107 (NA). For P i t t s b u rg h , see: P ittsb u rg h  D irec to ry  f o r  
1815 (P it ts b u rg h , 1815); and Fort F a y e tte  F re ig h t Book. 1812-1813. 
t ra n s c r ib e d  by F red erick  F . Seely and Richard C. Knoph, V ol. IX o f  
Document T ra n sc r ip tio n s  o f  th e  War o f  1812 in  th e  Northwest 
(Columbus, 1961) .
^% eyer. T ra n sp o rta tio n  in  th e  U .S .. 91-92. In  1818 pork 
sold f o r  $4.50  to  $5.00 c w t .,  and f lo u r  $5.00 t o  $5,75 a  b a rre l  
(196 l b s . ) ,  B idw ell and F a lconer, H is to ry  o f  A g ricu ltu re  in  N orthern 
U .S .. 176.
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ment rep la c ed , " I t  i s  p ro b ab le ,"  hazarded one h is to r ia n ,  " th a t  
$60,000,000 was expended fo r t ra n s p o r ta t io n  during th e  War o f  1812," 
T o ta l  war ex p en d itu res  were about $80,000,000, L i t t l e  wonder th e  
experience gave a b oost to  th e  demand fo r  in te r n a l  improvements a f t e r  
th e  war.
Lack o f  c a p i t a l  and eng ineering  s k i l l ,  f a i l u r e  to  m ain tain  
and r e p a ir  e x is t in g  ro ad s , and p la in  ignorance c o n trib u te d  to  th e  
i n f e r io r  road  system o f  th e  U nited S ta te s .  Clim ate and geography 
added to  th e  p r o b l e m , T h e  n o rth e rn  p a r t  o f  the  co u n try  had warmer 
summers, c o ld e r  w in te rs ,  and more p r e c ip i ta t io n  th an  western Europe,
As in  w estern R ussia, r a in ,  mud, and snow c h a ra c te r iz e d  the m il i t a ry  
environm ent. Surface c o n fig u ra tio n  v a ried  from mountains o f  g re a t  
and moderate r e l i e f  to  p la te a u s , h i H  la n d s , and r o l l in g  p la in s ,  
m o stly  covered w ith dense fo re s t  and in te r sp e rs e d  w ith  swamps, la k e s , 
s tream s, and r iv e r s .  Except fo r  o ccasio n a l v i l l a g e s ,  towns, and farm s, 
th e  th e a te r  o f  war ( th e  reg ion  northw est o f  the  m ountains) was v i r t u a l  
w ild ern ess, and in  th e  fo re s ts  "a  plague o f  g n a ts , m osquitoes, and 
f l i e s  harassed  both  man and b e a s t ,
The ro ad s n e a re s t  the  n o rth e rn  f r o n t ie r  were g e n e ra lly  
abysm al. N orth and west o f  th e  Susquehanna R iver i n  Pennsylvania 
and P la ttsb u rg ,  Rome, and Canandaigua in  New York, th e  p ro p erly  
d ra in ed  and g rave led  ro ad s  ended and the  mudholes began. In  h ea v ily  
fo re s te d  a re a s  most o f  them on ly  circum vented la rg e  t r e e s ,  b u t where 
t r e e s  were f e l l e d  o f te n  th e  stumps and ro o ts  lay  strew n along th e
N e t te ls ,  N a tio n a l Economy. 173.
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r o u te .  Roads through swamps were sim ply "corduroyed" w ith lo g s  l a id  
t ra n s v e rs e ly  i n  th e  p a th . There were few b r id g e s , r iv e r s  and stream s 
had to  be fo rded , and h i l l s  were not s lo p ed . Some o f  th e  b e t t e r  
roads and tu rn p ik e s  were g rave led  o r s toned  and graded fo r  d ra in ag e , 
but many were d i r t .  T rav ele rs  s tru g g led  "ag a in st mud, bogs, h i l l s ,  
sand, t r e e  stum ps, ro ck s , and unbridged stream s."  In  the  w in te r  ic e  
and snow made t ra n s p o r ta t io n  by s le ig h  sometimes p o s s ib le ,  b u t o th er 
problems in te rv en ed : s le ig h s  could not c a rry  heavy load s; unpacked
snow made d i f f i c u l t  going; when r iv e r s  and stream s f ro z e , w ater t r a n s ­
p o r t was im p o ssib le ; t ro o p s  needed s p e c ia l  equipment and c lo th in g ; 
s p e c ia l  p lann ing  was req u ired  to  stock  su p p lie s  so th a t  w in te r  opera­
t io n s  could be conducted; frozen  ground damaged wagons; and th e  
a lre a d y  d i f f i c u l t  ta s k  o f  fo rag in g  was rendered  more a c u te . During 
a  w in ter  thaw o r  th e  r a in y  sp rin g  and autumn, roads became im pass­
a b le ,  Trees o f  th e  f o re s t  prevented  th e  sun from drying  th e  mud, 
and th e  corduroyed roads through swamps, o f  rough and uneven con­
s tr u c t io n ,  were s lip p e ry  and dangerous. H eavily  loaded wagons, 
packhorses, c a t t l e ,  and swine plowed even th e  b e s t roads b o tto m less .
I t  was s t i l l  p o ss ib le ,  however, though slow and d i f f i c u l t ,  
to  g e t su p p lie s  through over th e s e  long lan d  ro u te s  from th e  l i t t o r a l ,  
as supp ly  t r a i n s  could  r e s o r t  to  lo c a l  sources o f  forage fo r  th e
I b id . , 251-55; Holmes, "Turnpike E ra ,"  Conquering th e  
W ilderness (e d . F l ic k ) ,  259-63; American S ta te  P apers: M iscellaneous. 
I ,  739. For th e  p e r i l s  o f  w in ter  t ra n s p o r ta tio n  and tro o p  movements, 
see Hitsman, In c re d ib le  War o f  1812. 109.
th e  case o f  Wheaton dem onstrated . In  t h i s  c o n te x t ,  by 
"advanced b ases"  th e  a u th o r means those  p lac e s  to  vdiich supply 
t r a i n s  could o b ta in  s u f f ic ie n t  lo c a l  fo rage  and beyond which th ey
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
But t h i s  was n o t p o ss ib le  on th e  f r o n t ie r .  Only i n  a  few p la c e s  near 
th e  border w ith  Upper and Lower Canada d id  th e  d e n s ity  of popu lation  
exceed th e  census d e f in i t io n  o f  a f ro n t ie r  a re a . L i te r a l ly  th e  ad­
vance reg ion  o f  se ttlem en t and c iv i l i z a t i o n  facing  a  h o s t i le  power, 
th e  n o rth ern  f ro n t ie r  was an ap p ro p ria te  co n ten ço rary  t i t l e  f o r  the 
th e a t e r  o f o p e ra tio n s . D e tro it  was an i s o la te d  ou tp o st between the 
im penetrable  Black Swamp and th e  Michigan w ild ern ess. Except fo r  
In d ia n s , no rthw estern  Ohio and most o f In d ian a  were u n in h ab ited . 
C leveland , B u ffa lo , R ochester, Sackets Harbor, and P la ttsb u rg  were 
f r o n t ie r  v i l l a g e s . ^  With only  s ix  persons on the  average p e r  square 
m ile in  a f i f t y  to  one-hundred m ile  band o f  t e r r i t o r y  along th e  
b o rd er, i t  was in c e s s ib le  fo r  an army to  l iv e  o ff  th e  co u n tryside  in  
th e  Napoleonic manner.
could  n o t. O m itting food depots o r  magazines along th e  l in e s  o f  
o p e ra tio n s  beyond th e se  p o in ts  and allow ing fo r some v a r ia t io n ,  the  
m ajor advanced bases o f  su b s is ten c e  were; D e tro it f r o n t ie r —Piqua, 
Sandusky, and Upper Sandusky; N iagara f r o n t ie r —Genesee R iver; 
E a s te rn  Lake O ntario—Oswego; Lake Champlain—VIhitehall. Such 
p lac e s  f a r th e r  north  and west a s  F o rt D efiance, B u ffa lo , Sackets 
H arbor, and P la ttsb u rg  were bases o f  o p e ra tio n s . T h is breakdown 
would have to  be a l te re d  in  th o se  cases when Americans c o n tro lle d  
th e  lak es  o r  could  u t i l i z e  w ater ro u tes  e x te n s iv e ly . Then B u ffalo , 
e .g . ,  could be considered  a base o f  o p e ra tio n s  and su b s is ten c e  fo r  
th e  N iagara f r o n t ie r ,  and P la ttsb u rg  o r even Champlain fo r  th e  
M ontreal f r o n t ie r ,
^ P a u l l i n ,  A tlas  o f  H is to r ic a l  Geography, P la te  ?6D,
f r o n t ie r  so t h a t  each re s id e n t  co u ld  support one s o ld ie r ,  th e  a rea  
req u ired  to  feed  an army near th e  border would be rough ly  40 tim es 
l a r g e r  than  in  France w ith  a p o p u latio n  d e n s ity  o f 250. A fo rc e  as 
sm all as 5,000 men would have th e  in c e s s ib le  ta sk  o f  foraging  in  an 
a re a  o f  over 850 square m ile s, which in  any case could  support them 
o n ly  b r ie f ly .  This a n a ly s is  i s  based on John G. Moore, "M obility  
and S tra te g y  i n  th e  C iv i l  War," M ilita ry  A f fa ir s .  XXIV (Summer 
i 960) ,  68-77. VJheat and com  y ie ld s  per a c re  in  1812 were com­
p a ra b le  w ith th o se  in  1860. H is to r ic a l  S t a t i s t i c s  o f  th e  United 
S ta te s  (Washington, I96I ) ,  Ser, K 83-97.
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Annies deployed on th e  Canadian border had to  be su b s is ted  
from b ases  in  th e  r e a r ,  which were a t  le a s t  f i f t y  to  one hundred 
m iles away in  sou thern  Ohio, western Pennsylvania, c e n tr a l  New York, 
and Vermont, In  th e  decade since  1800 the  l i n e  o f se ttlem en t had 
s u b s ta n t ia l ly  advanced northw est o f  th e  Appalachians and th e  Ohio 
R iver. O hio's p o p u la tio n , fo r  example, had in creased  from 45,365 
in  1800 to  230,760 in  1810. Much o f  th e  reg io n  contained  only two 
to  s ix  persons p e r  square m ile , even excluding  th e  b o rd er a re a , bu t 
th e re  were se v e ra l s e c tio n s  with a s  many as e ig h teen  o r  more; 
n o rth e rn  Vermont and th e  C onnecticut Valley^ wedges o f  se ttlem en t 
from Albany to  th e  "Genesee country" in  w estern New York, and n o r th  
along Lake Champlain; southw estern Pennsylvania a t  th e  Forks o f  th e  
Ohio; and a wide s t r i p  o f  t e r r i t o r y  in  southern  Ohio a long  the  
r i v e r . A l t h o u g h  s t i l l  p io n ee rs , s e t t l e r s  in  th ese  a re a s  a t  l e a s t  
no lo n g er could be compared to  the  is o la te d  J u te s  and Angles o f  th e
P a u llin ,  A tlas o f  H is to r ic a l  Geography, P la te  ?6D. "The 
Genesee country" was a re c ta n g u la r  s t r i p  ex tending  n o rth  to  south  
from Lake O ntario  to  th e  Pennsylvania l in e ,  and e ast t o  west from 
Lake Seneca to  th e  Genesee R iver,
^^Henry Adams made t h i s  comparison. H is to ry  o f  th e  United 
S ta te s  . , . (New York, 1930), I ,  5 .
^®Sources o f : VJheat—Hudson and Mohavdc v a lle y s ; Genesee 
country ; C onnecticut R. v a l le y ;  w estern  Pennsylvania; L icking R. 
v a lle y , Ky, ; Miami R, v a l le y ,  0, (and g e n e ra lly  s e t t le d  bottom lan d s 
in  Ohio) ; C in c in n a ti  and P ittsb u rg h  were m ajor f lo u r -m ill in g  c e n te rs  
o f th e  West as Albany was f o r  u p s ta te  New York. C a ttle  & hogs— 
h i l l y  d i s t r i c t s  o f  New England and e s p e c ia lly  Conn, R. v a lle y ;
Genesee country ; western P a . ;  S c io to , l-îiami. Hocking R. v a lle y s  ; 
B luegrass reg io n , Ky, H orses—New England (N .H .); B lu eg rass . S a l t — 
Syracuse; Z a n e sv ille ; Kanawha R ., (w est) Va, Runn-Mass. ; Whiskey— 
everywhere, N e t te ls ,  N a tio n a l Economy. 283-305; Bidw ell and F a lconer, 
A g ricu ltu re  in  N orthern U.S. .  169-77: Brown, H is to r ic a l  Geography.
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A su b s is ten ce  system  o f  supply t r a i n s  and magazines emplojdng 
animal-drawn v e h ic le s  had in h e re n t d isad v an tag es . Armies were shackled 
to  b a se s , moved slow ly , and confined  to  s p e c if ic  l in e s  o f  o p e ra tio n s , 
which were su b je c t to  enemy a tta c k .  The t ra n s p o r ta t io n  c o s ts  were 
heavy even over sh o rt d is ta n c e s .  They ro se  geo m etrica lly  a s  the  
d is ta n c e  from th e  base in c re a se d , s ince each v e h ic le  had to  re tu rn  
to  th e  base a f t e r  d e liv e rin g  a load  o f su p p lie s , and ex tra  food and 
fo rage  had to  be c a r r ie d  fo r  th e  p ersonnel and anim als engaged in  th e  
movement. E v en tu ally , in creased  d is ta n c e  c a n ce lled  out th e  c a p ac ity  
to  d e liv e r  su p p lie s  from th e  base to  th e  army. W illiam  T. Sherman 
c a lc u la te d  t h a t  in  th e  C iv il  War th e  maximum d is ta n c e  an army could 
s a fe ly  be from i t s  base was about 100 m ile s . I t  was about th e  same 
in  th e  War o f 1812—fiv e  to  seven days march from th e  base.^^
A f u U -s tr e n g th  regim ent o f  1,000 men rece iv in g  th e  a u th o rized  
r a t i o n ,  fo r  example, consumed 36,000  pounds o f b read  every 32 days.
This could be su p p lied  from a d is ta n c e  o f  90 m iles by 18 tw o-horse 
wagons making one t r i p  every  16 days—6 go ing , 4 re tu rn in g , and 6 
r e s t in g .  The maximum c a p ac ity  o f  each wagon was 1,500 pounds, but 
o n e -th ird  o f  th e  lad in g  c o n s is ted  o f fo rage  fo r  th e  team. As the  
d is ta n c e  and th e  tim e req u ired  to  reach  th e  régim ent from th e  base
181, 199-200j Paul W. G ates, The Farmer' s Age. 181 5-1860 (New York, 
i 960) ,  23-50. The c e n te r  o f th e  wheat b e l t ,  i . e . ,  so u th eas te rn  P a .,  
sometimes su pp lied  n o rth e rn  arm ies w ith f lo u r  and whiskey when crops 
f a i le d  o r  when p r ic e s  were too  h igh  near th e  f r o n t ie r .  S a l t  pork 
and packed b ee f could be procured from as f a r  away a s  New York C ity  
and New Je rsey  i f  w ater ro u te s  could  be used . Anderson to  Monroe,
2 Jan 1813, Reg. L trs .  Reed., RG 107 (NA).
^^Leighton, "L o g is t ic s ,"  Encyclopedia B r i ta n n ic a . (1964),
XIV, 329 .
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in c re a se d , so d id  th e  number of wagons and h o rses  u n t i l  th e  wagons 
were soon c a rry in g  more fo rag e  fo r  th e  teams th an  f lo u r  fo r  th e  
t r o o p s . I n  a d d it io n , th e  regim ent req u ired  per month 1,000 g a llo n s  
o f  rum, brandy, o r  vrtiiskey, 160 g a llo n s  o f s a l t ,  and 320 g a llo n s  o f 
v in eg a r. I t s  monthly r a t io n  of 24,000 pounds o f  pork o r  40,000 
pounds o f  beef could  be d e liv e re d  on the  hoof i f  forage were a v a i l ­
a b le .^  I f  th e  roads were so bad t h a t  the  wagons could  not be used , 
packhorses were th e  only r e s o r t .  In  t h i s  case  su b s is ten ce  was alm ost 
im p o ssib le . To supply th e  regim ent over th e  same d is ta n c e  o f 90 
m iles ev ery  16 days req u ired  360 packhorses, each c a rry in g  a maximum 
load o f  300 pounds, 250 pounds o f which c o n s is ted  o f fo rage  and on ly  
50 o f f lo u r .  But la rg e  numbers o f  wagons and horses were o ften  un­
o b ta in ab le  and unsupportab le  on th e  f r o n t ie r . 32
9 days ( a t  15 m iles  a day) from b a se . Each wagon would then  have to  
c a rry  750 pounds o f  fo rag e , and because of th e  in creased  d is ta n c e , 
tim e, and forage lo ad , many more wagons would be needed. I t  seems 
th a t  tw o-horse wagons were used more o ften  on th e  f r o n t ie r  th an  th e  
fo u r-  to  s ix -h o rse  Conestoga wagons, due probably  to  poor road con­
d i tio n s  which r e s t r i c te d  wagon lo a d s . The c a lc u la t io n s  in  t h is  p a ra ­
graph a re  based on James W inchester to  John P i a t t ,  17 Nov 1812, P i a t t  
Letterbook (M anuscript D iv is io n , L ib ra ry  of C ongress); A rnstrong to  
Jacob Brown, 10 Je  1814» M l i ta r y  Book, HG 107 (NA); and Moore, 
"M obility  and S tra te g y ,"  68-77.
^^The army r a t io n  co n s is ted  o f  1- 1/4  pounds o f  b ee f or 3 /4  of 
a pound o f  pork; 18 ounces o f  bread o r  f lo u r ;  1 g i l l  o f  rum, brandy, 
o r  whiskey; and 2 q u arts  o f  s a l t ,  4  q u a rts  o f  v in eg a r, and 1- 1/2  
pounds o f  candles p e r 100 r a t io n s .  R isch, Q u arterm aster Support, 118.
^% ee s u p ra , fn . 30 . W inchester was dea lin g  w ith  a s i tu a t io n  
in  which bad roads between Piqua and Fort W inchester prevented th e  
use o f wagons. Each packhorse consumed 25 pounds o f fo rag e  a day .
But W inchester appears not to  have tak e n  t h i s  in to  accoun t—each pack- 
horse  would c a rry  on ly  25 pounds o f  forage and 1 50 o f f lo u r .  T h is  
was obv iously  inadequate  f o r  a s ix -d a y  t r i p  t o  Fort W inchester. More­
over, he f a i le d  t o  co n sid er th e  r e tu rn  t r i p  o f  four d a y s . Risch 
accep ts  h i s  f ig u re s .  Q uarterm aster Support, f n .  114, I 63 . Applying
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Even had more r e c r u i t s  been a v a ila b le ,  th e  a tro c io u s  roads 
and low popu latio n  d e n s ity  i n  n o rth e rn  Ohio and n o rth ern  and w estern  
New York lim ite d  th e  s iz e  o f  arm ies on th e  f r o n t ie r .  Combined w ith  
a d m in is tra tiv e  f r i c t i o n  and in e f f ic ie n c y ,  th e  r e s u l t  was th a t  much of 
the  equipment d id  not reach  th e  f ro n t ,  and th e  troops were o ften  
u nderfed , poorly  c lo th ed , and in ad eq u ately  s h e lte re d . One a u th o r i ty  
concluded; "Given th e  s t a t e  of communication from 1800 to  I83O, i t  
may be doubted w hether i t  would have been p h y s ic a l ly  p o ss ib le  to  
mount an  e f f e c tiv e  campaign on any s u b s ta n t ia l  s c a le .  Even where 
i n te g r i t y ,  good w i l l ,  and harmony o f  purpose p re v a ile d , n a tu re , n o t 
yet subdued by man, in te rp o se d  stupendous o b s ta c le s
S im ila r  i f  not g r e a te r  communications d i f f i c u l t i e s  confron ted  
th e  B r i t i s h ,  From M ontreal, th e  h e a r t  o f Canadian d e fen se , th e re  was 
only one main road  lead ing  to  K ingston along th e  l in e  o f  th e  S t ,  
Lawrence d iv e r . Bateaux and f la t-b o tto m ed  Durham boats p lie d  between 
the  same p o in ts  on th e  r i v e r .  The K ingston Hoad between Kingston 
and York (Toronto) c a rr ie d  men and su p p lie s  n o r th  o f th e  Bay of 
Quinte and along th e  shore o f  Lake O n ta rio , Yonge S tre e t  led  n o r th
W in ch este r 's  f ig u re s  to  th e  a u th o r 's  h y p o th e tic a l s i tu a t io n ,  120 
packhorses c a rry in g  175 pounds o f fo rag e  and f lo u r  would be s u f f i ­
c ie n t ,  The a u th o r 's  c a lc u la t io n s  a re  based on in c re a s in g  A rm strong 's 
h igher f ig u re  fo r  packhorse loads (from  250 to  300 l b s , )  and in ­
c reasin g  th e  amount o f fo rag e  consumed in  10 days (from 25 to  250 
l b s , ) .  I t  may be th e  ca se , c o n sid e rin g  W incheste r 's  low load 
f ig u re  (175 lb s , )  t h a t  he d id  mean to  say each horse should c a rry  
150 pounds of fo rag e  (6 x  25) and 150 pounds o f  f lo u r .  But he 
s t i l l  n eg lec ted  th e  problem o f  r e tu rn in g  to  P iqua , In  o th e r  words, 
240 a d d it io n a l  h o rses  were needed to  c a rry  fo rag e  fo r them selves 
and W incheste r 's  120, But c f ,  the  f ig u re s  f o r  packhorses going 
between C h ill ic o th e  and Upper Sandusky in  McKee, "S erv ice  o f  Supply" 
(3rd P a p e r) , n . I 30 ,  38.
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from York to  Lake Simcoe. From th e r e  th e  B r i t i s h  tra n sp o rte d  men 
and su p p lie s  on th e  w aters o f  Georgian Bay and Lake Huron to  I&ckinac 
I s la n d . Another w ater ro u te  from M ontreal t o  Lake Huron was by th e  
Ottawa R iver, b u t i t  was u n su ita b le  fo r  m i l i t a ry  purposes because o f 
i t s  ra p id s  and d i f f i c u l t  p o rta g e s . Beginning a t  York, Dundas S tre e t  
went through Dundas a t  th e  head o f  Lake O ntario  to  Oxford, London, 
and Delaware on th e  Thames R iver. The road th en  follow ed th e  Thames 
to  Sandwich, and ano ther took  a  more s o u th e r ly  course  to  Amherstburg. 
None o f  th ese  ro ad s  were h ard -su rfaced  and were m i l i t a r i ly  u sab le  
only dxiring th e  d ry  m i d s u m m e r . A t  B ro c k v ille , between M ontreal 
and K ingston, where th e  woods began, th ey  became p ro g re s s iv e ly  worse. 
One t r a v e le r  w rote th a t  th e  roads were "u n p leasan t; long s tr e tc h e s  
o f  corduroy b rid g e  th e  swamps and low g r o u n d s . M o r e o v e r ,  th e  
land and water l in e  from M ontreal to  K ingston was v u ln erab le  t o  
American in te r d ic t io n .
The g re a t  amount o f  energy, tim e, and money consumed by 
th ese  f r o n t ie r  ro ad s  n e c e s s i ta te d  th e  use o f  water c a rr ia g e  on th e  
r iv e r s .  Great Lakes, and Lake Champlain. These w ater ro u tes  were 
im portan t in  b r in g in g  up su p p lie s  from rearw ard b ases to  tro o p s  
s ta t io n e d  along th e  b o rd er, bu t th e y  were a b so lu te ly  e s s e n t ia l  fo r  
in v as io n . Even on good ro ad s , an invading  army moving overland  
v a s t ly  com plicated i t s  supply  problem s. The i n a b i l i t y  to  forage 
on the  march and i n  enemy t e r r i t o r y ,  and dependence on se lf-co n ta in m en t
^^John C onrad 's map, Adams, H is to ry  o f  th e  United S ta te s .  VI, 
b e t .  298 and 299; Gerald M. C ra ig , Upper Canada; The Formative Years. 
1784-1841 (Toronto , 1963), 35, 53» 69, 147-48; G lazebrook, Trans­
p o r ta t io n  in  Canada. 64-71, 118-46.
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and supply from b ases  and m agazines, l im ite d  th e  s ize  o f  an invading  
army, reduced speed and m o b ility , fo rced  i t  t o  advance on a narrow 
f ro n t ,  and e lim in a ted  the  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  s u b s ta n t ia l  p e n e tra tio n .
O ffen siv es , o r  movement, p resen ted  tremendous planning  prob­
lem s. As E lb e rt Anderson, th e  c o n tra c to r  fo r  D i s t r i c t  No. 9> ex­
p la in ed  to  th e  S e c re ta ry  o f  War, magazines had to  be e s ta b lis h e d  and 
stocked w e ll in  advance along th e  ro u te  of march " in  p lac e s  b e s t 
c a lc u la te d  fo r  th e  accum ulation of th e  surrounding co u n try , w h ils t  
a t  th e  same tim e th e y  should possess th e  advantages o f  water com­
m unication to  such p o in ts  as  th e  army may co n cen tra te "  from tim e to  
tim e . P lanners had to  tak e  in to  c o n s id e ra tio n  th e  contem plated s iz e  
o f  th e  army, the  d u ra tio n  o f  th e  campaign, th e  amount o f  lo c a l  food 
su p p lie s  i n  f r ie n d ly  o r enemy t e r r i t o r y  th a t  might be a v a ila b le ,  and 
th e  time o f  the  y ea r when roads would be im passable and water ro u te s  
blocked by i c e .  With t h is  in fo rm a tio n , the  g e n e ra l and th e  c o n tra c ­
t o r  could decide where to  purchase f lo u r  and m eat, where to  e s ta b l is h  
m agazines, and w hether i t  would be p o ss ib le  t o  supply th e  a r m y .36 
Too o ften  such p lann ing  was n o t done.
Besides food, the  am%r had to  tra n s p o r t  i t s  ordnance, ammu­
n i t i o n ,  m edicine, e x tra  m uskets, and th e  r e s t  o f  th e  inçedim enta . 
Unless th e  invader could reduce h is  supply  t r a i n  by u sin g  water 
t r a n s p o r ta t io n ,  in v as io n  might be out o f  the  q u estio n  o r ,  i f  
a ttem p ted , doomed to  f a i l u r e .  In any case th e  advantage was o ver­
weighted in  favor o f  th e  d e fen d e r. T h is f a c to r  had im pelled  th e  
t h e o r i s t  o f  th e  w arfare  o f  th e  tim e, Henri Jom in i, to  warn: "From
3^2 Jan 1813, Reg. L t r s .  R eed., RG 107 (NA). See Meyer, 
T ra n sp o r ta tio n  in  th e  U .S.. 62.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
a  m il i ta ry  po in t o f  view th e  o ffe n s iv e  has i t s  . . .  bad s id e s .  
S t r a te g ic a l ly ,  an in v asio n  lea d s  to  deep l in e s  o f o p e ra tio n s , which 
a r e  always dangerous in  a h o s t i le  co u n try . A l l  the  o b s ta c le s  in  
th e  enemy's coun try—the m ountains, r iv e r s ,  d e f i l e s ,  and f o r t s — 
a re  fav o rab le  fo r  defense; th e  in h a b ita n ts  and a u th o r i t ie s  o f  th e  
co u n try  a re  g e n e ra l ly  h o s t i l e .
The b e ll ig e re n t  who had su p e rio r  n av a l fo rce on the G reat 
Lakes, which dominated the  m il i ta ry  f r o n t ie r ,  possessed  immense 
advantages over th e  o th e r . He could co n cen tra te  h is  tro o p s and 
su p p lie s  f a s t e r  a t  c r i t i c a l  p o in ts  i n  a l l  seasons except m idwinter; 
communicate w ith d i s t a n t  p o s ts  more sp e ed ily ; th re a te n  the  o th e r 's  
la n d  l in e  o f  communications and supp ly  depots near th e  shore; and, 
perhaps most im p o rtan tly , fo rc e  h is  ad v e rsa ry  to  move by lan d , 
th u s  possessing  th e  advantage o f what Jomini c a lle d  in te r n a l  l in e s  
o f  communication. Without n av a l s u p e r io r i ty  on th e  la k e s , th e  
Duke o f W ellington observed, " i t  i s  im possib le  . . .  t o  m ain tain  
an army in  such a s i tu a t io n  a s  to  keep the  enemy out o f  the  whole 
f r o n t ie r ,  much le s s  to  make conquest."^®
The lakes were more im portan t to  th e  Americans fo r  o ffen s iv e  
purposes and to  th e  B r i t i s h  fo r  defen siv e  purposes. Each o f th e  
m ajor in v asio n  approaches f o r  Americans depended upon naval c o n tro l  
o f  Lake E r ie ,  Lake O ntario , and Lake Chanç>lain. But i f  the  la k e s
^ ^ J . D. H i t t  l e  ( é d . ) ,  Jomini and His A rt o f  War (H arrisburg , 
1947), 68.
^®To E arl o f  L iverpoo l, 9 Nov 1814, Supplementary D espatches. 
Correspondence, and Memoranda of , . . the  Duke o f W ellington , ed. 
Son (London, 1862), IX, 425.
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were im portan t fo r  th e  Americans, th ey  were c ru c ia l  fo r  th e  B r i t i s h .  
The American communications network was tenuous and d i f f i c u l t ,  b u t ,  
with a  few ex cep tio n s, i t  was w e ll w ith in  t h e i r  own t e r r i t o r y ,  com­
p a ra t iv e ly  s a fe  from B r i t i s h  in c u rs io n s . But th e  b es t w ater ro u te  
to  th e  west f o r  the  B r i t i s h  was only  by th e  S t .  Lawrence-Great Lakes 
system . Even t h e i r  lan d  ro u tes  s k ir te d  i t s  sh o res , which in  any 
case were inadequate  f o r  th e  tra n s p o r ta t io n  o f  a l l  B r i t i s h  su p p lie s . 
I f  th e  Americans should acq u ire  n aval s u p e r io r i ty  on any se c tio n  o f  
t h is  l in e  o r m i l i t a r i l y  block communications a t  p o in ts  a long i t ,  
B r i t i s h  communications west o f  t h a t  s e c t io n  o r th o se  p o in ts  would 
be severed  and become m i l i t a r i l y  u n ten ab le . The p o p u latio n  o f 
Lower and Upper Canada was th in ly  strung  out a long th e  S t .  Lawrence- 
Great Lakes sh o re lin e  from Quebec to  Amherstburg. V ir tu a l ly  a l l  
m il i t a ry  su p p lie s  and much o f th e  food f o r  B r i t i s h  troops west o f 
M ontreal had t o  be sen t from Quebec and îfo n tre a l.
The la y  o f  th e  lan d  and i t s  n a tu r a l  and a r t i f i c i a l  highways 
made F o r t 1-lalden, Fort George, F o rt E r ie ,  K ingston, and M ontreal th e  
major m il i ta ry  t a r g e ts  o f  American s tr a te g y  and th e  key p o in ts  o f 
Canadian d e fen se . The A ppalachian M ountains, th e  p r im it iv e  country­
s id e , and the B r i t i s h  Navy p ro te c te d  th e  M aritim es and Quebec from 
in v as io n . James Wolfe had been ab le  to  tak e  Quebec in  1759 because 
o f B r i t i s h  n av a l s u p e r io r i ty  over the  French, In  th e  War o f  1812 
th e  U nited S ta te s  Army was not a s  fo r tu n a te , and th e  advantages to  
invader and defender accru in g  from c o n tro l  o f  th e  sea were rev e rse d .
cut o f f  from th e  sea. V/alter L. Dorn, Com petition fo r  Empire (New 
York, 1963) ,  361- 62. For th e  problems involved  in  a  land in v asio n  o f  
Quebec, see; James A. Huston, "The L o g is tic s  o f A rn o ld 's  I«Iarch to
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Fort Malden p ro te c te d  Amherstburg, a B r i tish - In d ia n  rendezvous 
in  th e  West, and c o n tro l le d  the  passages to  D e tro i t ,  Lake Huron, and 
F ort M ichilim ackinac through th e  D e tro i t  R iv e r, Fort Idichilim ackinac 
on Mackinac I s la n d  was an im portan t fu r  t ra d in g  post i n  th e  f a r  North­
w est, Fort E r ie  and F o rt George b locked  lan d  and w ater communications 
along th e  N iagara R iver between Lakes E rie  and O ntario , Kingston was 
th e  B r i t i s h  n av a l base on Lake O ntario  and guarded th e  en trance o f  
th e  S t ,  Lawrence R iver. M ontreal was th e  headquarters o f  S ir  George 
P ré v o st, th e  en tre p ô t f o r  men and m a te rie l  from th e  A t la n t ic ,  and 
th e  fo c a l  po in t o f  th e  lan d  and w ater ro u tes  to  the  W est,
A su c ce ss fu l s t r i k e  a g a in s t M ontreal would make th e  te r r i to ry -  
west o f  i t  American—i f  th e  c i t y  could be h e ld  a g a in s t B r i t i s h  coun­
te r s tr o k e s  from th e  west and e a st u n t i l  Upper Canada w ithered  on a  
dry  v in e ,^ ^  This t r u th  was obvious to  s t r a te g i s t s  on b o th  s id e s . 
L ieu tenan t G eneral P rév o st, fo r  example, regarded  M ontreal as " th e  
p r in c ip a l  Commercial C ity  in  the  Canadas" and " th e  f i r s t  o b jec t o f  
a t t a c k ,"  To defend i t ,  he s ta tio n e d  tro o p s i n  th e  Ifo n trea l area  a t  
s ig n if ic a n t  p o in ts  along th e  s o u th e r ly  approaches, th e re b y  forming a  
defen siv e  cordon south o f  th e  c i t y .  A p p rec ia tin g , however, th a t  
Quebec was th e  head o f deep-w ater n a v ig a tio n  and the  o n ly  o u tle t  to  
th e  se a , Prévost chose i t  a s  th e  most im portan t place to  defend.
Quebec," M ilita ry  A f f a ir s , XXXII (Dec 1968), 116-24; and Way, "The 
Topographical A spects o f  Canadian Defence, 1783-1871," Canadian 
Defence Q u a rte rly . XIV (Apr 1937), 280.
^% h is  was an im portan t " i f , "  The cap tu re  o f  Quebec in  
1759, e . g . ,  had n o t au to m a tic a lly  r e s u l te d  i n  th e  su rren d e r o f  a l l  
French fo rces  west o f i t .  The French made t h e i r  l a s t  s ta n d  a t  
M ontreal, Dom, Com petition fo r  Em pire. 362,
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Regarding Quebec as th e  fo r t r e s s  o f th e  Canadas, he f e l t  i t  was th e  
p o s it io n  upon which th e  B r i t i s h  should r e t i r e  i f  M ontreal and Upper 
Canada f e l l .
P ré v o s t 's  s tr a te g y  was to  r e f r a in  from major o ffen s iv e  opera­
t io n s ,  He lacked  s u f f ic ie n t  fo rc e s  and reso u rces  f o r  th a t  purpose, 
and he though t th a t  in cu rs io n s  would s tren g th en  American u n ity . With 
th e  exception  o f r a id s  ag a in st S ackets Harbor, Oswego, o r th e  Ameri­
can side o f  th e  Niagara f r o n t ie r ,  h is  s tr a te g y  was e s s e n t ia l ly  de­
fen s iv e  u n t i l  Napoleon was d e fea ted  and rein fo rcem en ts  a rr iv e d  from 
Europe, S ince he regarded  Quebec and M ontreal as th e  l a s t  b a s tio n s  
o f  Canadian defense and since th e s e  c i t i e s  were th e  gateways t o  th e  
Canadas from th e  se a , he kept th e  la rg e s t  p o r tio n  o f  B r i t i s h  re g u la rs  
i n  Lower Canada and reg u la te d  th e  flow o f rein fo rcem en ts  to  Upper 
Canada as th e  s i tu a tio n  a l l o w e d . I t  was perhaps th e  only s tr a te g y  
he could pursue , but i t  s a c r i f ic e d  Upper Canada,
The more w e s te r ly  American o b jec tiv e s  on th e  Niagara and 
D e tro i t  f r o n t ie r s  were o f  secondary m il i t a ry  im portance. I f  Niagara 
and Fort Malden f e l l  in to  American hands, th e  h ea rt o f  th e  Canadas, 
K ingston and Ptontreal, would rem ain untouched. On th e  o th er hand.
The cu rren t was rap id  and th e re  were dangerous channels 
between Quebec and M ontreal, Some la rg e  v e s se ls  ven tu red  the  voyage, 
b u t sm aller b o a ts  monopolized th e  t r a f f i c .  Brown, H is to r ic a l  
Geography. 168, The summary o f  P ré v o st 's  s tr a te g y  i s  based on H y att, 
"Defence o f  Upper Canada," 24-29. See a ls o ;  Hitsman, In c re d ib le  
War o f  1812 . 243-49 j Hitsman, " S i r  George P ré v o st 's  Conduct o f  th e  
Canadian War o f  1812," Canadian H is to r ic a l  A sso c ia tio n  Report (1962), 
34 -43 j and John K. Mahon, " B r i t i s h  Command D ecisions i n  th e  Northern 
Campaigns o f  th e  War o f  1812," Canadian H is to r ic a l  Review. XLVI 
(S ep t 1965), 219-37. H is to rian s  c r i t i c a l  o f  American s tra te g y  
reg a rd in g  M ontreal have not tak en  B r i t i s h  s tr a te g y  in to  account.
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Niagara and Fort Flalden were e a s ie r  t a r g e t s .  The same reaso n s th a t  
made M ontreal th e  main American m il i t a ry  o b jec tiv e  made i t  th e  more 
d i f f i c u l t  to  a c h iev e . M ontreal was th e  c e n te r  o f  B r i t i s h  communi­
ca tio n s  i n  th e  Canadasj a l l  roads from Upper Canada and n o rth e rn  
New York le d  to  i t ;  and the  rugged t e r r a i n  and th e  broad S t ,  Lawrence 
p ro te c te d  i t s  r e a r .  As American fo rc e s  crossed  in to  Lower Canada 
from S t.  A egis, French M ills , Chateaugay, o r Champlain and closed  th e  
r in g  sou th  o f th e  c i t y ,  they  l e f t  t h e i r  major b ases  a t  Sackets Harbor 
o r  P la ttsb u rg  f a r  beh ind , sim u ltan eo u sly  pushing th e  B r i t i s h  defen­
d e rs  back upon t h e i r  c e n te r  a t  M ontreal. The Americans would have 
to  reduce th e  d e fen siv e  p o in ts  o f  th e  cordon around M ontreal, t r a v e l  
over poor roads, and ford numerous stream s. Sum ounting th e s e  ob­
s ta c le s ,  th e y  th en  had to  c ro s s  th e  S t .  Lawrence in  th e  fac e  o f 
B r i t i s h  o p p o s itio n , la y  s ieg e  to  M ontreal, and d e fe a t  th e  fo rc e  con­
c e n tra te d  th e re .  Once cap tu red  the  c i t y  had to  be held a g a in s t  
B r i t i s h  c o u n te ro ffe n s iv e s  from Upper Canada, Quebec, and th e  B r i t i s h  
Navy.^^
An American movement o f  t h is  k ind  was expected by P rév o st.
But he knew th a t  i t  would re q u ire  a la rg e  preponderance o f  American 
fo rc e . A nother B r i t i s h  o f f i c e r  f e l t  t h a t  Americans could tak e  
M ontreal o n ly  i f  t h e i r  o ffe n s iv e  were undertaken w ith  " v ig o r, 
a c t i v i t y ,  and good sen se" ; i f  th ey  had a  su p e rio r  fo rc e ; i f  th ey  
had a s u f f ic ie n t  amount o f b o a ts ,  p ro v is io n s , ammunition, and ord­
nance; and i f  th ey  c o n tro l le d  Lake Champlain—q u a l i t ie s  and reso u rces
^ ¥ a y ,  "Topographical Aspects o f  Canadian D efence," 279-80.
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not l ik e l y  to  be found in  c o n ju n c tio n .^^  I t  could n o t be sa id  th a t  
M ontreal was th e  s o f t  u n d e rb e lly  o f  th e  Canadas.
In  o ffe n s iv e s  a g a in s t  Amherstburg o r  Niagara th e  American 
l in e s  o f  communications were w ith in  t h e i r  own t e r r i t o r y  and n o t 
s ig n i f ic a n t ly  lo n g er th an  th o se  to  M ontreal. The B r i t i s h  l in e s  to  
th ese  p o in ts  s tre tc h e d  a l l  th e  way from M ontreal and were in  danger 
o f  severance . As th e  a re a  o f  c o n f l i c t  s h if te d  from M ontreal t o  th e  
w est, Americans possessed  a r e l a t i v e  advantage in  s a fe ty  o f  movement 
and ease o f  supply  and c o n c e n tra tio n . P ré v o s t 's  s tr a te g y  o f defend­
ing  Quebec and M antreal w ith  th e  bulk  o f  B r i t i s h  re g u la rs ,  moreover, 
weakened th e  defenses o f  Upper Canada and o ffe re d  Americans th e  
chance o f  g a in in g  w estern Canadian t e r r i t o r y  w ith few er tro o p s th an  
would be req u ired  to  ta k e  I to n tre a l.
K ingston, though 200 m iles u p r iv e r  from M ontreal, was a 
t a r g e t  o f  comparable im portance, and i t s  d is ta n c e  from th e  main 
Canadian base made i t  more d i f f i c u l t  to  d efend . With K ingston in  
American hands, th e  B r i t i s h  could n o t communicate w ith  th e  r e s t  o f  
Upper Canada o r even m ain tain  a  te n a b le  po st west o f  M ontreal, 
American su ccesses a t  F o r t Malden and N iagara would n o t be c a ta ­
s tro p h ic  fo r  th e  B r i t i s h .  But i f  th e  Americans could cap tu re  
Amherstburg and F o rt Malden and a ls o  sweep through th e  Niagara 
p en in su la  to  B u rlin g to n  o r  York, th e y  would detach  th e  Ontario 
p en in su la  from B r i t i s h  c o n tro l  and g a in  t e r r i t o r y  fo r  annexation
^^F rederick  De Gaugreben, Memoir on th e  P laces  Which 
Ought t o  be F o r t i f ie d  fo r  th e  Defence o f Lower Canada, 1 Je 1815,
(F) M ilita ry  and Naval F ig u res , N ineteenth  Century Pre-C onfederation  
Papers, MG 24 (PAC). Gaugreben was a  c a p ta in  in  th e  King’s German 
Legion who served  in  th e  Canadas i n  th e  War o f  1812.
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or as a  pawn in  n e g o tia tio n s . The r e g io n 's  p o pu lation  was predom inantly  
immigrant American, With t h e i r  re a r  secu re , t h i s  area  could  be more 
e a s i ly  defended a g a in s t  B r i t i s h  co u n ters tro k es  from  the  e a s t  over long  
l in e s  o f  o p e ra tio n s ,
V\/hat would have been th e  b est American s tra te g y ?  Geography, 
supply, and th e  apparen t l im ite d  n a tu re  o f th e  war seemed to  make 
p laces r a th e r  tlian arm ies th e  most im portan t m i l i t a ry  o b je c t iv e s .
V/ith l im ite d  human and m a te ria l  reso u rces  the  U nited S ta te s  had l i t t l e  
chance o f  succeeding in  the  e a s t  and west sim ultaneously . I t  was 
im perative fo r  Americans to  d ecide on a  p r io r i t y  o b je c tiv e , e i th e r  
M ontreal o r  the  p o in ts  west o f  i t ,  M ontreal promised th e  g re a te s t  
r e s u l t s ,  bu t was more d i f f i c u l t  to  ta k e  given th e  l o g is t i c a l  r e a l i ­
t i e s  and Prévost ' s s tr a te g y ,  A g rea t d e a l  depended on American 
p o lic y . Was i t  to  conquer a l l  o f  B r i t i s h  North America? The cap­
tu re  o f  M ontreal m ight have r e s u lte d  in  th e  conquest of Upper Canada, 
but not o f  Lower Canada o r th e  î-ïaritim es. Was th e  p o licy  to  gain 
t e r r i t o r y  fo r  annexation  o r a s  a hostage to  win m aritim e concessions?
In  th a t  case  the conquest o f  only  p a rt  o f  Upper Canada might s u f f ic e .
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"CANADA! —CANADA! —CANADA! '»
The American d e c is io n  to  invade th e  Canadas may be viewed a s  
I g ra n d -s tra te g ic  d e c is io n . IVhat were th e  reasons behind i t ?  I f
the  answer might l i e  in  th e  i d e n t i f ic a t io n  o f American p o lic y  | 
H is to r ia n s , wi.o a r e  r e lu c ta n t  to  accep t th e  s ta tem en ts o f  p o l i t ic ia n s  
a t  face  va lue , have d isag reed  over American p o lic y  goals in  th e  War 
o f 1812, They have tended to  d iscu ss  th ese  w ith in  the  co n tex t of 
th e  causes o f th e  American d e c la ra t io n  o f war a g a in s t  B r i ta in ,  The 
p r in c ip le  of lo g ic  i s  th a t  i f  th e  r e a l  causes o f  vmr a re  uncovered 
then i t  follows th a t  th e  r e a l  p o licy  o b jec tiv e s  a re  to o . The b asic  
po in t o f  co n ten tio n  has been vdiether "Canada" was a means to  an end 
or an end in  i t s e l f .
N in e teen th -cen tu ry  h is to r ia n s ,  follow ing th e  argument in  
P re sid e n t I-]adison*s war message, s tr e s s e d  American concern over 
B r i t i s h  maritime p o lic y , Canada was b u t a means to  th e  end o f 
defending American n e u tra l  r ig h t s .  But in  th e  second and th i r d  
decades o f  th is  cen tu ry , when h is to r ia n s  were in c l in e d  to  peer be­
neath su rface  ev en ts  and seek  out economic m otives, D. R, Anderson, 
Howard T, Lewis, Louis M. Hacker, and J u lia s  W, P r a t t  rev iv ed  the
^Hart, S tra te g y . 351,
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ex p an sio n ist theme vrtiich John Randolph o f  Roanoke had so eloquently- 
o r ig in a te d  in  1611, In  a speech befo re  th e  House in  December 1811 
t h a t  was c r i t i c a l  o f th e  Foreign R ela tio n s  Committee’s re p o r t  recom­
mending an augmented m il i t a ry  e s tab lish m en t, Randolph d e liv e re d  one 
o f  h is  most memorable o r a to r ic a l  f lo u r is h e s :  "A grarian c u p id ity ,
not m aritim e r ig h t ,  u rges th e  w ar. Ever s in ce  th e  rep o r t . . . came 
in to  th e  House, we have heard b u t one word—lik e  th e  vAiip-poor-w ill, 
bu t one e te r n a l  monotonous to n e—Canada!-—Canada!—Canada!" Only 
Lewis and Hacker among th e  r e v i s io n is t  h i s to r ia n s ,  and th o se  o th ers  
who adopted th e  r e v i s io n is t  in te r p re ta t io n ,  proposed a g ra r ia n  c u p id ity  
as th e  cause o f  war, b u t th e  e s s e n t ia l  theme o f a l l  was th a t  aggres­
s iv e  design  in  Canada was th e  r e a l  b a s is  fo r  th e  demand fo r  war 
a g a in s t  B r i ta in .  Like Randolph, the  r e v i s io n is ts  a ls o  thought they  
perceived  s e c t io n a l  support fo r  war from th e  West and th e  South.
Although th ey  d i f fe re d  on c e r ta in  d e ta i ls  and la id  s t r e s s  on 
some fa c to rs  above o th e rs ,  th e  r e v i s io n i s t s '  ex p lan a tio n  fo r  th e  
coming o f th e  war included  th ese  ex p a n sio n is tic  reaso n s; W estern 
lu s t  fo r  Canadian a g r ic u ltu r a l  lan d ; th e  hope o f  removing In d ian  
o b s tru c tio n  to  westward expansion by removing t h e i r  B r i t i s h  a l l i e s  
from Canada; th e  suppression  o f  th e  B r i t i s h  Northwest fu r  t ra d e ;
"a d o u b le -b a rre lle d  scheme o f t e r r i t o r i a l  aggrandizem ent" in  F lo rid a  
and Canada; and th e  d e s ir e  to  annex Canada and extend repu b lican  
i n s t i t u t io n s  throughout North America—an am bition l a t e r  known as 
"m an ifest d e s tin y ."  The conquest o f Canada was th u s  an end in  i t ­
s e l f .  In  th e  1930's th e  ex p an sio n ist argument enjoyed wide accep t­
ance among h i s to r ia n s ,  e s p e c ia lly  as  p resen ted  by P r a t t ,  whose 
th e s i s  wove to g e th e r  th e  themes o f  a North-South s e c t io n a l  b a rg a in
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fo r  t e r r i t o r i a l  g a in  in  Canada and F lo rid a , removal o f th e  Indian  
t h re a t  to  westward expansion, and m an ifes t d e s tin y .  P r a t t  d id  not 
o f fe r  th ese  as  so le  causes o f  th e  war, but he f a i l e d  to  emphasize 
o th e rs  as p a rt o f  th e  e n t i r e  p ic tu r e ,^
Since 1941, with th e  p u b lic a tio n  o f Warren H. Goodman's 
h i s to r io g ra p h ic a l  a r t i c l e  on th e  o r ig in s  of th e  war, h is to r ia n s  have 
re-exam ined th e  sources, uncovered new ones, re -e v a lu a te d  in te r p re ­
t a t i o n s ,  and p resen ted  re v ise d  sy n th eses . The r e s u l t  has been a 
re tu rn  to  th e  g e n e ra l m aritim e l in e  o f  argument advanced in  th e  
n in e te e n th  ce n tu ry  and an attem pt to  p lac e  th e  w hippoorw ill c ry  fo r  
Canada in  i t s  p ro p er c a u sa l p e rsp e c tiv e . The post-Goodman rev is io n ­
i s t s ,  o r  ’'r e v e r s e - r e v i s io n is ts ,” have s tr iv e n  to  avoid , however, th e  
t ra p  o f  monocausationism^ t h a t  P ra tt  and the ex p an sio n ist r e v i s io n is ts  
had a p p a re n tly  f a l l e n  in to ,  Bradford Perk ins denied  the  ex is te n ce  o f  
a s e c t io n a l  co n sp iracy  but conceded th e r e  were s e c t io n a l  reasons fo r  
urg ing  th e  conquest o f Canada: "W esterners sought to  end th e  Indian
menace. S outherners conceivably  hoped to  purchase support f o r  th e i r  
F lo rid a  aims by backing war a g a in st Canada, some N ortherners be­
lie v e d  annexation  would s h i f t  the  c e n te r  o f power w ith in  th e  Union to  
the  f r e e  s ta t e s , " ^  Reginald Horsman adm itted  t h a t  " B r it ish  in s t ig a -
^For re fe re n c e s , see  Warren H, Goodman, "The O rig ins o f  th e  
War o f  1812; A Survey o f Changing I n te r p re ta t io n s ,"  I^ is s is s ip p i  V alley  
H is to r ic a l  Review. XXVIII (S ept 1941), 171-86. On P r a tt ,  see  Bradford 
P e rk in s , Prologue to  War: England and th e  United S ta te s .  1805-1812
(B erkeley , 1961), fn , 55, 289,
^On m onocausationism , see Thomas A, B a ile y , "The Kythmakers 
of American H is to ry ,"  Jo u rn a l o f American H is to ry . LV (Je  1968), 15,
^Prologue to  War. 289,
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t io n  o f  th e  In d ian s  was an added i r r i t a n t , " ^  and Eoger Brown did  not 
deny t h a t  fo r  some Americans annexation  and m an ifes t d e s tin y  were 
added inducements f o r  w ar,^
On the o th e r  hand, P erk ins m ain tained  t h a t  in  s p i te  o f  f re ­
quent v o c a l m an ifes ta tio n s  o f  ag g ress iv e  in te n t ,  "most re fe ren c e s  to  
Canada sim ply p o in te d  to  i t  a s  the  e a s ie s t  t a r g e t  fo r  American power." 
Horsman found th a t  in  a l l  t h e i r  speeches, th e  advocates o f  war dwelt 
on m aritim e f a c to rs  in  o f fe r in g  reasons fo r  war and only a rgued the  
m erits  o f  invading  Canada in  d isc u ss in g  methods o f  waging i t .  Brown 
in s i s te d  th a t  Republicans would have g iven  t h e i r  vo tes  fo r  war—and 
ap p a re n tly  d id—w ithout assu ran ces  o f  annexation."^
The consensus i s  t h a t  B r i t i s h  m aritim e p o lic y —and American 
in te r p re ta t io n s  o f  i t s  m otives, i n ju s t i c e ,  i l l e g a l i t y ,  and harm ful
"V/estern War Aims, 1811-1812," Indiana I'lagazine o f  H is to ry . 
L III  (Mar 1957), 18, Horsman ' s major work on th e  su b jec t i s  The 
Causes o f  th e  War o f  1812 (P h ila d e lp h ia ,  1962).
^The Republic in  P e r i l ;  1812 (New York, 1964), 108-30. In  
a d d it io n ;  "For some Republicans . . . .  annexation  would se v er B r i t i s h  
co n tac t w ith  the  north w este rn  In d ian s , perm it u n re s t r ic te d  American 
n a v ig a tio n  of th e  S t .  law rence R iver, a ffo rd  new f a c i l i t i e s  t o  th e  New 
England f is h in g  in d u s try , secu re  the  n a tio n  from B r i t i s h  in tr ig u e  and 
esp ionage, b ring  new revenue from t r a d e ,  remove a com petito r in  the  
fu r  t r a d e ,  provide new farm la n d , and add p o l i t i c a l  power t o  th e  
no rth ern  sec tio n  o f  th e  Union." To some R epublicans th ese  were bene­
f i t s  o f  i n t r in s i c  and p o l i t i c a l  (p a r t is a n )  v a lu e . Ib id . , 120-21,
Henry C lay  o ffe re d  y e t  an o th er reason f o r  invading  Canada; i t  would 
bring  an end to  smuggling a c ro ss  th e  b o rd e r . Speech, 22 Feb 1810,
The P apers o f Henry Clay, ed . James F. Hopkins and Mary W. M. Har- 
greaves (L exington, 1959), I ,  450. Dozens o f  reaso n s were o ffe re d  
fo r  c o n q u erii^  Canada, and i f  conquest d id  not se rv e  to  win m ari­
tim e concessio n s, i t  was a rg u ed , America would have Canada, Another 
im portan t r e v e r s e - r e v is io n is t  i s  Norman K, R is jo rd : "1812: Con­
s e rv a t iv e s ,  War Hawks, and th e  N a tio n 's  Honor," W illiam  and Mary 
Q u a r te r ly , 3rd S e r . ,  XVIII (Apr 1961), 196-210; and The Old Repub­
l ic a n s ;  Southern Conservatism  in  th e  Age o f  J e ffe rso n  (New Y o r k .1965).
Republic in  P e r i l , 126, 130.
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consequences—was th e  casus b e l l i . D esp ite  rep ea ted  ex p ress io n s  o f 
e x p an sio n ist d esig n , Americans urged th e  invasion  o f  Canada p r im a rily  
as th e  m il i t a ry  means o f  c a rry in g  on th e  s tru g g le  fo r  m aritim e r ig h ts  
and n a tio n a l  honor, "The c e n tr a l ,  u n iv e rsa l  them e," Perk ins found, 
"was s t r i k e  a t  Canada, th e  most v u ln erab le  B r i t i s h  t a r g e t ,  th e  e a s i ­
e s t way to  i n f l i c t  punishment and e x to r t  c o n cessio n ."^  The f in d in g s  
o f th e  r e v e r s e - r e v is io n is ts ,  P erk in s  concluded w ith  a m il i t a ry  mis­
nomer, dem onstrate th a t  th e  conquest o f  Canada was a " ta c t ic a l  objec­
t iv e ." ^  With e b u J lie n t confidence, most Americans b e liev ed  th a t  
B r i ta in  could be hu m ilia ted  and t h a t  Canada would become a hostage 
fo r  which B r i ta in  would pay a d ip lom atic  p r ic e .  The re v e rs e -  
re v is  i o n is t  s seem to  be saying t h a t  a  v a r ie ty  o f non-m aritim e and 
e x p an sio n ist m otives d id  e x is t  f o r  th e  conquest o f  Canada, b u t th a t  
th e se  were n o t c a u sa lly  s ig n i f ic a n t .  As Horsman argued , th e  oppor­
tu n i ty  o f  p rev en tin g  fu r th e r  In d ian  dep red a tio n s  and o f ga in in g  con­
t r o l  o f  th e  f u r  t ra d e , fo r  example, were n o t s u f f ic ie n t  reaso n s fo r  
th e  d e c la ra t io n  o f war,^®
I t  may be doubted whether th e  re c e n t r e v i s io n is ts  have s ig ­
n i f i c a n t ly  c la r i f i e d  th e  issu e  o f  c a u sa tio n , however. Ifhat i s  th e  
d iffe re n c e  between "reasons"  and "causes"? I f  th e  e x p an sio n ist 
m otives were n o t " s u f f ic ie n t"  reasons o r cau ses , were th ey  nev e rth e ­
l e s s  c au sa l fa c to rs ?  Moreover, where in  th e  c au sa l sequence should
'P e rk in s  ( e d , ) .  The Causes o f  th e  War o f 1812: N atio n a l
Honor o r  N a tio n a l I n te r e s t?  (New York, 1962), 6 and 96,
^C a u s e s  o f  th e  War of 1812. 183,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
th e  a d d it io n a l  fa c to rs  which th ey  have added to  th e  h is to r io g ra p h y  
o f  th e  coming o f  th e  war be p laced? P erk ins d isc u sse s  th e  ro le  o f  
tra g e d y , i ro n y , lack  o f  ex ecu tive le a d e rsh ip , p a rty  lo y a l ty ,  and p re ­
paredness l e g i s la t io n .  Brown emphasizes th e  importance o f th e  Repub­
l ic a n  p a r ty 's  concern f o r  the  s u rv iv a l  o f  th e  American experiment in  
repub lican ism  in  the  fac e  o f th e  B r i t i s h  ch a lle n g e . The rev e rs e -  
r e v i s io n is t  s have succeeded w ell in  q u a lify in g  P r a t t 's  conclusions 
and in  e la b o ra tin g  th e  m u lt ifa r io u s  events and fo rces  im pelling  th e  
U nited S ta te s  and B r i ta in  toward w ar. But i t  does seem to  be th e  
case  t h a t  th e y  a re  j u s t  a s  g u i l ty  a s  P ra tt  o f  o v e rs tre s s in g  one s e t  
o f  c a u sa l f a c to rs  a t  th e  expense o f  o th ers ,^   ̂ The most balanced 
p o in t o f  view may s t i l l  be th a t  o f  th e  n in e te e n th -c en tu ry  h i s to r ia n ,  
Henry Adams, who im plied  th a t  th e re  would have been no war had th e  
B r i t i s h  rep ea led  th e  O rders in  C ouncil e a r l i e r  than  th e y  d id , b u t 
conceded th a t  th e  aim o f  conquering Canada was a c o n tr ib u to ry  cause 
o f  w ar.^^
O r ig in a lly , a d m in is tra t io n  lead e rs  may have understood con­
q uest p r im a ri ly  in  term s o f  winning m aritime concessions more th a n  
in  term s o f annexation  o r  o f  f i n a l ly  e lim in a tin g  th e  B r i t i s h  from 
North America, At l e a s t  th e  advocates o f  war in s i s te d  t h i s  was th e  
case  i n  defending  t h e i r  advocacy a g a in s t  c r i t i c s .  But Monroe ad­
m itte d  in  1812 th a t  a su c ce ss fu l in v asio n  m ight make i t  " d i f f i c u l t
Harry L, C o les, The War o f  1812 (Chicago, 1965), 27-37î and B ra n t, 
James >îadison. VI, 13-21.
, , . r a th e r  than  a method o f ca rry in g  on a  s tru g g le  fo r  
o th e r  rea so n s ,"  Goodman, "O rig ins o f  the  War o f 1812," 173.
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t o  re l in q u is h  t e r r i t o r y  which had been c o n q u e r e d . R o g e r  Brovm 
quoted Speaker Clay t o  prove t h a t  C ongressional hawks thought th a t  
"Canada was not th e  end but th e  means," Brown, however, d iscoun ted
C la y 's  n ex t sen ten ce : "But i t  has ever been my o p in ion  th a t  i f
Canada i s  conquered i t  ought never to  be su rrendered  i f  i t  can 
p o ss ib ly  be re ta in e d .  R e la tio n s  and connexions w i l l  take  p lac e
which ought not to  be broken, in  the  event o f  i t s  co n q u est,"^^  An
a d d it io n a l  fa c to r  i n  th e  c a u sa l equation  has rece iv ed  in s u f f ic ie n t  
a t t e n t io n .  In so fa r  a s  Americans were co n fid en t th e y  could ta k e  
Canada, t h i s  b e l i e f ,  o r  s tr a te g y ,  convinced many le a d e rs  o f th e  
e ff ic a c y  o f  war, and e s p e c ia lly  as  a g a in s t  B r i ta in  and not F rance,^^  
As Clay commented to  a  f r ie n d : "The one we can s t r i k e ,  the  o th e r  we
cannot rea c h .
The r e v e r s e - r e v is io n is ts ,  moreover, have im plied  th a t  because 
th e  e s s e n t ia l  causes o f  th e  war were m aritim e, B r i ta in  r a th e r  th an
Jonathan R u sse ll, 26 Je 1812, The W ritings o f  James • 
Monroe, ed . S ta n is la u s  K. Ham ilton (New York, 1901), V, 213.
Thomas Bodley, 18 Dec 1813, Papers (ed . Hopkins), I ,
342. See Brown, Republic in  P e r i l . 129-30. Should we take men a t
t h e i r  word a s  Brown recommends? Obviously, what i s  needed a re  more
s tu d ie s  o f  in d iv id u a l  and group opin ions w ith  assessm ents o f  t h e i r  
in flu e n c e . One f a c t  stands o u t; men were m otivated toward war fo r  
many reaso n s which cannot be d ivorced  from  one an o th e r ,
 ̂^ S tra te g y  played  ju s t  a s  much a p a r t  in  th e  coming o f  th e  
War of 1812 and in  shaping p o lic y  as i t  d id  in  th e  Spanish-American 
war. Aside from th e  grand s tr a te g y  o f  ta k in g  Canada, Lawrence 
Kaplan has shown th a t  since  France was a t  war w ith B r i ta in ,  Repub­
l ic a n s  b e lie v e d  "France would th u s  f a c i l i t a t e  th e  waging o f a suc­
c e s s fu l  o ffe n s iv e  a g a in s t  B r i ta in ,  w ith th e  p ro sp ec ts  o f  a quick  
and p a in le s s  v ic to ry ,"  "France and M adison 's D ecision  fo r  War, 1812,' 
M is s iss ip p i V alley H is to r ic a l  Review. L (I4ar 1964), 6 6 l.
’ ^To [ ? ] ,  18 Je  1812, Papers (ed . Hopkins), I ,  674.
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th e  United S ta te s  was th e  a g g re sso r, W illiam  A. W illiam s, however, 
has made a s trong  case fo r  view ing th e  s tru g g le  a s  "a c la s s ic  war 
f o r  tra d e  and t e r r i t o r y , "  He quotes Randolph' s o b se rv a tio n  th a t  
' " i t  was our own t h i r s t  fo r  t e r r i t o r y ,  our own want o f m o d era tio n ,' 
th a t  provoked the  In d ia n s ,"  American m aritim e g o a ls , W illiams a rg u es , 
were to  win free  a ccess  to  world m arkets and commercial and manufac­
tu rin g  independence from B r i ta in ,  From t h i s  p o in t o f  view , both 
B r i ta in  and th e  U nited S ta te s  were ag g ress iv e  ( i f  not a g g re sso rs)— 
B r ita in , w ith  i t s  cla im s to  commercial dominance, and th e  United 
S ta te s ,  w ith  i t s  p re te n tio n s  to  power and impulse to  expand.
Their com petition  f o r  m arkets and c o n tro l  o f  th e  c o n tin en t erupted 
in to  war a s  th a t  co m petition  was p u lled  deeper in to  th e  maelstrom 
o f  the  European c o n f l i c t .  The B r i t i s h  (and th e  Ind ians) stood in  
th e  way o f  American economic and t e r r i t o r i a l  expansion, and n e ith e r  
th ey  nor th e  Americans would y ie ld .
Summary i s  n e c e s s a r ily  o v e rs im p lif ic a t io n , but c e r ta in ly  
Brown, P e rk in s , and Horsman have o v e rs tre sse d  th e  poin t t h a t  Ameri­
cans chose to  invade Canada because i t  was th e  e a s ie s t  t a r g e t  fo r  
American power or because B r i ta in  was most v u ln erab le  th e r e .  In 
t h i s  view , th e  conquest o f Canada was th e  grand s tr a te g y  designed
The Contours o f  American H is to ry . Quadrangle Paperbacks 
(Chicago, 1966) ,  192- 96 , See h is :  The Shaping o f  American Diplomacy 
(Chicago, 1956) ,  chap , i i i ;  "The Age o f  M ercantilism : An I n te r p re ta ­
t io n  o f th e  American P o l i t i c a l  Economy, 1763-1028," W illiam  and Mary 
Q u a r te r ly . 3rd S e r , ,  ZV (Oct 1958), 419-37; and The Tragedy o f  Ameri­
can Diplomacy (C leveland , 1959), 25-26, See a ls o :  M adison's Third 
Annual Message, 5 Nov 1811, and Address to  th e  House o f  Representa­
t iv e s  o f South C a ro lin a , 8 Jan  1812, The W ritings o f  James Madison. 
ed. G a illa rd  Hunt (New York, 1908), V I I I ,  161-65, and 174-75, Note 
th e  r e la t io n s h ip  Monroe makes between t ra d e  and th e  a c q u is i tio n  o f 
t e r r i t o r y  in  h is  l e t t e r  to  R u sse ll ,  23 Je  1813, W ritings (ed , 
H am ilton), V, 367,
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to  achieve th e  re d re s s  o f m aritim e grievances and r e s to ra t io n  of 
n a tio n a l  honor, "No one b e lie v e d ,"  Brown concluded, "the war should 
be continued  s o le ly  fo r  Canada alone once Great B r i ta in  had shown 
w illin g n e ss  to  s e t t l e  th e  m aritim e issues,"^®
The h is to ry  o f  the  fo rm ula tion  o f  s tr a te g y  suggests o th er 
reasons f o r  choosing to  a tta c k  th e  Canadas, On June 1, fo r  example, 
th e  very day th a t  Madison d e liv e re d  h is  war message to  Congress, 
S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  Itonroe and S e c re ta ry  o f  the  T reasury  A lb e rt G alla ­
t i n  made a l a s t  m inute a ttem pt to  win C ongressional approval o f a 
change in  grand s tr a te g y ,  Monroe asked G a lla t in  t o  approach th e  
members o f  th e  Foreign  R e la tio n s  Committee and o th e r  lea d e rs  o f  
Congress regard ing  h is  c o n v ic tio n  " th a t  i t  i s  v e ry  im portant to  a t ­
tempt a t  p re se n t,  th e  m aritim e war o n ly ,"  ̂^ G a l la t in  acceded, and 
th e re  i s  some evidence th a t  Fladison and o th er members o f th e  Cabinet 
shared Monroe's b e la te d  doubts about a Canadian in v as io n . But the  
lead in g  "war hav^s," W illiam  Lowndes, W illiam  H, Crawford, George 
Campbell, and George Bibb, r e je c te d  M onroe's p ro p o sa l. T h e ir  reasons 
were p o l i t i c a l  and m il i t a ry .  P o l i t i c a l :  t h e i r  c o n s ti tu e n ts  were not
in  immediate danger from a n o rth e rn  war as  were th e  re s id e n ts  o f some 
N orthern s t a t e s ,  and th e  Republican p a r ty  would s tan d  to  lo s e  l i t t l e  
i n  those s ta t e s  should war b r in g  i t s  rav ag es , because th e re  th e  Fed­
e r a l i s t  p a r ty  was p r a c t ic a l ly  n o n -e x is te n t .  B esides, to  have ab ru p tly
causes o r th e  reasons fo r  a tta c k in g  Canada cannot be divorced  from 
th e  causes o r  the  reasons fo r  war.
a scrib ed  to  an a ttem pt to  win F e d e ra l is t  support an4  in  gen e ra l, to  
" la s t-m in u te  m isg iv ings ."  P e rk in s , Prologue to  War, 402-403.
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a l te r e d  th e  "c h a ra c te r  o f  th e  war in  th e  way proposed would be a 
d ishonorab le  r e t r e a t  from an advanced p o s i t io n ,"  e v in c in g , they  f e l t ,  
lack  o f  firm ness in  American rep u b lican  government, t i i l i t a r y ;  o n ly  
the  d e s tru c tio n  o f  the  In d ian  rendezvous a t  Amherstburg, th e  occupa­
t io n  o f  Canadian t e r r i t o r y ,  and th e  severance o f  B r i t i s h  con tact w ith  
th e  Ind ians would re l ie v e  th e  Northwest from th e  th re a t  o f  Ind ian  and 
B r i t i s h  a t t a c k s .  " I f  th e  government r e s t r i c te d  h o s t i l i t i e s  to  th e  
sea, th e y  argued, th e  f r o n t ie r  would s t i l l  s u f f e r  from Ind ian  a tta c k s  
i n s t ig a te d  by th e  B r i t i s h .  Was i t  n o t b e t t e r  to  put an end to  th e s e  
a t ta c k s  a lto g e th e r  by s t r ik in g  a t  th e  h ea rt o f  th e  tro u b le ?"
The advocates o f  war had long  assumed and urged th a t  th e  in v a ­
sion  o f  B r i t i s h  North America was an in d isp en sab le  component o f Ameri­
can grand s tr a te g y  once war began. In  A p ril and May some o f th e  more 
a rd en t war hawks, along w ith  th o se  Americans e q u a lly  incensed  a g a in s t  
B r i ta in  and F rance , did q u ix o tic a l ly  recommend a " tr ia n g u la r  war" w ith 
both a n ta g o n is ts .  Some fa c e tio u s  opponents o f  th e  a d m in is tra tio n  had 
c a v a l ie r ly  jo in ed  in  th e  demand in  an e f f o r t  t o  render th e  war s p i r i t  
a red u c io  ad absurdum. Madison found i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  make a c le a r  
d e c is io n , but f in a l ly  r e je c te d  th e  p roposal a s  fraugh t w ith  too 
many obvious co m plica tions.^^
"the tim e has come fo r  us to  r e le g a te  a  m isleading  term — 'th e  war 
hawks o f  1812'—to  the  rea lm  o f p a r t i s a n  m isunderstanding  and 
h i s t o r ic a l  m ythology," I b id . . 66. More th an  any o th e r  h is to r ia n  
o f  th e  causes o f  th e  war, Brovm co n sid e rs  th e  ro le  o f s tr a te g y ,  
but i n  th e  a u th o r 's  op in ion  he n e g le c ts  i t s  f u l l  s ig n if ic a n c e  
reg a rd in g  the  cho ice  o f  Canada, m i l i t a ry  aim s, and p o lic y  g o a ls .
^^Ib id . ,  119-20; P e rk in s , Prologue to  War. 398-99. P e rk in s ' 
Madison i s  l e s s  su re -fo o te d  than  Brow n's, On t h i s  q u e s tio n , see 
Madison to  J e ffe rs o n , 25 My 1812, W ritings (ed . Hunt), V I I I ,  190-92.
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D esp ite  l a s t  minute h e s i ta t io n ,  a  grand s tr a te g y  had a lre a d y  
been determ ined , and a  m il i t a ry  s tr a te g y  had been fo rm ulated , even 
though o n ly  vaguely, to  accom plish th e  grand s tr a te g y .  U sually  
a t t r ib u t e d  to  Major General Henry Dearborn, i t  was a c tu a l ly  th e  
product o f  th e  id ea s  and recommendations o f  sev ei'a l in d iv id u a ls  s in ce  
a t  le a s t  a s  e a r ly  a s  180?.
In  Ju ly  1807, sh o r t ly  a f t e r  th e  Chesapeake in c id e n t o f  June 22, 
P resid en t J e ffe rso n  revea led  t o  th e  French m in is te r ,  Louis Marie 
T urreau, h i s  in te n t io n  to  " ta k e  Canada" i f  th e  "E nglish  do n o t give 
us th e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  we demand, On J u ly  25, d u ring  th e  h e ig h t of 
th e  c r i s i s .  S e c re ta ry  o f  th e  T reasury  G a l la t in  subm itted to  th e  
P re s id e n t,  ap p a re n tly  on h is  own i n i t i a t i v e ,  a "Memorandum o f  P repara­
to r y  Measures which may be adopted by th e  E xecutive in  r e l a t i o n  to  
w ar, d e fen siv e  and o f fe n s iv e ."  G a lla t in  recommended o ffen s iv e  opera­
t io n s  in  th e  f a l l  and in to  th e  w in ter  a g a in s t  a l l  o f  B r i t i s h  North 
America—Upper Canada, Lower Canada, New Brunswick, Nova S c o tia ,  
and Newfoundland. H is p lan  was extrem ely am bitious and even included 
a t ta c k s  on th e  is la n d s  o f  Grand Bahama and New Providence.
Quoted in  Adams, H is to ry  o f th e  United S t a te s . TV, 36.
In  September 1807 S e c re ta ry  o f  War Dearborn o b tained  a d e ta i le d  
d e s c r ip tio n  o f  Upper Canada and i t s  d e fe n se s . L a fay e tte  w rote 
Je ffe rso n  i n  th e  same month t h a t  th e  conquest o f Canada would 
p reven t a l l  a tta c k s  from th a t  q u a r te r .  A rthur Campbell o f Tennessee 
suggested th e  same and added t h a t  " i t  w i l l  be a sublim e sp e c ta c le  to  
spread l i b e r t y  and c iv i l i z a t i o n  in  th a t  v a s t  co u n try , Canada."  
Quoted in  Horsman, Causes o f th e  War o f 1812. 169. Goodman found 
th a t  "one e d ito r  [Richmond E n q u ire r . Jy  7 ] went so f a r  as  t o  p resen t 
a  d e ta i le d  p lan  fo r  m il i ta ry  o p e ra tio n s  a g a in s t Canada," "O rig ins 
o f  th e  War o f  1812," fn . 25, 177.
( P h ila d e lp h ia ,  1879), I ,  340-53.
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J e ffe rs o n  had to ld  Turreau  th a t  Canada "wants to  e n te r  th e  
Union; and when to g e th e r  w ith Canada, we s h a l l  have th e  F lo rid a s , 
we s h a l l  no lo n g er have any d i f f i c u l t i e s  w ith  our neighbors; and i t  
i s  th e  only  way o f p reven ting  them ," Whether by "Canada" J e ffe rs o n  
meant a l l  o f  B r i t i s h  North America i s  not c e r ta in .  Five y e a rs  l a t e r  
he spoke to  P re sid e n t Madison o f  occupying th e  Canadas only a s  f a r  
e a s t  as  T ro is  R iv ie re s ,  between M ontreal and Q u e b e c , N o r  i s  i t  
c le a r  whether G a l la t in 's  s tr a te g y  was designed  p r im a ri ly  to  rec e iv e  
"Canada" in to  th e  un ion . His memorandum was a m il i t a ry ,  n o t a  
p o l i t i c a l ,  document.
In  th e  event o f  war, G a l la t in  s tr e s s e d  th e  n e c e s s i ty  o f  
adop ting  d e fen siv e  measures a long th e  A t la n tic  c o a st a g a in s t th e  
c e r ta in ty  o f  B r i t i s h  r a id s ,  id ii le  "the  n o rth e rn  o r  Ind ian  f r o n t ie r  
[was] to  be considered  i n  connection  w ith p rep a ra tio n s  fo r  a t t a c k ,"
He regarded  Quebec as  th e  most im portan t o ffe n s iv e  ta r g e t .  I t s  
c ap tu re  would sever B r i t i s h  communications w ith  th e  Western In d ian s  
and w ith  Upper Canada, I f  tak en  b efo re  w in te r , th e  B r i t i s h  would 
p robably  have to  evacuate Lower Canada and could n o t c o u n te ra tta ck  
u n t i l  a t  l e a s t  th e  fo llow ing  y e a r .  But due to  th e  la te n e ss  o f  the  
campaigning season and th e  o b s ta c le s  p resen ted  by th e  Kennebec River 
in v as io n  approach, he doubted th a t  Quebec could be se ized  b e fo re  win­
t e r .  M ontreal th u s  became "th e  g re a t  p o in t o f  a t t a c k ,"  and i t  could 
be approached r e l a t i v e ly  e a s i ly  by th e  Lake Chançlain ro u te . Al­
though American aims cou ld  more e f f ic a c io u s ly  be achieved  a t  Quebec,
^ 6  Nov 1812, James Madison Papers, S e r, 2 (M anuscript 
D iv is io n , L ib ra ry  o f  C ongress),
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th e  cap tu re  o f  M ontreal and an advance as f a r  as T ro is  R iv ieres  
would serve th e  purpose more th an  a d eq u ate ly . Another b e n e fi t  o f  an 
o ffe n s iv e  d ire c te d  a g a in s t  Quebec o r  M ontreal was t h a t  i t  f ix e d  th e  
scene o f  c o n f l i c t  in  Canadian t e r r i t o r y  and helped r e s t r i c t  B r i t i s h  
in cu rs io n s  on American s o i l  a long th e  A tla n t ic  seaco ast and th e  
n o r th e rn  f r o n t ie r .
In  th e  meantime, sim ultaneous o ffe n s iv e s  were to  be launched 
a g a in s t  K ingston, N iagara , and F o r t Malden. The K ingston in v asio n  
would augment th e  a tta c k  on M ontreal, The cap tu re  o f  Niagara and 
Malden were n ecessa ry  " in  o rder t o  cover o u r no rth e rn  f ro n t ie r  and 
to  r u in  th e  B r i t i s h  fu r  t r a d e ,"  Subsequent o p e ra tio n s  in  Upper 
Canada would be d ire c te d  a g a in s t p o in ts  west o f  th e  D e tro it  f ro n ­
t i e r  along th e  shores o f  Lakes Huron and M ichigan w ith  th e  aim  o f  
d is ru p tin g  th e  fu r  t r a d e .  The e s tab lish m en t o f  a sm all naval fo rc e  
in  th e s e  lak e s  soon a f t e r  su c ce ss fu l m i l i t a ry  o p e ra tio n s  would serve  
th e  purpose o f  securing  th e  w estern  country  ag a in s t In d ia n s , Even­
tu a l l y ,  but a s  soon as p o ss ib le  and perhaps i n  the  sp r in g . New 
Brunswick and Nova S c o tia  would have to  be cap tu red  in  o rd er to  
sev er B r i t i s h  connections between th e  M aritim es and Quebec and to  
deny th e  B r i t i s h  th e  im portan t n a v a l base o f  H a lifax , from where 
th ey  were in  e x c e lle n t  p o s it io n  to  blockade American seap o rt towns 
and c i t i e s .
In  sum, G a l la t in  thought i t  p o ss ib le  to  conquer B r i t i s h  
North America from Lake Michigan t o  Trois R iv ie re s  b e fo re  w in te r , 
w ithou t th e  a id  o f  n av a l fo rces  upon th e  l a k e s ,  and t o  hold t h i s  
t e r r i t o r y  w ith  n o t more th an  5,000 men. The m il i ta ry  aims o f th e  
o ffe n s iv e s  were to ;  defend th e  noidihern f r o n t ie r  a g a in s t  B r i t i s h
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and In d ia n  in cu rs io n s  by ta k in g  th e  i n i t i a t i v e  and B r i t i s h  t e r r i t o r y ;  
e s ta b l is h  the  scene o f c o n f l i c t  in  th e  Canadas; and r e s t r i c t  B r i t i s h  
a b i l i t y  to  ra id  th e  A t la n tic  c o a st. C losely  a sso c ia te d  w ith  th e se  
aims, b u t probably  not e n t i r e ly  m il i t a ry ,  were th o se  o f  severing  
B r i t i s h  connections w ith th e  In d ian s , d es tro y in g  th e  B r i t i s h  fu r  
tra d e ,  and occupying and ho ld ing  as much B r i t i s h  s o i l  a s  p o ss ib le .
Were th e s e  l a t t e r  both m il i t a ry  aims and p o lic y  goals? G a lla tin  
o ffe re d  no c lu e , a s  he made no d i r e c t  a ttem pt in  h is  memorandum to  
r e la te  m il i t a ry  s tr a te g y  to  n a tio n a l  p o licy . But G a lla t in  and 
Je ffe rso n  undoubtedly understood vrtiat th e  r e l a t i o n  was. The u ltim a te  
aim was th e  conquest o f a l l  o f  B r i t i s h  North America,
Thus f iv e  years b e fo re  th e  outbreak  o f  war G a l la t in  had 
sketched the  o u t l in e s  o f an  American m il i ta ry  s tr a te g y .  He had 
id e n t i f i e d  the  im portan t p o in ts  o f a t t a c k ,  chosen the  in v asio n  ro u te s ,  
and suggested  th e  sources o f  manpower and s u p p lie s .  P laces  more th an  
arm ies were th e  most im portan t m i l i t a ry  aims, though G a l la t in 's  
plan was in  p a rt  designed to  b ring  American fo rc e s  to  g r ip s  with 
B r i t i s h  and Indian  fo rces  v/herever th e y  might b e . S ig n if ic a n t ly ,  
G a lla t in  appeared to  th in k  i t  unnecessary  fo r  Americans to  win n a v a l 
c o n tro l  o f  the  la k e s  b efo re  launching  m il i ta ry  a tta c k s .
H is to r ian s  have f a u l te d  American s t r a te g i s t s  f o r  f a i l in g  to  
a p p re c ia te  th e  most p ro p it io u s  o b je c tiv e s  in  B r i t i s h  North America, 
Said one c r i t i c :  "They had overlooked th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  h is to r ic
fro n t door to  Canada was t o  be found on Lake Champlain and not a t  
D e tro it  o r  N iagara , In  t h i s  view , th e  problem o f ta k in g  the
^ ^ F u lle r , The D ecisive  B a t tle s  o f  th e  United S ta te s  (London, 
1942), 81,
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Canadas was m etap h o rica lly  s im ila r  to  th e  hewing o f a t r e e :  "The
b e s t s tr a te g y  would have been to  co n cen trate  on severing  th e  tru n k  
a s  near th e  ro o ts  a s  p o s s ib le . . . . The tak in g  o f  M ontreal . . . 
would have assured  th e  f a l l  o f  a l l  t h a t  la y  above." There was no 
need to  waste men and reso u rces  west o f  M ontreal o r K i n g s t o n . B u t  
G a l la t in  and o th e r  American s t r a t e g i s t s  d id  not f a i l  to  a p p re c ia te  
th e  im portance o f  M ontreal, o r  fo r  t h a t  m atte r , Quebec and H a lifa x . 
G a lla t in  recommended a tta c k s  a g a in s t Malden and Niagara a s  comple­
m entary to  th e  m ajor o ffe n s iv e  a g a in s t M ontreal o r  Quebec. These 
would serv e  th e  d u a l purpose o f  more q u ick ly  b rin g in g  Upper Canada 
under American c o n tro l  and p reven ting  B r i t i s h  and Indian  ra id s  a long  
th e  f r o n t ie r .  They were a lso  based upon the  judgment t h a t  th e  men 
and su p p lie s  thrown a g a in s t Malden and Niagara would be drawn from 
th e  West and could n o t be used a g a in s t M ontreal anyway. Perhaps th e s e  
aims might j u s t  as w e ll have been achieved through an in v asio n  d i re c te d  
a g a in s t Ifo n trea l a lo n e , but G a lla t in  was co n fid en t th a t  American re so u r­
ces  were more th an  adequate t o  th e  f a i r l y  easy ta s k  o f conquering th e  
Canadas i n  one c a n ^ ig n  th rough se v e ra l  a tta c k s .
Nothing came o f  G a l la t in 's  p lan  in  1807. J e ffe rso n  pursued a
p o lic y  o f p eacefu l economic coerc ion  which endured in to  M adison's 
f i r s t  term . But by 1811 th e  two c o u n tr ie s  began to  d r i f t  toward w ar.
Congress renewed n o n-im porta tion  a g a in s t  B r i ta in  in  March on the
258-62. See a lso ;  Adams, H is to ry  o f th e  United S ta te s . VI, 317# 338, 
V II, 144-47, V III, 91 , 93, 99-102; B ran t, James Ifedison. VI, 46; 
Hitsman, In c re d ib le  War o f 1812. 240-41 ; Mahan, Sea Power. I ,  304-13, 
I I ,  29; G. P. S tacey , "An American P lan  fo r a Canadian Campaign . . . , "  
American H is to r ic a l  Review. XLVI (Jan  1941), 348-58.
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b a s is  o f th e  Cadore l e t t e r  o f  August 1810; th e  American m in is te r  to  
th e  Court o f  S t .  James, W illiam  Pinkney, l e f t  London in  February; 
B r i t i s h  s h ip s  hovered o f f  American harbors as  tra d e  resumed w ith  
France; Commodore John Rogers a ttack ed  th e  B r i t i s h  c o rv e tte  L i t t l e  
B e lt in  May in  response to  se iz u re s  and impressm ent; and though 
Madison r e t i r e d  to  h is  summer r e t r e a t  a t  M ontepelier in  Ju ly , he 
c a lle d  Congress in to  sess io n  f o r  November, a  month e a r l i e r  th an  u su a l. 
The P resid en t had a p p a re n tly  reso lv ed  to  f ig h t ,  b u t h is  message to  
Congress was le s s  th a n  a c la r io n  c a l l  f o r  r ig h te o u s  war. He d id  ask 
f o r  the  passage o f preparedness l e g i s la t io n  and w aited  while Congress 
m ight come to  the  same co n c lu sio n . R ecently  e le c ted  war havdcs,
B r i t i s h  in tra n s ig e n c e , and th e  b a t t l e  o f  Tippecanoe provided th e  
impetus fo r  Congress to  move slow ly  but in ex o rab ly  toward war. I t  
i s  more th an  l ik e ly  t h a t  G a l la t in ,  as a member o f M adison's C ab ine t, 
a t  one p o in t o r  an o th e r rev ived  h i s  old p lan  o f campaign, o r a t  l e a s t  
made h is  view s known. There was no agency in  th e  American m il i t a ry  
es tab lish m en t charged w ith  th e  development o f  war p la n s , but du ring  
th e  months o f  l a te  1811 and e a r ly  1812, when ta lk  o f  war was r i f e ,  
M adison's a d m in is tra t io n  was s u f f i c i e n t ly  p e rsp icac io u s  to  a t  l e a s t  
consider and d iscu ss  what were c a lle d  p lan s  of campaign.
In  December 1811 S e c re ta ry  o f War E u s tis  s o l i c i t e d  s tr a te g ic  
advice  from John Armstrong, fe llo w  v e te ran  o f  the  R evolu tion , au th o r 
o f  the  "Newburgh A ddresses," U .S. se n a to r , and m in is te r  to  France 
(1804-1810). Armstrong was p robably  not p r iv y  to  th e  s e c re ts  o f  
M adison's a d m in is tra t io n  or f u l l y  informed about n a tio n a l  p o lic y .
^"^Brant, James Madison. V I, 44.
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But he regarded  th e  invasion  o f  th e  Canadas as " th e  g rea t o p e ra tio n  o f 
th e  war, because t h a t  only  by which Great B r i ta in  can be brought to  a 
sense o f ju s t i c e . "  He based h i s  suggestions e n t i r e ly  on m il i t a ry  con­
s id e ra tio n s  and designed  them to  meet two p re re q u is i te s ;  " th e  p ro tec ­
t io n  o f y our own f r o n t ie r s ,  e a s te rn  and w estern , and th e  in v as io n  o f 
th o se  of your enemy," For d efense  he recommended th e  d isp o s i tio n  o f 
t ro o p s and guns a long  th e  A tla n t ic  seaboard and th e  es tab lish m en t o f 
a  strong g a rr iso n  a t  D e tro i t ;  t h a t  i s ,  w ith in  s t r ik in g  d is ta n c e  o f 
In d ian  v i l l a g e s  and N orthw estern B r i t i s h  se ttlem en ts ,^®
VJhile in  France Armstrong had s tu d ie d  the m il i t a ry  w ritin g s  o f  
se v e ra l European th in k e r s ,  in c lu d in g  th e  e a r ly  works o f  Henri Joraini,^^  
which seem to  have had a g rea t in flu en ce  on h is  recommendations to  
E u s t is ,  A rm strong 's o ffen s iv e  s tr a te g y  f u l f i l l e d  Jo m in i's  m ajor 
maxims; (1 ) bring  th e  g re a te s t  p a r t  o f th e  arm y's fo rc e s  to  b e a r  
upon th e  d e c is iv e  a re a  o f  th e  th e a te r  o f  war and a s  much as p o ss ib le  
upon the  enemy's communications from (2) a  s trong  and secure base 
(3) along in te r io r  l in e s  o f  o p e r a t io n s ,^
Armstrong a p p rec ia ted  th e  immense ex ten t o f  th e  B r i t i s h  l in e  
o f  defense and th e  dependence o f  t h e i r  fo rc e s  along th e  f r o n t ie r  on
Armstrong t o  E u s tis ,  2 Jan 1812, in  A rm strong 's N otices of 
th e  War o f  1812 (New York, 1840), I ,  236-37* E u s t is ' l e t t e r  t o  Arm­
s tro n g  and A rm strong 's to  E u s tis  a re  not i n  HG 107 (NA), Alec R, 
G ilp in , The War o f 1812 in  th e  Old Northwest (East lan s in g , 1958), 
28, a ccep ts  i t s  a u th e n t ic i ty .
''Adams, H is to ry  o f th e  United S ta te s .  V II, 179; New York29a. ______
Evening P o s t .  2 Nov 1813*
^^See T ra ite  des Grandes O perations M il i t a ir e s  (P a r is ,  1804- 
1816), I ,  chaps, v i i  and v i i i ;  I I ,  chap, x iv ;  I I I ,  chaps, x iv ,  xxv, 
xx v i; IV, chap, xxxv. On Jomini, see Crane B rin ton , e t  a l . .  "Jom in i,"  
Makers o f  Ifodern S tra te g y , ed, Edward M, E a r le  (P rin ce to n , 1941 ) ,  
77-93.
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rec e iv in g  su p p lie s  from th e  sea  through Quebec and M ontreal, Quebec, 
th e  o u t le t  to  th e  se a , was th e  " tru e  o b jec t o r p o in t o f  a tta c k ;  be­
cause, i f  gained , every th ing  depending upon i t  i s  gained a ls o ,"  But 
th e  United S ta te s  lacked  th e  means to  tak e  Quebec, and th u s  i t  was 
"p ra c t ic a b le  and expedient" to  se iz e  I to n tre a l, th e  next most impor­
ta n t  t a r g e t ,  M ontreal cap tu red , K ingston, York, N iagara , and Malden 
would soon f a l l  a ls o .  The United S ta te s  was fo rtu n a te  i n  having a 
w e ll-p laced  base o f  o p e ra tio n s  a t  Albany, A ll roads from th e  n o r th ­
e a ste rn  p o r tio n  o f  th e  coun try  d iverged  a t  Albany toward th e  Canadas— 
"a c ircum stance vrtiich while i t  keeps up your enençr's doubts as to  
your r e a l  p o in t o f  a tta c k ,  cannot f a i l  to  keep h is  means o f  defence 
in  a s ta t e  o f  d iv is io n ,"  An American o ffe n s iv e  a g a in s t M ontreal 
would fo llo w  th e  s h o r te s t  and most d i r e c t  l in e  o f  o p e ra tio n s  from 
th e  s tro n g  and secure  base o f  Albany,
Such an o ffe n s iv e  conformed w ith  th re e  b a s ic  m il i t a ry  maxims 
vrtiich Armstrong l i s t e d :  " 1 s t .  ^  o b jec t o f  im portan t o r  d e c is iv e
c h a ra c te r : , , . 2nd, A l in e  o f  o p e ra t io n , as  sh o rt and p e rp en d icu la r  
to  t h i s  o b je c t ,  as  p o ss ib le ; and 3d. A w ell secured b a se , on which 
must be accum ulated and ready fo r  t ra n s p o r ta t io n ,  a l l  su p p lie s  neces­
sa ry  to  s u s ta in  th e  o p e ra t io n ,"
To support th e  main a tta c k  a g a in s t  M ontreal, th re e  corps o f  
m i l i t i a  should make "dem onstrations" toward K ingston, th e  f o r t s  in  
th e  Niagara p en in su la , and th e  B r i t i s h  po sts  on th e  e a s te rn  s ide  o f  
th e  S o re l (R ich e lieu ) R iver, p r im a ri ly  to  c o n ta in  th e  tro o p s  s ta ­
tio n ed  a t  th o se  p o in ts ,  G a l la t in  had ap p a re n tly  c a lle d  f o r  the  
a c tu a l  s e iz u re  o f  th e  Niagara pen in su la  and o f  K ingston, To Arm­
s tro n g , however, th ese  d iv e rs io n a ry  a tta c k s  would serve to  e x p lo it
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American in te r n a l  l in e s  o f  communication and p lace g re a t  p ressu re  on 
th e  extended B r i t i s h  l in e  o f de fen se , w hile  10,000 re g u la rs  a tta c k ed  
M ontreal. Although " th e  cap tu re  o f  M ontreal would invo lve t h a t  o f  
a l l  p osts  westward from i t s e l f , "  Armstrong fu r th e r  recommended th a t  
îfeilden be a tta c k ed  soon a f t e r  th e  M ontreal invasion  commenced. He was 
proposing to  make p lac e s  ra th e r  th an  arm ies the  p ro p er o b jec ts  o f  
a t t a c k ,  w ith  th e  excep tion  o f a  D e tro it-b a se d  o f fe n s iv e , which, he 
argued , would e lim in a te  the  B r i t i s h - In d ia n  th re a t  t o  th e  N orthw est, 
Extrem ely im portan t f o r  th e  success  o f a l l  th ese  o p e ra tio n s , p a r­
t i c u l a r l y  th e  Malden and M ontreal o f fe n s iv e s , was n av a l supremacy on 
th e  la k e s . Without i t  th e  American advantage o f in te r n a l  l in e s  was 
a chim era, Armstrong assu red  E u s tis  t h a t  t h i s  p lan— i f  conducted 
" ra p id ly  and audaciously" w ith s u f f ic ie n t  numbers o f  men, q u a n ti t ie s  
o f  su p p lie s , and adequate tra n s p o r ta tio n —would "g ive a  su c ce ss fu l 
is s u e  to  th e  campaign i f  not t o  th e  war,"^^
The a d m in is tra t io n  a p p a ren tly  began to  make more deteraiined 
e f f o r t s  in  February to  fonmxLate a m il i ta ry  s tr a te g y .  While Congress 
debated  m easures to  p u t th e  army, navy, and economy on a war fo o tin g , 
E u s t is  summoned J e f f e rs o n ’s S e c re ta ry  o f  Vfer, Henry Dearborn, t o  
Washington f o r  c o n su lta tio n s , W illiam  H u ll, Governor o f  the  M ichi­
gan T e r r i to ry ,  journeyed to  Washington d uring  the  same month on h is  
own i n i t i a t i v e  to  p re se n t h is  views on th e  n e c e s s i ty  o f  defending 
th e  Northwest, The two R evolu tionary  v e te ra n s , bo th  good R epubli­
c an s, were soon to  command n o r th e rn  arm ies . In form ation  i s  p i t i f u l l y
31Armstrong to  E u s t is ,  2 Jan 1812, N o tices. 234-41. Arm­
s tro n g  d id  n o t use th e  term s " s tra te g y "  o r  " in te rn a l  l in e s ."
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scan ty  about ex a c tly  what m eetings were h e ld , who a tte n d e d , what was 
s a id , and what was dec ided . Perhaps i t  would be more a c cu ra te  to  
say  th a t  I^d iso n  and members o f  h is  C abinet in te r m i tte n tly  d iscu ssed  
s tra te g y  among them selves and w ith  o th e r s .
H ull subm itted a number o f  w r i tte n  recommendations t o  E u s tis  
i n  tlarch and met tw ice  with Madison in  A p r i l ,  On every occasion  H ull 
s tre s se d  th e  need f o r  augmented defenses in  M ichigan. He th u s  added 
h i s  voice t o  a memorial th a t  th e  c i t i z e n s  o f D e tro i t  had addressed  to  
th e  government on December 8 , a  few weeks a f t e r  th e  b a t t l e  o f  Tippe­
canoe. They expressed  fe a r  t h a t  the  n inety -four-m an  g a rr iso n  a t  
D e tro i t  and th e  seventy-nine-m an g a rr iso n  a t  M chilim ack inac would 
be unable to  cope w ith  ag g ress iv e  B r i t i s h  and In d ia n  a c tio n  in  
Michigan should war be d ec la red . Hull, urged th e  c o n s tru c tio n  of 
a d d it io n a l  w arships t o  complement th e  one armed b r ig  a t  D e tro i t  and 
g a in  c o n tro l  o f Lake E r ie ,  rein fo rcem ent o f  the  g a rr iso n  a t  D e tro i t ,  
and e re c t io n  o f gun b a t t e r i e s  a long th e  r i v e r . I n  A p ril,  before  
leav in g  W ashington, Dearborn subm itted t o  E u s tis  h i s  plan o f  campaign; 
a  major o ffe n s iv e  a g a in s t  M ontreal by th e  Champlain ro u te , supported 
by  th re e  s u b s id ia ry  m i l i t i a  a t ta c k s  from D e tro it ,  B uffalo , and Sackets 
H a r b o r . T h e  d e ta i l s  o f  a f i n a l  s tr a te g y  were n ev er vrorked o u t,^ ^  o r
iteport o f  th e  T r ia l  o f  B rig . General W illiam  H u ll, taken by  
L t .  Col. Forbes (Mew York. 181 &). 27-36. Madison read  th e  memorial. 
G ilp in , War in  th e  N orthw est. 26-30. See a lso :  Adams, H is to ry  o f
th e  United S ta te s . V I, 296-97J and B ran t, James Madison. VI. 45-A6.
^^T his i s  th e  ex ten t o f  in fo rm atio n  on Dearborn’s "p la n  o f 
th e  a n tic ip a te d  campaign." The only source i s  H. A. S. Dearborn 
(Son), Defence o f Gen. Henry Dearborn (B oston, 1824), 3 . I t  i s  not 
i n  RG 107 (NA).
^^Adams, H is to ry  o f th e  United S t a te s . VI, 297.
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i f  th ey  w ere, th ey  were c le a r  on ly  to  Madison and perhaps E u s t is ,  In  
any  case th e y  were n o t c le a r  t o  Dearborn and H ull, vrtio rece iv ed  t h e i r  
commissions and proceeded to  th e  f r o n t ie r  in  A p r i l ,
C ontrary  to  th e  conven tiona l h i s to r ic a l  view , th e  i l l - d e f in e d  
American s tr a te g y  on th e  eve o f  war d id  n o t c a l l  f o r  a four-pronged 
o ffe n s iv e  a g a in s t  M ontreal, K ingston, N iagara, and Malden, which, 
launched sim u ltan eo u sly , would overwhelm B r i t is h  defenses i n  the  
C a n a d a s , R a t h e r ,  14adison envisioned  a  major o ffe n s iv e  e f f o r t  
a g a in s t  M ontreal, w ith  sm all d iv e rs io n a ry  holding a c tio n s  i n  the  
d i r e c t io n  o f  Niagara and K ingston, The se iz u re  o f  M ontreal, he l a t e r  
t o ld  J e ffe rso n , would " a t  one s tro k e , have secured  th e  upper P rovince, 
and cut o f f  th e  sap th a t  nourished  Ind ian  h o s t i l i t i e s .  But t h i s  
cou ld  not be a ttem pted , w ithout s a c r i f ic in g  th e  W estern & N. W, 
F ro n tie r ,"  The purpose o f H u l l 's  movement was p r im a rily  to  defend 
th e  Northwest a g a in s t th e  " inundation  o f  savages under th e  in flu en ce  
o f  th e  B r i t i s h  estab lishm ent n ea r D e tro i t ."  Another reason fo r  " the  
ex p ed itio n  o f  Hull was t h a t  th e  unanim ity and a rd o r o f  Kentucky &
Ohio, promised th e  r e q u is i t e  fo rc e  a t  once fo r  t h a t  s e rv ic e , w h ilst 
i t  was too  d i s ta n t  from th e  o th e r  p o in ts  to  be a s s a i l e d , H u l l  
was i n i t i a l l y  to  a c t d e fe n s iv e ly , but once he secured  Northwest 
d e fen ses , i t  was hoped he could invade Upper Canada and advance as 
f a r  eastward as  p o s s i b l e , f e d i s o n ' s  reasoning  was th a t  such an 
advance would in su re  th e  s a fe ty  o f  th e  Northwest—as  G a l la t in  and
^^H isto rian s  have regarded  D earborn 's  "p lan" as  th e  s tra te g y  
f o r  1812 and have e lab o ra te d  upon i t  on th e  b a s is  o f  events in  1812,
^^17 Aug 1812, W ritings (ed . Hunt), V III, 211.
^ ^E u stis  to  H u ll, 24 Je  
1812, M ilita ry  Book, RG 107 (NA)
1812, to  Dearborn, 9 Apr and 26 Je
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Armstrong had e a r l i e r  suggested—v ^ ile  a t  th e  same tim e b r in g  about 
th e  conquest o f w estern  Upper Canada,
In so fa r  as I-Iadison contem plated sim ultaneous o ffe n s iv e s  th en , 
th e  plan  c a l le d  fo r  a two-pronged invasion  d i re c te d  a g a in s t Ifeilden 
and IJbn trea l, w ith  ho ld ing  a c tio n s  in  th e  c e n te r .  Madison in tended 
th e  inv asio n  to  accom plish s e v e ra l  aims: " the  g re a t  o b jec t o f  b rin g ­
in g  a l l  Upper Canada, and the  channels o f  communicating w ith  th e  
In d ia n s , under our command; w ith  u l te r io r  p ro sp ec ts  towards Quebec 
f la t t e r in g  t o  our arms . . .  ; subduing h o s t i le  fo rc e s ;  [and] command 
o f  th e  Lakes." No l e s s  im portan t was th e  d efensive  aim o f  p ro te c tin g  
th e  Northwest,
This f in a l  vague s tr a te g y —perhaps i t  m ight b est be c a lle d  
an " in te n tio n  to  a t ta c k  and defend"—was a  syncretism  of th e  sugges­
t io n s  of G a l la t in ,  Armstrong, H u ll, and D e a r b o r n , M o n t r e a l  and 
Quebec were th e  prime t a r g e ts .  Minor a tta c k s  a g a in s t  N iagara and 
K ingston were complementary to  th e  major e f f o r t .  The o ffen s iv e  
a g a in s t  Malden was in sp ire d  f i r s t  by defen siv e  and secondly by o ffen ­
s iv e  c o n s id e ra tio n s , and r a t io n a liz e d  on th e  b a s is  o f  the  a v a i l a b i l i t y  
o f  manpower i n  Kentucky and Ohio. The immediate aim  o f th e  in v asio n , 
b e s id e s  defending th e  f ro n t ie r  and severing  B ri tish - In d ia n  c o n ta c t,  
was th e  conquest o f Upper Canada, and th e  u ltim a te  aim , th e  se izu re
^%Iadison to  Dearborn, 9 Aug 1812, W ritings (ed . H unt),
V III , 206.
^^The infamous French P lan  XVII o f  World War I  has been des­
c rib e d  as an " in te n tio n  to  a t t a c k ."  See P h ilip  M, Flammer, "The 
S c h lie f fe n  P lan  and P lan  XVII; A Short C r i tiq u e ,"  M ilita ry  A ffa ir s .  
XXX (W inter 1966-6?), 207-12. Of course , th e  f in a l  s tr a te g y  fo r  
1812 may have been th e  product o f  o th e rs ' suggestions to o , b u t no 
o th e r  "p lans" a re  e x ta n t th a t  can be s a id  to  have in flu en ced  Madison.
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o f Quebec (and perhaps o f  B r i t i s h  North Am erica). And a l l  t h i s  was 
t o  be accom plished w ithout nava l c o n tro l o f  th e  l a k e s .  Indeed, i t  
was assumed th a t  th e  m il i t a ry  o p e ra tio n s  would g a in  th a t  c o n tro l  so 
necessary  to  su c ce ss fu l m il i ta ry  o p e ra tio n s  ! Here Madison d isreg a rd ed  
th e  advice o f  Armstrong, though G a lla t in  and Dearborn had not s tre s se d  
th e  need fo r  n av a l fo rc e s . H ull had assu red  th e  a d m in is tra tio n  in  
March, however, th a t  th e  presence o f  a d d it io n a l  m il i t a ry  fo rc e  a t  
D e tro i t  would alone probably  fo rc e  the  B r i t i s h  to  evacuate t h e i r  
W estern p o s ts  and d iscourage th e  Indians from  cooperating  w ith  th e  
B r i t i s h ,  th u s  o b v ia tin g  th e  n e c e s s i ty  o f g a in ing  n av a l c o n tro l o f  
Lake E r ie .  H u ll rendered  th is  op in io n  d e s p ite  h is  c o n v ic tio n  th a t  
n av a l c o n tro l was a b so lu te ly  e s s e n t ia l  m erely  in  o rd e r  to  m ain tain  a 
m il i t a ry  fo rc e  a t  D e t r o i t . T h i s  was not th e  l a s t  example o f  convo­
lu te d  American lo g ic . Americans began th e  war in  a  dream, o r  was i t  
a trance?^^
On Sunday, Ju ly  12, Madison, Monroe, and G a lla t in  g a th ered  to  
a p p ra ise  and d isc u ss  th e  B r i t i s h  rep e a l o f  th e  Orders in  C ouncil, news 
o f vrtiich had a rr iv e d  a f t e r  th e  d e c la ra t io n  o f  war on June 18. The 
most s ig n if ic a n t  r e s u l t  o f  the  se ss io n  was a  h a s t i ly  scraw led no te  
by G a l la t in ,  vdio recommended an a l t e r a t io n  in  m il i ta ry  s tr a te g y .  I t  
rep resen ted  th e  on]^ a ttem p t d u ring  th e  e n t i r e  war t o  determ ine what 
would have been th e  mi n i  mum m il i t a ry  success necessary  to  fo rce  
B r i t i s h  concessions. G a l la t in  adv ised  continuance o f  p rep a ra tio n s
^ T o  E u s t is ,  6 Mar 1812, Report o f  th e  T r ia l  (by F orbes),
32.
^^See "Mr. D ooley 's" comments on th e  Spanish-American War 
in  W illiam s, Americans a t  War. 105.
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fo r  ta k in g  M ontreal but th e  postponement o f  th e  o ffe n s iv e  i t s e l f  " u n ti l  
t r i a l  has been made o f p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  immediate peace ,"  In  th e  mean­
tim e, a  p incer movement from N iagara and D e tro i t  should be launched 
with th e  o b jec t o f  tak in g  "without any de lay  p o ssession  o f  Canada 
from N iagara upwards." The a c q u is i tio n  o f  what Madison would l a t e r  
c a l l  " th e  most v a lu ab le  p a r t s  o f th e  Upper province" would enable  th e  
United S ta te s ,  G a l la t in  argued, to  o f fe r  r e s to ra t io n  o f  t e r r i t o r y  i n - '  
r e tu rn  fo r  a b o li t io n  o f impressment and th e  re tu rn  o f  se ized  seamen, 
Madison r e je c te d  th e  p ro p o sa l. D esp ite  th e  re p e a l  o f  th e  O rders, he 
saw no change in  B r i t i s h  p o lic y  whose r e a l  purpose, he th ough t, was 
" to  b an ish  th e  American f la g  from th e  highway o f  n a tio n s ,"  to  make 
American commerce su b serv ien t to  B r i ta i n 's ,  and to  remove th e  United 
S ta te s  from th e  rank  o f a  sovereign  and independent n a tio n .
American s tr a te g y  suggests m il i ta ry  reasons f o r  a tta c k in g  th e  
Canadas as id e  from  the  argument t h a t  i t  was one way o f  s tr ik in g  a t  
B r i ta in :  an advance from D e tro it  in to  Upper Canada was th e  b e s t
means o f  defending th e  Northwest a g a in s t  th e  In d ian s , and th e  in v a ­
sion  o f  th e  Canadas would serve to  b lu n t th e  th re a t  o f  B r i t i s h  in c u r­
sions a long th e  A tla n tic  seaboard. I t  in d ic a te s  th a t  i n  1812 th e re  
was a t  l e a s t  one o th e r  p o lic y  g o a l, besides th e  red re s s  o f m aritim e 
grievances and r e s to ra t io n  o f  n a tio n a l  honor: th e  e lim in a tio n  o f
the  In d ian  th r e a t  (as  Madison in  f a c t  had s ta te d  in  h i s  war m essage).
^ G a l l a t i n ,  "Agenda," n .d . [ c a . Jy 1 2 ] , Madison Papers, 
Ser, 2j Madison to  Dearborn, 9 Aug 1812, W ritings (ed . H unt), 
V III, 211.
^^Quoted in  B ran t, James Ifedison, VI, 57.
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I'dadison's r e je c t io n  o f G a l la t in 's  n o te , moreover, rev ea led  
th a t  h is  m aritim e goals and m il i t a ry  aims were not a s  lim ite d  a s  he 
i n s i s t e d , ^  The "conquest o f Canada," fo r  example, meant th e  conquest 
o f b o th  Canadas and p o ss ib ly  o f a l l  o f  B r i t i s h  North A m e r i c a . B u t  
th e  connection  between th e  t o t a l  conquest o f  Canada and in s is te n c e  on 
B r i t i s h  rev o ca tio n  o f  impressment was r a th e r  tenuous. Was th e re  an 
elem ent o f m an ifest d e s tin y  involved  in  th e  adherence to  th e  s tr a te g y  
o f  conç)lete conquest? Was ïladison hoping f o r  the  a c q u is i tio n  o f  a 
la rg e  p o rtio n  o f  t e r r i t o r y  in  o rd e r  to  o b v ia te  fu tu re  border problems 
w ith B r i t i s h e r s ,  Canadians, and In d ian s  (Monroe explained  t h i s  r e a ­
soning to  American envoys in  1813 and 1814)?^^ P art o f  the  d i f f i c u l ty  
Madison faced in  rea d ju s tin g  s tr a te g y  to  f i t  a l te re d  d ip lom atic  con­
d i t io n s  was t h a t  th e  conquest o f  Canada was two th in g s  a t  once: i t
was a means o f  winning m aritim e concessions and r e t r ie v in g  n a tio n a l  
honor; and i t  was an end w ith reg a rd  to  th e  fu r  t ra d e ,  In d ian s , and 
American expansion . The muddle o f  means v e rsu s  ends and th e  p o t­
p o u rri o f  reasons fo r  conquering Canada were as d i f f i c u l t  fo r  contem­
p o ra r ie s  to  c le a r  up and s tra ig h te n  out as th ey  a re  f o r  h i s to r ia n s .
An a d d it io n a l  d i f f i c u l ty  was th e  tendency o f  m il i t a ry  s tra te g y  to  
sub v ert p o lic y . Once Americans began to  c o n sid e r m il i ta ry  s tr a te g y .
^ ^ e r k in s  argues t h a t  American in s is te n c e  on ending im 
ment, t h a t  i s ,  what l^adison considered  to  be a  l im ite d  g o a l, in  
e f f e c t  meant t h a t  " th is  would be n e ith e r  a  lim ite d  nor a sh o rt w ar." 
Prologue to  'War. 416.
^% ee, e .g . .  C lay, speech, 31 Dec 1811, W ritings (ed. Hopkins), 
I ,  603-604.
^4lonroe to  envoys, 23 Je  1813 and 1 and 28 Jan  1814, V ol. 7, 
Diplom atic I n s t ru c t io n s ,  G eneral Records o f  th e  Department o f  S ta te ,
HG 59 (NA).
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i t  ap p a re n tly  g o t away from them, so t h a t  m ili,ta ry  co n sid e ra tio n s  
became paramount. Thus i t  appeared necessary  t o  take  Quebec o r p e r­
haps even th e  M aritim es, At le a s t  th e r e  i s  reason  to  q u es tio n  whether 
m i l i t a ry  s tr a te g y  was i n te l l i g e n t ly  geared to  th e  more obvious p o lic y  
goals and to  conclude th a t  Americans were m i l i t a r i l y  aim ing too  h ig h .
Another s e rio u s  weakness in  th e  m il i t a ry  "plan" was th a t  i t  
was so vague. E s s e n tia l ly ,  i t  d id  n o t co o rd in a te  m il i ta ry  means 
and m il i t a ry  ends. Some h is to r ia n s  have a t t r ib u te d  th i s  t o  the  
p au c ity  o f  s t a f f  o f f ic e r s  i n  th e  army,^'^ But t h i s  ex p lan a tio n  i s  
u n s a tis fa c to ry .  There had been s u f f ic ie n t  tim e befo re  th e  d e c la ra ­
t io n  o f  war to  develop  a sound p lan even w ith th e  u n s a tis fa c to ry  
preparedness m easures passed by C ongress, The f a u l t  la y  i n  th e  ad­
m in is tra tio n , whether fo r  la c k  o f m il i t a ry  knowledge (w hich, however, 
th ey  cou ld  e a s i ly  have a c q u ire d ), u n c e r ta in ty  about th e  wisdom of 
war, la c k  o f f o re s ig h t ,  weakness o f  c h a ra c te r ,  o r  overconfidence.
On th e  eve o f war American s tr a te g y  was a  blend o f  confidence 
and f e a r —confidence in  th e  a b i l i t y  t o  tak e  Canada and f e a r  of th e  
B r i t i s h  and In d ian s  in  th e  Canadas, Although some Americans r e g re t te d  
th e  coming o f ;var, o th ers  welcomed i t ,  Andrew Jackson looked forw ard 
to  th e  "honorable t o i l  o f  ca rry in g  th e  rep u b lican  standard  to  the  
h e ig h ts  o f  a b r a h a m . Henry Clay b e lie v e d  th a t  deeds o f  g lo ry  in  
avenging th e  im m ortal Montgomery upon th e  w alls  o f  Quebec would 
rev iv e  th e  R evolu tionary  m a r t ia l  s p i r i t  and p rev en t th e  ennerva tion
^"^Hitsman, In c re d ib le  War o f  1B12, 42,
^^D ivision  O rders, 7 Mar 1812, Correspondence o f  Andrew 
Jackson, ed. John Spencer B a sse tt  (W ashington, 1926), I ,  222,
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of Americans a r i s in g  from p e a ce fu l, a v a ric io u s , commercial p u r s u i ts .  
There would be deeds o f g lo ry , b u t not a t  th e  w alls  o f  Quebec,
The U nited S ta te s  had plunged in to  a  war on th e  n o rth ern  
f r o n t ie r  o b liv io u s  to  th e  fa c t  t h a t  i f  the  tro o p s  were to  conquer 
th ey  needed th e  support o f  the  navy. H ull, concurring  in  th e  r e a ­
soning o f  M adison 's veto  o f  th e  p ro p o sa l to  b u ild  a navy on Lake 
E r ie ,  f e l l  v ic t im  to  h is  acquiescence in  a fo r lo rn  hope, because th e  
B r i t i s h  moved by w ater and he moved by lan d . In  June 1812, tak in g  
h is  l i t t l e  army o f  1,800 men to  D e tro i t ,  he had to  cu t a  road from 
Urbana to  Port Meigs on th e  Maumee R iver. The road sapped the 
energy o f  h is  fo rc e  and req u ired  alm ost a month to  t ra v e r s e .  D is­
mayed by h is  slow  p ro g re ss , Hull s e n t  much o f  h is  baggage and a l l  o f  
h is  l e t t e r s  on t o  D e tro it  by th e  o n ly  American boat on Lake E r ie .  
P assing  by Malden th e  boa t was in te rc e p te d  and cap tu red  by the  
B r i t i s h ,  who had ju s t  lea rn e d  o f th e  American d e c la ra t io n  o f war. 
Congress had d e c la red  war on June 18, but i t  was not u n t i l  Ju ly  2 
th a t  th e  message, which Bust i s  sen t through th e  re g u la r  m ail r o u te s ,  
reached Hull on th e  R a is in  R iver—a f t e r  he had a lread y  sen t h is  
baggage and l e t t e r s  ahead, Hull f i n a l ly  c ro ssed  in to  Upper Canada 
in  J u ly , and he im m ediately encountered d i f f i c u l t i e s  vdiich prevented  
the  conquest o f  F o rt Plalden and o f  a  s u b s ta n t ia l  p o r tio n  o f  t e r r i ­
to ry .  Tecumseh's In d ian s , who h a rassed  H u l l 's  supply t r a i n s ,  q u ick ly  
brought home to  th e  Americans th e  f a c t  th a t  Malden la y  a s tr id e  th e  
road to  D e tro i t ,  Hull decided  to  withdraw from  Upper Canada. He 
was a  mediocre g e n e ra l who had been p laced i n  an im possib le s i tu a t io n .
^% peech, 22 Feb 1810, V /ritings (ed . Hopkins), I ,  450.
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His B r i t i s h  c o u n te rp a rt, Isaac Brock, vAio had been ab le  to  rush  to  th e  
a re a  over w ater w ith  re in fo rcem en ts , was a  capable gen e ra l who enjoyed 
th e  advantages o f  p o s it io n ,  c o n tro l  o f Lake E r ie ,  and th e  knowledge, 
which he ob tain ed  from th e  captured  l e t t e r s ,  th a t  H ull g r e a t ly  feared  
an Ind ian  m assacre o f  American c iv i l i a n s .  On August 16 H ull su rren ­
dered  h is  s u p e rio r  fo rc e  and D e tro i t ,  a f t e r  Brock had warned th a t  
he could no t c o n tro l  h i s  In d ian s  in  th e  event o f  an a s sa u l t  on th e  
American p o s it io n .
The American commanders a t  N iagara, Major General Stephen 
Van R ensse laer and B rig ad ie r  G eneral A lexander Smyth, were supposed 
to  have co ord ina ted  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  w ith H ull in  o rd er to  hold  Brock 
i n  check. But t h e i r  supply  p rep a ra tio n s  were s lip sh o d , th ey  quar­
r e le d  over th e  command o f th e  o ffe n s iv e , and t h e i r  lu d ic ro u s  e f f o r ts  
ended in  f a i l u r e  in  November, Although th e  Americans were rep u lsed  
in  th e  c lim ac tic  b a t t l e  o f Queenston H eigh ts, th e y  won a v ic to ry  o f 
s o r t s  in  th e  death  o f  Brock, who was m o rta lly  wounded while charg ing  
up th e  h i l l .  Dearborn commanded what was to  have been th e  m ajor 
American th r u s t  a g a in s t  M ontreal, But he got a l a t e  s ta r t  in  ga th e r­
in g  su p p lie s  and m obiliz ing  manpower, and th e  advance d id n o t begin  
u n t i l  November, Twenty m iles o u t from P la ttsb u rg , th e  re lu c ta n c e  o f  
3 ,000 m i l i t i a  to  c ro ss  th e  b o rd er, and th e  r e a l iz a t io n  th a t  t ra n s p o r-
See Milo Q uaife , "General H ull and His C r i t i c s , "  Ohio S ta te  
A rcheo log ical and H is to r ic a l  Q u a rte rly . XLVII (Apr 1938), 168-82, 
G ilp in , War in  th e  N orthw est. i s  th e  b e s t  account o f  th e  fa r-w es te rn  
th e a t e r .  C oles, War o f  1812. and Zaslow ( e d , ) .  Defended B order, con­
t a i n  copious b ib lio g ra p h ie s ,
^^A b r ie f  account o f  American supply  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  1812 may 
be found in  R isch , Q uarterm aster Support. 155-70,
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The a b o rt iv e  o ffe n s iv e s  impressed Madison w ith  th e  n e c e s s i ty  
o f gain in g  n av a l c o n tro l o f  the  la k e s .  In  October 1812 C aptain Isaac 
Ghauncey a rr iv e d  a t  S acke ts Harbor and began p rep a ra tio n s  to  o u tb u ild  
th e  B r i t i s h  on Lakes O n tario , E r ie ,  and Champlain. The Anœricans 
achieved  s u p e r io r i ty  on Lake E rie  in  September 1813 and on Lake 
Champlain a y e a r  l a t e r .  On Lake O ntario  Commodore Chauncey and h is  
B r i t i s h  c o u n te rp a rt. S i r  James Yeo, engaged in  a nava l arms race  and 
a lte rn a te d  th e  ru le  o f  th e  lake depending on vdio had th e  newest and 
largesi) v e s se l ,
M adison 's prime o b je c tiv e s  in  1813 were th e  rec a p tu re  o f  
D e tro i t  and th e  conquest o f  Kingston o r M ontreal, Chauncey had suc­
ceeded in  e s ta b lis h in g  h i s  s u p e r io r i ty  on Lake O ntario , and e a r ly  in  
th e  y ea r Armstrong o rdered  Dearborn to  cro ss  th e  lake from Sackets 
Harbor and ta k e  K ingston. Humors o f  the  a r r i v a l  o f  s tro n g  re in fo rc e ­
ments a t  K ingston, however, dissuaded the commodore and th e  g e n e ra l 
from executing  th e  p lan , and l a t e  i n  A pril th e y  decided in s te a d  to  
r a id  York, th e  c a p i ta l  o f  Upper Canada and a more v u ln erab le  t a r g e t .
The Americans succeeded in  burning York and in  d estro y in g  the  ammuni­
t io n ,  guns, and naval s to r e s  d e s tin e d  fo r Commander Robert H. B a rc la y 's  
f l e e t  on Lake E r ie ,  B arc lay  was th u s  made to  depend on th e  meager 
reso u rces  in  w estern  Upper Canada, while P e rry , b u ild in g  h is  f l e e t  
a t  E r ie ,  Pennsylvania, was ab le  to  draw on th e  r e l a t i v e ly  abundant 
reso u rces  o f P itts b u rg h , The shortage  o f heavy guns i n  th e  b a t t l e  
o f Lake E rie  l a t e r  in  th e  year was one o f th e  major reasons fo r
 ̂ See S tacey , "Naval Power on the  Lakes, 1812-1814," A fte r  
Tippecanoe (ed . Mason), 49-59.
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and landed them i n  northw estern  New York in  p rep a ra tio n  f o r  a N iagara 
o f fe n s iv e . In an e x c e l le n t ly  planned and w ell-executed  amphibious 
a s sa u lt  in  May, he captured  F ort George and Queenston, b u t h is  ad­
vance tow ard B urlin g to n  was s h o r t - l iv e d .  The reappearance o f  th e  
B r i t i s h  f l e e t  on th e  lake w ith  reinforcem ents f o r  B rig ad ie r  General 
John V incent, th e  tem porary re tire m en t o f  Chauncey in to  Sackets Harbor, 
and a m il i t a ry  re v e rse  a t  Stoney Greek in  June convinced Dearborn to  
r e t r e a t  to  Fort George, During th e  nex t months th e  American re g u la rs  
in  th e  pen in su la  were slow ly  withdrawn toward Sackets Harbor in  o rd e r  
to  p a r t ic ip a te  in  ano ther campaign a g a in s t  M ontreal, By October l e s s  
than  1,000 American m il i t ia  and only  a  few re g u la rs  defended Fort 
George and th e  N iagara f r o n t ie r .
Captain P e rry , who had p a r t ic ip a te d  in  th e  Niagara o p e ra tio n s , 
had re tu rn ed  to  E r ie ,  and d u ring  th e  sp rin g  and summer he completed 
th e  b u ild in g  o f a  powerful f l e e t .  His v ic to ry  in  th e  memorable n av a l 
b a t t l e  o f  September is o la te d  Major G eneral Henry P ro c te r , lAo com­
manded B r i t i s h  fo rc e s  a t  D e tro it  and F ort Malden, His l in e  of supply- 
cu t o f f  from M ontreal, K ingston, and York, except by a long  land ro u te  
th re a te n e d  by P e r ry ’ s f l e e t ,  P ro c te r 's  only recourse  was to  abandon 
D e tro it  and r e t r e a t  toward Lake O n ta rio , H arriso n , whom P erry  landed 
in  Upper Canada, overtook and de fea ted  P ro c te r  and Tecumseh a t  
Moraviantown on th e  Thames R iver on October 5. "So fee b le  was th e  
d e s ire  f o r  permanent in co rp o ra tio n  o f  Canada w ith in  th e  Union,"
Canadian H is to r ic a l  Review. XXXIX (Mar 1958), 41-51. C f, Mahan, 
Sea Power. I I ,  28-37.
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Bradford P erk ins comments, " th a t  w ith in  s ix  weeks a f t e r  th e  d e s tru c ­
t io n  of B r i t i s h  power in  [w estern ] Upper Canada a t  th e  b a t t l e  o f  th e  
Thames in  1813, th e  W estern m i l i t i a  re tu rn ed  to  t h e i r  h o m e s , D e m o b i ­
l i z a t i o n  o f  m ilitiam en , however, was h a rd ly  p ro o f o f  th e  feeb len ess  o f 
a n n e x a tio n is t  sen tim en t. The government t r i e d  to  m in t a in  as many 
v o lu n te e rs  and re g u la rs  in  th e  D etroit-M aiden a re a  as  money, food, 
and su p p lie s  on hand would a llo w ,
Major G enerals James W ilkinson and Wade Hampton made th e  
second and l a s t  American a ttem p t a g a in s t  M ontreal l a t e  i n  1813. The 
p lan , dev ised  by Armstrong and W ilkinson and approved by Madison, 
c a l le d  fo r  Hampton to  march from P la ttsb u rg  w ith  4,000 men down th e  
Champlain v a lle y  to  th e  mouth o f  th e  Chateaugay R iver, W ilkinson was 
to  sweep down th e  S t ,  Lawrence R iver from S ackets Harbor w ith  8,000 
men, rendezvous w ith  Hampton, and a t ta c k  M ontreal. W inter was f a s t  
approaching and P rév o st had alm ost 15,000 m i l i t i a  and B r i t i s h  and 
Canadian re g u la rs  defending  th e  M ontreal a re a . I t  was th e  most d i f f i ­
c u l t  kind o f  m il i t a ry  o p e ra tio n , re q u ir in g  c o o p e ra tio n , co o rd in a tio n , 
and good t im in g . But W ilkinson and Hampton m is tru s ted  one ano ther 
and n e ith e r  major g e n e ra l could  command th e  obedience o f  th e  o th e r .
Only th e  S e c re ta ry  o f  War, Armstrong, could  provide th e  needed cen­
t r a l  d i r e c t io n ,  but he , having been a t  Sackets Harbor in  September, 
l e f t  fo r  Albany in  October a s  th e  campaign 1
^^Prologue t o  War. 426,
55,See G ilp in , War in  th e  Northwest. 227-30j and McKee, 
"S erv ice o f  Supply" (3 rd  P ap e r) , 34-37.
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The d i r e c t io n  o f  th e  campaign from a d i s ta n t  headquarters 
proved an im possib le  t a s k .  Hampton en te red  Lower Canada i n  September 
and made h is  way to  S p ears , a town on th e  Chateaugay River so u th east 
o f M ontreal. Before W ilkinson l e f t  Sackets Harbor, Armstrong o rdered  
Hampton to  assume a p o s it io n  n e a r  th e  mouth o f th e  r iv e r ,  h o ld  the  
B r i t i s h  in  check , and aw ait W ilkinson. Ten m iles down th e  Chateaugay 
a B r i t i s h  fo rc e  o f  1,100 h a lted  Hampton's march on October 25 . I t  
was th e n  th a t  Hampton's q u a rte rm aste r  rece iv ed  a d isp a tc h  from Arm­
stro n g  to  e s ta b l is h  w in te r  q u a r te rs  fo r  th e  tro o p s , Hampton was 
confused; should  he con tinue  h i s  advance and a ttem p t to  rendezvous 
w ith W ilkinson, o r should  he r e t r e a t  and p repare  f o r  the  w in ter?  
Dismayed by h i s  rep u lse  on the  tw e n ty - f if th ,  he chose th e  l a t t e r  
a l t e rn a t iv e ,  r e t r e a te d  in to  American t e r r i t o r y ,  and encamped fo r  
the  w in te r .
W ilkinson, ig n o ran t o f  Hampton's re tro g ra d e  movement and o f 
A rm strong's o rd e rs ,  marched down th e  S t .  Lawrence in  l a te  O ctober.
On November 11, a t  C ry s le r 's  Farm on th e  l e f t  bank o f  the  r iv e r  nea r 
Cornwall, 800 B r i t i s h  and Canadians a tta c k ed  and d e fea ted  2,500 
American r e g u la rs  forming th e  l e f t  wing o f  W ilk inson 's  army.^*^ Wil­
kinson had not been e n th u s ia s t ic  about th e  campaign from th e  begin­
ning j th e  se tb ack  a t  C ry s le r 's  Farm and growing supp ly  sho rtag es  
made him le s s  so . Learning th e  nex t day th a t  Hampton could n o t meet 
with him o r forw ard s u p p lie s ,  he marched h i s  d iv is io n  to  French 
M ills , New York, and cantoned h i s  tro o p s f o r  th e  w in te r . Hampton
(ed . Zaslow), 61—83.
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res ig n ed  from th e  army; W ilkinson accused Armstrong o f  leav ing  him in  
th e  lu rc h ;  and Armstrong branded W ilkinson a s  an incompetent.^®
A fte r  a y e a r  and a  h a lf  o f  war th e  U nited S ta te s  had found 
l i t t l e  success on th e  n o r th e rn  f r o n t ie r .  The Americans held  D e tro it  
and p a r t  o f  western Upper Canada, b u t th e  B r i t i s h  h e ld  F ort M ic h ili-  
mackinac i n  Lake Huron. Although P e rry  had won c o n tro l  o f  Lake E r ie ,  
th e  B r i t i s h  were more than  holding t h e i r  own in  the  n a v a l s tru g g le  
f o r  Lakes O ntario and Champlain. Madison was n a tu r a l ly  d isap p o in ted  
and began to  d e s p a ir  o f ach iev ing  th e  conquest o f  th e  Canadas.
Doubting th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  b rin g in g  an  end to  the  war and ga in in g  
American go a ls  th rough  m il i t a ry  v ic to r y ,  he began to  view  the s tru g g le  
from an o th e r p e rsp e c tiv e , one capable o f  r a t io n a l iz in g  d e fe a t through 
th e  argument th a t  s tru g g le  i t s e l f ,  w hether v ic to r io u s  o r  n o t, would 
s te e l  th e  n a tio n , produce c h a ra c te r ,  win r e s p e c t,  and make the  
n a tio n  g r e a t .  In  h i s  message to  Congress on December 7 he noted 
th a t  th e  t r i a l  o f  war on th e  seas and on th e  lan d  was, d e sp ite  
d e fe a t ,  an  impulse " a c c e le ra t in g  th e  growth o f  our m aritim e power," 
s tre n g th e n in g  m anufactures, and producing improvements i n  American 
m il i t a ry  fo rc e s .  The d if fu s io n  o f m il i t a ry  d is c ip l in e  throughou t 
th e  co u n try , the  augm entation o f "w arlike  p re p a ra tio n s ,"  and th e  
" z e a l  and v a lo r"  which th e  tro o p s  would soon dem onstra te , would even­
t u a l l y  and undoubtedly win "a  g re a te r  resp ec t f o r  our r ig h t s  and a  
lo n g er d u ra tio n  o f  o u r fu tu re  peace . . .  th an  could be expected w ith ­
o u t th ese  p ro o fs  o f  th e  n a t io n a l  c h a ra c te r  and re so u rc e s . . . .  In
W ilkinson (New York, 1938), chap. x .
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f in e , th e  war, w ith  a l l  i t s  v ic i s s i tu d e s ,  i s  i l l u s t r a t i n g  th e  c a p ac ity  
and th e  d e s tin y  o f  th e  United S ta te s  to  be a  g re a t ,  a f lo u r is h in g , 
and a  pow erful n a tio n , worthy o f  th e  fr ie n d sh ip  , . . w ith  .  ,  . o th e r s .  
Beyond th ese  t h e i r  c la im s have never e x t e n d e d . T h e  in ta n g ib le  
causes and purposes o f  th e  war—honor, g lo ry , n a tio n a l  p r id e —were 
coming to  th e  f o re .
Two ev en ts  l a t e r  in  th e  month would confirm  Ifedison in  h is  
r a t io n a l iz a t io n  o f  m il i t a ry  d e fe a t .  On December 10 B rig ad ie r  General 
V incent sent 500 re g u la rs  toward F ort George w ith  th e  in te n t io n  o f 
rec a p tu rin g  th e  p o s t.  News o f i t s  advance so frig h te n e d  B rig ad ie r  
G eneral George McClure, vdio held  th e  f o r t  w ith o n ly  a handfu l o f  
m i l i t i a ,  th a t  he abandoned i t  and withdrew ac ro ss  th e  r iv e r .  Before 
d e p a rtin g  from Upper Canada he fo o lis h ly  burned Newark and p a rt  o f  
Queenston, in ten d in g  to  deprive th e  B r i t i s h  o f  w in te r  q u a r te rs ,  bu t 
succeeding o n ly  in  exposing th e  c iv i l ia n  in h a b ita n ts  to  th e  w in ter 
cold and angering  th e  m il i t a ry  a u th o r i t i e s .  Five days l a t e r  McClure 
r e t r e a te d  t h i r t y  m iles t o  B u ffa lo , leav in g  only  a sm all g a rr iso n  a t  
Fort N iagara , L ieu ten an t G eneral Gordon Drummond, th e  newly appoin ted  
Governor o f  Upper Canada, now saw th e  o p p o rtu n ity  o f  e x p lo itin g  Vin­
c e n t 's  coup when he a rr iv e d  a t  th e  head o f  Lake O ntario  a few days 
l a t e r .  On th e  e ig h te e n th  and n in e te e n th , combined fo rces o f  B r i t i s h ,  
Canadians, and In d ia n s , never numbering more th an  1,500 a t  one tim e , 
cap tu red  Fort N iagara , burned Lewiston, B lack Rock, and B u ffalo , 
drove away th e  m i l i t i a ,  i n f l i c t e d  m il i t a ry  and c iv i l i a n  c a s u a l t i e s ,  
and destroyed  th re e  war schooners and $30,000  w orth o f m il i ta ry
^ ^F ifth  Annual Message, W ritings (ed . H unt), V III, 274,
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! th e  B r i t i s h  had e rased  hard  won Ameri­
can g a in s  in  th e  pen in su la  and cap tu red  a  piece o f  American t e r r i t o r y .  
On December 30 th e  B r i t i s h  sh ip  Bramble docked a t  A nnapolis, Maryland, 
b earin g  news o f  Napoleon 's d e fe a t a t  L eipzig  and G a s tle re a g h 's  o f fe r  
to  n e g o tia te  d i r e c t l y  w ith  American comm issioners, "The conduct o f 
t h i s  stran g e  l i t t l e  w ar," one h is to r ia n  n o ted , " took an unexpected 
,.61
^McKee, "S erv ice  o f  Supply" (4 th  P aper), 25 .
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WHITHER THE lEFT DIVISION?
"Something must be done o r more m o rt if ic a t io n  and d isg race  
w i l l  be th e  consequence." Governor D an ie l Tonçkins' alm ost trau m atic  
re a c t io n  t o  th e  news o f  the  f a l l  o f F o r t N iagara was su rp r is in g ,^  
C iv iliein  and m il i t a ry  lea d e rs  had long a p p re c ia te d  the  v u ln e r a b il i ty  
o f  th e  f r o n t ie r  between N iagara and D e tro it , and p a r t i c u l a r ly  since 
th e  m o b iliza tio n  fo r  W ilk in so n 's  autumn campaign had denuded the 
West o f  a v a ila b le  r e g u la r  t ro o p s ,  Armstrong, TonçDkins, and W ilkin­
son had been aware o f  th e  p a u c ity  o f t ro o p s  defending th e  Niagara 
f r o n t ie r .^  H arrison  had warned o f a p o ss ib le  B r i t i s h  a ttem p t in  th e  
w in ter  to  rec a p tu re  D e tro it  and d es tro y  th e  Lake E r ie  v e s se ls  a t  
D e tro i t ,  P u t-in -B ay , and E r ie .  Governor Lewis Gass o f th e  Michigan 
T e r r i to ry  had rep o rted  rumors o f  B r i t i s h  p rep a ra tio n s  fo r  an Indian 
a t ta c k  a g a in s t  D e tro i t .^  L i t t l e  had been done, however, t o  stren g th en  
W estern f r o n t ie r  d efenses anywhere, V/hen the  a c tu a l  blow f e l l  a g a in s t  
N iagara and not a g a in s t  D e tro i t ,  i t  was c e r ta in ly  m o rtify in g  but 
h a rd ly  unexpected, M adison's re p ly  to  Tompkins t h a t  "the even ts on 
th e  N iagara f ro n t ie r  were as unexpected a s  they  have been d is t r e s s in g "
^To Armstrong, 24 Dec 1813, Reg. L trs ,  R eed ., RG 10? (NA),
N o tice s . I I ,  38,
^G ilp in , War in  th e  Northw est. 231-32, 236,
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was d isingenuous,^
The d i f f i c u l ty  had been—and s t i l l  was—th a t  most o f  th e  
re g u la rs  were between French M i l s  and P l a t t  sburg , f a r  removed from 
Sackets Harbor, N iagara, and D e t ro i t , Redeployment in  th e  dead o f 
w in te r  was nex t to  in ç jo ss ib le . S ickness, d e s e r t io n , and th e  ex p ira ­
t i o n  o f  e n lis tm en ts  were making in roads in  t o t a l  reg u la r  s tre n g th .
By January 27 W ilk inson 's  army o f  8,000 men was reduced to  4,500 
e f f e c tiv e s .  In  th e  p revious month 216 men had d ied  in  o n ly  four
camps," W ilkinson lam ented, " th a t  fu n e ra l  d irg e s  were countermanded 
M d iso n  adm itted  t h a t  even had more re g u la r  o r m i l i t i a  t ro o p s  been 
a v a ila b le ,  " th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  supplying occasio n a l fo rce  in  d i s ta n t  
and detached s i tu a t io n s "  m il i ta te d  a g a in s t s u b s ta n t ia l  augm entation 
o f  manpower, e s p e c ia lly  fo r  th e  D e tro it fro n tie r,* ^  The d i f f i c u l ty  o f  
supply  had n o t been th e  only reason  fo r  th e  f ia sc o  a t  N iagara in  
December, however. The p resence o f on ly  a couple o f  hundred more 
re g u la rs  w ith  reasonab ly  determ ined lea d e rsh ip  could  probably  have 
prevented  a t  le a s t  th e  lo ss  o f  F o rt N iagara . I t s  r e te n tio n  was
1.6
^25 Jan 1814, L e tte rs  and Other Vfritings (Congress e d ,) ,
I I ,  580, H ere a fte r  "1814" w i l l  be om itted  from a l l  l e t t e r  c i t a t io n s  
f o r  th a t  y e a r .  On th e  r e s p o n s ib il i ty  f o r  th e  Niagara f ia s c o ,  c f ,  
Adams, H is to ry  o f th e  United S ta te s .  V II, 200-205, w ith B ran t,
James Madison. VI, 230-31, B rant c o n s is te n t ly  f a u l t s  Armstrong 
f o r  h is  e r r o r s ,  but he con v en ien tly  n e g le c ts  to  a s se s s  M d is o n 's  
r e s p o n s ib i l i ty .
^Quoted in  i b id . ,  299.
^To Tompkins, Jan 25, L e tte r s  and Other W ritings (Congress 
d , ) ,  I I ,  580,
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obv iously  im portan t to  any fu tu re  campaign, and a t t e n t io n  should have 
been g iven to  i t s  de fen se . Now i t  was to o  la te *
As th e  new year opened th e re  was no q uestion  th a t  th e  imme­
d ia te  problem was to  b o l s t e r  f r o n t ie r  defenses  from Sackets Harbor to  
D e tro i t ,  jiumors and f e a r s  abounded o f f u r th e r  B r i t i s h  a t t e n ç ts  to  
recoup t h e i r  1813 lo s s e s ,  and th e se  could n o t be e n t i r e ly  d isco u n ted . 
The Americans, possess in g  only a l im ite d  number o f  tro o p s , plagued 
with supply  problem s, and u n c e rta in  about B r i t i s h  in te n t io n s ,  had to  
decide vrtiere tro o p s  should be sen t and vdiat a c tio n  should be taken  
to  p reven t an o th e r B r i t i s h  success and th e  fu r th e r  e ro sio n  o f  t h e i r  
p o s it io n  in  th e  n o r th . Madison was r ig h t  i n  th in k in g  th a t  "a s  th e re  
can be l i t t l e  com parative inducement to  th e  enemy to  prolong th e i r  
b a rb a r i t i e s  in  t h a t  neighbourhood [N iag a ra ], i t  i s  most to  be appre­
hended th a t  th e  a t t e n t io n  o f t h a t  p a r t  o f  t h e i r  fo rc e  w i l l  be tu rned  
to  some o th er q u a r te r ;  e i th e r  to  P re sq u e 'I s le  [E rie ]  o r  D e tro it."®
Even Tompkins would agree w ith t h a t  assessm ent. Calm co n s id e ra tio n  
o f  th e  s i t u a t io n ,  moreover, would have shown th a t  though a  t h r e a t  
e x is te d , American c o n tro l  o f  Lake E rie  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  r e s t r i c te d  
B r i t i s h  a b i l i t y  to  s t r ik e  a t  p o s ts  in  th e  a re a .  The B r i t i s h ,  though 
th ey  would have l ik e d  to  do more, f u l l y  a p p rec ia ted  t h i s  f a c t  and 
were busy t ry in g  to  defend t h e i r  more e a s te r ly  p o ssess io n s. Indeed, 
in  s p i te  o f  th e  weakness o f  th e  D e tro it  g a rr iso n , i t  was a b le  to  
e x e rc ise  i t s  sway through much o f  w estern Upper Canada fo r  a l l  o f  1814.
The e s s e n t ia l  t a s k  was to  begin p lanning  f o r  a  campaign th a t  
might b e s t  ach ieve p o l i t i c a l  ends i n  th e  p a r t i c u la r  s t r a te g ic  s i tu a -
Ib id .
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t i o n .  Madison d id  n o t lend c o n s is te n t  d i re c t io n  to  t h i s  desideratum ^ 
however, and probably d id  not recognize th e  n e c e s s i ty  o f g iv in g  i t  
h i s  se rio u s  a t t e n t io n  so e a r ly  in  the  y e a r .  This was a l l  th e  more 
s u rp r is in g  s in c e  th e  P resid en t was in  th e  process o f sending  h is  
peace commissioners t o  Europe. Although Armstrong co n su lted  with 
Madison, and u su a lly  needed h i s  app ro v a l, th e  S e c re ta ry  o f  War made 
most o f th e  a c tu a l  m il i t a ry  d e c is io n s . He in  t u rn  was preoccupied in  
th e  f i r s t  t h r e e  months o f th e  y ea r w ith  meeting, p o ss ib le  B r i t i s h  moves 
a g a in s t  American p o s it io n s  between S ackets Harbor and D e tro i t ,  Actu­
a l l y ,  th e re  was l i t t l e  he could  do to  h e lp  N iagara and D e tro i t .  The 
damage had a lre a d y  been done a t  N iagara, and g iven  the  sh o rtag e  and 
d isp e rsed  s t a t e  o f  American tro o p s ,  any a c tio n  would p robably  come 
to o  l a t e  to  prevent a  B r i t i s h  a t ta c k  a g a in s t  D e tro i t  o r E r ie  in  th e  
w in te r .  He seemed to  r e a l iz e  t h i s  and was, w ith Madison, more con­
cerned  w ith  th e  s a fe ty  o f  P l a t t  sburg and Sackets Harbor. But the  
s p e c tre  o f  more In d ian  " b a rb a r it ie s "  and th e  n e c e s s i ty  o f  re ta k in g  
F o r t Niagara would have th e i r  im pact, k eaetio n  to  the  shock o f th e  
B r i t i s h  coup a t  N iagara , combined with a d m in is tra t iv e  b lu n d ers , s e t  
i n  motion a  b iz a r re  ch a in  o f ev en ts  t h a t  led  Americans u n in te n t io n a lly  
to  th e  N iagara f r o n t ie r  and e v e n tu a lly  determ ined o ffen s iv e  s tr a te g y  
f o r  1814.
On lea rn in g  o f  th e  burn ing  o f Newark and th e  subsequent B r i t i s h  
c a p tu re  o f  F o r t N iagara , Tompkins wrote Armstrong exp ress in g  h is  f e a r  
t h a t  th e  B r i t i s h  would combine w ith  th e  Indians t o  raze th e  whole 
W estern f r o n t ie r ,  a t t a c k  D e tro i t ,  and d e s tro y  th e  sh ips o f  th e  Lake 
E r ie  f le e t  a t  P u t-in -B ay , To prevent t h i s  from happening, he recom-
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mended s e v e ra l  co u rses  o f a c tio n :  augment th e  fo rces  a t  N iagara;
re ta k e  th e  f o r t ;  d r iv e  th e  B r i t i s h  from  th e i r  th re a te n in g  p o s it io n s  
i n  th e  p e n in su la ; conduct d iv e rs io n a ry  o p e ra tio n s  in  th e  e a s t to  
draw th e  enemy away from th e  Western f r o n t ie r ;  and employ f r ie n d ly  
Ind ians a g a in s t  th e  in h a b ita n ts  o f w estern  Upper Canada.^
Ifedison and Armstrong e ag erly  took up Tompkins' l a s t  sugges­
t io n .  W riting  H arriso n  on December 29 , th e  S e c re ta ry  o f  War warned 
th a t  th e  f a i l u r e  o f  W ilk in so n 's  campaign and M cClure's abandonment o f 
th e  N iagara p en in su la  w u ld  undoubtedly prompt renewed B r i t i s h  en­
deavors t o  recover t h e i r  c o n tro l  over th e  In d ia n s . The enemy, he 
c o n je c tu re d , would f i r s t  have to  r e - e s ta b l is h  m il i t a ry  p o s ts  among 
th e  Thames Hiver s e ttle m e n ts  in  o rder to  reopen communications w ith  
th e  In d ia n s . H arrison  could thw art t h i s  a ttem pt in  one o f  two ways: 
"These se ttle m e n ts  must be broken up & converted  in to  a d e se r t  o r  
th e y  must be held by a su p e rio r  fo rce— a force  competent to  c o n tro l  
th e  in h a b ita n ts  & to  meet any a u x il i a r y  means General P révost may 
d e tach ."  With no rein fo rcem en ts  in  s ig h t  fo r  th e  D e tro i t  g a rr iso n , 
th e  b est s tr a te g y  was th e  form er—i t  was th e  "cheapest & su re s t"  means 
o f  d e fen se . He th e re fo re  ordered  H arrison  to  c o n c il ia te  th e  In d ian s  
and combine w ith them  in  a sp rin g  o ffe n s iv e  to  ravage and depopulate 
th e  v a lle y  o f  the  Thames. "The se ttle m e n ts  in  Upper Cainada abandoned, 
t h e i r  p o s ts  cannot be su p p lied , & w i l l  o f  course be abandoned.
Two days l a t e r  Madison changed h is  m ind. He now thought th e  p lan  
was "more severe  th a n  may be p ro p er,"  a s  Armstrong phrased i t .  The
^24 Dec 1813, Heg. L t r s .  Heed., HG 10? (NA).
^^M ilita ry  Book, EG 107 (NA). H arrison  had l e f t  Washington 
on December 22 fo r  C in c in n a ti.
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P re sid e n t t o ld  Armstrong to  adv ise  H arrison  on ly  to  tak e  p riso n e r  
th o se  o f th e  male p o p u latio n  o f  th e  a re a  "as may be d isposed  to  do us 
harm. ^
Madison and Armstrong were j u s t  beginning to  rea s se s s  th e  
s t r a te g ic  s i tu a t io n  in  l ig h t  o f  recen t developm ents. An immediate 
t h r e a t  seemed to  e x is t  a g a in s t th e  W estern f r o n t ie r  from Niagara to  
D e tro i t .  But a t  t h i s  po in t n e ith e r  th e  P re sid e n t nor th e  S e c re ta ry  
o f War was prepared  to  send any tro o p s  to  th e  a re a .  For th e  moment 
th e  s tr a te g y  o u tlin e d  in  A rm strong 's in s t ru c t io n s  to  H arrison  would 
have to  s u f f ic e .  In  f a c t ,  Armstrong ordered  H arrison  to  d isp a tc h  th e  
1 s t and p a r t  o f  th e  24th  Regiments to  S ackets Harbor. To Madison i t  
was a  q u estio n  o f p r io r i t i e s :  "Sackets Harbor and th e  s tak e  on Lake
Champlain have an e s s e n t ia l  and co n stan t claim  to  a t t e n tio n .
Even th e  re c e ip t  o f  new in te l lig e n c e  on January 1 could n o t 
a l t e r  t h e i r  p rese n t d efen siv e  p o stu re : W ilkinson wrote from French
M ills  on December 29 th a t  2 ,500 red co a ts  were headed by fo rced  marches 
f o r  Kingston.^  ̂  Armstrong c o r r e c t ly  suspected  th a t  th ese  tro o p s were 
th e  K ingston, P re sc o tt,  and Cornwall detachm ents, who had followed
231,  argues t h a t  th e  scheme o f  depopulation  was s o le ly  t h a t  o f 
Armstrong. But see Armstrong to  H arrison , Jan 1 , M ilita ry  Book,
RG 107 (NA), in  which he says t h a t  th e  P re s id e n t,  "on r e f le c t io n ,"  
has changed h i s  mind. Brant c la im s th a t  t h i s  wording was A rm strong's 
a ttem p t to  throw  g u i l t  from h im se lf . On th e  employment o f  Ind ians 
in  th e  war, see  Madison to  Armstrong, Je  18, L e tte rs  and Other 
W ritings (Congress e d . ) .  I l l ,  405.
e d .) ,  I I ,  580.
(NA). W ilk inson 's  d iv is io n  was a t  French M ills ;  he was nearby a t  
Malone.
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W ilk in so n 's  movement in  November and were now re tu rn in g  to  t h e i r  
p o s ts  fo r  th e  w in ter P révost was more concerned over th e  s a fe ty  
o f  Ifon trea l than  th e  Americans were over th e  sa fe ty  o f  t h e i r  f r o n t ie r  
p o s ts ,  and as  l a t e  a s  February 17 he expressed re lu c ta n c e  to  re in fo rc e  
Upper Canada u n t i l  American designs a g a in s t Lower Canada became c le a r e r ,
In  th e  f i r s t  weeks o f  January  American in te n tio n s  were f a r  from c le a r  
even to  them selves, p r im a rily  because they  were t ry in g  to  determ ine 
what B r i t i s h  designs were a g a in s t  th e  United S ta te s .  Armstrong, 
however, d id  not d isre g a rd  th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  t h a t  th ese  westward-bound 
B r i t i s h  re g u la rs  were e i th e r  reinforcem ents in tended f o r  an a t ta c k  on 
Sackets Harbor o r were th e  " a u x i l l i a ry  means" by which th e  B r i t i s h  
would r e - e s ta b l is h  them selves in  th e  Thames v a lle y . More l ik e ly  was 
th e  l a t t e r  p o s s ib i l i ty ,  he f e l t ,  and i f  indeed these  tro o p s  were in ­
tended fo r  an o ffe n s iv e , th e  r e a l  t a r g e t  was D e tro i t ,  But an o ffe n s iv e  
i n  th e  Thames v a lle y  would o n ly  confirm  h is  previous su sp ic io n s , and 
so he sim ply r e i t e r a te d  h is  e a r l i e r  warning o f  p o ss ib le  a tta c k  to  
H arriso n . I f  Sackets Harbor were th e  t a r g e t ,  he had a lre a d y  tak e n  
measures f o r  i t s  d efense by o rdering  th e  two D e tro it-b a se d  b a tta l io n s  
to  th e  n av a l base. Sackets Harbor and P la t t  sburg were h is  prime 
concerns.
But public  re a c t io n  to  the  N iagara f ia s c o  continued to  nag 
th e  a d m in is tra tio n , A d e le g a tio n  headed by John Nicholas o f Geneva 
p e rso n a lly  c a lle d  on the  S e c re ta ry  o f  War in  th e  beginning o f January
^ ^ o  H arrison , to  Sm ith, to  W ilkinson, Jan 1, i b id . See 
a ls o .  Brown to  Armstrong, Feb 24, Reg, L trs . Reed., RG 107 (NA),
^%o Drummond, C 1222, RG 8 (PAC).
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and demanded th a t  he send a re g u la r  co n tingen t to  th e  a re a . On 
January  6 R ep resen ta tiv e  Thomas W ilson o f Northumberland County, 
Pennsylvania, conveyed th e  apprehension o f  h i s  c o n s ti tu e n ts  over the  
"d read fu l ca lam ity  o f be in g  put t o  f l ig h t  i n  th e  w in te r ."  B r i t i s h  
success a t  N iagara had proved t h e i r  s tre n g th  and d a rin g . He warned 
th a t  "hundreds o f  o th er Ind ian  t r i b e s , "  B r i t i s h  re g u la rs ,  and 
Canadian m i l i t i a  were now w ith in  easy  reach o f  the  f l e e t  a t  E r ie  
from Long P o in t, and he c a lle d  f o r  a  regim ent o f m i l i t i a  to  g a rr iso n  
the  town.^^ Governor Tompkins subm itted th e  same warning a f t e r  
le a rn in g  of th e  burning o f  B uffalo . "Something must be done sp e ed ily  
and e f f e c tu a l ly ,"  he added, "or th e  confidence o f th e  c i t iz e n s  o f  
th i s  q u a rte r  o f  th e  United S ta te s  i n  the  government, w i l l  be l o s t . "  
A lready, most o f  th e  b u ild in g s  a long th e  N iagara f r o n t ie r  were de­
s tro y ed  and th e  p o pu lation  had evacuated th e  a r e a . C o n c e r n  over 
th e  upcoming e le c t io n s  f o r  th e  S ta te  Assembly and th e  United S ta te s  
Congress may have p a r t ly  prompted Tompkins' p lea s .
Tompkins m odestly d iscla im ed  p re ten s io n s  to  su p e rio r  s tr a te g ic  
wisdom—he sa id  he was n o t a " M ilita ry  man"—b ut he n e v e rth e le s s  
o ffe re d  some more su g g estio n s. He recommended a tta c k s  e i th e r  a g a in s t  
B urling ton  and York o r, i n  order to  re l ie v e  B r i t i s h  p ressu re  on th e
^^W infield S c o tt,  Memoirs o f  L ieu t.-G en era l S c o tt (New York, 
1864), I ,  115.
^^To Armstrong, Reg, L trs .  Heed., HG 10? (NA).
'*®To Armstrong, Jan  2, i b id .
^"^After th e  e le c t io n s  and a f t e r  th e  tro o p s  had a rr iv ed  on 
th e  f r o n t ie r ,  P e te r  B. P o r te r  wrote Armstrong; "The r e s u l t  o f th e  
e le c t io n s  in  t h i s  p a rt o f  th e  s ta t e  must be h ig h ly  g ra t i fy in g  to  
th e  governm ent." My 4> i b id .
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Niagara f r o n t ie r ,  a g a in s t Kingston and P re sc o tt,  Should th e  govern­
ment choose th e  form er course  o f  a c tio n , he estim ated  th a t  2,500 
re g u la rs  would be necessary  and promised to  supplement such a force 
w ith 500 v o lu n te e rs . One week l a t e r ,  on January  9, he a ssu red  Arm­
strong  t h a t  5,000 v o lu n te e rs  could be assem bled on te n  days n o tic e . 
Perhaps as an a d d it io n a l  argument fo r  a Niagara o ffe n s iv e , Tompkins 
warned th a t  u n less  th e  Americans s tru c k  th e  B r i t i s h  a t  N iagara, they  
might c o n c en tra te  a t  K ingston to  d es tro y  Sackets H a r b o r . I t  was 
A rm strong 's and i-kd ison 's  view, however, t h a t  i f  th e  Americans stru ck  
Kingston, th e  B r i t i s h  would be th ereb y  weakened a t  N iagara. Tompkins 
was c le a r ly  c a r r ie d  away by concern over Niagara—th e  B r i t i s h  were 
supermen.
Madison and Armstrong responded in  a  token  fash io n  to  th e se  
req u es ts  on January  12 and 15. The S e c re ta ry  ordered Colonel Win­
f ie ld  S c o tt to  Albany, where he was to  arrange th e  supply and tra n s p o r t  
o f  500 re g u la r  in fa n try  and a r t i l l e r i s t s  to  N iagara and confer w ith 
th e  governor about ra is in g  m i l i t i a .  In  a d d it io n , he se n t a ratachm ent 
o f  th e  22nd In fa n try  to  E r ie  and c a lle d  on th e  governor o f Pennsyl­
vania  to  comply w ith  Ik d is o n 's  a u th o r iz a t io n  fo r  a d r a f t  o f 1,000 
six-m onth m i l i t i a .
By January 30 îk d iso n  and Armstrong were s e t t l e d  on t h e i r  
plans f o r  th e  rem ainder o f  th e  w in ter  and th e  sp rin g . Ten days
Public Papers o f D aniel D. Tompkins, ed. Hugh H astings (Albany, 
1902), IV, 411-13.
Jan 15, M ilita ry  Book, HG 107 (NA); Madison to  Tompkins, Jan 25, 
L e tte rs  and Other W ritings (Congress e d . ) , I I ,  580,
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e a r l i e r ,  Armstrong, la r g e ly  on th e  P re s id e n t 's  i n i t i a t i v e ,  had 
o rdered  W ilkinson to  move th e  bu lk  o f  h is  d iv is io n  to  P l a t t  sburg and 
had au th o rized  B rig ad ie r  General Jacob Brown to  detach  2,000 men 
from W ilk in so n 's  command and r e in fo rc e  th e  g a rr iso n  o f  1,000 a t  
Sackets Harbor— "fo r th e  b e t te r  s e c u r i ty  o f  th e  [Lake O ntario] 
f l e e t . B r o w n ' s  ta s k  a t  th e  h a rb o r was p r im a ri ly  d e fen siv e , b u t 
he was in s t ru c te d  to  a c t  i f  c ircum stances were fav o rab le  fo r  a t t a c k ­
ing K ingston. "The e f f e c t , "  Madison sa id , " w i l l  be s a lu ta ry  ev e ry -  
vWiere."^^ W infield  S c o t t,  with 500 re g u la rs ,  2,500 v o lu n te e rs , and 
400 In d ia n s , would a ttem pt to  accom plish th re e  i n te r r e la te d  aim s:
(1) t o  "break up" B r i t i s h  p o s it io n s  near th e  Niagara R iver; (2) t o  
fo rce  th e  enemy to  abandon Fort N iagara; and (3) to  p reven t them 
from deploying  tro o p s  westward a g a in s t  D e tro i t ,  Malden, E r ie , and 
P u t-in -B ay . The exact procedure S c o tt should fo llow  was never 
p ro p e r ly  ex p la in ed . I t  appears t h a t  he was t o  e n te r  th e  pen in su la  
and assume a p o s it io n  on th e  road between F o r t Niagara and i t s  source 
o f su p p lie s  a t  B u rlin g to n , thus fo rc in g  i t s  abandonment. In  th e  
p rocess o f approaching th e  road , S c o tt would have had to  reduce 
B r i t i s h  p o s it io n s  along th e  r iv e r .  The "p lan" was dependent on 
whether th e  " ic e  la s te d " —presum ably on th e  la k e , and presum ably in  
o rd er th a t  th e  B r i t i s h  O ntario  f l e e t  could n o t come to  th e  f o r t ' s  
a id .  I f  S co tt met w ith success th e r e  was th e  o u tsid e  chance, a s
^^Armstrong, N o tice s , I I ,  64; Armstrong to  W ilkinson, Jan  20 
and 21 , M ilita ry  Book, HG 107 (NA); W ilkinson to  Brown, Jan 25, i n  
W ilk inson 's  Memoirs o f  My Own Times (P h ila d e lp h ia , 1816), I ,  626-27.
^^To Tompkins, Jan  25, L e t te r s  and O ther W ritings (Congress 
e d .) ,  I I ,  580; Armstrong to  H arriso n , Jan 30* M ilita ry  Book, RG 107
(m).
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Armstrong to ld  Tompkins, o f  "d isp o ssessin g  th e  Enemy o f  th e  Country 
between Lakes O ntario  & E r ie ."  But even i f  th e  B r i t i s h  succeeded in  
holding F ort N iagara , th e  e f f o r t  expended to  defend th a t  p o s it io n  
would th w art t h e i r  assumed p lan s  a g a in s t  more w esterly  American p o s ts .  
No one seemed to  r e a l iz e  t h a t  S c o t t 's  p rep a ra tio n s  could not be com­
p le ted  i n  time to  coun ter w in te r  a t t a c k s . ^
The B r i t i s h  were indeed  contem plating  such a move. On Jan ­
uary  21 Drummond proposed a w in ter ex p ed itio n  over th e  ice-bound roads 
a g a in s t D e tro i t  and acro ss  frozen  Lake E rie  a g a in s t  P u t-in -B ay , A l­
though he could n o t send a d d it io n a l  fo rc e s , P rév o st h e a r t i l y  concurred , 
fo r  he regarded  such a tta c k s  as  extrem ely im portan t " to  th e  p rese rv a ­
t io n  o f  Upper Canada and fo r  th e  maintenance o f  r e la t io n s  with th e  
Western In d ia n s ,"  But th e  p lan  came to  naught. The w in te r  o f 1814 
was u n u su a lly  m ild and th e  i c e  too s o f t  to  c a r r y  h eav ily  loaded 
s le ig h s , Drummond can ce lled  th e  a t ta c k s  on Febmiary 3» For th e  nex t 
few weeks Drummond and P rév o st devoted most o f  t h e i r  tim e to  th e  mun­
dane b u t im portan t ta s k s  o f  dom estic p o l i t i c s ,  supply, and manpower 
needs.
Thus f a r  th e  new American tro o p  d isp o s i tio n s  were mainly th e  
re s u l t  o f  M adison 's and A rm strong 's e f f o r ts  t o  provide f o r  th e  defen se  
o f  Sackets Harbor and P l a t t  sburg . R ig h tly  o r  wrongly, th e  two men 
had not been unduly alarmed fo r  the  s a fe ty  o f  Western p o s ts  and had
^^Armstrong to  V lilkinson, Jan  30, M ilita ry  Book, RG 107 (NA), 
Armstrong to ld  W ilkinson to  fu rn ish  th e  re g u la rs  fo r  S c o t t 's  fo rce  from 
th e  ranks and r e c r u i t s  o f  th e  Right D iv is io n , On Niagara " s tra te g y "  
fo r  S c o t t,  see Armstrong to  Brown, Apr 7, Brown's Documents (ed, 
G ruikshank), 97-99.
^^Drummond to  P ré v o st, Jan 21, C 682, RG 8 (PAG); Prévost t o  
Drummond, Jan 29 and Feb 8, G 1222, RG 8 (PAG),
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s u c c e s s fu lly  r e s i s te d  th e  v o c ife ro u s  req u e s ts  o f  Tonçikins fo r  a  b ig  
push in  th e  West. With a  sm all fo rc e  o f re g u la rs  and v o lu n te e rs ,  
S c o t t 's  prime ta s k  was to  fo rc e  th e  immediate abandonment o f  F o rt 
Niagara and p reven t th e  B r i t i s h  from d isp a tc h in g  tro o p s  westward— 
an o p e ra tio n  t h a t  was more in  th e  n a tu re  o f  a  dem onstration  th an  an 
o f fe n s iv e . Even i f  th e  P re sid e n t and th e  S e c re ta ry  o f  War were not 
e n t i r e ly  co n fid en t th a t  H a rr iso n 's  ra id s  or S c o t t 's  e f f o r ts  ensured 
Western defense , what e ls e  could th e y  do fo r  th e  moment? Sackets 
Harbor and P la ttsb u rg  needed p ro te c tio n ;  th e y  expected th e  B r i t i s h  
would march on P la ttsb u rg  in  th e  sp rin g  in  th e  event o f  a European 
peace and an in e v i ta b le  augm entation o f  B r i t i s h  power i n  th e  Canadas, 
There were sim ply not enough tro o p s  to  go around. Although Armstrong 
and Madison had n o t as y e t begun planning  f o r  a major o f fe n s iv e , th ey  
remained committed fo r  th e  tim e being  to  an e a s te rn -o r ie n te d  s tr a te g y .  
Brown and W ilkinson were i n  good p o s it io n  to  conduct campaigns a g a in s t 
M ontreal o r  K ingston when and i f  c ircum stances seemed a p p ro p r ia te  in  
th e  summer. In  th e  meantime, th a t  i s ,  in  th e  w in ter and e a rly  s p rin g , 
W ilkinson could make dem onstrations a g a in s t B r i t i s h  p o s ts  south  o f 
M ontreal, and Brown might f in d  an o p p o rtu n ity  to  a tta c k  K ingston,
Both moves could have s a lu ta ry  e f f e c ts  everybhere and r e l ie v e  B r i t i s h  
p ressu re  on th e  W est,
As in  p rev ious y e a rs ,  however, events would lea d  Americans 
w i l ly - n i l ly  to  th e  West, Like A lice  through th e  Looking G lass, th ey  
could never reach  th e  top  o f  th e  h i l l  (M ontreal o r  K ingston), from 
vrtiere th e y  could b e t t e r  have seen th e  garden o f  f lo w ers . No m a tte r
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how hard  th ey  t r i e d  to  reach  th e  to p  o r  how s tr a ig h t  th e  path looked, 
th ey  always ended up a t  th e  bottom . The house ( th e  West) kept g e tt in g  
in  th e  way. I ro n ic a l ly ,  th e  tu rn in g  po in t came in  l a t e  February vAien 
Armstrong rece iv ed  a re p o r t  from an unnamed "inform ant" th a t  P rév o st 
had deployed tro o p s  westward a t  th e  expense o f  th e  r e s t  o f  Upper 
Canada—only  1,200 men were l e f t  to  p ro te c t Kingston and re in fo rc e ­
ments would not be forthcom ing u n t i l  June, The in fo rm ation  j ib e d  
w ith A rm strong 's b e l i e f ,  h e ld  s in ce  January , t h a t  th e  B r i t i s h  were 
p reparing  to  a t ta c k  D e tro i t ,  K ingston appeared to  be v u ln e ra b le .
On February 28 he ordered  Brown to  a t ta c k ,
A rm strong 's communication, which c o n s is ted  o f two sep ara te  
l e t t e r s ,  was a cu rio u s  document. In  one he tra n s m itte d  h is  i n t e l l i ­
gence e s tim a te  t h a t  P révost in tended  to  r e - e s ta b l is h  c o n tro l  over Lake 
E rie  and D e tro it  i n  March and in  a l l  p ro b a b i l ity  would weaken K in g sto n 's  
defenses to  support t h i s  a tte m p t. He th e re fo re  urged Brown to  c ro s s  
th e  ic e  o f  th e  S t ,  Lawrence a t  th e  fo o t o f Lake Ontario and "c a rry  
K ingston by coup de m ain," provided c e r ta in  c o n d itio n s  e x is te d ; t h a t  
la rg e  detachm ents o f  B r i t i s h  tro o p s a c tu a l ly  moved from Kingston 
westward, th a t  th e  roads and th e  w eather were fa v o ra b le , and th a t  th e  
naval commander a t  Sackets Harbor, Chauncey, f u l l y  and h e a r t i l y  co­
operated  w ith him. He ended with t h i s  sen tence : " I f  th e  e n te rp r is e
be ag reed  upon, u se  the  enclosed  l e t t e r  to  mask your o b je c t ,  and 
l e t  no one in to  your s e c re t  but Chauncey,"
In  th e  enclosed  l e t t e r ,  Armstrong p o in te d  out t h a t  American 
public  opin ion  would no lo n g e r  to le r a t e  B r i t i s h  p ossession  o f F o rt
^^Ibid,. 65,
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N iagara. He informed Brown t h a t  S cott had o rders to  proceed from 
Albany to  th e  N iagara f ro n t ie r  w ith  f i e ld  and b a tte r in g  a r t i l l e r y ,  
c o lle c t  In d ian s  and m i l i t i a ,  re ta k e  th e  f o r t ,  and r e s t r a in  th e  B r i t i s h  
from  e ff e c tin g  westward o p e ra tio n s . S c o t t ,  however, needed r e in fo rc e ­
m ents, f o r  h i s  fo rce  was inadequate  to  th e  ta sk  o f  reducing th e  penin­
s u la ,  and, th e re fo re ,  th e  P resid en t had d ire c te d  t h a t  Brown move h is  
d iv is io n  from  Sackets Harbor to  th e  N iagara f r o n t ie r  and rendezvous 
w ith  S c o tt,  stopping  on the  way a t  B atav ia  fo r  fu r th e r  in s t r u c t io n s .
He added th a t  in form ants in  M ontreal in d ic a te d  th a t  la rg e  B r i t i s h  
detachm ents from th a t  c i t y  were d e s tin e d  fo r  p o in ts  west o f  K ingston, 
and consequently , Sackets Harbor was in  no danger,^®
Jacob Brown, a  major g en e ra l as o f  January 24, had reached th e  
harb o r on February  16. With h ead q u arters  a t  th e  n av a l base , h is  fo rc e , 
vdiich began to  a r r iv e  on February 14, became known as  the  L e f t D ivi­
s io n  o f M ilita ry  D i s t r i c t  No. 9 . Brown rece ived  A rm strong 's communi­
c a tio n  on I'larch 9. A cting w ith  th e  d is c re tio n a ry  a u th o r i ty  given 
him, he decided  a g a in s t  ra id in g  Kingston, fo r  A rm strong 's co n d itio n s  
cou ld  not be met, Chauncey and he judged th e  ic e  unsound and e s t i ­
mated th e  Kingston g a rr iso n  a t  2,000 in fa n t ry  and 1,000 m arines, 
b e s id e s  seamen, s u b s ta n t ia l ly  more than  A rm strong 's 1,200. The same 
m ild  weather which had caused th e  c a n c e lla t io n  o f  Drummond's p lans
The only e x ta n t  cop ies o f  th e s e  l e t t e r s  a re  in  i b id . . App, 
14, 213. They are  n o t in  RG 107 (NA). Armstrong may not have re ­
corded  th e  l e t t e r s ,  o r  he may have put them  in  a c o n f id e n tia l  f i l e ,  
now l o s t .  Lossing, P i c to r ia l  F ield-B ook. 792, c i t e s  th e  l e t t e r s  
from  "General Brown's L e tte r-b o o k ."  But th e  d ep o sited  in  th e  
L ib ra ry  o f Congress, Brown's L e t te r  Book, con ta ins  l e t t e r s  d a tin g  
o n ly  as e a r ly  as A p ril  1814. Lossing may have seen an e a r l i e r  
le t te rb o o k ,  now l o s t .  The id ea  o f  a coup de main a g a in s t K ingston 
was o r ig in a l ly  Chauncey 's. Armstrong to  W ilkinson, Jan 30, M ilita ry  
Book, RG 107 (NA).
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a g a in s t  D e tro i t  prevented  the  Americans from rac in g  to  K ingston, vrtiich 
in  any case was too w ell-defended .
Then th e  confusion  began. Brown and Chauncey m isconstrued th e  
im port and purpose o f th e  spurious second l e t t e r  and accepted i t  as an 
a l t e rn a te  d i r e c t iv e .  On March 13 Brown s e t  out f o r  B atavia w ith  2,000 
men o f  the  L e f t D iv is io n , leav in g  a l i t t l e  more th an  1,000 to  defend 
S ackets Harbor, I t  was not vrtiat Armstrong wanted him to  do: he v^s
to  have used th e  Niagara l e t t e r  a s  a ruse  de g u e rre , as a  "mask" to  
cover th e  r a id  on K ingston,
No o th e r  in c id e n t  so po ig n an tly  exposed American command 
problem s. To begin  w ith , Armstrong had accepted  h i s  in fo rm an t's  
e s tim a te  o f K in g sto n 's  s tre n g th  even though he had p rev io u s ly  r e ­
ce ived  c o n f l ic t in g  in te l l ig e n c e ,  Lewis C ass, th en  a  w itness in  H u l l 's  
t r i a l ,  had rep o r ted  from Albany on February 4 th a t  th e  Kingston g a r r i ­
son to ta le d  2,000 men ex c lu siv e  o f  m arines and m i l i t i a , B u t  Arm­
s tro n g  d isreg ard ed  t h i s  es tim ate  upon rec e iv in g  th e  lower one w ithout 
s u b s ta n t ia t in g  e i th e r  w ith  Brown o r  Chauncey, who had in  f a c t  con­
firm ed C ass 's  in te l l ig e n c e .  Moreover, W ilkinson, though he no doubt 
exaggerated somewhat, continued  t o  rep o r t th e  movement o f  B r i t i s h
% o l,  B, to  Armstrong, Feb 18, Heg, L trs ,  Heed., RG 107 
(NA); Brown t o  Armstrong, Mar 4 , Unreg, L t r s ,  Heed,, RG 10? (NA); 
Brown to  Armstrong, Mar 21, Reg, L tr s ,  R eed,, RG 107 (NA); W ilkin­
son, Memoirs. I ,  642, Drummond estim ated  th a t  4,000 troops were 
req u ired  to  ta k e  Sackets Harbor w ith  a g a rr iso n  o f 3 ,300, K in g sto n 's  
f o r t i f i c a t io n s  were more fo rm idable , Drummond to  P rév o st, Apr 27,
C 683, HG 8 (PAC), The t ru e  s tre n g th  o f K in g sto n 's  g a rr iso n  was 
somewhere between both es tim ates  b u t c lo s e r  to  Brown's, An a s s a u l t  
on a  f o r t i f i e d  p o s it io n  alm ost always re q u ire s  more tro o p s th an  th e  
d efen d ers .
3°To Armstrong, Reg, L t r s ,  Reed., RG 107 (NA),
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t ro o p s  from M ontreal toward K ingston. P révost was a c tu a l ly  d isp a tc h ­
in g  some tro o p s  to  Drummond, On March k, a f t e r  Armstrong had h a s t i ly  
sen t h is  o rd er to  Brown and befo re  Brown rece iv ed  i t ,  P révost had 
sen t a half-com pany o f Rocket A r t i l le r y ,  fo u r companies o f  m arines, 
and th e  103rd Regiment o f Foot to  K i n g s t o n , A r m s t r o n g  ap p a ren tly  
made th e  unwarranted assum ption th a t  a l l  westward-bound B r i t i s h  tro o p s 
were aimed a t  D e tro i t ,  The S e c re ta ry  had attem pted  to  a llow  f o r  a l l  
c o n tin g en c ie s—in clu d in g  th e  p ro b a b i l ity  th a t  h is  p lan  might become 
in ap p lic a b le  b e fo re  i t  reached Brown—by a tta c h in g  so many co n d itio n s  
to  i t s  ex ecu tio n . The co n d itio n s  rendered th e  order p o in tle s s :
Brown was a lre a d y  under o rd ers  to  a t t a c k  K ingston,
Secondly, th e  S e c re ta ry  o f War had n o t explained  how he 
expected Brown to  use th e  Niagara l e t t e r  as a  ruse  de g u e rre . Years 
l a t e r  he wrote t h a t  Brown was "to  p u t in to  e x e rc ise  a l l  proper means 
fo r  inducing  a b e l i e f ,  in  f r ie n d s  and fo es , t h a t  the  rec a p tu re  o f  
F o rt Niagara was th e  o b jec t o f  th e  e x p e d i t i o n , B y  t h i s  he could  
have meant th a t  Brown should have "leaked" th e  co n ten ts  o f  th e  l e t t e r  
t o  one o r two o f th o se  American newspapers which were always eag er to  
r e v e a l  th e  d e s tin a tio n s  o f American fo rc e s . The B r i t i s h  read them 
f o r  p re c is e ly  t h i s  kind o f in fo rm a tio n , and Brown could conceivably  
have m isled  th e  enemy. Such a  stra tegem , however, was u n lik e ly  to  
succeed: o th e r  papers would probably have d iscovered  whether Brown
Prévost to  Drummond, Mar 4 , C 1222, HG 8 (PAC), On spying , 
se e ; Hitsman, "Spying a t  Sackets Harbor, 1813," In land  Seas, XF 
(Summer 1959), 120-22; "S ec re t S e rv ic e ,"  S e lec t B r i t i s h  Documents of 
th e  Canadian War o f  1812. ed , W illiam  Wood (T oronto, 1928), I I I ,
P t ,  I I ,  App, P, 850-60; and Lossing, P i c to r ia l  F ield-B ook, 662-63,
^% o tic e s , I I ,  65.
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were going t o  Niagara o r  K ingston, and, i n  any c a s e ,  B r i t i s h  sp ie s  
alw ays knew ap p ro x iim te ly  how many men th e  Americans deployed to  
v a rio u s  p o in ts  on th e  f r o n t ie r .  P révost had lea rn e d  long befo re  
t h a t  o ffe n s iv e  su rp r ise  in  th e  n o rth ern  coun try  was im possib le— 
bo th  s id es  spoke E n g lish  and in fo rm a tio n  was e a s i l y  o b ta in a b le , 
e s p e c ia lly  in fo rm a tio n  about a  major redeploym ent, Drummond, fo r  
example, had known o f  Brown's march from  French M ills  even though 
Armstrong had urged s e c r e c y , B u t  i f  t h i s  were what Armstrong 
vmnted Brown to  do w ith  the  l e t t e r ,  why d id  he n o t e x p l i c i t ly  t e l l  
him so? In s te a d , he sen t a sp u rio u s  l e t t e r  th a t  con ta ined  essen­
t i a l l y  a c cu ra te  in fo rm ation  abou t S c o t t 's  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  invoked th e  
P re s id e n t 's  a u th o r i ty ,  and was phrased a s  a le g it im a te  o rd e r .
More s e r io u s ly , Armstrong had n e g lec ted  t o  ex p la in  what 
Brown should do i f  he decided n o t to  a t t a c k  K ingston, Brown was 
o bv iously  c o n f u s e d . H e  might have w r i t te n  fo r  c l a r i f i c a t i o n ,  b u t 
th e  d i f f i c u l ty  was t h a t  t h is  would e n t a i l  delay , and i f  Armstrong
^&rummond to  P rév o st, Jan  25 and Feb 14, C 682, HG 8 (PAG) ; 
Drummond to  P rév o st, Je  21, C 683, RG 8 (PAC); P révost to  Drummond, 
Apr 23, C 1222, RG 8 (PAC).
3^Brown b e lie v e d  th a t  an  o ffe n s iv e  in  th e  a rea  would only 
be p o ss ib le  when Chauncey gained  c o n tro l o f  Lake O ntario , and every­
one expected he would by June 1, In t h a t  event th e r e  were two 
p o s s ib i l i t i e s  open: ( l )  assume a  p o s it io n  on th e  S t .  Lawrence R iv e r,
b lock  B r i t i s h  communications t o  K ingston, and p o ss ib ly  b r in g  on a 
b a t t l e ;  o r (2 ) a tta c k  Kingston d i r e c t l y .  The l a t t e r ,  however, would 
r e q u ir e  more tro o p s  th a n  he had . Brown t o  Armstrong, Mar 4 , Unreg, 
L t r s ,  Reed.,  RG 107 (NA). On rec e iv in g  A rm strong 's  l e t t e r s  o f  Febru­
a ry  28 , Brown thought th e  S e c re ta ry  wanted him to  a tta c k  Kingston 
im m ediately o r  to  a s s i s t  S c o tt,  Since a  Kingston a tta c k  was a t  th e  
moment im possib le , and since  he regarded  th e  N iagara l e t t e r  as an 
a l t e rn a te  d i r e c t iv e .  Brown might have though t he could  go t o  S c o t t 's  
a s s is ta n c e  and then  r e tu r n  to  S ackets Harbor viien Chauncey gained 
c o n tro l  o f th e  lak e , B ran t, James Madison, VI, 254, in c o r r e c t ly  
a rgues th a t  Brown though t he co u ld  a t ta c k  Kingston on May 1 .
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r e a l ly  d id  want him to  r e in fo rc e  S c o tt,  such d e lay  could be c o s t ly .  
Brown was a new major g e n e ra l,  and perhaps no t wanting to  appear slow - 
w it te d , l e f t  f o r  N iagara , A fter  a l l ,  th e  v e te ran  w a rr io r  Chauncey 
had a ls o  in te rp re te d  th e  Niagara a s  an a l te rn a te  d i r e c t iv e ,
A tro u b le d  Brown reached Geneva on March 21, At t h i s  p o in t 
he showed B rig ad ie r  G eneral Edmund Gaines, who accompanied him, both 
o f A rm strong 's l e t t e r s ,  and Gaines convinced Brown t h a t  he had m isin­
te r p r e te d  them. Brown counterm arched the  tro o p s  over f o r ty - f iv e  m iles 
o f  mud and snow to  Onondaga, But once more a f f l i c t e d  by second (o r 
th ir d )  th o u g h ts . Brown, " th e  most unhappy man a l i v e ,"  l e f t  them a t  
Onondaga and proceeded to  Sackets Harbor, Back a t  th e  naval b ase, 
he rea sse sse d  th e  m il i ta ry  s i tu a t io n ,  but a g a in  found th e  ic e  u n s u it­
ab le  f o r  c ro ss in g  and th e  Kingston g a rr iso n  too  form idable t o  a tta c k .  
A fter  c o n su ltin g  w ith Chauncey and "o th e r c o n f id e n tia l  men," he de­
cided th a t  h is  f i r s t  in te r p re ta t io n  was c o r r e c t ,  "Happy a g a in ,"  he 
l e f t  f o r  B atav ia  on the tw e n ty - f if th ,  p lac in g  Gaines in  command o f 
the  h a rb o r g a rr iso n ,
Meanwhile, W ilkinson remained o f f i c i a l l y  ig n o ran t o f Arm­
s tro n g 's  in s t ru c t io n s  to  Brown, though he was th e  s e n io r  commander in  
D i s t r i c t  No, 9 and was i n  a  p o s it io n  to  a id  an a t ta c k  a g a in s t K ingston, 
Armstrong and Madison had lo s t  confidence in  W ilkinson, The S e c re ta ry  
o f  War h e ld  him re sp o n s ib le  fo r  th e  f a i l u r e  o f  the  M ontreal o ffen s iv e  
in  1813, con v en ien tly  fo rg e t tin g  h i s  and Hampton's p a r t s  in  th e  a f f a i r ,  
W ilkinson had indeed  dem onstrated h i s  i n a b i l i t y  to  overcome o b s ta c le s .
^^Brown t o  Armstrong, Mar 21 and 24, and Gaines to  Armstrong, 
Apr 14, Reg, L t r s ,  Reed,, RG 107 (NA),
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and h is  behavior s in ce  November had not been exemplary e i th e r .
The camp a t  French M ills , i n  th e  m idst o f  th e  th ic k  Chateau- 
gay fo re s t  o f  hemlock and p in e , had been a poor choice fo r  w in ter  
q u a r te rs .^ ^  The tem peratu re  o ften  dropped to  t h i r t y  below z e ro , 
c lo th in g  and s h e l te r  were u n s a tis fa c to ry ,  h o s p ita l  accommodations were 
inad eq u ate , m edicines were alm ost n o n -e x is te n t ,  r a t io n s  were scarce  
o r  below p a r, and s o ld ie rs  were swindled out o f  t h e i r  money. While 
su p p lie s  and s h e l t e r  were r e l a t i v e ly  abundant a t  P la ttsb u rg , men 
were near s ta rv a tio n  a t  French l 'a i le  and o n ly  the  h e a r t ie s t  main­
ta in e d  t h e i r  h e a lth  and c h a ra c te r .  A ff lic te d  by pneumonia, d ia r rh e a , 
d y sen te ry , typhus fev e r , and a trophy  o f th e  lim bs, o n ly  o n e -th ird  of 
th e  men were f i t  f o r  d u ty . D em oralization s e t  in .  O ffic e rs  r e ­
signed o r  sought lea v e , s o ld ie rs  d e se rted  to  th e  B r i t i s h ,  camp p o lice  
and s e c u r i ty  broke down. W ilkinson h im self was i l l ,  d e sp a ir in g , and 
d is t r e s s e d  th a t  h i s  tro o p s  were e a tin g  "the bread o f  id le n e s s ."  He 
consumed a  goodly amount o f  laudanum to  r e l ie v e  h is  b o d ily  p a in s  and 
a s  a r e s u l t  l iv e d  in  a world o f dreams. During most o f  January he 
proposed crazy  schemes o f conquest to  Armstrong, even though h is  
army was in  no co n d itio n  to  c a rry  them o u t. His b iographer con­
c luded: "He wanted ever so hard to  be Napoleonic, and sometimes he
o r ig in a te d  a com plicated p lan  o f cançaign and sketched i t s  o u tlin e  
in  an e x h ila ra te d  moment. When more th o u g h tfu l and se ren e , he 
re a l iz e d  th a t  i t  had no e a r th ly  fo u n d atio n s."  In  January  W ilkinson 
and Major G eneral George Iz a rd , th e  new commander a t  P la ttsb u rg ,
^ W ilk in so n , i t  ap p ears , chose th e  s i t e ,  bu t Madison made 
th e  d e c is io n  to  assume a  w in te r  p o s it io n  a s t r id e  th e  S t .  Lawrence. 
B ran t, James Madison. VI, 225.
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were ab le  t o  remedy th e  d ep lo rab le  s i tu a t io n  a t  th e  camp someidiat, 
b u t a l l  was not w e ll.  Madison f in a l ly  ordered (January  20) the  R ight 
D iv isio n  to  P la ttsb u rg ,  where i t  could rece iv e  b e t t e r  c a re  and reco v er 
i t s  s tr e n g th .
A rm strong 's l a s t  communication to  W ilkinson concerning w in te r  
o p e ra tio n s  had been on January  30, w hile  the  R ight D iv isio n  was in  
th e  process o f  moving camp. In  a r a th e r  vague n o te , th e  S e c re ta ry  
in s t ru c te d  W ilkinson th a t  Brown might a t ta c k  K ingston, b u t i f  la rg e  
numbers o f  B r i t i s h  tro o p s  l e f t  Lower Canada fo r  K ingston, Brown would 
rem ain in a c t iv e ,  and W ilkinson should " in f l i c t  blows o f much im portance 
below .
W ilkinson su bsequen tly  learned  second hand o f Brown's march 
to  B a tav ia . Although he d id  n o t know th e  reason fo r  th e  movement, he 
guessed i t  was fo r  some worthvrtiile pu rpose. He decided to  make a 
dem onstration  in  th e  d ire c t io n  o f  M ontreal in  o rd e r  to  fo rc e  Prévost 
t o  r e s t r i c t  th e  flow  o f  rein fo rcem ents westward, c re a te  a  d iv e rs io n  
in  fav o r o f  Brown, and r e t r ie v e  h is  own p rid e  and r e p u ta t io n .39 On 
^ferch 19 he marched 4,000 tro o p s  through snow and mud from P la ttsb u rg  
tow ard L a c o lle , where a B r i t i s h  detachment o f  200 g a rriso n ed  a f o r t i ­
f ie d  stone m il l  guard ing  th e  c ro ss in g  a t  Lacolle  Greek, "The over­
s iz e d  ra id in g  party"  a rr iv e d  b efo re  th e  m il l  on th e  t h i r t i e t h  and
3^Jaco b s, T arn ished  W arrio r. 298-302j Armstrong, N o tices . I I ,  
chap , i i i  and 214-18j Armstrong to  W ilkinson, Jan  20 and 21 , in  
W ilkinson, Memoirs. I ,  625-26.
3% Iilitary Book, RG 10? (NA).
W ilkinson to  D earborn, Mar 27 , quoted in  Adams, H is to ry  o f  
th e  United S t a te s . V I I I ,  25; t o  a  f r ie n d ,  Apr 9 , N ile s ' Weekly 
R e g is te r . V I, 7 Mÿ 1814, 166.
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b a tte re d  i t  w ith two 12-pounders and a 5.5 how itzer, b u t w ith l i t t l e  
e f f e c t—th e  w alls were tw o -fee t th ic k .  Unable to  haul up heav ie r 
a r t i l l e r y  through th e  mire o f  th e  roads and un w illin g  o r  unable t o  
storm  th e  m il l ,  W ilkinson o rdered  a w ithdraw al to  P la ttsb u rg , Ameri­
can reconnaissance had been f i t f u l ,  W ilkinson had le n t  l i t t l e  d i r e c ­
t io n  to  th e  a tta c k ,  and the  men had shown no cohesion  and determ ina­
t io n .  American lo s s e s  were 150 to  th e  B r i t i s h  65. R esu lting  dem orali­
z a tio n  g r e a t ly  weakened th e  R ight D iv isio n  and d iscouraged  rec ru itm en t. 
On A pril 12 W ilkinson was re l ie v e d  o f  command, which some regarded as 
t h e  most c o n s tru c tiv e  achievement o f  th e  a f f a i r ,
A nother m iserab le  in c id e n t.  Indeed, P révost stopped sending 
rein fo rcem en ts  to  Upper Canada, but th e r e  was no in d ic a tio n  th a t  
W ilk in so n 's  movement had anyth ing  to  do with t h a t  d e c is io n , P révost 
was sim ply concerned about th e  i n a b i l i t y  of Upper Canada to  s u b s is t  
a d d it io n a l  men. W ilk inson 's  dem onstra tion  had only  dem onstrated th e  
feeb len ess  o f  American power in  the a r e a .  He probably would have 
been more su c ce ss fu l in  h is  purposes had he avoided a c o n fro n ta tio n  
and sim ply moved h i s  d iv is io n  in to  a th re a te n in g  p o s it io n ,  s u f f ic ie n t  
t o  worry P ré v o st, But even i f  he had taken  L a c o lle , th e  movement 
would have been f u t i l e ,  fo r  Brown was not to  engage B r i t i s h  fo rces  
f o r  ano ther th re e  m onths,
W ilkinson had acted  to o  qu ick ly  on sc an ty  in fo rm ation  about 
Brown's movements, Armstrong shared some blame fo r  h in tin g  on 
January  30 th a t  he should " in f l i c t  blows o f much importance below ,"
Jacobs, Tarnished W arrior. 304-305} Harold L, Nelson, 
" M ilita ry  Roads fo r  War and Peace, 1791-1836," M ilita ry  A f fa ir s .  XIX 
(Spring  1955), 5j Adams, H is to ry  of th e  United S ta te s , V I I I . " ^ - 2 7 ;  
Armstrong, N o tices. I I ,  78-82,
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i f  th e  o p p o rtu n ity  p resen ted  i t s e l f ,  and fo r  not in s t r u c t in g  W ilkinson 
about Wien th e  o p p o r tu n itie s  would lead  to  th e  most im portan t conse­
quences, He had f a i l e d  to  keep Brown and W ilkinson ap p rised  o f each 
o th e r ’s movements and to  i n s i s t  upon t h e i r  in tim a te  coo p era tio n . He 
had se n t vague in s t ru c t io n s  to  W ilkinson, co n ta in in g  s ta tem en ts o f 
th e  a d m in is tra t io n ’s in te n t io n s ,  which, i f  th ey  d id  not e n t i r e ly  con­
f l i c t  w ith  th e  in fo rm ation  he gave Brown, were in c o n s is te n t .
Brown, meanwhile, a rr iv e d  a t  B atavia  on th e  t h i r t i e t h .  Find­
ing  no fu r th e r  in s t ru c t io n s  from Armstrong, he once more began to  
q u estio n  th e  a p p ro p ria ten ess  o f  h i s  behav io r. F o rtu n a te ly , on A p ril  
8 , he heard from  th e  S e c r e t a r y . A r m s t r o n g  had lea rn ed  o f  Brown’s 
f i r s t  d e p a rtu re  from th e  harbor on I4arch 20. He was taken  by sur­
p r is e ,  bu t accep tin g  th e  f a i t  accom pli w rote; "You have m istaken my 
m eaning. . . .  I f  you hazard any th ing  by t h i s  m is tak e , c o rre c t  i t  
prom ptly by r e tu rn in g  to  your p o s t—i f  on th e  o th e r  hand you l e f t  th e  
Harbor w ith a competent fo rce  fo r  i t s  d efence, go on and p ro sp e r.
Good consequences a re  sometimes th e  r e s u l t  o f  m is tak es ."  On th e  same 
day he ordered S c o tt,  who was s t i l l  a t  Albany and now a b r ig a d ie r ,  to  
jo in  Brown im m ediately and exped ite  th e  shipment o f  how itzers and
Brown to  Armstrong, Har 31 and Apr 8, Reg. L trs .  R eed.,
RG 107 (NA). Armstrong wrote on March 20, and Brown rece iv ed  the  
l e t t e r  on A p ril 8—18 days l a t e r .  Brown had rece iv ed  th e  February 
28 l e t t e r s  9 days a f t e r  th ey  had been s e n t .  L e tte r s  from Prévost 
a t  M ontreal to  Drummond a t  Kingston took from 4 to  17 days to  reach 
t h e i r  d e s tin a tio n .  The norm appeared to  have been 8 days. Both 
s id e s  were plagued by slow communications, but th e  B r i t i s h  had the 
edge. Constant delays s tim u la ted  Brown to  p o in t o u t to  Armstrong: 
"A more rap id  communication i s  v e ry  d e s ira b le  u n less  you a re  n earer 
to  u s ."  Ity 30, i b id . The Americans f in a l ly  e s ta b lish e d  a m il i ta ry  
express se rv ice  between B uffalo  and Canandaigua in  m id-June.
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heavy a r t i l l e r y  to  th e  f r o n t ie r .
A rm strong 's d e c is io n  was prompted n o t only by  th e  a c tu a l  
movement o f th e  L eft D iv isio n  to  N iagara and the  r e a l iz a t io n  th a t  
Kingston was p re s e n tly  u n a ssa ila b le ^  but by concern over th e  sa fe ty  
o f N iagara and D e tro i t ,  and, perhaps more im p o rta n tly , th e  f a i lu r e  
o f m i l i t i a  and v o lu n te e r  c a l l s  in  New York to  produce s u f f ic ie n t  
numbers to  augment S c o t t 's  small re g u la r  fo rc e . Lacking m i l i t i a ,
S co tt had been unable  to  leave Albany and c a rry  out h is  m ission . 
Armstrong saw in  Brown's m istaken march th e  o p p o rtu n ity  to  con tinue  
w ith p lan s  to  rec a p tu re  F o rt N iagara and p ro te c t  w estern  New York, 
P u t-in -B ay , E r ie ,  and D e t r o i t . U n k n o w n  t o  Armstrong was th e  B r i t i s h  
abandonment o f t h e i r  e a r l i e r  o ffe n s iv e  p lan s  a g a in s t w estern American
Since January  30 Madison had withdrawn from reg u la r  p a r t i c i ­
p a tio n  i n  s tr a te g y  fo rm ulation  and troop  deploym ent, but he knew o f 
A rm strong 's approva l o f  Brown's march and e i th e r  d i r e c t l y  sanctioned
^%o Brown, to  S c o t t,  Mar 20, M il ita ry  Book, RG 107 (NA). 
S cott was promoted on March %
Brown's Documents (ed. C ruikshank), 98; S c o t t ,  Memoirs. I ,  116 ; 
Tompkins to  Armstrong, Mar 30, Unreg. L trs .  Reed., RG 107 (NA).
^ * ^ran t, James Madison. VI, 255, im p lie s  t h a t  I'fe.dison was 
unaware o f  Brown's march and A rm strong 's ap p ro v a l. Firm  evidence to  
prove th e  case e i t h e r  way i s  n o n -e x is te n t .  But in  a l e t t e r  t o  Arm­
strong  from M ontpelier on May 4 , r e f e r r in g  to  Niagara o p e ra tio n s , 
I4adison d id  not in d ic a te  t h a t  he f e l t  any th ing  was am iss. L e t te r s  
and O ther N ritin g s  (Congress e d .) .  I l l ,  395. Moreover, Tom pkins'in­
volvement in  th e  a f f a i r  in d ic a te s  t h a t  Ifedison was a  p a r t i c ip a n t  in  
th e  d e c is io n . B ra n t 's  argument i s  c o n s is te n t  with h i s  b ia se s  and 
"based" on the  absence o f  l e t t e r s  between Armstrong and Madison 
from March to  May. Vftien i n  Washington, however, th e  P re sid e n t r a r e ly
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d efen siv e  w in te r  s tr a te g y ,  t h e i r  a c tio n  was p orten tous fo r  th e  fu tu re  
development o f  American o ffe n s iv e  s tr a te g y .  The e f f e c t  o f Brown's 
movement was t o  place more re g u la r  troops a t  the  N iagara f r o n t ie r  
th an  a t  Sackets Harbor, The u ltim a te  o b je c tiv e s  in  th e  p en in su la  were 
s ti]%  e s s e n t ia l ly  d e fe n s iv e , but i n  th e  co u rse  of subsequent confused 
e v e n ts ,  th e  d e c is io n  would c o n tr ib u te  to  th e  o v e rtu rn  o f  the  e a s te rn -  
o r ie n te d  s tr a te g y  and th e  f u l l  acceptance o f  Tompkins' w estern - 
o r ie n te d  o ffe n s iv e  s tr a te g y ,
Tompkins was exp ected ly  p leased , b u t tem p o rarily  puzz led .
With w rinkled brow he w rote Armstrong on March 30; "Gen, Brown pro­
ceeded to  Geneva, from whence, on th e  2 1 s t, he wrote me an u n i n t e l l i ­
g ib le  l e t t e r  about re tro g ra d in g . On th e  2 4 th  he wrote from th e  Harbour 
t h a t  in  a few hours he would r e tu r n  to  h is  t ro o p s  who were a t  Onondaga," 
Vfliile Brown was marching to  and f ro  over th e  f r o n t ie r ,  Tonpkins had 
a lre a d y  been a ssu red  by Armstrong th a t  he had approved Brown's move­
ment t o  B a tav ia , and W infield  S c o tt was on h i s  way from Albany to  
jo in  Brown a t  B atavia  b e fo re  Brown was c e r t a in  th a t  was where he 
should have been .^^  The la g  in  communications and th e  vagueness o f 
w r i t te n  o rd ers  were two problems Americans never overcame.
w rote bu t f re q u e n tly  co n fe rred  w ith  Armstrong, I f  indeed  he was 
unaware from March 20 to  May 4 o f  Brown's movenmnt, th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  
would seem to  be h is  n e v e r th e le s s ,  and A rm strong 's a c tio n s  cou ld  be 
a t t r ib u te d  to  decision-m aking  which was c o n s is te n t  w ith  p rev io u s ly  
determ ined s tr a te g y  in  d e fa u l t  o f  P r e s id e n tia l  d i r e c t io n .
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THE FOG OF WAR AND FORT NIAGARA
The fog which enveloped th e  American command process la y  
h e a v ily  in  A p r i l ,  Brown addressed  h is  l e t t e r s  to  Armstrong, and 
Armstrong addressed  h i s  to  Brown, but Brown wrote o f  one th in g  and 
Armstrong o f  an o th er a s  th e  l e t t e r s  crossed  in  t h e i r  passage o f 
h a l f  a  thousand m ile s. Although Brown had been re l ie v e d  to  l e a m  on 
A p ril  8 th a t  Armstrong was p leased  w ith h i s  m istaken march, he de­
c ided  to  d e la y  th e  a t ta c k  on F o r t N iagara . O sten sib ly , h i s  reasons 
were th a t  th e  heavy s ie g e  a r t i l l e r y  he thought necessary  could  not 
be o rdered  p a s t  Canandaigua because o f th e  poor co n d itio n  o f  th e  
ro ad s , and th e  m il i t a ry  s to re s  f o r  th e  b a t te r in g  t r a i n  were s t i l l  
a t  Albany. B esid es , he regarded  a siege  o f  th e  f o r t  as foo lhardy  
when th e  B r i t i s h  f l e e t  would p robably  soon appear on Lake O n ta rio , 
But th e  r e a l  reaso n , i t  seems, was th a t  he was no longer c e r ta in ,  
i f  he had ever been, t h a t  th e  N iagara l e t t e r  o f  February 28 was th e  
p lan  o f  o p e ra tio n s . Stunned by h is  marches and counterm arches and 
undoubtedly wary o f making s im ila r  e rro r s  in  th e  fu tu re ,  he vras not 
prepared  to  a c t  o f fe n s iv e ly  a g a in s t  the  f o r t  u n t i l  he obtained  a 
" c le a re r  view" o f  A rm strong 's in te n tio n s ,^
R eed., RG 107 (NA).
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Armstrong b e liev ed  he had a lre a d y  made i t  unm istakably c le a r  
t h a t  Brown should ta k e  Fort N iagara im m ediately . A fte r  a l l ,  he had 
approved Brown's m isguided march and encouraged him to  "go on and 
p rosper" in  h i s  l e t t e r  o f  March 20, T his n o te , which Brown rece iv ed  
on A p ril  8 , v a lid a te d  and confirmed h i s  in s t ru c t io n s  in  th e  N iagara 
l e t t e r  o f  February 28, which Brown in  f a c t  had o r ig in a l ly  accepted  as 
an o rd e r .^
Near m idnight o f  A p ril  7 , " a f t e r  a day o f  g rea t la b o r ,"  th e  
S e c re ta ry  w rote Brown once a g a in . I t  was th e  c le a r e r  view  th a t  Brown 
was w aiting  to  re c e iv e , fo r  Armstrong exp lained  th e  reaso n s fo r  ap ­
proving  th e  march to  N iagara and reviewed the  purposes o f  the  nK>ve- 
ment. The immediate o b je c t iv e  had been and s t i l l  was t o  fo rce  th e  
abandonment o f  Fort N iagara, w ith  th e  aims o f re ta k in g  th e  f o r t  and 
p rev en tin g  what Armstrong s t i l l  b e liev ed  was th e  obvious enemy in te n ­
t io n  " to  reco v er vAiat th ey  l a s t  year l o s t  in  th e  W est," But th e  
f a i l u r e  o f  v o lu n te e r  and m i l i t i a  c a l l s  i n  January  and February had 
delayed i t s  im plem entation. With th e  ic e  gone, th e  p lan  th a t  S c o tt  
was to  fo llo w  was now in fe a s ib le .  The only  a l t e rn a t iv e s  were an 
a s s a u l t ,  a s ie g e , o r  an investm en t. The form er, Armstrong suggested 
in  a  ro m a n tic a lly  l y r i c a l  n o te , was th e  b es t approach; " to  reco n n o itre  
w ell th e  ground, to  s e iz e  t h a t  most commanding p o s it io n  in  th e  n ig h t ,  
to  cover your men & r a i s e  your b a t te r ie s  and to  mount your cannon 
b e fo re  daybreak , and a s  th e  day dawns t o  f i l l  h i s  fosse  w ith  s h e ll s  
and sh o t,"  The ta k in g  o f  th e  f o r t ,  however, would only tem p o ra r ily
sh an k ), 98-99.
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check th e  B r i t i s h  p lan  to  re g a in  t h e i r  lo se s  in  th e  West, and, in  
o rd er to  "put i t  down a lto g e th e r"  he promised to  channel 3,000 
expected r e c r u i t s  f o r  " the  W estern Regiments" to  Buffalo  by June 1 • 
Brown, having cap tu red  Fort N iagara, was to  "d riv e  th e  Enemy out o f  
N iagara" w ith  h is  stren g th en ed  L eft D iv is io n . Under S c o tt,  th e  prim e 
o b je c tiv e  o f  th e  l im ite d  w in ter  plan was th e  rec a p tu re  o f  th e  f o r t ;  
under Brown, th e  prime o b je c tiv e  of th e  open-ended rev ised  p lan  
appeared to  b e  th e  conquest o f  th e  p e n in su la .^
U n fortuna tely  fo r  th e  Americans, th e  l e t t e r  would n o t reach 
Brown fo r a f u l l  month. In th e  meantime. Brown, u n c e rta in  about 
proceeding a g a in s t  F o r t N iagara, postponed the a t t a c k ,  and th en , by 
some strange  m ental p ro cess , drew  up h i s  own, and com pletely d i f f e r ­
e n t,  p lan  o f  campaign. On th e  same day (A p ril 8) he wrote Armstrong 
about h is  d e c is io n  to  d e lay  th e  a s sa u lt  on th e  f o r t .  Brown offhanded ly  
mentioned to  Armstrong h is  d e c is io n  to  co n cen tra te  th e  L eft D iv ision  
near Buffalo  "w ith  th e  view o f  passing  in to  the  Enemy's c o u n try  w ith  
th e  a id  [o f  th e  Lake E r ie  f l e e t ]  and form ing a ju n c tio n  w ith  th e  
fo rc e  a t  D e tro i t" —t h i s  on th e  co n d itio n  th a t  "no orders a r r iv e  to  
in te r f e r e , "  The m ystify ing  fe a tu re  o f Brown's th in k in g  was t h a t  he 
was r e lu c ta n t  to  proceed on th e  b a s is  o f  A rm strong 's l e t t e r  o f  March 
20 u n less  he rece iv ed  more d e ta i le d  in s t r u c t io n s ,  b u t was w i l lin g  to  
begin  p u ttin g  h is  own in v asio n  p lan  in to  e ff e c t  on th e  o n ly  co n d itio n  
th a t  Armstrong d id  n o t countermand h is  in te n t io n s .  Rather th an  p ro -
^ Ib id , Unclear i s  viiat Armstrong meant by "Niagara"—the  
f o r t  o r  th e  p e n in su la , o r  both? The "W estern Regiments" were th e  
17th , 19th, 23 rd , 24 th , 26th, 2 ? th , and 2 8 th , Armstrong t o  H arrison , 
My 4» to  S c o t t ,  %  25, M ilita ry  Book, RG 10? (NA), Some were re ­
c ru i te d  in  th e  East b u t s ta t io n e d  in  th e  West, American S ta te  P ap ers ; 
M ilita ry  A f fa ir s .  I ,  521,
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ceed w ith p rep a ra tio n s  fo r  a tta c k in g  th e  f o r t ,  he undertook p repara­
t io n s  to  conduct an o p e ra tio n  vdiich went beyond anyth ing  th a t  Arm­
stro n g  had h i th e r to  suggested and involved  fo rces  beyond h i s  ju r i s d ic ­
t i o n ,  I t  appears t h a t  he chose t h i s  course  o f a c tio n  on th e  b a s is  o f  
h i s  judgment th a t  he had no stan d in g  o rd ers  to  move a g a in s t th e  f o r t ;  
Chauncey's f l e e t  would not be ready  in  tim e to  a id  th e  o p e ra tio n s  o f  
th e  L eft D iv isio n  b e fo re  June; and in  th e  in te rim  he could "see what 
we can do above Lake O ntario" w ith  th e  h e lp  o f  th e  Lake E r ie  f l e e t , ^  
Brown developed h is  p lan  more f u l l y  w ith in  th e  next two weeks, 
adding arguments fo r  i t s  e f f ic a c y  which may o r may not have o r ig in a lly  
occurred  to  him. He determ ined th a t  th e re  were two ways "o f  approach­
in g  th e  Enemy in  Upper Canada w ith  a prospec t o f s tr ik in g  a  blow th a t  
w i l l  e f fe c t  any n a tio n a l  o b je c t" :  through Kingston and through the
N iagara p e n in su la . He recognized  Kingston as th e  prime t a r g e t ,  but 
r e a l iz e d  th a t  no a ttem p t could be made a g a in s t i t —o r a t  l e a s t  th e  
govenm ent was tinw illing  to  make i t —u n t i l  Chauncey commanded Lake 
O n ta rio , The q u estio n  turned  th e n  on th e  b e s t means o f s tr ik in g  a t  
th e  B r i t i s h  i n  th e  p en in su la . Brown saw th a t  th e  southern f la n k  of 
th e  pen in su la  was v u ln erab le  to  an  amphibious a s s a u l t  from Lake E r ie .  
The L eft D iv isio n  could  disembark from th e  E r ie  f l e e t  a t  Long Point 
o r  p o in ts  n earby , ra p id ly  march to  B u rlin g to n , sev er B r i t i s h  land 
communications w ith th e  p e n in su la , i s o la te  th e  B r i t i s h  g a rr iso n s  a t  
F o r ts  N iagara, George, M ississauga, and E r ie ,  and, i f  Chauncey ap­
peared  on th e  la k e , move a g a in s t th e  f o r t s ,  c ap tu rin g  o r d estro y in g  
a l l  B r i t i s h  fo rc e s  in  th e  p ro ce ss ,^
% eg . L trs ,  R eed ,, RG 107 (NA).
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The Niagara p en insu la  i s  a rec ta n g u la r  j u t  of land  between 
th e  head o f  Lake O ntario  and th e  foo t o f  lake  E r ie ,  about t h i r t y  
m iles wide and f i f t y  m iles lo n g . The 250-foot gorge ex tending e ig h t  
m iles below Niagara F a l ls  northward to  Queenston prevented  m il i ta ry  
c ro s s in g s . Below Queenston and above Chippawa, bateaux and o th er 
tro o p -c a rry in g  b o a ts  could e a s i ly  c ro ss  th e  r iv e r ,  though Grand 
Is la n d  above th e  f a l l s  o b s tru c ted  d i i 'e c t  passage from th e  American 
shore . On th e  Lake O ntario  s id e  o f  th e  p e n in su la , v e s se ls  could lan d  
tro o p s in  th e  imauth o f  th e  N iagara B iver and alm ost anywhere a long th e  
n o rth  sh o re . On th e  Lake E r ie  s ide  an amphibious force  could e n te r  
th e  pen in su la  a t  Abino Bay, th e  mouth o f  th e  Grand R iver, Rainham, 
and Long P o in t Bay,^
In  A p ril  (and u n t i l  August 1814) B r i t i s h  naval supremacy on 
Lake O ntario  p ro te c te d  th e  n o rth ern  f la n k  o f B r i t i s h  p o s it io n s  on 
th e  p en in su la  from amphibious lan d in g s . The f o r t s  on th e  e aste rn  
f la n k  along the  Niac^ara R iver, a l l  in  B r i t i s h  p o ssess io n , affo rded  
them p o s it iv e  d efen siv e  advantages. F o r ts  George and M ississauga, 
i n  th e  n o r th e a s te rn  co rner o f  th e  p en in su la , and Fort N iagara, a c ro ss  
th e  mouth o f  th e  r iv e r ,  p rovided a p ro te c te d  h a rb o r fo r  t h e i r  v e s se ls  
and p erm itted  the  secure  tra n s fe re n c e  o f  tro o p s acro ss  th e  r iv e r .
The g a rr iso n  o f F o rt Niagara th re a te n e d  the  American lan d  l in e  o f  
communications a long  th e  Ridge Road from the  Genesee d epo ts to  Lewis­
to n .  F ort E r ie ,  in  th e  so u th eas te rn  c o m e r o f  th e  p en in su la , ob­
s tru c te d  a  land  advance from th e  head o f  the  r iv e r .
^Com missioner's Report on Defence, Sept 1825, quoted in  
Way, "Topographical Aspects o f  Canadian D efence," 280; Map No. 3, 
S e lec t B r i t i s h  Documents (ed . Wood), I ,  n .p .;  John Harvey to  R ia l l ,  
Mar 23, C 682, RG 8 (PAC).
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On th e  o th e r  hand, th e  pen insu la  was an exposed s a l i e n t  along 
th e  B r i t i s h  f r o n t ie r  l in e  o f d efense, and Brown ' s  p lan  o ffe re d  the 
prospec t o f  severing  i t  a t  i t s  base, i s o la t in g  advanced B r i t i s h  po si­
t io n s ,  and n u l l i fy in g  th e i r  d efen siv e  advantages on the  e a s te rn  f la n k . 
An American s tr ik e  a long th e  roads to  B urling ton  from Long P o in t Bay, 
Bainham, o r  th e  mouth o f th e  Grand R iver would av o id  the  B r i t i s h  p o si­
t io n s  a long th e  N iagara R iver and th re a te n  to  d r iv e  a wedge between 
them and t h e i r  bases a t  York and K ingston, The Lake E rie  f l e e t  could 
supply th e  invading  army from B uffalo and E r ie .  I f  th e  Americans 
advanced from Rainham, small b o a ts  could use the  Grand R iver t o  t ra n s ­
p o r t  su p p lie s  and equipm ent, th ereb y  e lim in a tin g  conçilete dependence 
on packhorses and wagons. But wherever along  th e  Lake E rie  shore 
th e  Americans landed . Brown knew th e i r  l in e s  of communications would 
be f a i r ly  secu re : "A ll our su p p lie s  not c a rr ie d  in to  the f i e l d  could
be placed on board o u r F le e t .  We need leav e  no d e p o s its  behind  to  
d i s t r a c t  o u r a t t e n tio n  o r d iv id e  our F o rce, & w ith  good lu ck , good 
management, and th e  sm iles o f  Providence, th e  second p lan w i l l  com­
p le te ly  succeed by th e  1st o f  June."^
The plan  p a r t i a l l y  depended on th e  a s s is ta n c e  of Chauncey's 
O ntario  f l e e t ,  viiich vrould be needed to  prevent th e  B r i ti sh  from 
ru sh in g  re in fo rcem en ts  and su p p lie s  to  t h e i r  Right D iv ision  and re ­
ta k in g  B u rling ton  H eigh ts. Chauncey expected to  s a i l  in  June, when 
h i s  f le e t  would be more powerful than Y eo 's . According to  th e  p a tte rn  
t h a t  had developed i n  1813, he would sim ply have t o  show h im se lf  on 
th e  lake i n  o rd er to  c a rry  out h is  prime m ission o f  p reven ting  Yeo
^To Armstrong, Apr 17, Unreg. L t r s .  Reed., RG 107 (NA).
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from s a i l in g .  Beyond e x p ed itin g  th e  shipment o f  a d d it io n a l  su p p lie s  
and m a te r ie l  to  th e  Left D iv isio n , Chauncey vrould have l i t t l e  e ls e  
to  do , fo r  Yeo in tended  t o  r e t i r e  in to  Kingston harbor vdien Chauncey 
s a i le d .
Brown had made a c ru c ia l  assum ption about American o b jec tiv e s  
in  th e  p en in su la . The f i r s t  s tep  i n  A rm strong 's p lan s  and th e  o r ig i ­
n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  sending  re g u la r  fo rces  to  th e  a re a  was th e  recap­
tu re  o f  F ort N iagara . In  th o se  o f A rm strong 's l e t t e r s  which Brown 
had th u s  f a r  rece iv ed  (February  28 and Inarch 2 0 ), th e re  was only  th e  
im p lic a tio n  th a t  th e  government envisioned  th e  conquest o f  th e  penin­
su la  w ith  i t s  f o r t s  and t ro o p s .  I t  was p u re ly  c o in c id e n ta l th a t  
Brown's u ltim a te  o b je c t iv e s  in  th e  pen in su la  coincided  w ith  th e  l a r ­
ger o b je c t iv e s  i n  A rm strong 's l e t t e r  o f  A p ril  7 , which Broivn had not 
yet rec e iv ed .
Their s t r a te g ie s  were fundam entally  d i f f e r e n t ,  however.
Brown's was b o ld e r  but n o t more d a rin g , fo r  i t  o ffe re d  th e  s o lu t io n  
to  two c r i t i c a l  problems; supply and manpower. Brown c a lc u la te d  
th a t  an inv asio n  launched from Lake E r ie  would req u ire  fewer tro o p s  
than  one thrown ac ro ss  th e  Niagara R iv er, p r im a ri ly  because i t  would 
encounter fewer o b s tru c tio n s  and be more secure  l o g is t i c a l l y .  The 
p lan was c o n s is te n t  with th e  a d m in is t r a t io n 's  defen siv e  aims, b u t 
o ffe re d  la rg e r  p o s s ib i l i t i e s ,  and was th e  k ind  o f p lan  t h a t  th e  
P resid en t or th e  S e c re ta ry  o f  War m ight be expected  to  develop in  
o rder t o  accom plish t h e i r  p o lic y  g o a ls ,^  I t  c a p ita l iz e d  on prev ious
the  U nited S t a te s . V III, 30-31.
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American m il i t a ry  ga in s  and u t i l i z e d  American s t r a te g ic  a s s e t s ;  in  
t h i s  case  th e  Lake E r ie  f l e e t ,  which roamed f re e ly  and could keep th e  
L eft D iv isio n  supp lied  and make i t  m obile, and th e  fo rce  a t  D e tro i t ,  
vrtiich was f u l l y  capable o f  advancing f a r  in to  the  Upper Canadian in ­
t e r i o r  to  B u rlin g to n .
The immediate q u estio n  was th e  f a te  o f  F ort N iagara. Since 
an in v asio n  from Lake E rie  would perm it th e  L eft D iv isio n  to  bypass 
th e  r iv e r  f o r t r e s s e s .  Brown regarded  i t s  rec a p tu re  a s  unnecessary .
( I t  p robably  d id  not occur to  him th a t  an a d d it io n a l  reason  f o r  
allow ing  th e  B r i t i s h  to  g a rr iso n  th e  f o r t  i n  th e  even t h is  p lan  were 
put in to  e f f e c t  was t h a t  i t  re q u ire d  them to  imm obilize s o re ly  needed 
tro o p s .)  Yet he had been in s t ru c te d  to  ta k e  the  f o r t .  Although he 
was no longer c e r ta in  o f  t h a t ,  he could reasonab ly  expect t h a t  h is  
p lan  o f  campaign would e i th e r  be re je c te d  o r  prove im possib le  to  
execute  fo r  one reason  o r  a n o th e r . The in ço rtan ce  o f  tim e, and o f 
s e iz in g  th e  i n i t i a t i v e ,  were uppermost in  Brown's mind, but he 
avoided th e  o n ly  course t h a t  was im m ediately open to  him: an a tta c k  
a g a in s t  F ort N iagara , vdiose c ap tu re  was e s s e n t ia l  f o r  an in v as io n  
from a c ro ss  th e  r iv e r .  I t  was c e r ta in ly  w ith in  h is  p re ro g a tiv e  to  
a s se s s  th e  m il i t a ry  s i tu a t io n  and to  suggest o b je c t iv e s  and s t r a t e ­
g ie s ,  bu t th e s e  had to  be approved in  Washington, and , as he w e ll 
knew, t h a t  took  tim e . He sen t h is  p lan  to  Armstrong on A p ril  17.
Meanvrtiile, th e  B r i t i s h  f r e t te d  over th e  s t r a te g ic  and lo g is ­
t i c a l  weaknesses o f  t h e i r  p o s i t io n .  From h is  headquarters a t  King­
s to n , Drummond had follow ed th e  marches o f  th e  L eft D iv ision  s in c e  
i t  had l e f t  French M i l s  fo r  Sackets Harbor, He a t  f i r s t  c o r r e c t ly
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guessed th a t  i t  was going to  th e  harbor s o le ly  to  p ro te c t  th e  American 
f l e e t . But he th en  began to  rec e iv e  r e p o r ts  o f in creased  American 
a c t i v i t y  in  w estern  Upper Canada, which le d  him to  su sp ec t, even 
b e fo re  Brown l e f t  fo r  B a tav ia , t h a t  th e  L e ft D iv ision  vrould u l t im a te ly  
invade the N iagara p en in su la  and a ttem pt to  rendezvous with an Ameri­
can fo rc e  advancing eastw ard from D e tro i t ,  At th e  tim e  he though t 
th e  D e tro i t  g a rr iso n  posed th e  g r e a te s t  th r e a t ,^
General H arrison  s t i l l  commanded M ilita ry  D i s t r i c t  No, 8 , 
but had e s ta b lis h e d  h is  h ead q u arters  a t  C in c in n a ti,  and during th e  
w in ter  and in to  sp ring  th e  a c tiv e  command o f  th e  1,600 reg u la rs  and 
m i l i t i a  in  th e  D e tro it  a re a  f e l l  t o  L ieu tenan t Colonel Anthony B u tle r ,  
Shortage o f p ro v is io n s  fo rced  B u tle r  to  send frequen t fo rag ing  ex­
p e d it io n s  deep in to  Upper Canada. Very o f te n  th ey  tu rn e d  in to  ra id s  
a g a in s t  c iv i l i a n  and n o n -m ilita ry  p ro p erty , designed n o t only t o  pur­
chase fo o d s tu f fs  and ta k e  p r is o n e rs ,  but t o  deny su b s is ten ce  and 
s h e l te r  to  th e  enemy, The a c tu a l  s tr a te g y  pursued was a c ro ss  
between th a t  o f  raz in g  th e  Upper Canadian f r o n t ie r  and th a t  o f  tak in g  
p r is o n e rs .  D esp ite  M adison's a ttem p ts  to  s c a le  down th e  f e r o c i ty  of 
the  f r o n t ie r  w ar, n a tio n a l  a n im o s itie s  and r a c i a l  h a tre d s  combined 
with m il i t a ry  n e c e s s i ty  t o  produce d e s tru c t iv e  ra id s  and r e p r i s a l s .  
Government o f f i c i a l s  and reg u la r  s o ld ie rs  were more d is in c lin e d  
toward d e s tro y in g  p r iv a te  p ro p erty  and m olesting  c iv i l i a n s  th an
(PAC),
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and î'Iadison who d id  no t, were in fluenced  by th e  experience o f f ig h t in g  
In d ia n s , which, a long w ith  th e  o th e r  b ru ta l iz in g  ten d en c ies  o f war, 
in c l in e d  them tow ard  extreme m easures when th e y  were deemed n ecessa ry . 
The burn ing  o f W ashington, D .G .,in  th e  f a U  o f  1814 was only  th e  l a s t  
o f a s e r ie s  o f  such a c ts  t h a t  had begun on th e  f ro n t ie r  w ith  In d ian  
d e s tru c tio n  o f w hite p ro p e rty  and l iv e s ,  vdiite d e s tru c tio n  of In d ian s  
and In d ian  v i l l a g e s ,  th e  bu rn ing  o f York, Newark, and B u ffa lo , and 
numerous o th er b i t t e r  in c id e n ts .  Long before  Sherman's liarch to  th e  
Sea, war lea d e rs  had recognized  th e  m il i ta ry  and p sycho log ical v a lu e  
o f d es tro y in g  g ra in ,  m il ls ,  b u ild in g s , and, i n  th e  case o f  American 
p o licy  i n  Upper Canada, th e  abduction  o f  persons who "may be d isposed  
to  do us harm," even i f  th e y  were n o t wearing uniform s, Drummond's 
a t t e n tio n  was drawn to  two r e l a t i v e ly  mild American r a id s  in  February 
and Iferch,
In  e a rly  February an American p a rty  advanced as  f a r  as th e  
town o f  Delaware on the  Thames and cap tu red  L ieu tenan t Colonel 
F ran cis  Baby, th e  A ss is ta n t Q uarterm aster G eneral o f M il i t i a ,  and 
seven o th e r  men, some o f whom were m ilitiam en . The Canadian guide 
fo r  th e  r a id e rs  was an American sym pathizer, and before  leav in g  he 
burned h is  own p ro p e rty , which had been occupied by Canadian m i l i t i a .  
In  subsequent weeks B r i t i s h  and American detachments fought se v e ra l 
sk irm ishes south o f  th e  Thames, On February 21 B u tle r  s e n t a more 
s iz e a b le  p a rty  t o  ra id  P o rt T a lb o t, a  B r i t i s h  p o st on th e  shore o f  
Lake E r ie ,  in  an e f f o r t  to  reduce B r i t i s h  m il i t a ry  a c t i v i t y  near 
D e tro i t ,  C aptain Andrew Holmes was unable to  s u rp r ise  P o r t Talbot 
and had to  abandon th e  a tte m p t. At Longwood (n o rth  o f Delaware) on
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March 4 , however, h is  v ic to ry  over 200 re g u la rs  and m i l i t i a  w ith  only  
170 men produced th e  d e s ire d  r e s u l t s :  th e  B r i t i s h  withdrew t h e i r
advanced post from Delaware to  Oxford, Returning to  D e tro it  th e  Ameri­
cans destroyed  P o in te  Aux P in s , and th e  t o t a l  e f f e c t  o f  th e  r a id  was 
to  alarm  th e  p o pu lation  throughout th e  Thames v a lle y , in clu d in g  
Drummond a t  Kingston
When Dnunmond lea rn ed  o f Brown's t r e k  from S ackets Harbor to  
B atavia i n  March, he became confirmed in  th e  view t h a t  th e  L e ft D ivi­
s io n , invading  th e  p en insu la  from ac ro ss  th e  N iagara R iver vdiile p a rt  
o f  i t  besieged  F o rt N iagara, would cooperate w ith an augmented Ameri­
can fo rc e  from D e tro i t  advancing up th e  T h a m e s , P révost had been 
o f  th e  same g e n e ra l op in ion  as e a r ly  as February 26, Wien he guessed 
th a t  th e  Americans would a ttem pt to  recap tu re  Fort Niagara and u t i l i z e  
th e i r  Lake E rie  f l e e t  to  invade th e  p en in su la . Both were anxious fo r  
th e  s a fe ty  o f th e  g rain -p roducing , f lo u r -m ill in g  reg io n  in  th e  a rea  
o f  Long P o in t, Those along th e  Thames and Niagara R ivers were v i r ­
tu a l ly  exhausted .
Both men thought th e  s i tu a t io n  to  be c r i t i c a l .  There were 
fewer th an  5,000 re g u la rs  in  Upper Canada in  A p ril defending th e  l in e  
from Cornwall to  London, P rév o st, adhering  to  h is  s tr a te g y  o f  de­
fending Lower Canada f i r s t ,  was r e lu c ta n t  t o  send rein fo rcem ents to  
Drummond u n t i l  he was c e r ta in  th e  Americans would n o t a t ta c k  M ontreal
^%rummond to  F re e r ,  Feb 14» to  P rév o st, Mar 5, C 682, 
RG 8 (PAC).
^^To P rév o st, Mar 31» ib id ,
 ̂^ ^ e v o s t  t o  Drummond, Feb 28, C 1222, HG 8 (PAC),
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o r u n t i l  tro o p s a rr iv e d  from E u r o p e ,M o r e o v e r ,  th e  western p a rts  
o f  th e  upper prov ince could  b a re ly  su b s is t  t h e i r  own g a rr iso n s , much 
l e s s  any re in fo rcem en ts , except w ith  su p p lie s  sent from Lower Canada, 
But as P révost w e ll knew, th ese  co u ld  not be conveyed w ithout " se rio u s  
expense, d i f f i c u l ty ,  and inconvenience, [ in  a d d it io n  to  ] th e  uncer­
ta in ty  o f  t h e i r  a r r iv in g  a t  t h e i r  d e s t in a tio n ."  I t  was im p racticab le  
to  send su p p lie s  a long th e  land ro u te  from M ontreal except d u rin g  th e  
summer months, and the  re in fo rcem en ts , should they  go to  N iagara, 
would have to  depend on th e  water ro u te  a c ro ss  Lake O ntario , P rév o st, 
however, expected th a t  Chauncey would c o n tro l  the  la k e  fo r  th e  g re a te r  
p a rt  o f  th e  s a i l in g  season. He adv ised  Drummond to  defend th e  penin­
su la  w ith  th e  t ro o p s  he iiad and draw on th e  depots and magazines 
which he could e s ta b l is h  befo re  th e  opening o f  the  canç)aigning season. 
He was a b le  to  send only th e  103rd Regiment, four companies o f  ma­
r in e s ,  and a half-com pany o f  Rocket A r t i l l e r y  to  K ingston on March 4» 
Drummond shipped th e  103rd to  R ia l l  in  the  middle o f  A p ril vdien the 
ic e  broke on th e  lak e .^ ^
Major G eneral P hineas R ia l l ,  wiio commanded th e  B r i t i s h  Right 
D iv isio n  defending  th e  l i n e  from York to  London, fea re d  th a t  u n less  
he rece iv ed  "a good and s u f f ic ie n t  reinforcem ent" he could n o t hold 
th e  p en in su la . In  March, when R ia l l  had o n ly  2,000 men, but befo re  
Brown had even l e f t  Sackets Harbor, he warned Drummond; "%  p o s it io n  
i s  a s s a i la b le  in  i t s  f ro n t  and on b o th  f la n k s ,  . . . p a r t i c u la r ly  . ,  ,
 ̂^To Drummond, Feb 17 and Apr 30, i b id , ; P rév o st ' s m arginal 
note in  Drummond to  P rév o st, Je 21, C 683, RG 8 (PAC).
 ̂^Prévost to  Drummond, Feb 28 and Mar 4 
Drummond to  P ré v o st, Apr 15, 0 683, RG 8 (PAC).
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th e  r ig h t ,  where , , ,  the  Enemy may, by . . .  land ing  a t  Long P o in t 
o r  i t s  v i c in i ty ,  o r  by advancing a long th e  W estern Road, g e t in to  my 
r e a r  and c u t  o f f  my communication w ith  you."^ ̂  By th e  end o f A p ril  
th e  Right D iv isio n  had in creased  in  s tre n g th  to  alm ost 3,000 men, 
b u t th e  s tr a te g ic  s i tu a t io n  was e s s e n t ia l ly  unchanged. R ia l l  had 
been ordered by Drummond to  s c a t t e r  h i s  troops over a wide a rea from  
York to  Oxford in  o rd e r  to  g a rr iso n  se v e ra l  key p o s it io n s  and main­
t a i n  th e  confidence o f  the  r e s id e n ts .  In  th e  even t o f an American 
in v as io n , most of them would have to  rem ain a t  t h e i r  p o s ts ,  and R ia l l  
would have fewer men than  Brown to  f ig h t  with i n  th e  f i e l d .  The 
f o r t s  were g re a t  o b s ta c le s  to  an American fo rce  invading  acro ss  th e  
Niagara R iv e r, but handicaps t o  the  B r i t i s h  i f  th e  Americans ad­
vanced from a  po in t a long th e  shore o f  Lake E r ie .  R ia ll  was so 
w orried  about having a  competent f ie ld  an%r th a t  he suggested th e  
d r a s t ic  measure o f d es tro y in g  a l l  o f F o r t N iagara but i t s  e a s te rn  
ram parts and tower so th a t  th e  g re a te r  p a r t  o f th e  g a rr iso n  o f 600 
co u ld  be withdrawn f o r  use in  th e  f i e l d ,
Drummond, f o r  th e  same reasons a s  R ia l l ,  feared  an inv asio n  
from Lake E r ie .  He thought th e re  was n o t a la rg e  enough "d isp o sab le  
fo rc e "  on th e  p en in su la  to  r e s i s t  in v as io n  and e stim ated  th a t  pro­
v is io n s  were inadequate  to  support what troops th e re  w ere. He 
warned P rév o st th a t  u n less  an o th e r regim ent b e s id e s  the  103rd were 
se n t  to  R ia l l ,  and u n le ss  Lower Canada sen t s u p p lie s ,  th e  sa fe ty
17piar 10, G 682, RG 8 (PAC).
^^Drummond t o  P rév o st, Mar 15, and Harvey to  R i a l l ,  Mar 23,
i b i d .
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o f th e  p en in su la  could not be g u a r a n t e e d , P révost f e l t ,  and pro­
b ab ly  c o r r e c t ly ,  th a t  h is  hands were t i e d ;  he could do no more fo r  
l i i a l l  u n t i l  more re g u la rs  a r r iv e d  from Europe.
In A p r i l  one p o s s ib i l i ty  seemed to  o f fe r  a  way out o f  th e  
dilemma: w ith  th e  L e ft D iv isio n  gone from Sackets Harbor, th e
American n av a l base might be open to  a t t a c k .  Drummond toyed  with th e  
id ea  in  the  beginning  o f  th e  month but alm ost abandoned i t  u n t i l  
P révost encouraged him to  in v e s t ig a te  th e  m atter  f u r th e r  on A p ril  23. 
Drummond took i t  up ag a in  w ith  e a rn e s t,  r e a l iz in g  th a t  w ithout con­
t r o l  o f  th e  lak e  th e  Right D iv isio n  might s ta rv e .  The Commissary 
Department had ju s t  es tim ated  th a t  a t  th e  p resen t r a te  o f  consump­
t io n  th e  Right D iv is io n 's  supply o f f lo u r  would e x p ire  in  a  few 
months; f re sh  meat was scarce ; and s a l t  meat could only  be procured 
from Lower Canada. " I  th e re fo re  c o n s id e r ,"  Drummond concluded, " th a t  
th e  s a fe ty  o f  th e  province in  g re a t  measure depends . . . upon . . .  
nava l s u p e r io r i ty  . . . [and] th e  d e s tru c tio n  o f th e  enemy's v e s s e ls ."  
I f  Chauncey were allow ed to  complete h is  new sh ip , he would be ab le  
to  sev er th e  in d isp en sab le  w ater l in e  o f  communications w ith  
N iagara , "by which alone  th a t  d iv is io n  can be supported and fed ."^^
But t h e i r  hopes snagged on th e  th o rn y  problem o f numbers. 
Drummond estim ated  th a t  he would need n o t l e s s  th an  4,000 e f f e c t iv e s  
fo r  an a t ta c k ,  but he had only 3 ,200 , in c lu d in g  m i l i t i a  and m arines, 
and Prévost would have to  send a t  le a s t  800 re g u la rs  from Lower
^%rummond to  P ré v o st, Apr 2, i b id . ; P révost to  Drummond, 
Apr 23 , C 1222, RG 8 (PAC); Drummond to  P rév o st, Apr 26 and 28,
C 683, HG 8 (PAC).
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Canada. P re d ic ta b ly , Prévost refu sed  th e  e x tra  men; th e  a t ta c k  would 
have to  aw ait th e  a r r i v a l  o f  re in fo rcem en ts  from Europe, A n tic ip a tin g  
P ré v o st ' s r e f u s a l ,  Drummond prepared  an a tta c k  on th e  American depot 
a t  Osvrego, which would req u ire  only  900 men. With luck , he hoped to  
cap tu re  o r  d es tro y  enough American p ro v is io n s , guns, and ammunition 
to  h inder th e  o u t f i t t in g  o f Chauncey's f l e e t  and r e l ie v e  some o f 
R i a l l '8 n e e d s . Even befo re  Drummond rec e iv ed  P ré v o s t 's  r e je c t io n  o f  
th e  req u es t fo r  800 men, and b efo re  P rév o st sanctioned  th e  a tta c k  on 
Oswego, Drummond and Yeo got under way on May 3.^^ Drummond had 
probably  n ev er s e r io u s ly  e n te r ta in e d  th e  hope o f  s tr ik in g  S ackets 
Harbor.
In  m id-A pril Chauncey g o t wind o f  B r i t i s h  in te n tio n s  through 
a  " c o n f id e n tia l  ag en t"  in  K ingston . The agent was more c e r t a in  of 
th e  a tta c k  th an  B r i t i s h  le a d e r s ,  fo r  he warned Chauncey t h a t  Yeo 
would s a i l  a g a in s t Sackets Harbor w ith 3,000 men a s  soon a s  th e  wind 
was f a i r .  Gaines d isp a tch ed  th e  in fo rm atio n  to  Brown on A p r i l  14 
( th e  day a f t e r  n o tify in g  Arm strong), ex pressing  h i s  and Chauncey's 
deep concern th a t  t h e i r  fo rces  were inadequate  t o  p ro te c t th e  h a rb o r. 
S ince th e  wind was f a i r ,  he expected th e  a tta c k  m om entarily, but 
n e v e rth e le s s  asked f o r  a  company of a r t i l l e r y ,  some dragoons, and a 
regim ent o f  in fa n try .
G a in e s 's  f e a r s  were unwarranted and h is  req u e s t fo r  troops 
was b la ta n t ly  i r r e s p o n s ib le .  In  a s e r ie s  o f  l e t t e r s  to  Armstrong
21 Drummond to  P rév o st, Apr 26 and 27 and My 3 , C 683, H3 8 
(PAC); P rév o st to  Drummond, My 7 , C 1222, RG 8 (PAC).
22unreg, L t r s .  Reed., RG 107 (NA).
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from th e  t h i r te e n th  t o  th e  tw e n ty - f if th  o f  A p ril, he overflowed w ith  
confidence and even welcomed an  a t ta c k .  He d escrib ed  th e  f o r t i f i c a t io n s  
o f  th e  h arb o r as fo rm idab le , th e  a r t i l l e r y  as abundant, th e  number 
o f  tro o p s  a s  s u f f i c i e n t ,  and th e  coopera tion  between th e  army and 
navy as e x c e lle n t .  He and Chauncey b e lie v e d  th e  supposed B r i ti sh  
a t t a c k  was p red ic a te d  upon th e  in fo rm a tio n  th a t  o n ly  500 tro o p s  
p ro te c te d  S ackets Harbor and Chauncey*s f l e e t  had sa ile d  f o r  th e  
N iagara f r o n t ie r .  F i f t y  o r a hundred more re g u la rs  a t  any po in t on 
th e  f ro n t ie r  always made a g re a t  dea l o f  d if fe re n c e , and th e  number 
a t  Sackets Harbor and Kingston f lu c tu a te d  by a t  l e a s t  t h a t  amount 
from week to  week, making i t  v i r t u a l ly  im possib le  to  determ ine the  
ex act number o f  " e f fe c tiv e "  o r  "d isp o sab le"  tro o p s  a t  e i t h e r  place 
f o r  any s p e c i f ic  t im e . But on A p ril  14 a t  l e a s t  1,000 re g u la rs  and 
from  1,500 to  2,000 seamen defended S ackets Harbor—b esid es  hundreds 
o f  m i l i t i a  who were a r r iv in g  d a i ly —behind new and s tro n g e r f o r t i f i ­
c a tio n s .  Confident o f  t h e i r  s tre n g th , Gaines and Chauncey a c tu a l ly  
f e l t  th a t  i f  th e  B r i t i s h  a tta c k ed  they  would be b ad ly  "cu t up ," and 
th e  Americans would be a b le , w ith  rein fo rcem en ts , to  c o u n te ra ttack  
a g a in s t  K ingston.
Gaines may have been a ttem p tin g  t o  in g ra t ia te  h im se lf  with 
th e  S e c re ta ry  o f  War w hile throw ing blame from h is  shou lders should 
ca ta s tro p h e  a c tu a l ly  b e f a l l  S ackets Harbor. He a ssu red  Armstrong 
o f  h i s  own d e fen siv e  p re p a ra tio n s , t r i e d  to  im press him w ith  h is  
confidence and courage, and even mentioned th a t  he had c o r r e c t ly  
in te rp re te d  th e  Niagara l e t t e r  o f  February 28,^^ But he begged
% ain e s  to  Armstrong, Apr 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 22, and 25,
Reg, L trs .  R eed ., RG 107 (NA); Brown to  Armstrong, Apr 17, Unreg. L t r s .  
R eed ., RG 107 (NA); Drummond to  P rév o st, Apr 27, C 683, RG 8 (PAC).
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Brown fo r  more tro o p s , perhaps to  p lace  u l tim a te  r e s p o n s ib il i ty  fo r  
th e  fa te  o f  th e  harb o r on him. The behavior o f  Gaines and Chauncey 
betrayed  an ex cessiv e  concern fo r  t h e i r  own r e p u ta tio n s  and b a iliw ick s  
—vAat l a t e r  in  American m il i t a ry  h is to ry  would be c a lle d  "post 
psychology" by one h is to r ia n ,  In  Chauncey's case , i t  would f in a l ly  
prove f a t a l  to  o p e ra tio n s  i n  1814,
Brown rece iv ed  G a in e s 's  l e t t e r  on th e  n ig h t o f  A p ril  17 and 
was su rp r ise d  by h i s  alarmed concern fo r  th e  h a rb o r 's  s a fe ty .  He 
had ju s t  d isp a tch ed  to  Armstrong th e  communication c o n ta in in g  h is  
new plan  o f  canqpaign, in  which he had a lso  a ssu red  th e  S e c re ta ry  
t h a t  Gaines could e a s i ly  defend th e  n av a l base  w ith i t s  1,000 regu­
l a r s ,  The next day he wrote Gaines t h a t  he could  do noth ing  in  any 
case as a l l  a d d it io n a l  t ro o p s  were to o  f a r  from th e  h arbor to  a r r iv e  
in  tim e and th a t  th e  b est course  o f  a c tio n  was to  c a l l  out th e  m il i t ia  
i n  th e  neighborhood,^^ Gaines had a lre a d y  summoned them , and, more­
ov er, had taken  i t  upon h im se lf , w ithout Brown's knowledge, to  o rd er 
300 " f in e  r e c r u it s "  o f  th e  23rd Regiment from U tica to  Sackets 
Harbor and to  r e c a l l  600 r e c r u i t s  o f  th e  9 th  and 25th th en  on th e  
march to  th e  Niagara f r o n t i e r . S t i l l ,  he and Chauncey continued 
to  send Brown f rig h te n in g  e s tim a tes  o f  t h e i r  w e a k n e s s e s ,W h a t  d i s -
^ W illia m s , Americans a t  War. 97,
25to G aines, to  Chauncey, Apr 18, Unreg, L trs ,  R eed., RG 107
(NA),
^^Gaines t o  Armstrong, Apr 16, Reg, L t r s ,  R eed,, RG 107 (NA),
^^Brown to  Armstrong, Apr 19 and 25,
Gaines and Chauncey a re  not in  RG 107 (NA),
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tu rb e d  Brown ap p a re n tly , b e s id e s  th e  c r i t i c a l  to n e  of th e  l e t t e r s ,  was 
h i s  understanding  th a t  th e  B r i t i s h  were ready t o  a tta c k  w ith  3,000 
tro o p s , b e s id e s  m arines and m i l i t i a ,  Chauncey had re c e n t ly  (March) 
assu red  Brown th a t  Drummond had only about 1 ,500, and th a t  th e  harbor 
was p e r f e c t ly  safe  a s  he had l e f t  i t .  VJhether Chauncey and Gaines 
now thought t h a t  Dnunraond had 3,000 re g u la rs  i s  u n c e rta in , but i t  
appears th e y  d id  n o t ,  and th a t  Brown m is in te rp re te d  t h e i r  accounts on 
th e  b a s is  o f  t h e i r  s tr id e n t  appeals f o r  more defenders.^®
Brown allowed th ese  subsequent l e t t e r s  t o  make him "anxious 
and unhappy, " and, leav in g  S co tt in  command a t  B uffalo  on A p ril 21, 
he l e f t  f o r  Sackets Harbor w ith  a t ro o p  o f  dragoons " to  sh are  the  
f a t e  o f  t h a t  p la c e ,"  In  th e  c ircum stances h is  d ep a rtu re  was under­
s ta n d a b le , His su b o rd in a te , G aines, had paid him a d iss e rv ic e  by 
causing  him to  leave th e  f r o n t ie r  and f in d  out f o r  h im self th e  a c tu a l  
s ta t e  of a f f a i r s —"Such i s  th e  anxious s ta te  o f  my mind t h a t  I  cannot 
l iv e  upon t h i s  F ro n tie r  under th e  e x is t in g  s ta te  o f  t h i n g s , U n f o r ­
tu n a te ly ,  he gave approval to  G aines’s d iv e rs io n  o f  r e c r u i t s  from 
Buffalo  to  th e  h arb o r.
Brown, reach ing  Sackets Harbor fo u r days l a t e r ,  a ssu red  him­
s e l f  o f i t s  s tre n g th . An a t ta c k ,  he f e l t ,  was more to  be desired
^%rown to  Chauncey, Apr 18, Unreg, L tr s ,  Reed,,  RG 107 (NA),
^ E x a c t ly  when Brown gave h is  approval o r  whether he sim ply 
acquiesced  in  th e  d e c is io n  i s  u n c e r ta in . He d id  o rder th e  U tica 
r e c r u i t s  to  Sackets Harbor on A p ril  18, before  he knew Gaines had 
issu ed  th e  same o rd e r .  See Brown to  G aines, Apr 18, Unreg, L trs ,  
Reed,, RG 107 (NA); Gaines to  Armstrong, Apr 25, and S c o tt to  
Armstrong, My 17, Reg, L trs ,  R eed ,, RG 107 (NA).
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than  fe a re d , G aines, in  f a c t ,  had ju s t  sen t th e  m i l i t i a  home. A nti­
c ip a t in g  an a t t a c k  on th e  Oswego d ep o t, however, th ey  ordered th e  
bulk o f  th e  m a te rie l  moved a mile in lan d  to  th e  f a l l s  o f  the  r iv e r .  
When Drtunmond s tru c k  Oswego on May 6 , he managed to  cap tu re  n in e  guns 
and 2 ,400  b a r r e ls  o f ammunition, po rk , s a l t ,  and cordage. But th e  
B r i t i s h  paid th e  p rice  w ith  n in e ty - f iv e  men and f a i l e d  to  c a p tu re  the  
la rg e  q u a n tity  o f  heavy guns and s to re s  dep o sited  a t  th e  f a l l s .
The se q u el to  th e  ra id  occurred  on May 30. Yeo had imposed 
a blockade o f Sackets Harbor in  o rd e r  to  p reven t Chauncey from g e tt in g  
the  heavy guns and cordage he needed fo r h is  new s h ip s . S h o r tly  a f t e r  
the  r a id  Chauncey decided to  t ra n s p o r t  them in  n in eteen  row-barges 
from Oswego to  Stoney C reek, near S ackets Harbor, and th en  by lan d  
to  h is  base. Brown su p p lied  him w ith  150 rif lem en  to  accompany th e  
l i t t l e  f l o t i l l a .  En ro u te  to  S toney Creek th e  barges passed in to  
Big Sandy Creek to  reo rgan ize  and aw ait in fo rm ation  concerning th e  
p o s it io n  o f Yeo’s sh ip s . Three B r i t i s h  gunboats follow ed, anchored 
o f f  th e  mouth o f  th e  c reek , and debarked 200 men, who marched in la n d  
to  tak e  p o ssession  of th e  American barg es . The rif lem en  ambushed 
them. Fourteen B r i t i s h  d ie d , the  r e s t  f e l l  p r iso n e r,  and the  Ameri­
cans cap tu red  th e  gunboats, Yeo cou ld  i l l - a f f o r d  th e  lo s s  o f men, 
b o a ts , and equipm ent. He re lin q u ish e d  the  blockade a s  i t  had proved 
in e f f e c t iv e  and c o s tly ,  Drummond deeply  r e g re tte d  th e  lo s s  o f  gun-
Brown t o  Armstrong, %  6 , Ô, and 12, Reg. L t r s ,  R eed.,
RG 107 (M ) ;  G aines to  Brown, Apr 14, Unreg. L trs .  R eed ., RG 10? 
(NA).
^ % etu m  o f  I^ a te r ie l Captured a t  Oswego, My 7 , C 683, RG 8
(PAC).
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b o a ts , which he needed to  p ro te c t th e  ro ck e t-b arg es  he in tended using  
in  a  fu tu re  a t t a c k  ag a in s t Sackets Harbor.
On balance th e  B r i t i s h  had s a c r i f i c e d  more th an  th ey  had 
gained , but in  th e  long ru n  Drummond, more th an  he knew, had accom­
p lish e d  a g rea t d e a l .  On May 7 Brown, then  a t  Sackets Harbor fo llow ­
ing ev en ts  a t  Oswego, f in a l ly  rece iv ed  Arm strong 's l e t t e r  o f  A p r il  7. 
He wrote Armstrong th a t  had he rece iv ed  the l e t t e r  sooner, he would 
not have l e f t  th e  f r o n t ie r ,  and noted  th a t  a s  a r e s u l t  o f  h is  r e tu rn  
to  th e  harbor and th e  r e d i s t r ib u t io n  o f  th e  L eft D iv is io n , the  course  
o u tlin e d  in  th e  l e t t e r  cou ld  not now be pursued . Brown decided to  
remain a t  S ackets Harbor in s te a d  o f  making an  attem pt t o  co n cen tra te  
h is  fo rc e s  a t  N iagara , a p p a ren tly  f e e l in g  th a t  he had b e t t e r  aw ait 
fu r th e r  in s t ru c t io n s  o r th e  approval o f  h is  own plan  o f  campaign,
Fort N iagara was sa fe  fo r  th e  B r i t i s h .  S co tt had only  1 ,600 e f f e c ­
tiv e s  a t  B u ffa lo . Brown's i n i t i a l  d ec is io n  to  delay  th e  a s s a u l t ,  h is  
re tu rn  t o  th e  h arb o r and d e c is io n  to  rem ain, and th e  d iv e rs io n  o f  
r e c r u i t s  away from B u ffalo , ended any  chance o f  tak in g  th e  f o r t  in  
th e  n e a r  fu tu re .
I t  was p robably  t r u e  th a t  i n  A p ril o r  I4ay Brown could have 
recap tu red  i t  w ithou t heavy a r t i l l e r y  o r Chauncey's a s s is ta n c e .  The 
f i r s t  sp rin g  r a in s  had caused p a r ts  o f  th e  w a lls  to  c o lla p s e , pronç)- 
t in g  R. Bruyere, th e  commanding Royal Engineer in  th e  Canadas, t o  
t e l l  P révost a t  th e  end o f  March; "You have not th e  means to  m ain-
P ré v o st, Je 4 ,  ib id . ;  F o rtescu e , H isto ry  o f  th e  B r i t i s h  
Army. X, 102-104; Mahan, Sea Power. I I ,  283-90.
3 ^ 0  Armstrong, My 7 , Reg. L t r s .  R eed ., RG 107 (NA).
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t a i n  t h a t  P o s i tio n , i f  a tta c k ed  w ith  Energy, and g re a t  s u p e r io r i ty  
o f  num bers." He and H ia l l  recommended i t s  dem o litio n  and evacua­
t io n ,^ ^  But P rév o st and Drummond re je c te d  th e  ad v ic e , and a s  the  
dry  summer approached, th e  B r i t i s h  were a b le  to  s tren g th en  P o rt 
N iagara and th e  f o r t s  a c ro ss  th e  r iv e r .
Drummond thought th e  f o r t  too  im portan t to  g ive up w ithout 
a f ig h t :  i t  a long  w ith th e  o th e r  f o r t s  provided  a  good harb o r fo r
Yeo's v e s se ls ;  depending on which contingency  p lan  were follow ed 
in  th e  event o f  an American in v as io n , F o rt Niagara had a r o le  to  
p lay  i n  defending th e  p e n in su la ; and i t  would, he argued , occupy 
te n  tim es as  many Americans to  b esieg e  i t  a s  g a rriso n ed  i t .  But 
Drummond exaggerated  i t s  s tre n g th , as he must have known a f t e r  per­
so n a lly  observ ing  i t s  d i la p id a te d  c o n d itio n  in  December, He could 
not in  a l l  reason  have b e liev ed  t h a t  th e  g a rr iso n  o f  500 o r  600 
could long  occupy 5,000 o r  6,000 tro o p s , o r  fo r  t h a t  m atter f a r  
l e s s —even i f  th e y  were a s  incom petent as he thought American 
ge n e ra ls  and tro o p s  to  b e . Moreover, he d id  not a n tic ip a te  a 
siege  u n t i l  th e  summer, vrtien th e  f o r t  would be s l i g h t ly  improved. 
Because o f  i t s  im portance, he was probably  try in g  to  assuage 
H ia ll ’s  fe a rs  and encourage him to  defend th e  f o r t  d e sp ite  th e  
risk .^^
Brown's in te l l ig e n c e  reg a rd in g  B r i t i s h  s tre n g th  in  th e  
p en in su la  and a t  F ort N iagara in  A p ril  and May had been a c c u ra te .
^^Bruyere to  P ré v o st, Mar 25, and Drummond to  P rév o st, 
Mar 15 and 31, C 682, HG 8 (PAG).
^^Harvey to  H ia l l ,  Mar 23, i b id . ; Drummond to  P rév o st, 
Dec 22, C 681, HG 8 (PAG).
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At B atav ia , however, he had been preoccupied w ith  th e  annoying and 
time-consuming ta s k s  o f  g a th e rin g  more tro o p s , e s tab ü sh ljn g  supply  
l in e s ,  and co n cen tra tin g  h i s  fo rce  a t  B u ffa lo , none o f vdiich had 
been s e r io u s ,  but may have le d  him to  u nderestim ate  h is  own s tr e n g th .  
Having agonized f o r  a  month about what Armstrong wanted him to  do . 
Brown sim ply ceased agonizing  and devoted h is  a t t e n tio n  to  h is  own 
schemes and immediate l o g i s t i c a l  problem s, shoving F o it N iagara o u t 
o f  h is  mind u n t i l  i t  was to o  l a t e ;  t h a t  i s ,  when he rece iv ed  Arm­
s tro n g 's  l e t t e r .  He was l a t e r  to  r e g r e t  i t .  His argument th a t  he 
could not have r is k e d  a s ie g e  w ith th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f Yeo appearing  
on th e  la k e  was as  unsound a s  h is  argument about b a t te r in g  t r a i n s — 
a  prolonged siege was probably  unnecessary; Yeo was not on the la k e  
b u t a t  K ingston, and though he was su p e rio r  to  Chauncey, he was n o t 
prepared to  come t o  F ort N ia g a ra 's  a id ;  and Drummond's p lan s  o n ly  
c a lle d  f o r  a  defense o f th e  f o r t  by i t s  g a rr iso n .
The upshot o f  f r o n t ie r  events from A p r il  to  I’lay was the  l o s t  
o p p o rtu n ity  to  r e ta k e  Fort N iagara , th e  lo ss  o f  tim e in  p rep arin g  
f o r  the  in v as io n , and the  l o s s  o f about 500 tro o p s  to  th e  Left D iv i­
s io n . Most o f  th e  r e c r u i t s  which Gaines d iv e r te d  to  S ackets Harbor 
e v e n tu a lly  jo ined  th e  Left D iv isio n  a t  B u ffalo , But p ressu red  by 
Chauncey, Brown l e f t  an a d d it io n a l  500 re g u la rs  a t  Sackets Harbor, 
in c lu d in g  1 50 s k i l le d  r if le m e n , though he was c e r ta in  th e  o r ig in a l  
g a rr iso n  o f  1,000 e f f e c t iv e s  was capab le  o f p ro te c tin g  th e  base w ith
37
(NA),
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o r  w ithout th e  f l e e t , -  
th a t  th e y  prepared  th e  way f o r  th e  adop tion  o f  Brown's p lan  o f 
campaign. Now i t  was in  th e  hands o f  th e  P re sid e n t and h is  C ab in e t.
•^^row n's language i s  confusing  and th e  a c tu a l  lo s s  to  th e  
L eft D iv isio n  may have been g re a te r .  At one p lac e  he s a id  he l e f t  
2,000 men a t  th e  h arb o r and a t  an o th e r , 1,500 e f f e c t iv e s .  From 
about February to  A p r i l ,  1,000 e f f e c t iv e s ,  o r  was i t  1 ,000 men? 
g a rriso n ed  th e  b a se . Of, i b i d . ; Brown to  Armstrong, My 21 and 
Je  15, Heg. L trs ,  R eed., RG 10? (NA); and Brown to  Armstrong,
%  21 and Je 15, Brown's Documents (e d . C ruikshank), 21, 31»
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"THERE WAS NO STRATEGY ABOUT IT"
I'fost h is to r ia n s  o f  th e  War o f  1812 tend  to  view i t s  campaigns 
in  term s o f  exaggerated s im p lic ity .  Thus I rv in g  B ran t, M adison's 
b io g rap h er, t r e a t s  th e  a f f a i r  o f  Brown’s march a s  though i t  alone 
tu rn ed  American s tr a te g y  westward. He holds Armstrong re sp o n s ib le , 
because, working in s id io u s ly  behind th e  P re s id e n t 's  back, th e  
S e c re ta ry  o f War approved i t  w ithout Madison' s knowledge, Armstrong, 
r a th e r  th an  confess h is  own in e p ti tu d e  in  th e  w ritin g  o f th e  Febru­
a ry  28 l e t t e r s ,  " l e t  th e  s tr a te g y  o f th e  1814 campaign tu rn  on 'th e  
r e s u l t  o f  m is ta k e s , ' and d iv e r te d  th e  main a tta c k in g  fo rce  to  a 
su bord ina te  zone th a t  would be gained au to m a tic a lly  i f  Kingston 
f e l l ," ^  B ra n t's  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  development o f  1814 s tr a te g y  i s  
cu rso ry , b e tra y s  a p e rs is te n t  and d ep lo rab le  an ti-A rm strong and p ro -  
Madison b ia s ,  and re p re se n ts  an a ttem pt to  save th e  P resid en t from 
th e  orthodox h i s to r ic a l  c r i t ic i s m  o f American s tr a te g y —th a t  i t  
should have been aimed a t  M ontreal, o r  a t  le a s t  Kingston, r a th e r  th an  
a t  p o in ts  w est. The argument i s  o v e rs im p lified  and stands on an un­
w arranted assum ption th a t  B rant i s  u n w illing  to  admit openly: Madi­
son was so com pletely out o f  touch w ith  events t h a t  fo r  a t  le a s t  
over a month (March 20 to  May 1) he was t o t a l l y  unaware o f  develop­
ments on th e  f r o n t ie r  and w ith in  h is  own C abinet, A c tu a lly , Madison
^James Madison. VI, 235.
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had approved th e  march to  B atav ia , vAiich in  any case d id  not by 
i t s e l f  p reclude a tta c k s  ag a in s t Kingston o r  M ontreal. But c o n s id e r­
in g  th e  P re s id e n t 's  performance a s  Commander-•in-Ghief from January  
through June, i t  may be sa id  t h a t  i f  anyone " le t "  th e  s tra te g y  f o r  
1814 tu rn  westward, i t  was Madison,
Although i t  i s  n e a rly  im possib le  to  fathom M adison's t ru e  
m otives and p re c ise  reason ing  in  1814, c e r ta in  o f h is  a t t i tu d e s  a re  
f a i r l y  c le a r .  In  th e  l a s t  days o f  December 1813 the  a r r i v a l  in  
Washington o f  news about th e  f a l l  o f  Fort N iagara and Napoleon's 
d e fe a t a t  L e ipzig  plunged him in to  a  m i l i t a r i l y  d efen siv e  mood t h a t  
endured u n t i l  th e  end o f  th e  war. His hopes o f  conquest and annexa­
t io n ,  though no t abandoned as aim s, were extrem ely f a i n t .  He doubted 
th a t  th e  United S ta te s  could  win a  m il ita ry  d e c is io n , and as th e  
yea r wore on, he became in c re a s in g ly  concerned about expected B r i t i s h  
a t ta c k s  along th e  seaboard and in  th e  n o r th .^
The P re s id e n t 's  response to  th e  d ish e a rte n in g  news led  him 
to  p a r t i c ip a te  to  an e x tra o rd in a ry  degree i n  th e  form ulation  o f  a  
w in te r-sp rin g  s tra te g y  th a t  was e s s e n t ia l ly  d e fen siv e : hold th e
l in e  a t  P la ttsb u rg  and Sackets Harbor a g a in s t th e  t h re a t  o f B r i t i s h  
a t t a c k ,  hoping th a t  American s tre n g th  might grow s u f f ic ie n t ly  and 
o p p o rtu n itie s  a r i s e  to  perm it a t ta c k s  a g a in s t M ontreal, Kingston, 
or p o in ts  in  between; and in  the  meantime a t ta c k  the  B r i t i s h  a t  
Mackinac and in  th e  N iagara pen in su la  in  o rd er to  p ro te c t  the  W estern 
f r o n t ie r  and American 1813 g a in s . By January 30 he had ordered S c o tt
as s tro n g  and p e rsp icac io u s  in  th e  face  o f  g re a t  d i f f i c u l t i e s  and 
th e  bumbling o f  le s s  i n te l l i g e n t  S e c re ta r ie s .
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to  Albany, r e g u la rs  and m i l i t i a  to  Niagara and E r ie ,  W ilkinson to  
P la ttsb u rg , and Brown to  Sackets H arbor, thus com pleting th e  redeploy­
ment o f  American troops i n  fu lf i l lm e n t  o f th e  w in te r-sp r in g  s tr a te g y .  
The continued ho ld  o f th e  B r i t i s h  on Mackinac, and th e  lo s s  o f  F orts  
George and N iagara , had n o t only e x c ite d  Western public  o p in io n , but 
had dim inished th e  e f fe c t  o f  and tak en  th e  l u s t r e  from P e r ry 's  and 
H a rr iso n 's  v i c to r ie s .^  The immediate th re a t  to  th e  f ro n t ie r  appeared 
to  e x is t  in  th e  West.
From January  to  th e  end o f A p r i l  th e  P resid en t and h i s  Secre­
t a r i e s  were l a r g e ly  unaware th a t  ev en ts  on th e  n o rth e rn  f r o n t ie r  were 
undermining th e  value and v a l id i ty  o f  t h e i r  m i l i t a ry  p lan s . Even 
b e fo re  Brown a rr iv e d  a t  B a tav ia , Drummond had abandoned hopes o f 
o ffe n s iv e  success  west o f  Niagara and was in  f a c t  deeply concerned 
about th e  seem ingly im possib le  ta s k  o f  holding th e  p en in su la . In 
February he had can ce lled  h i s  planned two-pronged a tta c k  o ver the  ic e  
a g a in s t  D e tro it  and P u t-in -B ay . By March th e  B r i t i s h  R ight D ivision  
began encountering  acute  supply problem s. The supreimcy o f  th e  
American f le e t  i n  Lake E r ie ,  and th e  a b i l i t y  o f  L ieutenant B u tle r  to  
r a id  w estern Upper Canada from D e tro it  and Malden with im punity , en­
sured Western d efen se . But Madison r e t r e a te d  t o  th e  f a ls e  n e c e ss i ty  
o f h i s  m akeshift defen siv e  s tra te g y  and re fra in e d  from any attem pt 
to  re -e v a lu a te  re g u la r ly  th e  evolving s tr a te g ic  s i tu a t io n ,  to  rev ise  
American s tr a te g y  acco rd in g ly , and t o  e x p lo it  o p p o r tu n itie s .  In 
p a r t ,  h is  w ithdraw al was due to  th e  la g  in  communications between
th e  War o f 1812," American H is to r ic a l  Review. XL (Jan  1925), 257.
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th e  f r o n t ie r  and Washington and th e  d i f f i c u l ty  encountered in  in te r ­
p re tin g  th e  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f th e  a c tio n s  o f  m il i t a ry  commanders and 
a s se s s in g  th e  r e l i a b i l i t y  and meaning o f  new in te l l ig e n c e  about enemy 
a c t iv i t y —in  o th e r  words, th e  fog o f  war. But th e  most im portan t 
fa c to r  was h is  d efen siv e  mood—hold th e  l in e  in  th e  e a st and a tta c k  
in  th e  west fo r  purposes o f  defense .
For th e  g re a te r  p a r t  o f  th e  f i r s t  f iv e  months o f  th e  y e a r, 
14adison devoted most o f  h is  a t t e n tio n  to  economic and d ip lom atic  
p o lic y . In  January  he accep ted  C a s tle rea g h ’ s o f f e r  o f  d i r e c t  nego­
t i a t i o n s  and in  subsequent weeks completed th e  appointm ent o f  American 
envoys. D espite B r i t i s h  rev o ca tio n  o f th e  Orders in  Council in  1812, 
th e re  rem ained se v e ra l  unresolved  is s u e s  between th e  two c o u n tr ie s ;  
c la r i f i c a t io n  o f th e  rev o c a tio n , l e g a l i t y  o f th e  b lockade, im press­
ment, f i s h e r i e s .  O r ie n ta l  t ra d e ,  d e f in i t io n  o f contraband, s ta tu s  
o f  p r iso n e rs  o f war, B r i t i s h  rec o g n itio n  o f American n a tu ra l iz a t io n  
law s, n o r th e rn  b oundaries, In d ia n s , and American access  to  B r i t i s h  
m arkets. By January , however, both governments were p repared  to  
make re c ip ro c a l  ad justm en ts in  a l l  m aritim e d isp u te s ,  though n e ith e r  
was w i l lin g  to  concede any th ing  o f  substance on th e  m atter o f  im press­
ment. But by m id-February even th a t  is s u e  was d e c lin in g  in  s ig n i f i ­
cance a s  a reason f o r  co n tinu ing  th e  war, fo r  V/ashington buzzed w ith 
th e  news th a t  Napoleon had accep ted  p re lim in a ry  peace p ro p o sa ls .^
The war between th e  United S ta te s  and B r i ta in  had always been 
double-edged. I t  had i t s  o r ig in s  and purpose, on th e  one hand, in  an
% ra n t ,  J ^ e s  IW iso n , VI, 238-47. See Monroe to  envoys, 
Feb 14, V iritings (! ed . H am ilton). V, 3?0.
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Anglo-American commercial and m aritime r iv a l ry  which had been exacer­
ba ted  by th e  European war, and on th e  o th e r , in  a  s tru g g le  f o r  m astery  
over th e  North American co n tin e n t which had been brought to  a  head by 
th e  r a p id i ty  o f  American expansion, B r i t i s h  co o p era tio n  w ith  th e  In d i­
ans, and com petition  over th e  fu r  t r a d e .  The end o f  the  war in  Europe 
promised to  remove th e  most im portan t avowed reaso n s fo r  con tin u in g  
th e  Canadian war; th e  m aritim e d isp u te s .  I t  began to  appear to  
Madison th a t  th e s e  issu e s  would la rg e ly  solve them selves w ith  the  
emergence o f peace in  Europe.
European peace a ls o  augured th e  re tu rn  o f  o p p o rtu n ity  fo r  
economic expansion and o f American p ro sp e r ity , f o r  a lread y  Europe 
was be in g  opened to  commerce. S e ru r ie r ,  a p e rcep tiv e  o b se rv e r o f th e  
American scene and o f  M adison 's b eh av io r, f e l t  t h a t  th e  war w ith  
B r i ta in  had a c c e le ra te d  th e  development o f  th e  U nited S ta te s  a s  a 
r iv a l  m aritim e and m anufacturing power. " I r r e s i s t i b ly  c a lle d  to  a 
g rea t n av a l d e s t in y ,"  Americans could o n ly  r a t i f y  th e  accomplishment 
o f  t h i s  war aim by concluding a  peace.^  I4adison 's thoughts were 
s im ila r ,  and on March 30, w ith  th e  unanimous approval o f th e  C abinet, 
he recommended re p e a l  o f th e  embargo and nonim portation  laws in  order 
to  tak e  advantage o f  European m arkets, in crease  p u b lic  revenue, and 
s tim u la te  th e  economy. S t i l l  concerned w ith p ro te c tin g  nascen t 
American m anufactu res, whose r i s e  had been encouraged by th o se  laws, 
he a lso  urged th e  m aintenance o f double im port d u t ie s  fo r  two years 
a f t e r  th e  end o f th e  war. The measure passed , b u t th e  B r i t i s h  block­
ade made i t  r a th e r  p o in tle s s .  European peace could  only be e x p lo ited
^Quoted in  B rant, James Madison. VI, 240.
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by b rin g in g  th e  Canadian war to  an end. I f  i t  con tinued , American 
economic and f in a n c ia l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  would become even more acu te  th a n  
th e y  were a lre a d y . Congress had r e je c te d  th e  id ea  o f a  n a tio n a l  bank 
and was u n lik e ly  to  vo te  new ta x e s .^  1-Iadison th e re fo re  moved tow ard 
compromise on th e  m aritim e iss u e s ,  while European and f r o n t ie r  
m il i t a ry  developments dim inished h i s  enthusiasm  fo r  a war o f Canadian 
conquest. There had alw ays been a  tenuous connection  between th e  
g rand s tr a te g y  o f invad ing  th e  Canadas and th e  m aritime g o a ls  o f  th e  
w ar. Conquest was spoken o f as a means o f fo rc in g  re d re s s  o f m ari­
tim e g riev an ces . But in  1814 th e  m aritim e is s u e s  were fad in g  away, 
and î'iadison d esp a ired  o f  ach iev ing  a  m il i ta ry  d ec is io n  i n  th e  n o r th .
He s t i l l  adhered to  th e  g o a l o f  Ind ian  su b ju g a tio n  and i t s  
c o ro l la ry , th e  te rm in a tio n  o f B r i t i s h  in flu e n ce  over th e  "sav ag es ."
In  t h i s  re g a rd , an exact correspondence e x is te d  between grand s t r a ­
te g y  and p o l ic y .  As Monroe explained  in  c o n f id e n tia l  Jan u ary  no tes  
t o  American comm issioners in  Europe, th e  annexation  o f a  la rg e  por­
t i o n  o f Canadian t e r r i t o r y —e ith e r  b o th  Canadas or w estern  Upper 
Canada from N iagara to  Lake Huron—was e s s e n t ia l  to  th e  e lim in a tio n  
o f  fu tu re  cau ses  o f war between th e  United S ta te s  and B r i ta in ;  th e  
r a p id  spread o f  American po p u latio n  along th e  Northwestern border; 
th e  c u p id ity  o f  Canadian-based B r i t i s h  t r a d e r s ;  B r i t i s h  support and 
i n s t ig a t io n  o f  Indian  "m assacres"; and mutual c o n tro l  o f  th e  la k e s .
I f  th e  B r i t i s h  refu sed  t o  cede enough t e r r i t o r y  to  o b v ia te  th ese  
d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  th e  commissioners should  warn them  o f American in te n ­
t io n s  to  s e iz e  i t  in  th e  p resen t war o r  in  th e  n ex t. The B r i t i s h
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government must know in  any case  th a t  th e  in h a b ita n ts  o f  th e  Canadian 
p rov inces " w ill  soon f e e l  t h e i r  s tre n g th  and a s s e r t  t h e i r  independence," 
J e ffe rso n  had expressed  e x a c tly  th e  same though ts to  Turreau in  1807. 
F in a lly , Monroe to ld  John Quincy Adams: "Your own enlarged  view o f
th e  su b je c t w i l l  suggest o th e r  reaso n s , which i t  i s  unnecessary fo r  
me to  enumerate."'^
Brant d isco u n ts  th e  n o tio n  th a t  Monroe's t h r e a t  was s in c e re ly  
d e liv e re d , because, in  th e  event o f B r i t i s h  r e f u s a l  to  su rren d e r t e r r i ­
to ry ,  he only empowered th e  envoys to  term in a te  th e  t r e a ty  r ig h ts  o f  
B r i t i s h  tra d e rs  i n  American t e r r i t o r y  and r e je c t  l im ita t io n s  on Ameri­
can n av a l s tre n g th  on the  la k e s . "The so ft a l t e rn a t iv e  marked th e  
in s t r u c t io n  as t ra d in g  m ateria l."®  The th re a t  o f  annexation  may have 
been a  d ip lom atic  p loy , as Brant a rg u es , but th e  reason  was th a t  th e  
government was i n  no p o s it io n  to  c a rry  i t  o u t, r a th e r  than  because 
i t  had never s e r io u s ly  e n te r ta in e d  th a t  g o a l. As Monroe s a id  in  1812, 
a su c ce s s fu l in v as io n  would make i t  " d i f f i c u l t  t o  re l in q u is h  t e r r i t o r y  
which had been conquered," which would p resen t a v ery  se rio u s  o b s ta c le  
"on th e  p a rt  o f th e  United S ta te s  to  an a c c o m m o d a t i o n . O n  23 June 
1813 he explained  to  th e  envoys th a t  American success a t  York and 
N iagara, th e  growing p o p u la r ity  o f th e  war, and B r i t i s h  lac k  o f 
success in  th e  n o r th  and a long th e  A tla n tic  c o a s t ,  held  out th e  p ro s­
pect o f  "o b ta in in g  p o ssession  in  th e  course  o f  th e  campaign, o f  a l l
'15 Apr 1813 and 1 and 28 Jan 1814, D iplomatic In s t ru c t io n s ,  
HG 59 (NA). Fred L. Engelman, The Peace o f Christmas Eve (New York, 
1962) ,  134, t r e a t s  th e  n o tes  from th e  envoys' p o in t o f view .
®James Madison, VI, 242.
^To H u sse ll, 26 Jan 1812, W ritings (ed . Ham ilton), V, 213.
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upper Canada." Any d ip lom atic  accommodation "which f a l l s  sh o rt o f 
th ese  ex p ec ta tio n s  [ w i l l  ren d e r i t ]  th e  le s s  accep tab le  to  th e  N ation ."  
As an added inducement to  th e  B r i t i s h  government to  cede " th e  upper 
p a r ts  and even th e  whole o f  Canada to  th e  United S ta te s ,"  he provided 
th e  envoys w ith arguments which, to  h i s  th in k in g , should convince 
th e  B r i t i s h  t h a t  c e ss io n  was in  t h e i r  b e s t n a tio n a l  i n te r e s t ;  t h e i r  
p o ssession  o f Canada was and would con tinue to  be a source o f  con­
t ro v e rsy  between th e  two c o u n tr ie s ;  c e ss io n  o f Canada would re l ie v e  
them o f  " the  burden o f supply ing  i t " ;  in  peacetim e "Great B r i ta in  
would d e riv e  th e  same advantage from i t ,  in  t h e i r  [ th e  U nited S ta te s ]  
hands a s  a source o f  s u p p lie s , as i f  i t  were in  h is  own, th e  United 
S ta te s  being  p recluded by p o lic y  as w e ll as by th e  C o n s titu tio n  from 
tax in g  ex p o rts" ; and " these  Provinces w i l l  be severed  from Great 
B r i ta in  a t  no d i s ta n t  day by th e i r  own c a re e r ."  Monroe empowered 
the  envoys to  promise t ra d e  concessions in  th e  event o f th e  t r a n s fe r  
o f t e r r i t o r y .
Too many in f lu e n t i a l  Americans had argued th e  m anifold values 
o f Canadian annexation  fo r  anyone to  d is re g a rd  t h e i r  r e a l  in te n t io n s ,  
I4onroe' s January n o tes  marked no s ig n if ic a n t  e sca la tion^^  in  American 
war aim s. Congressman C harles J .  I n g e r s o l l 's  defense  of government 
p o lic y  i n  January 1814 was p re c is e ly  t h a t  o f Monroe's in  1812:
Canadian conquest was not a  sep ara te  cause o f war, but th e  Canadas
B u sse ll, 23 Je 1813> W ritings (ed , Ham ilton), V, 367.
m aritim e r ig h ts  cou ld  e a s i ly  have e sc a la te d  in to  a war fo r  maritime 
r ig h ts  and t e r r i t o r i a l  conquest."  C o les, War o f  1812. 34.
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were in d isp en sab le  "as an instrum en t fo r  waging i t  e f f e c tu a l ly ,  and 
a s  a d e s ira b le  a c q u is i tio n  in  th e  course o f  i t s  p ro secu tio n ."^^  On 
January  15 Calhoun ro se  on th e  Senate  f lo o r  to  defend th e  war a g a in s t  
c r i t i c s  who a tta c k ed  i t s  o ffen s iv e  c h a ra c te r .  But he concluded th a t  
"should success accompany our arm s, we would be indem nified fo r  th e  
p r iv a t io n s  and expenses o f  th e  w ar, by th e  a c q u is i tio n  o f  an ex ten ­
s iv e  and v a lu ab le  t e r r i t o r y ,  and th e  permanent peace and se c u r i ty  
which i t  would a ffo rd  a  la rg e  p o r tio n  o f ou r co u n try ."^^  Although 
advocates o f  war might s u c c e ss fu lly  argue t h a t  the  d e s ir e  fo r  perma­
nen t conquest had not been the  cau se  o f war, th ey  never denied i t  was 
a  g o a l, tlad ison  would undoubtedly have welcomed th e  agonizing  ta s k  
o f  decid ing  vdiether t o  annex Canadian t e r r i t o r y ,  but by 1814 h is  
hopes o f  conquest had n o t m a te ria liz e d  and fu tu re  p ro sp ec ts  were 
d isco u rag in g . Moreover, most o f  th e  avowed reasons f o r  conquest 
were fad ing  from the  scene: th e  European war was coming to  an end,
and H a rr iso n 's  and P e r ry 's  v ic to r ie s  in  1813 had made th e  West com­
p a ra t iv e ly  secure  from Indian  r a i d s , A n d  as  he was w il lin g  to  
compromise on m aritim e is s u e s , because a m il i t a ry  d e c is io n  seemed 
ou t o f reach , so probab ly  he was w illin g  to  s e t t l e  fo r  th e  rec a p tu re  
o f  Mackinac and success a t  Niagara to  ensure Western defense and de­
s tro y  B r i t i s h  in flu en ce  over th e  In d ian s ,
^Q uoted  in  B ra n t, James Madison. V I, 235.
^^The Papers o f  John C. Calhoun, ed , Robert L, Meriwether 
(Columbia, 1959), I ,  192,
^ ^F if th  Annual Message, 7 Dec 1813, W ritings (e d . Hunt), 
V I I I ,  272,
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Two c ru c ia l  d e c is io n s  a t  th e  end o f  March sprang from Madi­
s o n 's  s tr a te g ic  and d ip lom atic  p o s tu re : h i s  sa n c tio n  o f  Brown's
movement to  B atav ia  and h is  approva l o f  a jo in t  e x p ed itio n  in to  Lake 
Huron to  rec a p tu re  F o rt M ichilim ackinac on Mackinac I s la n d . In to  
March and A p r il  th e  a d m in is tra tio n  s t i l l  took  s e r io u s ly  th e  assumed 
B r i t i s h  t h r e a t  to  a tta c k  American p o sts  on Lake E r ie  and th e  p o s s i­
b i l i t y  o f t h e i r  re -e s ta b l is h in g  c lo se  c o n tac t and e f f e c tiv e  coopera­
t i o n  w ith th e  Northw estern In d ia n s . Madison and Armstrong regarded  
t h e i r  approval o f  Brown's march a s  a s l ig h t  ad justm ent o f  p lans in  
l i e u  o f r a is in g  enough reg u la rs  and v o lu n tee rs  from o th e r  sources in  
tim e to  p ro te c t  th e  W est. The d e c is io n  seemed c o n s is te n t  w ith  t h e i r  
w in ter  s tra te g y .^ ^  They fa i le d  t o  r e a l iz e  th a t  i t  amounted to  a 
committment o f  scarce  American re g u la r  manpower to  l a r g e r  o ffe n s iv e  
o p e ra tio n s  a t  Niagara a t  th e  expense o f a t ta c k s  a g a in s t  Kingston.
But a f t e r  a l l ,  i t  was o n ly  March and th e re  seemed p le n ty  o f tim e . 
Chauncey, w ithout whom an a tta c k  on Kingston was im possib le , would 
not s a i l  u n t i l  June o r Ju ly . As tim e s lip p ed  by, however, th e  com­
m ittm ent became in c re a s in g ly  i r r e v e r s ib l e ,
A defen siv e  mood p rev a ile d , and s in c e  the  immediate t h r e a t  
was t o  th e  West and not to  P la ttsb u rg  o r  Sackets Harbor, th ey  spent 
t h e i r  e f f o r ts  in  th a t  d i r e c t io n ,  A rm strong 's l e t t e r  to  Brown o f  
A p ril  7 , in  which he ap p a re n tly  expressed th e  in te n t io n  o f  d r iv in g  
th e  B r i t i s h  com pletely  o u t o f th e  Niagara p en in su la , rep resen ted  a 
s l i g h t  e s c a la tio n  o f  American aim s—but aims which n e v e rth e le s s
^^Chauncey to  Armstrong, Apr 1, Reg. L trs ,  R eed ., HG 10? 
(NA); Armstrong to  Brown, Apr 7, Brown's Documents (ed . C ruikshank), 
97-99,
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sprang from d e fen siv e  m otives, Madison c e r ta in ly  approved o f  the  
aim, bu t w hether he a u th o rized  Armstrong’ s promise o f  3,000 r e c r u i t s  
to  augment th e  L eft D iv isio n  i s  u n c e r ta in . In  any case , th e  promise 
was r e l a t i v e ly  unim portant in  comm itting th e  L eft D iv ision  more f irm ly  
to  N iagara th an  K ingston, fo r  th e  r e c r u i t s  would come from regim ents 
s ta t io n e d  in  th e  West, and n e ith e r  Armstrong nor Madison had formu­
la te d  a d e f in i te  p lan  f o r  Brovm to  fo llo w . The most im portan t fac ­
t o r  in  tu rn in g  s tr a te g y  away from Kingston was th e  b e l ie f  t h a t  th e  
West needed immediate p ro te c tio n .  O blivious to  tim e , th ey  were 
lu l l e d  in to  p u ttin g  s o p o rif ic  t r u s t  in  th e  n e c e s s i ty  and va lu e  of 
th e  j e r r y - b u i l t ,  stopgap s tr a te g y  patched to g e th e r  in  January . 
I ro n ic a l ly ,  j u s t  as th e  B r i t i s h  Western th r e a t  was d isa p p e a rin g , th e  
Americans became in c re a s in g ly  f e a r f u l .
In  a d d it io n , th e  r a t io n a le  vdiich seemed to  p re v a il  among a l l  
concerned, in c lu d in g  Madison, was th a t  Brown’s movement would p u ll  
B r i t i s h  tro o p s  away from M ontreal and K ingston. The Right D iv isio n  
a t  P la ttsb u rg  would th en  have an o p p o rtu n ity  to  dem onstrate a g a in s t 
M ontreal and keep th e  B r i t i s h  a t  bay. The fo rce  a t  Sackets Harbor, 
w ith Chauncey’s h e lp , might have th e  o p p o rtu n ity  to  a tta c k  K ingston,
To be su c ce ss fu l anyvhere, American s t r a t e g i s t s  knew th ey  had to  
co n cen tra te  more tro o p s  than  th e  B r i t i s h ,  b u t su p e rio r  c o n cen tra tio n  
was p re s e n tly  im possib le  in  th e  e a s t .  The expedient was to  e n tic e  
th e  B r i t i s h  westward and hope th a t  re g u la r  r e c r u it in g  would t i p  the
Madison to  Tompkins, Jan  25, to  Armstrong, My 4, L e tte rs  and 
Other W ritings (Congress e d .) ,  I I ,  580, I I I ,  395; Armstrong to  W ilkin­
son, Jan 30, to  G aines, Apr 26, M ilita ry  Book, RG 107 (NA); Armstrong 
to  Iz a rd , Apr 28, ( I z a r d ’s) O f f ic ia l  Correspondence. 5-6, In  January ,
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s u b s ta n t ia l  rein fo rcem en ts to  th e  West, and American re c ru it in g  
d isappo in tm en ts enabled  Drummond to  match American s tre n g th  from 
Kingston to  N iagara . Madison and Armstrong knew what t a r g e t s  were 
inç)o rtan t—K ingston and M ontreal—and in  t h i s  re s p e c t  d id  n o t lack  a  
" s tr a te g ic  se n se ,"  But th ey  never seemed able  t o  a d ju s t ends and 
means in  th e  face o f  what were, ad m itte d ly , g rea t d i f f i c u l t i e s .  As 
th e y  weakened them selves in  th e  e a s t ,  th e y  spread them selves th in ly  
i n  th e  w est, and th u s  even th e re  missed th e  chance o f o u t-c o n c e n tra tin g  
th e  B r i t i s h .  The case  in  p o in t was th e  e f f e c t  o f  th e  Mackinac expe­
d i t i o n  on N iagara o p e ra tio n s ,
Ifed ison’s n a v a l response to  th e  Western t h r e a t ,  in  concert 
w ith  S e c re ta ry  of th e  Navy W illiam  Jo n es, was to  i n i t i a t e  p rep ara­
t io n s  fo r  an ex p ed itio n  in to  Lake Huron ju s t  as th e  ice  began to  
b reak  on th e  lak e s . H arrison  had contem plated such a move in  
O ctober 1813 but had to  abandon i t  because o f bad weather and the  
a r r i v a l  o f  w in te r . In  a d d itio n  to  t h e i r  lo n g -stan d in g  d e s ir e  to  
reco v e r Northwestern lo s s e s ,  Madison, Armstrong, and Jones were 
m indful o f  H a r r is o n 's  and C a s s 's  w in ter warnings o f  th e  B r i t i s h -  
In d ia n  t h r e a t  from th e  north  a s  w ell as  from N iagara . In fo n n atio n  
was now a t  hand th a t  in d ic a te d  th e  B r i t i s h  were a ttem p tin g  t o  open a  
new l in e  o f  communication from York to  Mackinac v ia  Lake Simcoe, The 
o b je c tiv e  o f  th e  e x p ed itio n  was to  rec a p tu re  F ort M ichilim ackinac and 
d e s tro y  th e  nearby tra d in g  p o st on S t. Joseph I s la n d ,  th e re b y  ensuring  
th e  d is ru p tio n  of communications between th e  B r i t i s h  and In d ia n s , On
a t  th e  P re s id e n t 's  re q u e s t ,  th e  House r a is e d  th e  r e g u la r 's  bounty from  
$16 to  $124. B rant, James Madison. VI, 235.
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A p r il  1 th e  navy asked  Armstrong fo r  700 troops o f  th e  D e tro i t  g a rr iso n  
t o  accompany th e  e n t i r e  Lake E r ie  f l e e t  to  I4ackinac
The m in iscu le  war w est o f  D e tro it  had f a r - re a c h in g  im plica­
t io n s .  B r itish -C an ad ian  fu r  t r a d e r s ,  who e x e rc ised  a s tro n g  in f lu ­
ence on B r i t i s h  s t r a t e g i s t s ,  and American fu r t r a d e r s ,  who exe rc ised  
s l i g h t ly  l e s s  over American s t r a t e g i s t s ,  regarded th e  Northwestern 
s tru g g le  a s  one fo r  th e  conquest and c o n tro l  o f  th e  t e r r i t o r i e s  and 
f u r  tra d e  o f  M ichigan, M isso u ri, and I l l i n o i s .  To th e  few American 
s e t t l e r s  i n  th e  reg io n  i t  was a life -a n d -d e a th  s tru g g le  f o r  ex is ten ce  
a g a in s t  In d ian s  and t h e i r  B r i t i s h  a l l i e s .  In  March 1814 Governor 
W illiam  C lark  o f th e  M issouri T e r r i to ry  d isp a tch ed  d ire  warnings 
about th e  th re a t  to  M issouri and I l l i n o i s  posed by B r i t i s h  presence 
a t  Mackinac.  ̂̂  P révost regarded  the  a s s e r t io n  o f  B r i t i s h  c o n tro l 
o ver the  American F o rt M ichilimackinac a s  doubly im p o rtan t: as a
p ro te c tiv e  p o s t fo r  th e  fu r  t r a d e  and f o r  th e  m aintenance o f  communi­
c a tio n s  w ith  the  In d ia n s , Holding Mackinac, th e  B r i t i s h  cou ld  extend 
t h e i r  in flu e n ce  over th e  In d ian s  from Hudson Bay to  New O rleans, and 
from the  P a c if ic  Ocean to  th e  M iss iss ip p i R iver, and p reven t ambi­
t io u s  Yankees from m onopolizing th e  fu r  t r a d e . B o t h  Madison and 
Armstrong understood B r i t i s h  m otives, b u t tended to  exaggerate  th e  
th r e a t  to  Michigan and D e tro i t ,  and Madison was s l i g h t ly  more con-
^ G ilp in , War in  th e  N orthw est. 228; Chauncey to  Armstrong, 
Apr 1, Reg, L trs ,  R eed .,  RG 10? (NA); Madison to  Armstrong, My 4* 
L e t te r s  and Other W ritings (Congress e d . ) .  I l l ,  396.
° P r a t t ,  "Fur Trade S tra te g y ,"  246, 262. John Jacob A s to r 's1® ;
i n te r e s t  i n  th e  war and h is  f r ie n d sh ip  w ith  Madison i s  well-known. 
’^To B a th u rs t, Jy  10, C.O. 42/157, MG 11 (PAC).
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cerned th an  Armstrong w ith th e  q u e s tio n  o f subduing th e  In d ian s , The 
navy was f e a r f u l  o f  th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  a n av a l th re a t  developing in  
lak e  Huron to  ch a llen g e  i t s  supremacy on Lake E r ie .  In  g en e ra l, as 
one h i s to r ia n  a rg u e s , "each o f  th e  a n ta g o n is ts ,  i t  i s  p la in ,  over­
r a te d  th e  s tre n g th  o f  th e  o t h e r . A n d  i t  m ight be added, each 
exaggerated  th e  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f th e  Northwestern s tru g g le  and o f  
Mackinac, whose v a lu e , in  th e  con tex t o f  th e  e n ti r e  th e a te r  o f  war, 
was p r im a ri ly  p re s tig io u s .^ ^  The outcome i 
th e  c o n tin e n t would be decided  elsevdiere.
The s tr e s s e s  and s t r a in s  o f  P r e s id e n tia l  d u tie s  would n o t 
have been onerous fo r  a man o f  g re a te r  p h y s ica l s tre n g th  and i n t e s ­
t i n a l  f o r t i tu d e  th an  Madison, But tiadison was not such a man, and 
a t  the  end o f A p r il  he took advantage o f  th e  a r r i v a l  o f  sp ring  and 
withdrew to  M ontpelier fo r  a  m onth's r e s t .  He l e f t  Washington c o n fi­
dent th a t  th e  w in ter  s tr a te g y  was s t i l l  a p p ro p r ia te .  Nothing could  
d e te r  him from h is  d e s ire  to  escape 'Washington, even a s  changes in  
th e  s t r a te g ic  s i tu a t io n  were s h o r t ly  made known to  him t h a t  req u ired  
h is  presence and immediate a t t e n t io n .
Sometime in  th e  l a s t  few days o f A p r i l ,  Armstrong rece iv ed  
Brown's l e t t e r  o f A p ril  17 c o n ta in in g  th e  new p lan  o f campaign.
A lready he had rece iv ed  Brown's e a r l i e r  l e t t e r  (A p ril 8) n o tify in g  
him o f th e  postponement o f  th e  a tta c k  a g a in s t F ort N iagara and b r ie f ly  
o u tlin in g  th e  proposed coopera tion  w ith  th e  E r ie  f l e e t .  I t  may have
^ ^ P ra tt ,  "Fur Trade S tra teg y ,"  267. P r a t t ,  h im se lf , o v e rra te s  
th e  r e a l  im portance o f th e  s tru g g le .
B ran t, James Madison. VI, 53.
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led  him to  q u estio n  th e  m erits  o f  employing the  f l e e t  in  Lake Huron. 
The second l e t t e r  tu rned  him a g a in s t  i t .  To Armstrong th e  most 
im portan t co n s id e ra tio n  was Brown’ s b e l i e f  th a t  th e  B r i t i s h  had 
pu lled  in  t h e i r  r ig h t  f la n k :  no s u b s ta n t ia l  fo rces  were w est o f
B u rling ton , and th e  B r i t i s h  appeared to  be p inning th e i r  d efensive  
l in e  i n  the  p en insu la  on F ort E r ie .  The w in te r-sp r in g  s tr a te g y  was 
now o u t-o f -d a te ,  and th e  fo rm ula tion  o f a  new s tr a te g y  seemed to  be 
in  o rd e r ,  o r e ls e  the  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  ach iev ing  g re a te r  s tr a te g ic  
gains would be lo s t ,^ ^
Armstrong ap p a ren tly  f e l t ,  however, th a t  Brown’s in te l l ig e n c e  
only a ffe c te d  th e  d isp o s i tio n  o f  th e  L eft D iv ision  and the E r ie  f l e e t  
and t h a t  no change in  p lan s  was w arranted f o r  the  Right D iv is io n .
His in s t r u c t io n s  to  Iza rd  a t  th e  end o f A p r i l  were s im ila r  t o  those 
issu ed  to  W ilkinson e a r l i e r  in  th e  y ear: c o n c en tra te  on th e  west s id e
of Lake Champlain a t  an advantageous p o s it io n  which provided p ro tec ­
t io n  f o r  depots o f  su p p lie s  and " th e  co u n try  in  your r e a r ,"  b u t 
vAiich a ls o  perm itted  fo ra y s  a g a in s t  th e  M ontreal p erim eter and th e  
S t .  Lawrence l in e  o f communications—forays th a t  would annoy th e  
enemy and perhaps fo rce  him to  g iv e  b a t t l e . N o r  d id  Armstrong f e e l  
th a t  a  d i re c t  a t ta c k  a g a in s t  Kingston was a d v isa b le . He focused h is  
a t t e n tio n  on N iagara even though o th e r  a l t e rn a t iv e s  were s t i l l  open. 
One, which Gaines had h in te d  a t ,  i f  only vaguely, was to  
march most o f th e  Left D iv isio n  from B uffalo  back to  Sackets Harbor
^^Armstrong to  I'dadison, Apr 30, L e tte r s  Sent to  th e  P re s i ­
d en t, RG 107 (NA).
^^Apr 28 , ( I z a r d 's )  O f f ic ia l  Correspondence. 5-6.
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and a t ta c k  K ingston. In t h i s  way A rm strong's stra tegem  contained  
i n  th e  N iagara no te  o f  February 28 would have been played out to  th e  
l e t t e r .  The e ff e c t  o f  Brown's march had been to  weaken K ingston, 
because Drummond b e liev ed  th e  next American o ffe n s iv e  would be 
d ire c te d  a g a in s t  Niagara and had d isp a tch ed  tro o p s  to  k i a l l .  But 
G a in es 's  id e a  was p red ic a te d  upon a B r i t i s h  " f i r s t - s t r i k e "  a g a in s t 
S ackets Harbor th a t  in  i t s  rep u lse  would c r ip p le  th e  B r i t i s h  army 
and navy, fu r th e r  weaken K ingston 's  d efen ses , and enable Chauncey to  
s a i l .  Armstrong, however, f e l t  th a t  i f  the  a t t a c k  came, th e  L eft 
D iv isio n  would not be needed, and i f  th e  a tta c k  d id  not come, to  
march i t  back to  Sackets Harbor ( i f  anyone s e r io u s ly  considered  t h i s  
move) would be p o in tle s s .  The t r a n s fe r  would s t i l l  not t i p  the  o ffe n ­
s iv e  sca le  in  favor o f  the  A m e ric a n s ,^
An a tta c k  on Kingston involved c e r ta in  d i f f i c u l t i e s  and r i s k s  
W iich Americans never seemed w illin g  t o  face i n  s p ite  o f  t h e i r  a p p re ­
c ia t io n  o f  K in g sto n 's  im portance, Kingston could  be a tta c k ed  e i t h e r  
by land  o r  by sea. The land  approach was the  s a fe s t  and su re s t one, 
b u t req u ired  a la rg e  preponderance o f fo rce  t h a t  could n o t be con­
c e n tra te d  w ithout warning th e  B r i t i s h .  The se a , o r  coup de main. 
approach could  be im dertaken w ith  a sm a lle r  number o f tro o p s  but 
req u ired  s tro n g  n av a l sup p o rt. Moreover, th e  j o in t  fo rce  would en­
c o u n ter th e  b a t t e r i e s  o f th e  s tro n g ly  f o r t i f i e d  harbor i n  a d d itio n  
t o  those o f  th e  B r i t i s h  f l e e t ,  and th e  landing  fo rce  would run th e  
r i s k  o f d e s tru c tio n  on shore—unless th e  Kingston g a rr iso n  had been
" B a in e s  to  Armstrong, Apr 16, Reg. L t r s .  Reed,, RG 10? 
(NA); Armstrong to  G aines, Apr 26, I -ü l ita ry  Book, RG 107 (NA),
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d ep le ted  by th e  deployment o f tro o p s  to  th e  W est,^^ The dilemma r e ­
mained; c o n c en tra tio n . In  1813 th e  Americans had fo o lis h ly  passed 
up two o p p o rtu n itie s  to  a tta c k  Kingston when th ey  had a la rg e  prepon­
derance o f fo rc e . In  1814 th ey  no lo n g er had th e  w herew ithal, u n le ss  
both th e  L eft D iv isio n  and flight D iv isio n  were combined. But a t  th e  
moment no one env isioned  th e  redeployment o f  a l l  o r  p a rt  o f  th e  fligh t 
D iv isio n  from P la ttsb u rg —fo r  reaso n s which were o ffe n s iv e  and defen ­
s iv e , but m ainly th e  l a t t e r ,  and corresponded w ith  th e  w in te r-sp r in g  
s tr a te g y .
Brown's a p p re c ia tio n  o f  th ese  f a c t s  had le d  him to  N iagara, 
to  th e  gen esis  o f  h is  p la n , and to  a p e r s i s te n t  b e l i e f  in  th e  value 
o f  a Niagara in v as io n . He recognized  th e  problem as  one o f  co n cen tra ­
t io n .  In  A p ril  th e  t o t a l  o f  B r i t i s h  and Canadian tro o p s  i n  Upper 
Canada stood a t  n e a rly  5 ,000, and while American s tre n g th  was growing. 
Brown could command only  3»500 re g u la r  e f f e c t i v e s , T h e  most reaso n ­
ab le  a l t e r n a t iv e  seemed to  be h is  own p lan  o f  campaign: a t ta c k  through
th e  " s o f t  underbe lly"  o f  th e  Niagara p en in su la  w ith  th e  a id  o f  th e  
D e tro i t  g a rr iso n  and th e  E rie  f l e e t ,  rendezvous w ith  Chauncey, and 
cap tu re  o r  d e s tro y  B r i t i s h  fo rc e s  in  th e  p en in su la . With th e se  
"rendered  u s e le s s  to  th e  enemy," th e  way was open to  move a g a in s t  
York and K ingston. In  i t s  own u n so p h is tic a ted  way, h is  s tr a te g y  was 
noth ing  l e s s  th an  th a t  o f  "c lo s in g  th e  r in g "  around th e  Canadas, 
tak in g  advantage o f o p p o r tu n itie s ,  wearing down th e  enemy, and d e liv e r -
^%ee Brown to  Armstrong, ifer 4 , Unreg, L t r s .  R eed., RG 107 
(NA); and Gaines to  Armstrong, Apr 13, Reg. L trs .  flecd ., RG 10? (NA),
^ ^ rc fjn  to  Armstrong, Apr 29 and Je  12, Reg. L trs .  Reed.,
RG 107 (NA).
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ing th e  f in a l  blow a g a in s t K ingston.
Armstrong, as a s tu d en t o f  Jom ini, understood Brown's reason­
in g , and was coining to  th e  view t h a t  B r i t i s h  l o g i s t i c a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
made N iagara a more app ealin g  t a r g e t  a t  th e  moment th a n  Kingston or 
M o n t r e a l ,A m e r i c a n s  cou ld  c o n cen tra te  f a r  more e a s i l y  than  th e  
B r i t i s h  in  th e  West, and i f  Chauncey d id  h i s  du ty , N iagara co u ld  be 
taken  w ith  p ro sp ec ts  tow ard K ingston. Brown had won Armstrong over 
to  h is  p lan . But th e re  may have been o th er reasons vAiy Armstrong 
chose N iagara . As a su b o rd in a te , he had to  propose a  p lan  t h a t  was 
not a r a d ic a l  a l t e r a t io n  o f  the  w in te r-sp r in g  s tr a te g y  and one th a t  
could persuade Madison to  abandon th e  Mackinac e x p ed itio n , tAiich he 
and th e  navy s tro n g ly  fav o red . Armstrong had to  propose a p lan  
vdiich made th e  b e s t  use o f  American m il i t a ry  and n a v a l fo rces  a s  
th ey  were then  s i tu a te d  i n  o rder t h a t  the  in v asio n  could  be launched 
by th e  opening o f  th e  campaigning season in  June.
On A p ril 30 Armstrong subm itted  h is  compromise plan  to  th e  
P re s id e n t,  Why go to  Mackinac, he asked, when a l l  th e  aims o f  th e  
w in te r-sp r in g  s tr a te g y  cou ld  be gained  in  th e  p en insu la?  The ic e  
was gone, the  B r i t i s h  no lo n g er in tended  to  reoccupy th e  Thames 
v a lle y  o r  a tta c k  Malden and D e tro i t ,  and th e y  were making F ort E rie  
th e  w estern  e x trem ity  o f  t h e i r  l in e  o f  d e fen se . The danger o f  
B r i t ish - In d ia n  co o p e ra tio n  was v i r t u a l l y  n i l .  Can "an o th er and 
b e t te r  u se  . . .  be made o f  our f l o t i l l a " ?  He went on; "Lake E rie  
. . .  fu rn ish es  a  way sc a rc e ly  l e s s  convenient fo r  approaching th e
Aug 16, Brown's Documents (ed . C ruikshank), 62-63.
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h e a r t  o f  Upper Canada, th an  Lake O n tario . 8 , o r even 6000 men landed 
in  th e  bay between P o in t Abino and Fort E r ie  and o p e ra tin g  e i t h e r  on 
th e  l in e  o f  th e  N iagara, o r  more d i r e c t l y  . . . a g a in s t  th e  B r i t i s h  
post a t  th e  head o f B u rling ton  bay—cannot be r e s i s te d  w ith  e ff e c t  
w ithou t com pelling th e  enençr so t o  weaken h i s  more e a s te rn  p o s ts ,  as 
to  b r in g  them w ith in  th e  reach o f  our means a t  S a c k e tts  Harbor &
P la ttsb u rg ."  A lready, th e  Left D iv ision  was p rep a rin g  to  move a g a in s t 
N iagara , Adding th e  b u lk  o f  th e  g a rr iso n s  o f  D e tro it  and Malden, new 
r e c r u i t s ,  and 3,000 New York and Pennsylvania v o lu n te e rs , th e  Left 
D iv is io n  could be augmented to  6 ,000 o r  8 ,000 tro o p s  by June 10, W ith­
out th e  a id  o f  th e  E rie  f l e e t ,  th e  Left D iv isio n  would become "com­
p a ra t iv e ly  in o p e ra tiv e  and n e c e s s a r ily  d isp e rse d , b u t w ith t h e i r  a id ,  
competent to  g re a t  o b je c ts ."  A su c ce ss fu l amphibious in v asio n  o f th e  
N iagara p en in su la  to  B urling ton  and York would e f f e c t iv e ly  p ro te c t  
D e tro i t  and Malden, make B r i t i s h  co n tac t w ith  the  Western In d ian s  
extrem ely ten u o u s, i s o l a te  Fort M ichilim ackinac, fo rc e  th e  abandonment 
o f F o r t N iagara (which Brown had n o t ta k e n ) , and remove "from the 
enemy h a lf  h is  motive f o r  con tin u in g  th e  Naval c o n f l i c t  on Lake Onta­
r io . "  On th e  o th e r  hand, he a rg u ed , " tak e  Mackinaw and vriiat i s  
gained but Mackinaw i t s e l f ? "  Armstrong n eg lec ted  to  emphasize th a t  
the  d e s tru c tio n  o f th e  B r i t i s h  R ight D iv isio n  and th e  occupation  of 
B u rling ton  H eights would give th e  Americans a l l  o f  th e  O ntario  penin­
su la—what in  1812 Madison had c a l le d  " th e  most v a lu ab le  p a r t s  o f th e  
Upper P ro v in ce ."  A rm strong 's p lan  was s im ila r  to  Brown's w ith  the  
exception  o f  th e  e x c e lle n t  p roposa l—which th e  B r i t i s h  fea red —of 
having th e  D e tro i t  g a r r iso n  advance from th e  west. This om ission may
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have weakened h is  p re s e n ta t io n ;  i t  c e r ta in ly  weakened h is  plan,^®
Madison rece iv ed  th e  no te  a t  M ontpelier on May 1 and communi­
ca te d  Arm strong’s views to  S e c re ta ry  Jones on May kt suggesting  t h e i r  
m erit  and urg ing  Jones to  g iv e  them f a i r  c o n s id e ra tio n . Since he was 
a t  M ontpelier and o u t o f touch  w ith e v e n ts , he t o ld  the  two S e c re ta r ie s  
t o  reso lv e  th e  q u es tio n  between them selves in  keeping w ith  th e  l a t e s t  
i n te l l ig e n c e .  But h is  approval was te n ta t iv e  and q u a li f ie d .  Only 
th e  Mackinac ex p e d itio n , he f e l t ,  could  f in a l ly  end B r i t i s h  c o n ta c t 
w ith  the  In d ia n s , p reven t th e  savages "from descending to  th e  main 
t h e a t r e  o f  o p e ra t io n s ,"  and o b v ia te  th e  n e c e s s i ty  o f  an o th er f a r  
W estern campaign. Although he in s t ru c te d  Jones to  can ce l th e  expedi­
t i o n  i f  vAiat Armstrong sa id  was t ru e ,  he c le a r ly  in d ic a te d  th a t  he was 
n o t in  fav o r o f  abandoning i t  o r  d im in ish ing  i t s  power, Armstrong, he 
t o ld  Jones, might look  elsevriiere fo r  w ater t r a n s p o r ta t io n .  But where, 
he d id  not say .
The P re sid e n t ra ise d  two se rio u s  q u estio n s  about Arm strong’s 
p la n . F i r s t ,  he doubted w hether 6,000 to  8,000 tro o p s could  be 
assem bled a t  Niagara by June 10, Indeed , Armstrong had been o v e rly  
o p tim is t ic  reg ard in g  tim in g , b u t i t  was w ith in  American means to  
co n c en tra te  approxim ately  6,000 tro o p s  by Ju ly  i f  p a r t  o f  th e  
D e tro i t -a r e a  fo rce  were made a v a ila b le .  A ccepting, however, th e  
assu rance  o f  th e  S e c re ta ry  o f  War about th e  number o f  t ro o p s  he could  
m o b ilize , Madison saw i t  as a l l  th e  more reason  vAiy th e  Mackinac expe­
d i t i o n  should not be c a n c e lle d . The tro o p s  req u ired  fo r  i t  would "be 
to o  in co n s id e rab le  t o  in te r f e r e  w ith th e  o th er o b jec t" !  Secondly,
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tk d iso n  observed th a t  " th e  is s u e  o f o ffe n s iv e  o p e ra tio n s  in  the  n e ig h ­
borhood o f Lake O ntario  must have some dependence on th e  Naval command 
th e r e ,"  Emphasizing th e  p recario u sn ess  o f  th e  co n te s t fo r  Lake 
O n ta rio , he c a s t  doubt on the  p o s s ib i l i ty  of ach iev ing  s u b s ta n t ia l  
r e s u l t s  a t  N iagara . S tre s s in g  th e  im portance o f  Chauncey's f l e e t ,  
he d iscoun ted  Arm strong’ s emphasis on th e  Lake E r ie  f l e e t , B r a n t  
p ra is e s  Ik d iso n  fo r  h i s  M ahan-like i n s ig h t ,  but i n  fa c t i t  was ano­
th e r  example o f  convoluted lo g ic ,  Ghauncey's f l e e t  needed fo r  
a N iagara in v as io n , b u t he expected to  s a i l  in  June or J u ly ,  The 
ex p ec ta tio n  c o n s ti tu te d  the  o n ly  se rio u s  gamble i n  Arm strong's p la n , 
but any o ffe n s iv e , w hether a g a in s t  N iagara, York, o r  K ingston, 
depended on him. I t  would have been m i l i t a r i ly  sound p ra c t ic e  to  
p lan  an o ffe n s iv e  and have i t  prepared  to  move vrtien he s a i le d .  More­
ov e r, th e  employment o f  the  E r ie  f le e t  would reduce l o g is t i c a l  depend­
ence on Ghauncey and h e lp  so lve one o f th e  problems fac ing  Americans 
in  th e  Lake O ntario  reg io n : how to  u t i l i z e  th e  f l e e t  w ithout weak­
ening i t ,  Ghauncey's main ta s k  would be to  occupy Yeo and force 
H ia ll  to  supply h is  R ight D iv isio n  by lan d —an im possib le  f e a t ,
Madison was a b so lu te ly  c o rre c t in  one re sp e c t though, Ghaun­
cey would have to  be on th e  lak e  before  th e  Left D iv isio n  en te red  th e  
p en in su la . N e ith e r  Brown nor Armstrong f u l ly  understood th a t  to  
launch the  o ffe n s iv e  b efo re  Ghauncey s a i le d  would s u b s ta n t ia l ly  in ­
c rease  R i a l l 's  a b i l i t y  to  r e s i s t  and c re a te  th e  e x c ru c ia tin g  problem
(Gongress e d ,) .  I I I ,  395-96,
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o f tim in g  the  rendezvous between Brown and Ghauncey.
Madison doubted A rm strong 's p lan , Armstrong doubted M adison 's, 
and Brown and Armstrong d id  not f u l l y  understand  t h e i r  own. S tran g e ly , 
in  th e  midst o f  u n c e rta in ty  about Western o p e ra tio n s , no one thought 
i t  p ro p er to  revamp e n t i r e ly  the  w in te r-sp r in g  s tr a te g y ,  a llow  th e  
West t o  fend f o r  i t s e l f ,  and t r y  t o  ou t-co n cen tra te  th e  B r i t i s h  a t  
K ingston, i-iadison, in  h i s  d efensive  mood, could  not a p p re c ia te  s t r a ­
te g ic  p o s s ib i l i t i e s  and ru n  c a lc u la te d  r i s k s .  He was obsessed by the 
p ro sp ec ts  o f  a  "réan im ation  o f savage h o s t i l i t i e s "  and concerned th a t  
"M ichilimackinac should remain a source o f B r i t i s h  in flu e n ce  and in ­
t r i g u e ."  His s tr a te g ic  v is io n  had turned  westward, p a s t  N iagara, 
past D e tro i t ,  t o  th e  un inhab ited  w ilderness reg io n s  o f  th e  f a r  North­
west.^^ At M ontpelier, w hile he w orried abou t the  H essian f l y  in  
h is  wheat and t r i e d  to  f in d  c o n so la tio n  in  th e  p u r ity  o f  the  a i r ,  
d isp a tch es  from Washington were l o s t  in  l o c a l  spring  f l o o d s , a n d  
in d ec is io n  decided  by d e fa u l t .  Brown had drawn up h i s  plan in  o rd er 
to  "see  lAat we can do" b efo re  Ju n e . Armstrong had rev ise d  i t  in  
o rder to  see what they  cou ld  do June. American le a d e rs  s a i le d  
between th e  Charybdis o f  Western concern and th e  S c y lla  o f o ffe n s iv e
(NA); Armstrong t o  Brown, Je  10, M il ita ry  Book, RG 10? Ô'IA)j Arm­
strong  t o  Iz a rd , Je  11, ( I z a r d 's )  O f f ic ia l  Correspondence, 34.
^^In June Governor Clark and I4ajor Zachary T ay lo r cap tu red  
P r a ir ie  du Chein, 600 m iles  w ith in  Indian  co u n try . C lark  wanted to  
hold i t ,  but he needed re in fo rcem en ts  and su p p lie s .  Armstrong 
ob jec te d , but Madison favored  the  scheme. P r a t t ,  "Fur Trade S t r a ­
te g y ,"  263-65; M adison's no te  on a  n o te . Je 19, L e tte r s  and O ther 
Vfritings (Congress e d .) .  I l l ,  40?.
^ ^ r a n t ,  James Madison. VI, 235.
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n e c e s s i ty . They wanted to  do something now, but committments i 
since January  t i e d  them t o  th e  West, and th e  only a l te rn a t iv e s  i 
open a t  Niagara o r  Mackinac—or b o th .
For th e  moment M adison's q u a li f ie d  approval o f  Arm strong 's 
plan  had the  e f f e c t  of d e f in i te ly  committing th e  L eft D iv ision  to  
N iagara and e lim in a tin g  th e  op tion  o f  a tta c k in g  Kingston by th e  open­
ing o f th e  campaigning season . I t  rep resen ted  th e  P re s id e n t 's  appro­
v a l o f a  s tr a te g y  th a t ,  i n  i t s  ev o lu tio n  s in c e  January , now d e f in i te ly  
poin ted  westward, A Kingston o ffe n s iv e  would have to  w ait u n t i l  
events played them selves o u t in  th e  West,
Armstrong succeeded in  persuading Jones to  reduce th e  s iz e  o f 
th e  Mackinac ex p ed itio n  to  approxim ately  300 men and o n ly  two "armed 
v e sse ls " —probably th e  N iagara and Lawrence, th e  l a r g e s t  s h ip s . Be­
tween Iday 7 and May 25 o p e ra tio n a l o rd ers  went out to  Brown, G aines, 
H arriso n , Iza rd , S c o tt,  and Captain A rthur S in c la i r ,  vdio commanded 
the  E r ie  f l e e t ,  Armstrong d ire c te d  H arrison  to  provide between 250 
and 350 s o ld ie rs  f o r  Mackinac, leav e  token g a rr iso n s  a t  D e tro it  and 
Malden, and "send a l l  th a t  can be moved" o f fo u r re g u la r  regim ents 
to  B u ffa lo , presumably on what remained o f th e  E rie  f l e e t —th e  b r ig s  
Hunter and Caledonia, and th e  sm alle r schooners, th e  Ohio. Somers. 
Scorpion . T ig re s s , and Porcupine, Iza rd  vms to  put th e  Right D iv isio n  
in to  f ig h t in g  t r im  and, i f  th e  B r i t i s h  detached westward, move a g a in s t 
th e  M ontreal cordon. In  th e  same ev e n t, Gaines (and Ghauncey) should 
a tta c k  K ingston, Brown's ro le  was u n c le a r . He was s t i l l  a t  Sackets 
Harbor, and Armstrong a p p a re n tly  presumed th a t  S co tt would o r should 
command th e  Niagara in v as io n . On May 7 Armstrong to ld  Brown to  fo r ­
ward a r t i l l e r y  and ammunition to  S c o tt  and "quicken" m i l i t i a  g e n e ra l
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S c o tt and S in c la i r  in  th e  meantime had been g a th e rin g  i n t e l l i ­
gence th rough an i n t r i c a t e  spying o p e ra tio n  co o rd in a ted  by a m aster 
agen t a t  E r ie ,  S in c la i r  landed sp ie s  near Long Point Bay and r e ­
t r ie v e d  them a t  predeterm ined p o in ts  a long th e  shore . The agen ts 
spread  over th e  p en in su la  and h id  among t h e i r  f r ie n d s , who v i s i te d  
B r i t i s h  p o s ts  and o b tained  th e  r e q u is i te  in fo rm atio n . By e a rly  May 
S c o tt had been a b le  to  determ ine th e  t o t a l  number o f B r i t i s h  tro o p s  
from York to  Port E r ie  and uncover th e  roads between th e  southern  
shore  o f  th e  pen in su la  and B u rlin g to n . The b e s t  land ing  zone, S c o tt 
b e lie v e d , was Turkey P o in t, from where a  good road ran  f if ty - tw o  
m iles to  B u rlin g to n  through th ic k ly  s e t t le d  co u n try  "capable  o f 
a ffo rd in g  many n ecessary  su p p lie s ,"  With 5,000 reg u la rs  and 600 
In d ia n s , S c o tt promised, he could overcome any "probable" re s is ta n c e  
thrown a g a in s t  him; he p re fe rre d  to  f ig h t  w ithout v o lu n te e rs , S in ­
c l a i r  was c o o p e ra tiv e ; about f i f t y  ba teaux  and seven b o a ts  were 
a v a ila b le  a t  D e tro it  and Cleveland f o r  water t ra n s p o r t ;  ra t io n s  
were abundant; th e  tro o p s  were t r a in in g  and in  good h e a lth ;  and th e  
sou thern  h a l f  o f th e  p en insu la  was unguarded from Port E r ie  to  Long 
P o in t,  He es tim ated  th a t  th e  L eft D iv ision  could  make i t s  way to  
B urling ton  b e fo re  l ü a l l  could c o n cen trate  more than  tw o -th ird s  o f
^^Armstrong to  Brown, %  7, to  H arrison , My 14, to  S c o tt, 
i'ly 25, M ilita ry  Book, HG 107 (NA); t o  Iza rd , %  14, ( I z a r d ’s) 
O f f ic ia l  Correspondence. 15-16; S co tt t o  Armstrong, My 17, keg, 
L t r s ,  Heed,, 107 (NA), The reason Iza rd  was to  move a f t e r  th e
Niagara in v as io n  got under way was t h a t  Armstrong knew I z a r d 's  
regim ents could  not be f i l l e d  u n t i l  about August 1,
^ ^ o  Armstrong, My 17, Reg, L t r s ,  Reed,, RG 10? (NA),
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B urlin g to n , th e  d is ta n c e  was about f i f t y  m ile s .
S c o tt , who had o n ly  about 1,600 re g u la rs  w ith  him in  th e  
beginning  o f May, had tak e n  th e  l ib e r ty  o f  o rd erin g  up detachments 
o f  re g u la rs  and m i l i t i a  from E rie  under th e  command o f  Colonel John 
Campbell. B efore lea v in g , S in c la i r  suggested a r a id  on the  numerous 
f lo u r  m ills  and depots i n  the  Long Point a re a  while en ro u te  to  
B u ffa lo , On May 14 Campbell landed with about 700 re g u la rs  and volun­
t e e r s  below th e  town o f  Dover, and a f t e r  s c a t te r in g  th e  few B r i t i s h  
dragoons p a tr o l l in g  th e  a re a , encamped fo r  th e  n ig h t.  The n ex t day 
th ey  reached Dover w ithout m eeting any s ig n if ic a n t  r e s is ta n c e  and 
destroyed  th re e  f lo u r  m i l ls ,  th re e  d i s t i l l e r i e s ,  one sawm ill, one 
c ard in g  m achine, and "some Public p ro p e r ty ." They a ls o  burned 
" se v e ra l  p r iv a te  Houses" sa id  to  have belonged to  th e  "R evolutionary 
T o rie s"  vrtio had p a r t ic ip a te d  in  th e  burning o f  B uffalo  in  January .
The Americans were two days on sh o re , but no force co n cen tra ted  to  meet 
them , and R ia l l  a t  Fort George d id  not l e a m  of th e  landing  u n t i l  May 
1?.^^  Campbell and S in c la i r  had dem onstrated the  accuracy  o f  S c o t t 's  
e s tim a te .
By May 25 Armstrong rece iv ed  S c o t t 's  in te l l ig e n c e  es tim ates  
and re p o r t  about Campbell' s r a id .  On th e  b a s is  of t h a t  in fo rm ation  
and se v e ra l  sk e tch y  maps, he w rote Sco tt su ggesting  landing  zones 
and o b je c t iv e s .  P rev io u sly  r a th e r  la c k a d a is ic a l ,  Armstrong was in  
g re a t haste  to  g e t the  campaign under way, even though he had ju s t
L e t te r s ,  Naval Records, RG 45 (NA). See a ls o ;  Brown's Documents 
(ed . C ru ikshank), 18-24; and T albo t to  R ia l l ,  Ify 16, and R ia l l  "to 
Drummond, C 683, RG 8 (PAG).
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lea rn e d  t h a t  S c o t t 's  s tre n g th  was below  e x p e c ta tio n s . U n til  v e ry  
r e c e n t ly ,  he had ap p a re n tly  been unaware o f th e  e ffe c t  on th e  L e ft 
D iv isio n  o f  Brown's r e tu rn  t o  Sackets Harbor and th e  d iv e rs io n  o f  
r e c r u i t s  from  B u ffa lo , In  a d d it io n , he d iscovered  th a t  P o rte r  was 
having d i f f i c u l ty  r a i s in g  v o lu n te e rs , and th a t  no r e c r u i t s  from th e  
"W estern Regiments" could be expected a t  Niagara u n t i l  J u ly , Never­
th e l e s s ,  he to ld  S c o tt to  invade as soon as 4 ,500 re g u la rs  could be 
assem bled ( th e  f ig u re  had been Brown's o r ig in a l  estim a te  fo r  th e  
r e q u is i t e  f o rc e ) .  P ro c ra s tin a tio n ,  he f e l t ,  would d e s tro y  the  nuorale 
o f  th e  v o lu n tee rs  and In d ia n s , tfore s ig n i f ic a n t ly ,  however, he 
in s t ru c te d  S c o tt to  invade b e fo re  Ghauncey s a i le d  d e s p ite  h is  su sp i­
c io n  th a t  th e  Oswego r a id  may have delayed  Chauncey's p re p a ra tio n s . 
S tra te g y  was becoming muddled, i f  i t  was not a lre a d y , and 
o b je c tiv e s  were u n c le a r ,  Armstrong t o ld  S co tt t o  occupy B urling ton  
o r  a  s trong  p o in t on R i a l l 's  l i n e  o f communications between B u rlin g ­
to n  and F ort George—b efo re  Ghauncey b e n t h is  s a i l s .  H is reasoning  
was th a t  i f  Yeo came to  R i a l l 's  a s s is ta n c e ,  Kingston would be l e f t  
u n p ro te c te d . I f  he d id  no t, S c o tt  had nothing to  f e a r .  In  e i th e r  
c a se , th e  N iagara pen in su la  o r  Kingston would be taken—o r  bo th . The 
s tr a te g y  depended on s ta t io n in g  enough tro o p s a t  Sackets Harbor i n  
o rd e r  to  ( l )  tak e  advantage o f  Yeo's d e p a rtu re  from K ingston, o r 
(2) p ro te c t  S ackets Harbor i f  Ghauncey went to  Niagara b e fo re  d e fe a t ­
in g  Yeo, But S co tt needed more tro o p s , and th u s ,  on th e  same day , 
Armstrong w rote Brown—vdiom he assumed was s t i l l  a t  Sackets Harbor— 
to  ta k e  as many re g u la rs  as he could to  S co tt a s  soon a s  Ghauncey
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d efea ted  Yeo,^^ What had happened to  th e  o b jec tiv e  o f  tak in g  Kingston?
F o rtu n a te ly  perhaps. Brown had a lre a d y  l e f t  S ackets Harbor on 
th e  tw e n ty - f ir s t  to  assume a c tiv e  command o f th e  L eft D i v i s i o n . B y  
June 2 Armstrong was ap p rised  o f  Brown's d ep a rtu re  fo r  B u ffalo , "Beat 
th e  enemy o u t o f  th e  p e n in su la ,"  he t o ld  Brown, "and e s ta b l is h  your­
s e l f  a t  York." I f  Ghauncey d e fe a ts  Yeo, " I  do not d e sp a ir  o f your 
ta k in g  K ingston b e fo re  th e  campaign en d s."  The L eft D iv isio n , appar­
e n tly ,  would f i r s t  conquer th e  p en in su la  and th en  advance a g a in s t 
K ingston.
Ju s t  th e  day b e fo re , however, Armstrong and Jones had tak en  
from Brown what would have made i t  a l l  p o ss ib le —th e  Lake E rie  f l e e t .
On June 1 Jones rece iv ed  new in te l l ig e n c e  from S in c la i r  about enemy 
a c t i v i t y  in  Lake Huron. The source o f  th e  in fo ra ia tio n  was, i r o n ic a l ly ,  
one C aptain  Marc l e ,  a  Canadian in  American enç»loy, whom S co tt had 
recommended to  S in c la i r  fo r  t h e i r  spying o p e ra tio n s . M arcle had landed 
w ith  Cam pbell's ra id in g  p a r ty  and d isp a tch ed  h i s  f r ie n d s  in to  th e  penin­
s u la .  R e triev in g  them se v e ra l days l a t e r ,  S in c la i r  and Marcle learn ed  
th a t  diuring th e  w in ter  th e  B r i t i s h  had sen t 1,000 s a i l o r s  and mechanics
o f th e  reaso n s Armstrong gave fo r  th e  u n a v a ila b il i ty  o f  th e  W estern 
regim ents f o r  Niagara o p e ra tio n s  was t h a t  th e  Americans had not been 
a b le  to  conclude a  t r e a ty  w ith  th e  In d ian s  and tro o p s were needed, he 
f e l t ,  a t  D e tro it  and Malden. See a ls o ,  Madison to  Armstrong, Je  18, 
L e t te r s  and O ther W ritings (Congress e d .) .  I l l ,  405. P o r te r  s a id  th a t  
one o f  th e  main reaso n s he had not been ab le  to  r a is e  and organize 
more th an  about 1 ,000 v o lu n tee rs  was th a t  as l a t e  as May 30 th e  re g u la r  
army had not provided him w ith  " su p p lie s  o f  any k in d ."  Brown to  Arm­
s tro n g , %  30, Brown's Documents (ed . C ruikshank), 24. Who was a t  
f a u l t —Brovm, S c o tt,  . . .  ?
^^Brown to  Armstrong, 19 and Je 15, Reg. L t r s .  Reed.,
RG 107 (NA).
^ ^M ilita ry  Book, RG 107 (NA).
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northw estward and had begun to  c o n s tru c t t ra n s p o r t  v e s se ls  and sm all 
gunboats in  Penetanguishene Bay, as p a r t  of t h e i r  e f f o r t  to  open a 
l i n e  o f communications between York and Mackinac, The a g e n ts ’ wives 
had learned  from th e  wives o f  B r i t i s h  o f f ic e r s  th a t  P rév o st in tended  
to  ga in  c o n tro l  o f Lakes Huron and E r ie  by A u g u s t . A n a s t r o n g  and 
Jones considered  th e  in fo rm atio n  re le v a n t to  th e  P re s id e n t 's  i n s t r u c ­
t io n s  about new in te l l ig e n c e  governing t h e i r  f i n a l  d e c is io n . On June 
1 th ey  rev e rsed  t h e i r  previous d ec is io n  and in creased  th e  s ize  o f  the  
Mackinac e x p ed itio n  to  approxim ately f iv e  v e s se ls  and o ver 800 s o l ­
d i e r s , l ^ a d i s o n  had re tu rn ed  to  Washington on May 30 and probably  
had a hand i n  th e  change. What had been a s iz e a b le  o p e ra tio n  e a r ly  
i n  A p ril  and a minor one in  mid-May, now became again  a  major op era­
t io n  on an even grander s c a le .  N either S e c re ta ry  re a l iz e d  th a t  th e  
L e ft D iv isio n  would be l e f t  s tranded  a t  B u ffa lo ,
Armstrong, though he was undoubtedly p ressu red , had abandoned 
h i s  previous po in t o f  view: " tak e  Mackinaw and what i s  gained b u t
Mackinaw i t s e l f ? "  He to ld  L ieu tenan t Colonel George Croghan, who 
now commanded the D e tro i t  fo rc e s ,  t h a t  th e  e stab lishm ent a t  Pene­
tangu ishene "must be broken up; the  s a fe ty  o f D e tro it ,  th e  command of 
t h e  lak e s , th e  g e n e ra l s e c u r i ty  of th e  f ro n t ie r  depends on i t ." ^ ^
The weakness o f  even A rm strong 's a n a ly s is  o f th e  s tr a te g ic  s i tu a tio n
^ ^ s in c la ir  to  Jones, My 19 and 27, C ap ta in s ' L e t te r s ,  RG 45 
(NA), Enemy a c t i v i t y  had been suspected  a t  Penetanguishene a t  l e a s t  
as  e a rly  as  I4ay 1.
^R obert B. McAfee, H is to ry  o f  th e  Late War in  th e  W estern^ ( ______
Country (Lexington, 1816), 422,  424.
^ U e  2 , M il ita ry  Book, RG 107 (NA).
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in  h i s  A pril 30 note to  l«Iadison had been h is  acceptance of th e  impor­
tan ce  o f  rem aining B r i ti sh - In d ia n  a c t iv i t y .  No one in  th e  ad m in istra ­
t io n  re a l iz e d  th a t  Tecumseh's d ea th  a t  Moraviantown, and th e  lo ss  o f 
D e tro i t ,  Malden, and Lake E rie  f o r  the  B r i t i s h ,  had ended th e  th re a t  
of m assive In d ian  p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  the  ;var,^^
The B r i t i s h  had indeed re in fo rc e d  Mackinac and co n stru c ted  a 
sm all navy a t  Penetanguishene, b u t Marcle ' s f r ie n d s  had exaggerated .
In th e  w inter Prévost had sent a  few sh ipw rights t o  th e  bay and ordered 
L ieutenant Colonel Robert ïfcDouall to  r e in fo rc e , resu p p ly , and hold 
Iteckinac a g a in s t an expected American a t t a c k .  McDouall, however, 
reached  Mackinac on May 18, a f t e r  a  d i f f i c u l t  m onth 's journey from 
Nottawasaga Bay, with o n ly  two companies o f  p ro v in c ia l  re g u la rs ,  a 
few cannon, and f iv e  months' su p p lie s . At Penetanguishene th e  
B r i t i s h  had b u i l t  some bateaux, b u t had been unable to  c a rry  on with 
the  c o n s tru c tio n  of th e  la rg e r  c r a f t  fo r  want of su p p lie s  and 
la b o re rs ,  ^iackinac was held  tenuously  a t  b e s t .  The land ro u te  
from York to  Lake Simcoe was v e ry  d i f f i c u l t ,  and in  Lake Huron the 
B r i t i s h  had to  cope w ith  f lo a t in g  chunks o f  ice  and ro arin g  g a le s .
On I4ay 1 Croghan had w r itte n  h is  su p e rio rs  th a t  th e re  was 
l i t t l e  to  f e a r  o f fe n s iv e ly  from th e  B r i t i s h .  " I  th in k  i t .  .  . 
p robable  th a t  b o a ts  a re  b u ild in g  on Lake Simcoe, b u t . . .  I  am 
induced to  b e lie v e  th a t  th ey  a re  not l a r g e r  than  o rd in a ry  bateaux 
and t h a t  they  a re  in tended  fo r th e  purpose o f keeping up th e
42,'S tan ley , "The Indians i n  th e  War o f  1812," Canadian 
H is to r ic a l  Review. XXXI (Je  1950), 155.
^ ^ P ra tt ,  "Pur Trade S tra te g y ,"  257j G ilp in , War in  th e  North­
w est. 242; P révost to  B a th u rs t, Jy  10, C.O. 42/l57> MG 11 (PAC).
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communication . . . w ith  th o se  p o s ts  above mentioned than  f o r  ac tin g  
o f f e n s iv e ly ," ^  S in c la i r ,  Jones, Armstrong, and Madison allovred o ld  
w ives' t a l e s  to  convince them th a t  w ith t h e i r  Mackinac fo rc e , th e  
B r i t i s h  would conquer th e  upper M is s iss ip p i v a lle y , re tak e  Malden and 
D e tro i t ,  and d e fe a t th e  Lake E r ie  f l e e t .
By th e  end o f May and th e  beginning o f  June American s tra te g y  
was a d r i f t  in  a sea  o f  doubt, f e a r ,  and confusion , IW iso n , seeing  
l i t t l e  r e la t io n  between p o lic y  and o ffen s iv e  s tr a te g y  save defense 
o f  th e  Northwest from In d ian s , had le n t  in d e c is iv e  d i re c tio n  to  
s tr a te g y  fo rm u la tio n , Armstrong s a t  a t  h is  map-strewn desk in  Wash­
ing to n , p lo t t in g  ro u tes  o f  in v asio n  and iss u in g  c o n f l ic t in g  and im­
p o ss ib le  o rd e rs . The navy worried about th e  th re a t  in  Lake Huron,
As one s tu d en t o f  American command concluded, th e  P re sid e n t and h is  
S e c re ta r ie s  lacked  "a reasoned conception  o f  fu n c tio n  and d u ty  th a t  
would have provided  an i n te l l i g e n t  means o f  coping w ith  th e  emer­
gency,"^^ On June 3 I^adison, b e se t w ith numerous f e a r s ,  was f in a l ly  
moved to  c a l l  an e x tra o rd in a ry  Cabinet m e e t i n g . T h e  P resid en t had 
alm ost always worked through h is  S e c re ta r ie s  in d iv id u a lly  and sepa­
r a t e ly ,  and though, as B rant say s, th e  opin ions now s o lic i t e d  from 
th e  viiole Cabinet were p u re ly  a d v iso ry , th e  meeting n ev e rth e le ss
^*^0 S in c la i r ,  My 1, enc, S in c la i r  t o  Jones, My 6. Documen­
ta r y  H is to ry  (ed . C ruikshank), IX, 334.
^^Vftiite, J e ffe rs o n ia n s , 223,
^^*Madison to  Armstrong, to  Jones, t o  Monroe, to  Campbell, to  
Hush, Je  3 , L e tte r s  and O ther W ritings (Congress e d ,) .  I I I ,  402-403,
^^James Idadison, VI, 262, A Cabinet m eeting was held  on 
8 Feb 1813. I b id , .  165,
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only be surm ised. Perhaps he f e l t  th a t  s tr a te g y  had been allowed 
to  d r i f t  f a r  to o  long, and th a t  i t  was now tim e to  launch a  campaign. 
New in te l l ig e n c e  about Mackinac coupled w ith  A rm strong's advocacy o f  
a N iagara in v asio n  were undoubtedly f a c to rs .  The most inçsortant 
stim ulus fo r  a c o lle c t iv e  meeting may have been th e  foreboding news 
o f  Napoleon's a b d ic a tio n  in  A p r il ,  which portended th e  tra n s fe re n c e  
o f  W ellin g to n 's  army to  North America. S ince re tu rn in g  from V irg in ia , 
th e  P re sid e n t had c o n tin u a lly  dw elt on th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f la rg e  sc a le  
in v asio n  o f  "our A tla n tic  and in la n d  f r o n t i e r . C a n a d i a n  s tr a te g y  
had always been both  o ffe n s iv e  and d e fen s iv e .
On June 7 Madison met w ith  Armstrong, Jones, Monroe, S e c re ta ry  
o f  th e  T reasury  George ’W. Campbell, and A tto rney  G eneral R ichard Rush. 
The C abinet probably  looked in to  th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  a  d riv e  on Mon­
t r e a l ,  b u t found th e  p ro p o sitio n  im p ra c tic a l .  Armstrong ' s ta b u la tio n s  
placed th e  t o t a l  e f f e c tiv e  re g u la r  s tre n g th  in  th e  country  a t  20,OCX), 
w ith 7 ,000 r e c r u i t s  ready to  be mustered in to  t h e i r  reg im en ts . But 
thousands o f one-year men were about to  be d isch arg ed , and on the 
n o rthern  f r o n t ie r  th ere  were only 2,000 re g u la rs  in  th e  D e tro i t  a re a , 
3,500 under Brown from Sackets Harbor to  B u ffalo , and 5,000 under 
Izard  i n  th e  e n t i r e  Champlain a re a .  Even adding th e  r e c r u i t s ,  4,000 
to  Iza rd  and 3,000 to  Brown, th e  meager numbers precluded an  a tta c k  
on M ontreal. Although Armstrong tended t o  d isco u n t re p o r ts  of
^ % adison  to  Armstrong, My 20 and 24 , L e t te r s  and O ther Vfritings 
(Congress e d .) .  I l l ,  399, 401; B ra n t, James Madison. VI, 266-71.
^^On t h i s  p o in t, see  Calhoun, speech , Jan 15, Papers (ed . 
M eriw ether), I ,  192-93*
^% ra n t, James Madison. VI, 262.
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B r i t i s h  s tre n g th , he and the  C abinet probably  knew th a t  ap prox im ately  
8,000 tro o p s defended th e  M ontreal cordon, and th ey  c e r ta in ly  ex­
pected  those  t o  be re in fo rc e d  from  Europe, For th e  p re se n t ,  the  
s tro n g e s t  argument a g a in s t  a d r iv e  on M ontreal was a com bination o f  
l o g i s t i c a l  and r e c r u i t in g  f a c to r s :  th e  Champlain f le e t  was not
prepared  to  ch a llen g e  th e  B r i t i s h  f l e e t ;  wagons and horses were 
scarce ; and th e  Right D iv ision  had not a s  ye t recovered  from  the 
L aco lle  f ia s c o , Izard  was s tru g g lin g  to  assemble and t r a i n  r e c r u i t s  
and mold the  R igh t D iv isio n  in to  a competent f ig h t in g  f o r c e , A n  
immediate a t ta c k  on K ingston was eq u a lly  ou t o f th e  q u estio n  as th e  
bulk o f  th e  L e ft D iv isio n  was a t  B uffalo and p rep a ra tio n s  had a lre a d y  
begun f o r  a N iagara in v as io n .
The p lan  th a t  emerged rep re se n te d  th e  sy n th e s is  o f  d e c is io n s  
since January , I t  comprised fo u r  se p ara te  but r e la te d  o p e ra tio n s ,
( l )  An ex p ed itio n  o f f iv e  sh ips and 800 t o  1,000 men would e n te r  Lake 
Huron, a t ta c k ,  and occupy the  p o s ts  a t  Penetanguishene and S t .  Joseph 
I s la n d , From Penetanguishene Croghan would open a  l in e  o f  communica­
t io n s  w ith  th e  L e ft D iv isio n  a t  York. (2 ) The L eft D iv isio n  would 
invade th e  N iagara pen in su la  from Lake E r ie  a t  a p o in t nea r Long 
Point and march to  B urling ton  H eigh ts, " p rep a ra to ry  to  fu r th e r  opera­
tio n s  f o r  reducing  the  P e n in su la ,"  From B u rlin g to n  th e  d iv is io n  would 
advance to  York and p o ss ib ly  Kingston w ith  the  a s s is ta n c e  o f  Chauncey's 
f l e e t .  The campaign was " to  depend on Commodore Chauncey's g e tt in g
Adams, H is to ry  o f  th e  United S ta te s .  V I I I ,  25.
^^See correspondence b e t .  Armstrong and Iz a rd  from 7 to  
Je 11, ( I z a r d 's )  O f f ic ia l  Correspondence. 2 -33j and Armstrong, 
N o tices. I I ,  118-19.
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th e  command o f  th e  la k e , w ithout which su p p lie s  could n o t be rec e iv ed , 
and w ith  vAiich th ese  might be conveyed s a fe ly  by w ater from depo ts on 
th e  so u th  s id e  o f  Lake O n ta rio ."  (3) The navy was to  c o n s tru c t f i f ­
tee n  armed b o a ts  a t  S ackets Harbor, and, under th e  p ro te c tio n  o f p o s ts  
e s ta b lish e d  by Iza rd , g a in  command o f th e  S t .  Lawrence R iver to  sev er 
communications between M ontreal and K ingston. (4) With " th e  main 
fo rc e ,"  Izard  should dem onstrate a g a in s t M ontreal in  o rd e r  to  d iv e r t  
B r i t i s h  a t t e n tio n  from w e s terly  o p e ra tio n s  and "conçel P révost to  
f ig h t  d isad v an tag eo u sly , o r b reak  up h is  connection  w ith Lake Champ­
l a in ."  Agreement was unanimous, except t h a t  Monroe, "vrtio thought 
th e  measure hazardous,"  expressed r e se rv a tio n s  about p o in t (2 ) .^ ^
On th e  su rface  th e  plan  was e x c e l le n t ,  b u t in  a p p lic a tio n  
con ta ined  l o g is t i c  and s t r a te g ic  a b s u rd i t i e s .  C abinet approval o f  
th e  Huron ex p ed itio n  gave form al reco g n itio n  to  Arm strong’s and Jo n e s 's  
i d io t ic  June 1 d e c is io n  to  send th e  Lake E r ie  f l e e t  to  Mackinac vdiile 
prom ising i t  to  Brown. The adm onition to  make th e  N iagara in v asio n  
dependent on Chauncey's s a i l in g  was sound, b u t Armstrong and Brown 
would subseq u en tly  e r r  and , in  e f f e c t ,  d is re g a rd  i t .  For th e  moment, 
th e  reason ing  behind th e  adm onition served  to  r e v e a l  a m inor paradox. 
The C abinet b e lie v e d  th a t  Chauncey's whole f l e e t  was needed to  a s s i s t  
Brown, which le d  them to  b e lie v e  in  tu rn  t h a t  Chauncey would f i r s t  
have t o  meet and d e fea t Yeo in  a  p itch ed  n aval b a t t l e , ( T h e y  would 
l a t e r  a l t e r  t h e i r  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  s i t u a t io n .)  In  t h a t  e v en t, why
C ab in e t, J e  7 , L e tte r s  and Other W ritings (Congress e d .) .  
I l l ,  403- 404. Im plied , a p p a re n tly , was t h a t  th e  Lake Huron ex p ed itio n  
would a ls o  a ttem p t to  r e ta k e  M ackinac.
^% rm strong to  S c o tt,  My 17, to  G aines, Je  16, M ilita ry  Book, 
RG 107 (NA).
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d id  th ey  n o t decide to  a t ta c k  Kingston?—e s p e c ia lly  s in ce  th e  p lan  
c a l le d  fo r  g a in ing  command o f  the  S t ,  Lawrence R iv e r, S im ultaneously , 
th e y  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  reduced th e  E rie  f l e e t ’s support o f  Brown and 
th ere b y  made him more dependent on Chauncey, thus  d es tro y in g  th e  
m ajor m il i t a ry  (and naval) j u s t i f i c a t io n  fo r  launching  a N iagara 
in v as io n ,
A Niagara campaign launched from lak e  E rie  made sense fo r  two 
m ajor reaso n s: to  reduce dependence on Chauncey and to  annex t e r r i ­
t o r y  (o r  in  the  l e a s t  to  secu re  th e  conquest o f  th e  West from Niagara 
t o  D e t ro i t ) ,  In  b o th  cases  th e  C abinet f a i l e d  to  a p p re c ia te  th e  f u l l  
p o t e n t i a l i t i e s  o f  Brown's o r ig in a l  p lan  o f  campaign. M il i t a r i l y ,  
American s t r a t e g i s t s  continued  to  lab o r  under t h e i r  p e r s i s te n t  in a b i l ­
i t y  to  a d ju s t  ends and means. P o l i t i c a l ly ,  i t  ap p ears , th ey  labored  
under Madison’s f a i l u r e  to  a p p re c ia te  th e  p o s s ib i l i t i e s  of conquest 
a t  N iagara on th e  one hand, and h is  exaggerated  concern about North­
w estern In d ian s  on th e  o th e r .
In  th e  Cabinet m eeting Armstrong appears t o  have s tre s se d  
th e  l o g i s t i c a l  advantages o f  u t i l i z i n g  th e  Lake E rie  f l e e t  to  enable 
th e  L eft D iv isio n  t o  occupy B u rlin g to n , a t  which p o in t i t  would 
en trench  i t s e l f  and wait f o r  Chauncey, Thus Armstrong favored a 
Niagara in v asio n  because su p e rio r  co n c en tra tio n  was p o ss ib le  a t  
N iagara , and w ith th e  E rie  f l e e t  a lo n e , the  L e ft D iv isio n  co u ld  a t  
l e a s t  tak e  th e  pen in su la  w ithout having to  depend e n t i r e ly  on Chauncey, 
U ltim a te ly , o f  co u rse , th e  O ntario  f l e e t  was needed. Moreover, i f  
Chauncey gained  c o n tro l  o f  Lake O n tario , th e  L eft D iv isio n  co u ld , 
depending on c ircum stances, e i th e r  ta k e  ( l )  York o r (2) K ingston,
In  o th e r words, Armstrong t r i e d  to  f i t  h is  id ea s  to  th e  d i f f i c u l t  
r e a l i t i e s  o f  th e  o b je c t iv e  s i tu a t io n ,  w ith th e  hope o f  gain ing  
som ething.  However, Ifedison and Jones favored the  Mackinac expedi­
t io n ,  and Armstrong succumbed w ithout r e a l iz in g  th a t  i t  meant th e  
t o t a l  lo s s  o f  th e  E r ie  f l e e t .  He was unable , th e re fo re ,  to  come to  
th e  r e a l iz a t io n  o f  th e  im portance o f  Chauncey's f l e e t ,  vrtiose t ru e  
r o l e ,  t a c t i c s ,  and s tr a te g y ,  Armstrong never understood . See Heads 
o f  p lan  o f  campaign w ith in  D i s t r i c t  No, 9> i n  Armstrong, N o tice s .
I I ,  218-19.
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To Madison and Monroe, th e  P re s id e n t 's  a l te r - e g o ,  "conquest" 
meant th e  c ap tu re  of M ontreal. Prom th e  tim e o f th e  e a r l i e s t  e f f o r t s  
to  form ulate  a  m i l i t a ry  s tra te g y  to  accom plish th e  grand s tra te g y , 
Madison b e liev ed  th a t  conquest f o r  dip lom atic  and an n e x a tio n is t p u r­
poses would come only by tak in g  and hold ing  M ontreal and Quebec. 
Armstrong and G a l la t in  q u ick ly  a l t e r e d  t h e i r  own id e a s , b u t M adison's 
r e je c t io n  o f G a l la t in 's  no te  o f  Ju ly  1812 rev ea led  h is  continued 
s tr e s s  on M ontreal and t o t a l  conquest. The euphoria o f over-confidence 
in  th e  opening weeks o f  th e  1812 campaign had tem p o rarily  le d  Madison 
to  e n te r ta in  th e  view t h a t ,  though the  I fo n trea l campaign was u ltim a te ly  
n ecessa ry , i t  would be p o ss ib le  i n  the  meantime to  detach p a r ts  o f  
Upper Canada from  B r i t i s h  North America. But th e  hope had been p re d i­
cated on h is  un d erestim atio n  o f  th e  im portance o f  naval c o n tro l  o f  th e  
lak e s . The d e fe a ts  o f 1812, in  la rg e  measure due to  naval weakness, 
destroyed  th ese  tem porary naval i l l u s io n s ,  and brought home to  him 
the  n e c e s s i ty  o f  naval supremacy and, i f  "Canada" were to  be conquered, 
o f  ta k in g  M ontreal. Cançiaigns i n  th e  West were e s s e n t ia l  f o r  d e fen se , 
but th e  cap tu re  o f  îfo n tre a l was e s s e n t ia l  f o r  conquest and annexation .
Armstrong was p robably  a lone  among p resen t Cabinet members 
in  a p p re c ia tin g  th e  m il i t a ry  and d ip lom atic  importance o f Niagara and 
K ingston , In  term s o f lo g i s t i c s  bo th  were e a s ie r  to  take th an  M ontreal,
See: Monroe to  Brown, 10 Feb 1815, C o n fid en tia l and U noffi­
c i a l  L e t te r s  S e n t, RG 107 (NA); and M onroe's Notes on Idea o f  a P lan 
o f  C a ^ a ig n  fo r  th e  Year 1813, W ritings (ed . H am ilton), V, 235-37,
I f  t h i s  in te r p re ta t io n  o f  M adison's and Monroe's understand ing  o f 
"conquest" i s  c o r r e c t ,  i t  does n o t inçily t h a t  th ey  would have been 
u n w illin g  to  accep t a B r i t i s h  ce ss io n  o f o n ly  Upper Canada, On th e  
o th e r  hand, th ey  would probably  have f e l t  t h a t  such a  cess io n  would 
be more secure i n  the  fu tu re  fo r  th e  United S ta te s  i f  i t  were 
accompanied by th e  ce ss io n  o f M ontreal to o .
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At th e  moment l o g i s t i c a l  co n s id e ra tio n s  po in ted  to  N iagara, while 
d ip lo m a tic a l ly , as he to ld  Iz a rd , success would mean " th e  p en insu la  
w il l  be added to  what we a lread y  hold o f  Upper C a n a d a , A r m s t r o n g  
alw ays, however, b e tray ed  a weakness in  th e  a p p lic a tio n  o f  good 
s t r a te g ic  id e a s ,  and a long  w ith o th er American s t r a t e g i s t s  favored 
com plicated and d isp e rsed  o f fe n s iv e s ,
Madison and Monroe d id  speak in  term s o f  "conquering" th e  
p en in su la , bu t th ey  d id  not appear to  regard  i t s  conquest as v ery  im­
p o rta n t d ip lo m a tic a l ly .  On June 23 Monroe ag a in  urged th a t  th e  Ameri­
can envoys req u e s t th e  cession  "o f th e  upper p a r ts  and even th e  whole 
of Canada to  th e  United S ta te s ,"  But he d e liv e re d  no th re a t  o f  im­
m ediate American se iz u re  as he had in  1813 and January  1814, R ather, 
he to ld  th e  envoys to  persuade th e  B r i t i s h  government, w ith  th e  same 
arguments he had summarized e x a c tly  a y ea r b e fo re , th a t  i t  was in  i t s  
b est i n te r e s t s  to  d iv e s t  i t s e l f  o f  Canada, P erk ins d isco u n ts  th e  
American am bition  fo r annexation  as a goa l stemming from determ ined 
purpose and a rgues th a t  i t  was a  dream stemming from in to x ic a t io n  
w ith m il i t a ry  s u c c e s s , I n  June 1813 Monroe's am bitions d id  re p re ­
sent a  dream seem ingly made p o ss ib le  by m il i ta ry  v ic to ry , bu t complete 
m i l i t a iy  success would have confirm ed a n n e x a tio n is t purpose and made
My 14, ( I z a r d 's )  O f f ic ia l  Correspondence. 16, In  Cabinet 
m eeting Armstrong had suggested; conquest o f th e  pen in su la  in  o rd er 
to  sev er B r i t i s h  c o n tac t w ith th e  In d ian s  and g a in  a hold on th e  
e n ti r e  O ntario  p e n in su la , w ith p ro sp ec ts  toward Kingston, whose 
cap tu re  would "g ive us u ncon tested  possession  o f  a  g rea t p ro p o rtio n  
o f Upper Canada." A pparently , Madison and th e  o th e r  members o f  th e  
Cabinet d id  n o t share A rm strong 's confidence. Heads o f  p lan  o f 
campaign, in  Armstrong, N o tices. I I ,  219,
^^C astlereagh  and Adams; England and th e  United S ta te s , 
1812-1823 (B erkeley , 1964), 55-56,
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dip lom atie  accomodation d i f f i c u l t .  In mid-1814 n e ith e r  Madison nor 
Monroe were in to x ic a te d  by su ccess , and th ey  f e l l  back upon the  a r t s  
o f  persu asio n  in  o rder to  win Canada, Lack o f m il i t a ry  success and 
lac k  o f  optimism removed th e i r  determ ined purpose and removed annexa­
t i o n i s t  o b s ta c le s  to  d ip lom atic  accomodation. They were so d esp a ir in g  
th ey  cou ld  not see  th a t  conquest a t  N iagara could give them  the  "upper 
p a rts "  o f  Canada,
Moreover, in  h is  defen siv e  m il i t a ry  mood, Madison tended to  
doubt vdiether any v ic to ry  east o f  Mackinac and w est o f Kingston 
would be perm anent. The B r i t i s h ,  he f e l t ,  would not o n ly  soon invade 
th e  c o ast and th e  Champlain a re a ,  but would by th e  end o f  the  y e a r  
reg a in  supremacy on Lake O ntario  a f t e r  Chauncey's expected tem porary 
ascendancy, The C ab in e t' s p lan  of campaign was fo r  him d efensive  
r a th e r  th an  o ffe n s iv e . Aware t h a t  the  o r ig in a l  avowed reasons f o r  
th e  war were fad in g  in  s ig n if ic a n c e , f e a r f u l  o f  growing B r i t i s h  m i l i ­
t a r y  s tr e n g th , knowing th a t  France could no lo n g er ac t "a s  a check on 
E n g la n d ," ^  concerned about p o ss ib le  B r i t i s h  d ip lom atic  demands, 
a p p a re n tly  abandoning hopes of ach iev ing  annexation  m i l i t a r i ly ,  Madi­
son could see l i t t l e  e ls e  to  do b u t sa lvage vdiat remained o f  American 
h old ings w ith in  and w ithout American t e r r i t o r i a l  b oundaries . He was 
more in te re s te d  i n  destro y in g  B r i tish - In d ia n  connections in  the  N orth­
west th an  he was in  making a supreme e f f o r t  to  ta k e  N iagara, d e fe a t  
Yeo, and then  ta k e  Kingston—u sin g  th ese  v ic to r ie s  to  b a rg a in  d ip lo -
^^To Armstrong, 24, L e tte rs  and Other W ritings (Congress 
e d ,) .  I I I ,  401.
^Monroe to  envoys, Je 25, Diplomatic I n s t r u c t io n s ,  RG 59 (NA); 
Je  27, W ritings (ed . Ham ilton), V, 370-73.
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m a tic a lly , Monroe was p e rso n a lly  a t  odds with Armstrong and h is  s t r a ­
te g ic  th in k in g  was f ix e d  on M ontreal. He had l i t t l e  i n te r e s t  in  Arm­
s tr o n g 's  id ea s  o r N iagara , and he in  f a c t  regarded  the o p e ra tio n  a s  
"hazardous.
The Cabinet ' s p lan  was m ak esh ift. On w r itin g  o f f  M ontreal in  
January , î& dison had never t r i e d  to  d ecide what maximum t e r r i t o r i a l  
g a in s  could be made w ith  a v a ila b le  American reso u rc e s . He had grown 
in c re a s in g ly  f e a r f u l  o f  B r i tish - In d ia n  co o p era tio n  and more despondent 
about ach iev ing  a m il i t a ry  d e c is io n  in  th e  war. S t ra te g ic  th in k in g  
had d r i f te d  t o  th e  p o in t when th e  Cabinet met and simply fo rm alized  
the d r i f t .  Madison accep ted  th e  Niagara in v as io n , because i t  seemed 
to  be th e  on ly  major campaign p o ss ib le  a t  th e  tim e . But he had 
never advocated one; he had l e t  events le a d  him to  N iagara. N iagara 
was an  e x p ed ien t. I t  was as though th e  in v asio n  were ju s t  something 
to  do , which might p o ss ib ly  produce good r e s u l t s —re tr ie v e  n a tio n a l  
c h a ra c te r ,  g a in  the p en in su la , and r e s u l t  in  th e  cap tu re  o f  Kingston 
( re f e r r e d  to  i n  the  C abinet n o tes  as " e t c . " ) .  No one, in clu d in g  
Madison, had asked th e  r ig h t  q u e s tio n s , ex e rc ised  t h e i r  im ag in atio n , 
o r s tu d ie d  th e  l o g i s t i c a l  r e a l i t i e s ,
American le a d e rs  seemed t o  e x is t  i n  an in e x p lic a b le  m alaise 
o f confusion , re s ig n a tio n ,  i l l - w i l l ,  and i r r e s o lu t io n .  Diplomatic 
as w e ll as m il i t a ry  aims were u n c le a r ,  and no a ttem p t was made to  
r e l a te  o ffe n s iv e  s tr a te g y  to  whatever was l e f t  o f  p o lic y  g o a ls .
L a ter in  the  month o f June Madison and th e  Cabinet decided to  aban-
. 1813,
W ritings (ed . H am ilton), V, 237-41.
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don th e  is s u e  o f im pressm ent, "The e s s e n t ia l  causes o f  war between 
th e  United S ta te s  and Great B r i ta in ,  and p a r t i c u la r ly  th e  p ra c t ic e  
o f  im pressm ent," Monroe wrote American envoys, "have ceased ,"  and 
he suggested  t h e i r  r e f e r r a l  t o  se p a ra te  n e g o tia tio n s  a f t e r  th e  p eace .^  
The war became, in  M adison's words, an  "experim ent of prolonged hos­
t i l i t i e s " ^ ^  w ith no apparen t purpose b u t to  salvage n a tio n a l  p r e s t ig e  
and h o n o r , O f  th e  p lan  o f campaign fo r  1814 i t  may be sa id —a f t e r  
G eneral W illiam  S h a f te r 's  qu ip  about h i s  1898 Santiago  campaign— 
" th e re  was no s tr a te g y  about i t , " ^ ^
^^Je 25, D iplom atic In s t r u c t io n s ,  ÜG 59 (NA).
^^To J e ffe rs o n , My 10, L e tte rs  and O ther W ritings 
e d . ) ,  I I ,  583.
^ ^ r a n t. James Madison. VI, 247 ,  267.
^^Quoted in  W eigley, H is to ry  o f  th e  U.S. Army. 305.
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"BEGIN WITH THE BELLY"
American s t r a t e g i s t s  planned backwards, adopting  a s tr a te g y  
be fo re  confirm ing i t s  l o g i s t i c a l  f e a s i b i l i t y .  On to p  of t h a t ,  they  
designed com plicated combined o p e ra tio n s  t h a t  req u ired  a degree o f 
c o o rd in a tio n , c o o p era tio n , and tim ing  which th ey  were unable to  
ach iev e . S h o r tly  a f t e r  th e  Cabinet m eeting Armstrong and Jones 
mulled over th e  p lan  o f  campaign and a t  l a s t  came to  th e  r e a l iz a t io n  
th a t  th e  Niagara phase could  not be implemented as planned. Jones 
c a lc u la te d  th a t  th e  number o f  v e s se ls  a ssigned  to  th e  Left D iv isio n  
could o n ly  t ra n s p o r t  800 men a t  a tim e to  th e  Canadian sh o re . I f  
Brown had fo u r o r  f iv e  thousand men, th e  v e s se ls  would have to  make 
f iv e  o r  s ix  t r i p s ,  ex c lu siv e  o f th o se  req u ired  to  lan d  su p p lie s  and 
equipm ent. Armstrong doubted, furtherm ore , th a t  Brown possessed 
enough wagons and horses to  t ra n s p o r t  h is  su p p lie s  and equipment 
from Long P o in t to  B u rlin g to n . An amphibious in v asio n  from Lake 
E rie  was th e re fo re  out o f  th e  q u e s tio n , fo r  th e  elem ents o f su rp r ise  
and speed expected from th e  o r ig in a l  p lan  would be l o s t .
Armstrong communicated th e  C ab in e t' s p lan  o f  campaign to  
Brown on June 10. O u tlin in g  th e  tra n s p o r t  problem s, he explained  
th a t  th e  approach to  B u rling ton  must be made from a c ro ss  th e  N iagara 
R iver r a th e r  th an  from Long P o in t, Only th e  lo g is t i c  support o f  the  
O ntario  f l e e t  would enable th e  L eft D iv ision  to  reduce i t s  supply
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t r a in ,  secure  i t s  communications, and advance on B u rlin g to n , "In 
a l l  m il i t a ry  o p e ra tio n s , we must, a s  you know, begin  w ith th e  b e l ly ."  
The campaign would have to  be suspended u n t i l  Chauncey gained c o n tro l 
o f Lake O n tario , A fter  a l l ,  he consoled Brown, th e  O ntario f l e e t  
would have been n ecessary  anyway i n  o rder to  hold B u rling ton  o r  subdue 
th e  p en in su la , and th e  postponement would perm it th e  r e c r u i t s  and 
v o lu n te e rs  to  j o in  t h e i r  reg im en ts,
"To p rev en t t h e i r  blood from s ta g n a tin g ,"  however, Armstrong 
suggested an "occupation" fo r  Brown's tro o p s  in  th e  in te r im  befo re  
Chauncey s a i le d .  Why no t take F o r t E r ie , s e iz e  th e  bridge  over the  
Chippawa R iver, and e i t h e r  stop  th e re  o r push on as  th e  c ircum stances 
allowed? I f  R ia l l  should ch allenge the  passage , he would probably  
su ffe r  d e fe a t—Armstrong doubted th a t  R ia l l  could c o n c en tra te  more 
than  1,600 tro o p s  during  th e  l i t t l e  occupation . Brown would then  be 
fre e  t o  in v es t F o r t George, meet Chauncey " in  the  most d i re c t  way," 
and reduce F ort N iagara, With Chauncey b rin g in g  up su p p lie s  from 
th e  d epo ts a t  E ighteen  N ile  Creek and th e  Genesee R iv er, th e  L eft 
D iv ision  could march to  B u rlin g to n  and proceed to  inç)lement th e  
"g re a te r  plan" o f  advancing a g a in s t York. To Armstrong th e  march to  
B u rlin g to n  was th e  "campaign"; th e  red u c tio n  o f B r i t i s h  s tro n g -  
po in ts  a long  th e  Niagara R iver was only a minor p rep a ra to ry  s te p  to  
e ff e c t  th e  rendezvous w ith  Chauncey,^
At B u ffa lo , meanvdiile. Brown had reached th e  same conclusions 
—but f o r  d i f f e r e n t  reaso n s . By th e  time he a rr iv e d  a t  B uffalo  in  
th e  f i r s t  week o f  June, th e  c lo se  co o p era tio n  which had e x is te d
M ilita ry  Book, RG 107 (NA),
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between S in c la i r  and th e  L eft D iv ision  had vanished . On June 9 
S in c la i r  had rece iv ed  h is  o rd ers  (d a ted  June l )  to  leav e  E r ie ,  p ro ­
ceed to  D e tro i t ,  and prepare fo r  th e  en larged  Huron ex p ed itio n .
Brown never heard from  him ag a in . Before d ep a rtin g , however, S in ­
c l a i r  had sen t word through Campbell t h a t  he would provide fiv e  
gunboats to  a s s i s t  th e  Left D iv isio n , Brown f e l t  th a t  th e s e  would 
have been s a t i s f a c to r y  had th e  f i f t y  bateaux  and seven r i v e r  b o a ts  
been brought down from D e tro i t  and C leveland . The t o t a l  c a p ac ity  o f  
gunboats, bateaux , and sm all c r a f t  would have exceeded 3,000 men 
w ith  t h e i r  su p p lie s  and equipment. But th e re  were no b a teaux  o r 
b o a ts  to  be had now th a t  S in c la i r  had s a ile d  away. Nor were a l l  th e  
gunboats a v a ila b le .  Only two, th e  Somers and Porcupine. were in  th e  
immediate a re a .  With l i t t l e  p rospect o f  g e tt in g  the  o th e r  gunboats, 
much le s s  th e  ba teau x . Brown re a l iz e d  t h a t  in v asio n  p lan s  would have 
t o  be a l t e r e d .  On June 17, a s  Arm strong’s l e t t e r  was on i t s  vray. 
Brown wrote and suggested a p lan  o f o p e ra tio n s  e x a c tly  s im ila r  to  
th e  S e c re ta ry 's ,  I t  was th e  f i r s t  tim e both men had s im ultaneously  
come to  th e  same c o n c lu s io n s ,^
In  th e  end, th e  abandonment o f  th e  e x c e lle n t  p lan  o f  invad­
in g  th e  pen in su la  from Lake E r ie  tu rn ed  on th e  f in e  d e ta i l s  o f l o g i s -
^ ro w n  to  Armstrong, My 21 and Je  7 and 17, and Kennedy to  
Brown, Je 23 , enc. Brown to  Armstrong, Je  26, Reg. L trs .  R eed., RG 107
(NA). The ca p ac ity  o f  3 schooners and th e  Lady P ré v o st, o r  5 schooners
w ithout th e  Lady P ré v o s t, was, i t  seems, 800 men. The 50 bateaux 
could  c a rry  2,500 men. A dd itio n a l b o a ts  needing r e p a irs  were a t  
C leveland , E r ie ,  and B u ffa lo , For some unknown reason  S in c la i r  d id  
n o t c a rry  Cam pbell's re g u la rs  o r  Colonel F en to n 's  Pennsylvania volun­
t e e r s  from E rie  to  B u ffa lo , They walked, Canpbell a r r iv e d  with 
250 men on June 17. The l a s t  o f  F en to n 's  v o lu n tee rs  a r r iv e d  on June
28, Brown to  Armstrong, Je  17 and 28, Reg. L t r s ,  Reed., RG 107 (NA).
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t i c a l  p rep a ra tio n . A pparently  c a lc u la t in g  on th e  b a s is  o f  f iv e  schoon­
e rs ,  Armstrong and Jones had concluded th a t  shipping  was in s u f f ic ie n t .  
But any o f s e v e ra l  com binations o f schooners, bateaux, sm all b o a ts , 
perhaps a b r ig ,  p lus a  few m iscellaneous sm all c r a f t  a t  B uffalo  and 
E rie  needing r e p a ir s ,  would have p erm itted  a la rg e ,  sa fe  landing  a t  
Long P o in t, A rm strong 's es tim a te  o f  th e  number o f  horses and wagons 
needed to  support th e  d iv is io n  on shore had been a  g ross m isca lcu la ­
t io n ,  Only a  r e l a t i v e ly  few, which probably  could have been procured 
in  Upper Canada, were re q u ire d ,^  At th e  scene. Brown and S co tt had 
known vrtoat was needed, but had lacked th e  a u th o r i ty  to  commandeer 
th e  v e s se ls  and b o a ts , " I  do n o t know th e  man," Brown lam ented, "who 
has , , , th e  command o f  our m il i ta ry  and naval means as now s itu a te d ," ^  
On June 21, when Brown rece iv ed  A rm strong 's l e t t e r  confirm ing 
h is  own in te n t io n s ,  p rep a ra tio n s  were alm ost complete to  begin  th e  
campaign. The major de lay  was in  procuring  enough boats t o  cro ss  th e  
N iagara, Although Drummond had captured  and destroyed  s u b s ta n t ia l  
q u a n ti t ie s  o f  food and m il i ta ry  s to re s  during  h is  ra id  in  December, 
su b sis ten ce  f o r  th e  L e ft D iv isio n  was adequate . By th e  end o f Janu-
■^Armstrong seemed to  th in k  th a t  Brown should tak e  a  f u l l  
m onth 's su p p lie s  w ith him, as  a  s e lf -c o n ta in e d  fo rc e , to  B u rlin g to n . 
The t r a i n  would have to  have been enormous—perhaps 1,600 horses o r  
270 wagons. But th e  l in e  o f  supply would have been s u f f ic ie n t ly  
secure  from Turkey Po in t to  B urling ton  to  perm it continuous supply 
from th e  r e a r .  The a u th o r 's  c a lc u la t io n s  a re  t h a t  a maximum o f 
about 10 wagons and 20 h o rses , making 4 t r i p s  p e r month, would have 
been req u ired  to  supply 5,000 men. The Long P o in t reg io n , m oreover, 
produced goodly q u a n ti t ie s  o f c a t t l e ,  f lo u r ,  and whiskey, Prévost 
t o  Drummond, Feb 28, C 1222, RG 8 (PAC)j Drummond to  P rév o st, Mar 5, 
C 682, RG 8 (PAC). Brown could have ex p lo ited  t h i s  source lA ile  
denying i t  to  th e  Right D iv isio n ,
Sro Armstrong, Je  15, Reg, L tr s ,  Reed,, RG 107 (NA),
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a ry  the  new Q uarterm aster G eneral, ilobert Swartwout, had been ab le  
to  make la rg e  new d e p o s its  o f  bread and meat in  and about B uffalo  from 
sources provided by th e  c o n tra c to r ,  E lb e rt Anderson. During A p ril  
and May S c o tt  had worked d i l i g e n t ly  t o  have th e  f lo u r  baked in to  hard 
b read  in  rea d in e ss  fo r  th e  campaign, IVhen W illiam  Cheever rep laced  
Anderson in  June, th e  r e s u l t in g  acrimony over balancing  accounts had 
no n o tic e a b le  e f f e c t  on th e  continued  supply o f  p ro v is io n s . Cheever 
d id  f in d , however, t h a t  by J u ly  th e  L e ft D iv isio n  was sh o rt o f  soap, 
can d le s , and o th er p a r ts  o f  th e  r a t io n ,  which he d id  n o t s p e c ify . 
N ev e rth e less , th e  d e f ic ie n c ie s  were n o t so s e rio u s  as to  d issuade 
Brown from launching  the  in v asio n  as  soon as  th e  b o a ts  were read y .
The r e l a t i v e  abundance o f food su p p lie s  was i n  larg e  measure due to  
th e  fa c t  t h a t  c e n tr a l  and w estern  New York were among th e  most produc­
t iv e  a reas  on the  no rth e rn  f r o n t ie r ,  even w hile  o th er a reas  n ea r
P la ttsb u rg  were d ry in g  up.
Forage fo r th e  anim als was extrem ely scarce  on the  Niagara 
f r o n t ie r ,  a s  i t  had been fo r  over a y e a r .  But Brown seems to  have 
encountered l i t t l e  d i f f i c u l ty  in  tra n s p o r t in g  su p p lie s  to  B uffalo  
from the  depots a t  B a tav ia , Canandaigua, and W illiams v i l l e ,  and on
Eighteen  M ile Creek, th e  Genesee R iv e r, and th e  Ridge Road. N everthe­
l e s s ,  t ra n s p o r ta tio n  was th e  crux o f  a l l  o f Brown's o th e r  supply d i f f i ­
c u l t i e s .  Most o f  th e  men in  th e  L eft D iv ision  were wearing worn and 
t a t t e r e d  uniform s, and some had to  s e t t l e  fo r  gray m i l i t i a  co a ts  
in s te a d  o f th e  re g u la r  army b lu e . In  January th e  Commissary D epart­
ment in  P h ila d e lp h ia  had prepared  10,000 uniform s fo r  th e  Niagara 
f ro n t ,  but a  p au c ity  o f  funds in  th e  Q uarterm aster Department delayed  
t r a n s p o r ta t io n .  The acu te  shortage o f  shoes seems to  have been due
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
190
t o  poor sc h ed u lin g . By June th e  heavy cannon which S co tt had g a thered  
in  Albany had been tra n sp o rte d  as f a r  as Oswego. There th ey  would 
have to  s ta y ,  however, u n t i l  Chauncey could b rin g  them up by w ater, ̂  
Overland c a rr ia g e  was to o  d i f f i c u l t  and expensive.^
Brown possessed  one g rea t advantage over prev ious American 
g e n e ra ls : the  L e ft D iv isio n  was i n  a r e l a t i v e ly  high  s ta te  o f  h e a lth
and t a c t i c a l  p re p a ra tio n . The c r e d i t  belonged to  W infield  S c o tt,
Brown had l e f t  th e  f ro n t ie r  in  A p r i l  with th e  only  th re e  o f f ic e r s  o f  
th e  In sp e c to r G e n e ra l's  Department a ssigned  to  th e  L e ft D iv is io n , He 
f e l t  th a t  r e c r u i t s  a t  S acke ts Harbor were more in  need o f m ustering , 
in sp e c tio n , and b a s ic  t r a in in g  th an  th e  v e te ran s  th e n  a t  B u ffa lo , 
S c o tt,  however, had not been of th e  same o p in ion  and had i n i t i a t e d  a 
r ig o ro u s program o f  parade-ground d r i l l .  Most l in e  o f f ic e r s  were un-
Brown to  Arm strong, Je 22, Cheever to  Armstrong, My 23,24,
J y  6, and Aug 17, and S c o tt to  Armstrong, %  17, i b id , ; Armstrong to  
C allen d er I rv in e , Jan 18, M ilita ry  Book, RG 107 (NA)j McKee, "Serv ice 
o f  Supply" (4 th  P ap e r) , 25 , 30, 31J C harles W, E l l i o t t ,  W infield  
S c o tt:  The S o ld ie r  and th e  Man (New York, 1937), 162. On th e  connec­
t io n  between po o rly  made garm ents and low wages to  workers i n  the  
p u ttin g -o u t  system with c o n tra c to r  middlemen, see I rv in e  to  E u s tis ,
24 Nov 1812, Unreg. L trs .  Heed,, HG 107 (NA), By 1814 th e  Commissary 
G e n e ra l's  Department had ceased working through c o n tra c to rs  and began 
d i s t r ib u t in g  c lo th  d i r e c t l y  to  th e  w orkers. The r e s u l t  was an im­
provement in  c lo th in g  and, a s  I rv in e  sa id , " th e  poor o f  t h i s  c i t y  
have been g re a t ly  re l ie v e d  by the  c lo th in g  es tab lish m en t h e re ."  To 
W illiam  James, Nov 22, L e t te r s  S en t, Commissary G eneral o f  Purchases, 
Records o f  th e  O ffic e  o f  th e  Commissary G eneral o f P urchases, HG 92
(NA). But in  November Brown complained th a t  " f iv e  men have perish ed
by d ise a se , to  one who has f a l l e n  by th e  sword," m ain ly  because of 
th e  "infamous" q u a li ty  o f  c lo th in g  and shoes, and because th e  w in ter 
c lo th in g  always a rr iv e d  in  m idw inter in s te a d  o f in  O ctober. To Mon­
ro e ,  Nov 29 , Reg, L trs ,  R eed ,, RG 107 (NA).
^ In  1814 th e  co st o f  t ra n s p o rt in g  cannon from New York C ity  
to  Sackets Harbor on wagons was $400 per cannon, nmre than  th e  cost 
o f  b r in g in g  th e  same guns from L iv erp o o l. McKee, "S erv ice  o f  Supply" 
(4 th  P ap er), 31,
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w il lin g  to  perform  t h i s  duty,'^
S co tt could  im press men on th e  parade ground. S ix  f e e t ,  f iv e  
inches t a l l ,  weighing over 230 pounds, w ith  an e re c t  b earin g  and a 
head o f  h a ir  r i s i n g  s t i f f l y  from h is  fo reh ead , he looked th e  p a r t  of 
an o u tstan d in g  m il i t a ry  commander, A n a tiv e  o f  V irg in ia ,  he had begun 
a  c a re e r  in  law , but jo in e d  th e  army in  1808 follow ing th e  Chesapeake 
in c id e n t.  He served  a t  New O rleans b e fo re  th e  war, fought a t  Queenston 
H eights in  1812, and planned and le d , w ith  C aptain P e rry , th e  h ig h ly  
s u c ce ss fu l amphibious a s s a u l t  on F ort George in  1813. His m il i t a ry  
rep u ta tio n  l ik e  th o se  o f  most o f  th e  o f f ic e r s  o f  th e  L eft D iv isio n , 
emerged unscathed  from h is  p a r t i c ip a t io n  in  W ilk inson 's  f a l l  cam­
paign , On 9 March 1814, th re e  months b e fo re  h i s  tw en ty -e ig h th  b i r t h ­
day, he was promoted to  th e  rank  o f  b r ig a d ie r  g e n e ra l,
S co tt r a r e ly  e x h ib ited  concern fo r  th e  p e rso n a l problems o f 
th e  common s o ld ie r  and d o u b tle ss  appeared to  them somewhat o f  a mar­
t i n e t ,  But he was ab le  to  b r in g  fo r th  th e  b e s t  f ig h t in g  e f f o r ts  o f 
h is  o f f ic e r s  and men, S c o tt o c c a s io n a lly  h ig h lig h ted  t h i s  ach ieve­
ment by  issu in g  bom bastic c a l l s  to  g lo ry  in  th e  h ea t o f  b a t t l e  in  
apparen t a tte n d its to  make h is  men fo rg e t th e  r e a l i t y  o f  l i f e  and 
dea th— o r as th e  r e s u l t  o f  h is  own i r r e s i s t i b l e  urge to  rom antic ize  
war. At a  c ru c ia l  moment du ring  th e  b a t t l e  o f  Queenston H eigh ts, fo r  
example, he was quoted a s  c ry ing  to  h is  men: " H u ll 's  su rren d e r i s  to  
be redeemed. Let u s , th e n ,  d ie  arms in  hand. The co u n try  demands 
s a c r i f i c e .  The example w i l l  no t be l o s t .  The blood o f  th e  s la in  w i l l
"^Brown t o  Armstrong, My 8 , Reg, L tr s ,  R eed,, RG 10? (NA),
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
192
make heroes o f  th e  l iv in g ," ^  D esp ite  a  y o u th fu l cock iness th a t  he 
ex h ib ited  throughout th e  war, S c o tt was t o  show in  1814 s ig n s  o f  h is  
fu tu re  b r i l l i a n c e  as a f ie ld  commander in  Mexico, He was, above a l l ,  
a  s te m  d is c ip l in a r ia n  and an a b le  a d m in is tra t iv e  s o ld ie r ,  and one 
who c o n s ta n tly  s tu d ied  fo re ig n  m il i t a ry  l i t e r a t u r e .  The infamous 
Terre aux Boeufs in c id e n t  a t  New Orleans in  1809-1810, vdaen n e a rly  
1,000 men out o f  2,000 d ied  in  camp, had im pressed S co tt w ith th e  im­
portance o f d i s c ip l in e ,  e f f ic ie n c y ,  and adequate supp ly ,^  Without h is  
e f f o r ts  a t  B uffalo  i t  i s  d o u b tfu l th a t  th e  Left D iv isio n  would have 
achieved what i t  d id .
The War Department had d isca rd ed  Duane's in fa n try  manual in  
February 1814, b u t had n eg lec ted  to  rep la c e  i t  w ith  an o th e r au th o rized  
t e x t .  Always r e s o u rc e fu l ,  S co tt based h i s  t r a in in g  program a t  B uffalo  
upon th e  "French system ," He had with him one French and one E ng lish
Quoted in  L ossing , P i c to r ia l  F ield-B ook. 402,
^On S c o t t ,  see: W illiam s, "The Macs and th e  Ik e s ,"  American
Mercury. LXXV (Oct 1952), 32-39J E l l i o t t ,  W infield  S c o tt ; and Edward 
D. M ansfield , L ife  and S erv ices o f  G eneral VJinfield S c o tt (New York, 
1852),
^ % c o tt.  Memoirs. I ,  119-20, o n ly  r e fe r re d  to  th e  "French 
system ," See a ls o  Brown to  Monroe, Nov 29, Reg, L trs .  R eed ., RG 10? 
(NA). No doubt S co tt meant th e  Ordinance o f 1791» The a u th o r has 
found t h a t  S c o t t 's  own In fa n try  T a c tic s ,  o r  Rules fo r  th e  E xercise  
and ^ n e u v e rs  o f  th e  U.S^. In fa n try . 3 v o ls ,  (new e d ..  New York.
1859), f i r s t  pub lished  i n  1835, vas  a p lag ia rism  o f  th e  Ordinance, 
Based on h is  War o f 1812 ex perience, he added a se c t io n  on sk ir ­
m ish ers , W eigley, H is to ry  o f th e  U.S. Army. 129, claim s th a t  S c o tt 
used D uane's manual. S c o t t 's  experiences  in  th e  Niagara campaign 
had a profound in p ac t on h is  subsequent t a c t i c a l  th in k in g . See h i s  
"Systems o f M a rt ia l  Law, and F ie ld  S e rv ic e , and P o lic e ,"  26 Dec 
1820, American S ta te  P apers: M ilita ry  A f f a ir s . I I ,  231-32,
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in s t ru c te d  h is  o f f ic e r s  in  th e  "schools" o f  th e  s o ld ie r  and company— 
th e  s o ld i e r 's  s ta n c e , h is  s te p s  and movements fo r  marching, th e  manual 
o f  arms, methods o f  f ir in g  and t a r g e t  p r a c t ic e ,  how to  change from 
th e  l in e  t o  column and column to  l i n e ,  and how to  wheel to  th e  r ig h t  
o r  l e f t .  He th en  superv ised  the  o f f ic e r s  a s  they  d r i l l e d  t h e i r  own 
squads and companies. The t ra in in g  p rogressed  in  t h i s  manner u n t i l ,  
f o r  th e  f i r s t  tim e in  th e  war, u n i ts  o f  b a tta l io n  s iz e  to g e th e r  moved 
through th e  so -c a l le d  ev o lu tio n s  o f  th e  l i n e ,  " to  th e  g rea t d e lig h t  
o f  the  tro o p s  them selves, who now began to  pe rce iv e  why th e y  had been 
made to  fag  so long  a t . .  . d r i l l .
L ike the  French, S c o tt emphasized th re e -d e e p  l in e  f o r  f i r e  
d e liv e ry  and the  column f o r  maneuver.^^ But S c o t t 's  ad hoc t a c t i c a l  
d o c tr in e  was d e f ic ie n t  in  one im portan t r e s p e c t;  la c k  o f ençjhasis on 
sk irm ish in g . The Ordinance o f 1791 provided no in s t ru c t io n s  fo r  th e  
purpose, and n e ith e r  Sco tt nor Brown f u l ly  ap p re c ia te d  the  value o f 
l a r g e ,  independent, and w e l l- t ra in e d  sk irm ishing  u n i t s .  The l ig h t  
companies fought w ith  the  l in e  companies o f  t h e i r  own regim ents; 
th e  v o lu n te e r -m il it ia  were no t com pletely s a t i s f a c to r y  as s k i l le d  
sk irm ish e rs  and were used haphazard ly  anyway; and th e  only u n i t ,  a 
company o f  r if le m e n , th a t  might have served th e  purpose was s t i l l  a t  
S ackets Harbor.
S c o t t 's  d a i l y  ten -h o u r t r a in in g  schedule was s tren u o u s, and 
he t r i e d  to  m ain tain  i t  even a f t e r  th e  campaign began. By mid-May 
he had been able  t o  boast t h a t  h is  charges were "a lread y  broken in to
 ̂^S co tt, Memoirs. I ,  120-21.
^^M ansfield, L ife and S erv ices  o f S c o tt.  101.
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th e  h a b its  o f  su b o rd in a tio n , a re  becoming ex p ert in  t h e i r  t a c t i c a l  
e x e rc ise s , and w i l l  i n  ano ther month • • . possess th e  firm ness and 
cohesion o f v e t e r a n s , T h e  pub lic  execu tion  o f  fou r d e s e r te r s  
b esid e  t h e i r  prepared  c o ff in s  and graves on June k» which th e  tro o p s  
were fo rced  to  w itn ess , undoubtedly helped  improve d is c ip l in e ,  S co tt 
had decided to  spare  a  f i f t h  d e s e r te r  because o f  h is  youth , and th e  
p ieces  aimed a t  him were loaded with b lank  c a r t r id g e s ,  "Finding him­
s e l f  untouched, [ th e  tee n a g e r]  sprang up, to re  o f f  h is  bandages and 
p in io n s , s ta re d  w ild ly  about him, and fa in te d  dead away," Those o f 
the  commissioned o f f ic e r s  who d id  not meet S c o t t ’s rig o ro u s s tandards 
were put under a r r e s t .  At th e  end o f  June n ine  o f them were in  th e  
guardhouse,
As rein fo rcem en ts  a r r iv e d  S co tt broke them in to  th e  ro u tin e . 
Most o f  th e  tro o p s  t h a t  Sco tt t r a in e d ,  however, were a lre a d y  v e te ran s  
—men vdio had seen f ig h tin g  from one end of th e  f r o n t ie r  to  th e  o th er 
but req u ired  more p o lis h  and p re c is io n  in  t h e i r  t a c t i c a l  maneuvers. 
B rig ad ie r  G eneral E leaza r R ip ley , lAo rep o rted  a t  camp in  l a t e  May, 
had tra in e d  th e  21st Regiment when he le d  i t  a s  a c o lo n e l. Few o f 
the  v o lu n te e rs  d i r e c t l y  b e n e f i te d . The m a jo rity  o f  r e c r u i t s  fo r  
a l l  reg im en ts , in clu d in g  th o se  in  S c o t t 's  F i r s t  B rigade, a r r iv e d  a t  
B uffalo  in  June and were not e::qDosed to  th e  f u l l  regim en. In  g e n e ra l, 
however, th e  r e c r u i t s  who jo in e d  th e  regim ents b e n e fite d  from th e  
experience, s k i l l ,  and d i s c ip l in e  o f th e  o ld er s o ld ie rs ,  and th e  
o th e r  two b rig ad es  b e n e fite d  from th e  example o f  S c o t t 's  b rig a d e .
^^To Armstrong, My 17, Reg, L t r s ,  R eed,, RG 107 (NA), 
^ E l l i o t t ,  W infield  S c o t t . 149-50,
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AU b e n e fite d  in  th e  sense t h a t  they  had become b e t te r  f ig h te r s .
But as  such, th ey  were l e s s  l ik e l y  to  b reak  ran k s, run, o r  take cover 
a f t e r  a B r i t i s h  v o lle y , and more o f them would d ie  by s tanding  f a s t  
and re tu rn in g  sho t fo r  sh o t. In  such s i tu a t io n s  e ig h te e n th -c en tu ry  
form ations were not noted  fo r  t h e i r  a b i l i t y  to  save l iv e s ,  S c o t t 's  
b rig ad e , vdiich was th e  b e t te r  o f  th e  th r e e ,  would see most of th e  
f ig h t in g  and would lo se  most o f  th e  men.^^ i
Everyone d i r e c t l y  b e n e fite d  from S c o t t 's  e f f ic ie n c y  in  
a n o th er way—a w e ll-ru n  camp. The tro o p s  were f a i r l y  h e a lth y  d e s p ite  
th e  r e f u s a l  o f  many to  e a t  t h e i r  r a t io n s ,  the  inclem ent w eather, and 
th e  unfavorab le  t e r r a i n .  In  A p r i l  and 1‘Iay th e  winds o f f  Lake E r ie  
had blown co ld , and in  June th e  warm w eather n ig h tly  produced a  th ic k  
fog , which ro se  a t  sunset from th e  surrounding fo re s t  and marsh on ly  
to  d isap p ear a f t e r  su n r is e . But the  s o ld i e r 's  u b iq u ito u s  enemies, 
d ia r rh e a , ty p h u s, and rheum atism, made r e l a t i v e ly  few appearances, 
and o n ly  two dea th s  were re p o r ted . H o sp ita l Surgeon Joseph L ovell 
a t t r ib u te d  th e  g en e ra l h e a lth  to  e x e rc ise , c o n s tan t a c t i v i t y ,  s t r i c t
^At f i r s t ,  i , e ,  by mid-May, S c o tt  had 1,600 infantrym en 
p resen t from th e  9 th , 1 1 th , 2 1 s t,  and 25 th  Regiments. The 600 r e ­
c ru i t s  o f  th e  9 th  and 25 th , which had been d iv e r te d  to  Sackets 
Harbor, were s t i l l  th e re  by May 17 and may o r may not hiave been 
ordered to  B uffalo  by Ju ly  3> when th e  campaign began. The 300 
r e c r u i t s  o f th e  23rd, and the  23rd Regiment i t s e l f ,  were not o rdered  
to  B uffalo  u n t i l  June 12, Cam pbell's detachm ents o f th e  1?th and 
19th  and F en to n 's  Pennsylvania v o lu n te e rs  d id n o t a l l  a r r iv e  u n t i l  
June, Most o f  th e  o th e r  Pennsylvania and New York v o lu n tee rs  were 
not f u l l y  assem bled, and would n o t be u n t i l  a f t e r  Ju ly  3 . VJhen d id  
th e  22nd a r r iv e ?  S co tt to  Armstrong, My 17, and Brown t o  Armstrong, 
Je 12, Reg. L t r s ,  R eed., RG 107 (NA); and see su p ra , fn . 2 . W eigley, 
H is to ry  o f  th e  U.S. Army. 129, says t h a t  S c o t t 's  t r a in e e s  were n o t 
r e a l ly  re g u la rs ,  s ince th ey  had been in  se rv ice  fo r  only  a  short 
tim e. Perhaps, but th ey  had seen  f ig h t in g  and were sub jec ted  to  
g re a te r  d is c ip l in e  th an  v o lu n te e rs .
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d is c ip l in e ,  and r ig id  p o l ic e .  Even vihen a number o f  r e c r u i t s —whom. 
L ovell d escrib ed  a s  "the m iserable  re fu se  o f  s o c ie ty  who never had 
th e  energy to  dem onstrate t h a t  th e y  l iv e d " —arriv ed  in  June, th e  
e ff ic ie n c y  of camp p o lice  checked th e  d ise a se s  th ey  might have brought 
i n  t h e i r  wake. P r iv a te  A lexander îfcl^ullen o f  the  Pennsylvania  volun­
te e r s  su c c in c tly  d escrib ed  th e  s i tu a t io n  a t  camp: "Constant e x e rc ise ,
wholesome p ro v is io n s , and s t r i c t  d is c ip l in e  soon made our regim ent 
have an o th e r ap pearance."^^  There were, n e v e r th e le s s ,  a la rg e  number 
o f  o f f ic e r s  and men on th e  s ick  l i s t  a t  th e  end of June—433 out o f 
a  t o t a l  o f  3j 508 p rese n t. The r a t i o  o f th o se  u n f it  f o r  du ty  to  
th o se  f i t  fo r  d u ty  approximated Brown's ru le  of thumb th a t  one- 
n in th  o f  any m il i t a ry  fo rc e  would always be " s ic k ."  Most o f  th e  
c ases , however, were not a s  se rio u s  as th o se  in  p a s t campaigns. The 
s ic k  were probably s u ffe r in g  from l ig h t  c a ses  o f typho id  o r  p a ra ­
typho id , c o n tra c te d  from drin k in g  impure w a te r,
At peak s tre n g th  e a r ly  in  J u ly  the  L eft D iv isio n  comprised 
two re g u la r  in fa n t ry  b rig a d e s , one a r t i l l e r y  b a t ta l io n ,  and one 
v o lu n te e r-m il it ia  b rigade—a l l  u n d e rs tre n g th , S co tt commanded the  
F i r s t  B rigade, A ip ley  led  th e  Second, and I-Iajor Jacob Hindmn com­
manded th e  four a r t i l l e r y  companies o f  the  r e c e n tly  co n so lid a ted  
Corps o f  A r t i l l e r y ,  B rig ad ie r  G eneral P e te r  B. P o r te r ,  fo rm erly  a 
war hawk Congressman, commanded th e  Third B rigade o f  Pennsylvania
^% eport o f  L ovell, Documentary H is to ry  (ed , C ruikshank),
I I ,  452; N arrativ e  o f  McMullen, i b id . « 372.
^'^Pbrning keport o f  th e  D iv isio n , J e  23, in  Louis L, Babcock, 
The War o f  1812 on the  Niagara F ro n tie r  (B u ffa lo , 1927), 1495 Brown 
t o  Armstrong, Apr 17, Unreg, L trs ,  Reed., RG 107 (NA); E l l i o t t ,  
W infield S c o tt . 147-48.
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and New York v o lu n te e rs ,  p lu s  about 300 In d ian s  led  by th e  Seneca 
c h ie f .  Red Ja c k e t .  B esides having e x c e lle n t g e n e ra l o f f i c e r s .  Brown 
enjoyed th e  se rv ic es  o f  prom ising young ju n io r  o f f i c e r s ,  p a r t i c u la r ly  
t ia jo r  Thomas Jesup, Major Henry Leavenworth, and C aptain  Nathan Towson. 
The L eft D iv isio n  was th e  b e s t  t ra in e d  and le d  fo rce  th e  United S ta te s  
put i n  th e  f i e l d  du rin g  th e  e n t i r e  w ar, and i t s  c a p ac ity  fo r  f ig h tin g  
was q u ite  unknown to  th e  B r i t i s h .
On A p r il  17, when he had proposed th e  now defu n c t Lake E rie  
p lan  o f  campaign. Brown estim ated  th a t  he would need 4*500 re g u la rs  
to  ta k e  th e  p e n in su la . The aggrega te  o f  r e g u la r  and v o lu n te e r o f f i ­
c e rs  and tro o p s  in  th e  a rea on Ju ly  1 was 4 ,800 . Only th e  Pennsylvania 
v o lu n tee rs  were a t  B uffalo ; th e  New Yorkers were a t  t h e i r  rendezvous 
p o in ts  aw aitin g  the  a r r i v a l  o f  equipment. Inclu d in g  th e  s ick  and 
absen t Brown had on ly  4,000 re g u la rs .  He had l e f t  2 ,000 re g u la rs  a t  
S ackets Harbor, and depending on how many a re  counted a s  e f f e c t iv e s ,  
the  lo s s  to  th e  Left D iv ision  was 500 to  1,000 men. From th e  west 
Campbell had brought only  250 men of th e  17th and 19th Regiments. 
R ec ru its  and replacem ents from th e  e a s t  and w est would con tinue to  
t r i c k l e  in to  Brown's d iv is io n ,  but th e y  would on ly  enable  him to  
rep la c e  some o f  those  l o s t  in  b a t t l e .  The e f f e c tiv e  s tre n g th  o f  th e  
L eft D iv ision  would never exceed 3,000 to  4,000 men, in clu d in g  volun­
t e e r s  and a r t i l l e r i s t s .^ ®
By th e  end o f  June th e  Right D iv isio n  o f  B r i t i s h  and Canadian 
re g u la rs  and p ro v in c ia l  m i l i t i a  to ta le d  approxim ately 4 ,800 . Although
"Western Regim ents," see Armstrong to  S c o tt,  My 25, M ilita ry  Book, 
RG 107 (NA).
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num erica lly  equal to  th e  L eft D iv is io n , R ia l l  labored  under one 
g re a t d isadvan tage : h is  fo rc e s  were d isp e rsed  a t  s tr a te g ic  p o in ts
over th e  e n t i r e  f r o n t ie r .  Even a f t e r  Brown launched th e  in v asio n  
and rev e a led  h is  land in g  zone, many o f  R i a l l ' s  tro o p s (n o ta b ly  th e  
f o r t r e s s  g a rr iso n s )  would have to  rem ain a t  t h e i r  p o s it io n s .  Drum­
mond had been feeding  rein fo rcem ents t o  R ia l l  s ince  A p r i l ,  b u t u n t i l  
enough o f W e llin g to n 's  v e te ran s  moved in land  to  p ro te c t  M ontreal and 
th e  l in e  o f  th e  S t ,  Lawrence, he would be unable  to  augment th e  Right 
D iv isio n  v ery  s u b s ta n t ia l ly .  I f  Chauncey s a i le d  when Drummond ex­
p ected  he would—in  th e  f i r s t  week o f  Ju ly —th e  rein fo rcem ents would 
have to  walk to  th e  f r o n t ie r .  In  e i t h e r  c a se , th e r e fo r e ,  i t  was 
R i a l l 's  ta s k  to  s t a l l  Brown u n t i l  h e lp  a rr iv e d  or a ttem pt to  d e fe a t 
him i n  b a t t l e ,  w ith emphasis on th e  l a t t e r .  In  a March d isp a tc h  cover­
ing v a rio u s  d e fen siv e  d is p o s i tio n s  to  be assumed a g a in s t  an American 
in v asio n  from any one o f  s e v e ra l  p o ss ib le  p o in ts ,  Drummond had in ­
s tru c te d  R ia l l  " to  oppose any descent made from  above Chippawa," He 
had assu red  him th a t  a rap id  c o n cen tra tio n  o f  h is  fo rc e s  would enable 
him to  e f f e c t ,  "by one a c tio n , th e  d e fe a t ,  c a p tu re , o r  d e s tru c tio n  o f 
a c o n s id e rab le  p a rt  o f  th e  enemy's d isp o sab le  fo rce ,
Drummond's s tr a te g y  played in to  American hands. Brown's only 
hope o f  accom plishing h is  m ission  was to  d e fe a t B r i t i s h  fo rces  on th e  
ground, u n le s s ,  o f  c o u rse , Chauncey gained m astery  o f th e  la k e . Brown
^^These a re  rounded numbers. Return o f  the  R ight D iv is io n , 
Je 22, Documentary H is to ry  (e d , C ruikshank), I ,  28-30, Drummond to  
P rév o st, Mar 5 and 11, C 682, RG 8 (PAC)j to  P rév o st, Mÿ 21 and Je 
16, C 683, RG 8 (PAC); to  P rév o st, Jy  9 , C 684, RG 8 (PAC). B r i t i s h  
r e g u la rs  from Europe and th e  co lo n ies  began a rr iv in g  a t  H a lifax  and 
M ontreal in  June, F o rtescu e , H is to ry  o f  th e  B r i t i s h  Army. X, 105,
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was a c u te ly  aware o f  th e  n e c e ss i ty ;  "The co n ten ts  o f th e  B r i t i s h  
p o s ts  a re  o f  much g re a te r  im portance i n  t h i s  c o n te s t th a n  th e  p o s ts  
them selves. I f  we , , .  ren d er u se le s s  to  th e  Enemy th e  fo rce  he 
has i n  th e  P en in su la , we may hope to  reach  Kingston in  th e  course o f  
the  C a m p a i g n . B r o w n  was w e ll- s u ite d  to  command the  in v as io n . More 
than  most American g e n e ra ls , except perhaps S c o t t ,  he was eager t o  en­
gage th e  enemy. As one h is to r ia n  s a id , "vrtierever Brown went f ig h t in g  
follow ed.
But th e  odds a g a in s t a  com plete ly  su c ce ss fu l in v as io n  were 
g re a t .  By invading  b e fo re  Chauncey appeared , th e  element o f  s u rp r ise  
would be l o s t .  Brown's l in e  o f  communication to  th e  Genesee would be 
endangered, and i f  Chauncey were delayed , R ia ll  m ight re c e iv e  p l e n t i ­
fu l  re in fo rcem en t. Chauncey w rote Brown on June 25 and a ssu red  him 
th a t  he would be ready to  s a i l  on Ju ly  1 , but he a tta c h ed  so many 
q u a li f ic a t io n s  to  th e  prospect o f  rendezvous and expressed  so many 
f e a rs  about Sackets H arb o r's  d efenses t h a t  Brown a c tu a l ly  began to  
doubt Chauncey's a s s is ta n c e  would come,^^ He h e ld  conferences w ith  
h is  o f f i c e r s .  They reco n sid ered  th e  t h r e a t  F ort Niagara posed to  
communications and Whether th e y  should reduce i t .  Should th ey  gamble 
on Chauncey's prom ises? Ripley recommended f u r th e r  postponement o f  
th e  in v asio n  u n t i l  Chauncey a c tu a l ly  appeared . B esides, on ly  enough 
sunken and condemned b o a ts  had been re p a ire d  t h a t ,  even a long w ith  
the two schooners, few er than 1 ,000 men could c ro s s  the  r iv e r  a t  a
^% row n 's Documents (ed . C ruikshank), 40-41.
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t im e . But Brown re je c te d  th e  a ttem pt on Fort Niagara— i t  would e n ta i l  
too  g rea t a lo s s  o f t im e , and i f  Chauncey were v ic to r io u s ,  th e re  would 
have been no need f o r  i t . ^ ^  F a ith  su s ta in ed  th e  Quaker g en e ra l; " I  
do n o t d e sp a ir  of su ccess , and r e ly  on the  goodness o f  my cause, and 
th e  kindness o f  Providence which had never fo rsaken  m e ," ^  Now, how­
e v e r, Brown d efined  success i n  more modest te rm s: th e  "o ffen s iv e
a t t i tu d e "  he was about to  assume would a t  l e a s t  serve a s  a powerful 
d iv e rs io n  in  favor o f  I z a r d 's  o p e ra t io n s .
"We g o ,"  Brown em phatically  t o ld  Major Jesup on Ju ly  2 , and 
"noth ing  but th e  elem ents s h a l l  stop u s ."  Brown and Armstrong had 
decided to  launch th e  in v asio n  d e sp ite  l in g e r in g  s tr a te g ic  confusion , 
d i f f e r in g  views of th e  o b je c tiv e s  o f th e  campaign, and incom plete and 
in secu re  l o g i s t i c a l  p rep a ra tio n . The a ims o f  conquering t e r r i t o r y  
and d estro y in g  B r i t i s h  fo rc e s , and th e  naive b e l i e f  t h a t  they  might 
as w e ll begin  th e  campaign to  g e t th in g s  going , were im portan t fa c to rs  
in  t h e  d e c is io n . But th e  d r iv in g  m otives to  invade as  soon as p o ss ib le  
were p r id e , honor, and g lo ry . Brown was d isappo in ted  in  R ip ley , from 
whom "he had expected so much," because R ipley expressed re se rv a tio n s  
about the  most recen t plan  o f  campaign and was r e lu c ta n t  to  c ro s s  th e  
r iv e r .  But most o f th e  o th er o f f ic e r s  were e a g er, as Jesup  put i t ,
"to  remove th e  d isg race  vdiich former d e fe a ts  and d i s a s te r s  had a ttach ed  
to  o u r arm s." Brown had the  support o f  Scott and the o f f ic e r s  o f  th e  
F i r s t  B rigade, vdio, knowing t h a t  R ia ll  would f ig h t ,  were "anxious" to
^ T h e  Campaign on th e  N iagara, Thomas S . Jesup Papers, Box 
11 (M anuscript D iv is io n , L ib ra ry  of Congress); Brown to  Armstrong, 
Je 26 , Reg. L t r s .  R eed ., BG 107 (NA).
^ ^ u o te d  in  S tone , L ife  o f G eneral Jacob Brown, 89.
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tak e  th e  f i e ld  im m ediately. They made i t  "a po in t o f honor," Jesup 
r e c a l le d ,  " to  go in to  ac tio n  w ith  sashes and e p a u le t te s ,  and to  wear 
throughout th e  campaign every th ing  th e  country  a llow s us to  wear" to  
symbolize t h e i r  d e te rm in a tio n ,^ ^  The ju n io r  o f f ic e r s  and tro o p s  
chafed under th e  d u l l  ro u tin e  o f  camp l i f e  and d r i l l  and were eager 
to  rec e iv e  "o rd ers  to  bea t up th e  enemy's q u a r te rs ,
The L e ft D iv isio n  cro ssed  in to  Upper Canada du rin g  th e  foggy 
e a r ly  morning o f  Sunday, Ju ly  3» S c o tt took h is  b rig ad e  over f i r s t ;  
R ip le y 's  Second Brigade and th en  th e  a r t i l l e r y  companies follow ed.
In  th e  course o f  th e  day, th e  Americans in v es te d  Fort E r ie ,  Con­
s tru c te d  o f  sod and harboring  only  th re e  sm all c a lib e r  guns, th e  
B r i t i s h  work posed no se rio u s  o b s ta c le  to  th e  in v ad e rs . A fte r  ex­
changing a few p e rfu n c to ry  sh o ts  w ith American a r t i l l e r y ,  the  sm all 
g a rr iso n  su rrendered  a t  5:00
R ia ll  lea rn ed  o f th e  c ro ss in g  a t  8:00 A,M, Sunday morning.
He im m ediately led  f iv e  companies o f  th e  1 st o r  Royal Scots Regiment 
from F o rt George to  Chippawa, C onfident th a t  he could d efea t Brown 
in  th e  f ie ld  even i f  he were s l i g h t l y  outnumbered, he planned to  coun­
t e r a t ta c k  th a t  n ig h t.  But R ia l l  was unable to  a c t  e i t h e r  on Sunday o r 
Monday, fo r  th e  expected a r r i v a l  o f th e  8 th o r  K ing 's Regiment from 
York d id  not m ate ria lize ,^ ®
^% ay, "Defences o f  th e  Niagara F ro n tie r ,  1764-1870," (un­
pub lished  M aste r 's  t h e s i s .  Queen's U n iv e rs ity , 1938), 35-36; Brown 
to  Armstrong, Jy  6 and 7, Reg, L trs ,  Reed,, RG 107 (NA),
^ ^R ia ll  to  Drummond, Jy  6, C 684, RG 8 (PAC),
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Monday morning. Brown ordered  S c o tt to  th e  b rid g e . I f  p o s s ib le ,  
he was to  se ize  i t .  In  any event he was to  e s ta b l is h  a nearby  canç), 
S co tt marched under a warm Fourth o f J u ly  sun w ith  the F i r s t  B rigade, 
a  tro o p  o f  l ig h t  dragoons, and C aptain Towson's a r t i l l e r y  company.
Ten m ile s  no rth  o f  Fort E r ie  h is  vanguard encountered a  B r i t i s h  
scou ting  p a rty  o f  l ig h t  tro o p s  and dragoons, and fo llow ing a  b r ie f  
sk irm ish , the  B r i t i s h  withdrew ac ro ss  th e  Chippawa. S co tt pursued, 
but ba lked  a t  a ttem p tin g  to  fo rce  a  c r o s s i n g . T h e  r iv e r  was deep 
and 150 yards w ide, a tê te -d e -p o n t  b a tte ry  guarded the b r id g e , and 
about 1,000 tro o p s  manned entrenchments and b a t te r ie s  on th e  n o rth e rn  
s h o r e , A t  su n set th e  weary Americans re tra c e d  t h e i r  s te p s  fo r  a  
m ile , h a lt in g  sou th  of S t r e e t ’s Creek to  encamp f o r  the n ig h t .  Brown, 
R ip ley , th e  Second Brigade, the  r e s t  o f th e  a r t i l l e r y ,  and some wagons 
jo ined  S co tt a t  11:00 P.M.
The cam psite was not i d e a l .  The creek  was deep and miry a t  
i t s  mouth, but fo rdab le  se v e ra l hundred yards upstream . Dense woods, 
th re e -q u a r te r s  o f  a m ile from th e  N iagara shore, bordered th e  g ra s sy  
p la in  on both s id e s  o f th e  c reek . Through them B r i t i s h  sn ip e rs  and 
reco n n o ite rin g  p a r t i e s  could  approach th e  r e a r  o f  th e  camp un d etec ted . 
A ll du rin g  the  morning o f  Ju ly  5 a  sm all body o f Canadians and In d ia n s , 
posted i n  the  woods near th e  n o rth e rn  shore  of th e  creek , harassed  
American p ick e ts  and prevented  them  from tak in g  p o s it io n s  on the  l e f t
^^Brown's memoranda. Brown’s Documents (e d , Cruikshank), 
73-74; S c o tt to  Adj. G en., Jy 15, Reg. L t r s ,  R eed,, RG 107 (NA).
3^Plan o f  th e  N iagara F ro n tie r ,  enc , P révost to  B a th u rs t, 
Jy  12, C ,0 , 42/157, MG 11 (PAC)j Hitsman, In c re d ib le  War o f  1812. 
195.
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of th e  camp.^^
The K ing 's  Regiment f in a l ly  reached R ia l l  th a t  same Tuesday 
m orning. L ieu tenan t Colonel Thomas Pearson , a s k i l le d  le a d e r  o f  l ig h t  
tro o p s  and m i l i t i a  and one o f  th e  v ic to r s  a t  C ry s le r 's  Farm, reco n - 
n o ite re d  th e  American camp b e fo re  noon. His m i l i t i a  and In d ian s , 
some o f  whom climbed nearby t r e e s ,  re p o r te d  t h a t  Brown's army num­
b ered  le s s  th a n  2,000 men. Although an  underestim ate  by 1,000, R ia l l  
accepted  th e  f ig u re . He was unaware o f  th e  f a l l  o f  F ort E rie  and con­
c luded th a t  th e  main body o f Americans had not a s  yet jo in e d  S c o t t 's  
b r ig a d e . With 1,430 B r i t i s h  re g u la rs ,  300 Canadian m i l i t i a ,  300 
In d ia n s , Royal A r t i l l e r y  detachm ents, and some p ro v in c ia l  dragoons, 
R ia l l  decided to  a t t a c k .
At 4 :00  P.M. h i s  force moved a c ro ss  th e  Chippawa b rid g e . The 
100th, the  K in g 's , and th e  Royal Scots Regiments marched in  th re e  
columns up th e  r iv e r  ro ad . Ahead on th e  r ig h t ,  th e  In d ian s  f i l e d  
through the f o r e s t ,  follow ed on th e  edge o f th e  woods by Pearson w ith  
the  2nd L incoln M il i t i a  and th e  l ig h t  companies o f  each reg u la r  u n i t .^ ^
Meanwhile, Brown was becoming in c re a s in g ly  annoyed with th e  
s n ip e rs .  Vftien P o r te r  a rr iv ed  a t  camp in  th e  a fte rn o o n  w ith  300 
Pennsylvania v o lu n te e rs  and an equal number o f In d ia n s , Brown d ire c te d  
him t o  scour them from th e  woods. Out o f  s ig h t o n e -h a lf  m ile sou th  
of th e  camp. P o r te r  l in e d  up th e  Indians and about 150 v o lu n te e r-  
m i l i t i a .  They s i l e n t l y  en tered  th e  woods s h o r t ly  before 4:00  P.M.—
Brown to  Armstrong, Jy  7, Reg. L trs .  R eed ., RG 107 (NA).
^ ^ R ia ll  to  Drummond, J y  6, and Drummond to  P rév o st, Jy  10 
and 1 1 , 0  684, RG 8 (PAC)j C ruikshank, The B a ttle  o f  Lundy's Lane 
(W elland, O n ta rio , 1888), 13.
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about th e  same moment K ia ll  l e f t  Chippawa. The In d ian s , adept a t  
s ta lk in g  th e  f o r e s t ,  led  th e  way, followed by th e  v o lu n te e rs , Wio 
a lig n ed  in  s in g le  rank a t  wide i n te r v a l s .  F i f ty  re g u la rs  t r a i l e d  in  
re se rv e .
P o r te r 's  men q u ick ly  fo rced  th e  sn ip e rs  out o f t h e i r  p o s it io n s  
and , in  a  w ild m ile -lo n g  chase punctuated  by "savage y e l l s ,"  cap tu red  
o r  tomahawked a l l  but a few . Proceeding a  l i t t l e  f a r th e r ,  h is  In ­
d ian s  suddenly encountered an unexpected v o lle y  o f  m usketry, which 
s e n t them scu rry in g  back toward th e  v o lu n te e rs . They had c o ll id e d  
w ith  th e  L incoln M il i t i a ,  lead in g  R i a l l ' s columns. P o r te r  and h is  
o f f ic e r s  re s to re d  th e  d iso rg an ized  l in e ,  and th e  two s id e s  exchanged 
a  few v o lle y s . But a l in e  o f  red -co a ted  l ig h t  tro o p s  soon appeared 
on th e  scen e , rush ing  to  support th e  L incoln  M il i t i a ,  and P o r te r  
ordered  a  r e t r e a t .  I t  q u ick ly  developed in to  f l i g h t  as th e  B r i t i s h  
ac c e le ra te d  t h e i r  charge,
Brown was near th e  farmhouse o f Samuel S t r e e t ,  vdiich la y  a 
few hundred f e e t  n o rth  o f  th e  c reek . For t h i r t y  m inutes s in c e  P o r te r 's  
d e p a rtu re ,  he had l is te n e d  to  th e  r is in g  r a t t l e  o f  m usketiy . F in a lly  
looking  n o rth  over th e  p la in  as th e  r a t t l e  became re g u la r  v o lle y s , he 
sp o tted  th e  dust ra is e d  from th e  tram p o f R i a l l 's  t ro o p s . S ta r t le d  
by t h i s  tu rn  o f e v e n ts , he galloped  back to  camp to  p repare  the  
d iv is io n  fo r  b a t t l e ,^ ^
^^P o rte r  to  W. L, S tone, 26 My 1840, Documentary H is to ry  
(ed , C ruikshank), I I ,  363-65,
^^Brown to  Armstrong, Jy  7 , Reg, L t r s ,  R eed,, RG 10?
(NA); S tone, L ife  o f  G eneral Jacob Brown. 177.
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Brown found S c o tt near h i s  t e n t .  F o rtu n a te ly , th e  F irs t  
B rigade was read y  to  m arch. Having ju s t  awakened from an  a fte rn o o n  
nap, S c o tt  was i n  th e  p rocess o f  forming h is  regim ents f o r  d r i l l .
S co tt sub seq u en tly  c re a ted  a m inor myth >dien he wrote in  h is  Memoirs 
t h a t  he had ju s t  re tu rn ed  from a nearby f ie l d  a f t e r  e x e rc is in g  h i s  
men, vrtio had p rev io u s ly  ea ten  a  heavy lunch  in  b e la te d  c e le b ra t io n  o f 
Independence Day. A fte r  summarizing th e  s i t u a t io n .  Brown ordered him 
t o  move h is  b rig ad e  onto th e  p l a in .  S c o t t ,  who had as low  an op in io n  
o f  th e  B r i t i s h  a s  R ia l l  had o f th e  Americans, doubted he would " f in d  
300 o f  th e  enemy.
As th e  American camp came a liv e  and S co tt approached th e  creek  
b r id g e , R i a l l 's  re g u la rs  began to  deploy f o r  b a t t l e  about 700 y ards 
from th e  mouth o f  th e  c reek  in to  a  ty p ic a l  W ellingtonian  o rd e r . The 
Royal A rtille ry m e n  unlim bered two 24-pounders and one 5 .5  how itzer cn 
th e  ro ad , fac in g  th e  b r id g e . The Royal S co ts and th e  100th deployed 
on th e  meadow, w ith  th re e  6-pounders on th e  r ig h t  o f  th e  100th. The 
K ing 's hung in  re s e rv e . The m i l i t i a  and l ig h t  tro o p s  s t i l l  pursued 
P o r te r 's  command through th e  woods. Most o f  R i a l l 's  In d ian s  had 
taken  a  roundabout ro u te  from Chippawa and were o u t o f th e  a c tio n . 
R ia l l  a p p a re n tly  b e liev ed  th a t  P o r te r 's  detachm ent was one s im ila r  to  
P e a rso n 's—a sk irm ish in g  group lea d in g  th e  flank  o f  an a t t a c k .  Such 
i s  the  fog  o f w ar.^^
^^Cf, S c o t t ,  Memoirs. I ,  127-28, w ith  N arra tiv e  o f  Jesup, 
Documentary H is to ry  (ed. C ruikshank), I I ,  473-74, and Brown's 
memoranda. Brown's Documents (ed . C ruikshank), 74-75.
^ ^ R ia ll  t o  Drummond, Jy 6 , and Drummond to  P rév o st, Jy 10,
C 684, RG 8 (PAG) ; Capt. l-Iackonochie to  Ife j. Gen. Glascow, Aug 19, 
Documentary H is to ry  (ed . C ruikshank), I ,  49 . I t  may have been th e  
c ase , however, t h a t  R ia l l  was sim ply deploying to  a tta c k .  See 
W ilkinson, Memoirs. A tla s ,  P la te  11.
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The main B r i t i s h  b a t te ry  on th e  road opened on S c o t t 's  b rig ad e  
as i t  f i l e d  ac ro ss  th e  narrow b rid g e . Captain Towson, having crossed  
e a r l i e r  a t  Brown's command, was near th e  r iv e r  bank j u s t  no rth  o f  th e  
b r id g e  with two 6-pounders and one 5 .5  how itzer. He p a r t i a l l y  covered 
th e  exposed American in fa n try  by annoying th e  B r i t i s h  gun crew and 
in fa n try  l i n e  with h i s  f i r e .  D espite some lo s s e s ,  th e  F i r s t  Brigade 
advanced on th e  road p ast S t r e e t 's  farmhouse and deployed toward the  
l e f t  in  e x c e lle n t  o rd e r .  The 9 th  Regiment and a  detachment o f  th e  
22nd, both commanded by I4ajor Henry Leavenworth, l in e d  up near th e  
ro ad , fac in g  th e  Royal Scots on R i a l l 's  l e f t .  Colonel Campbell led  
th e  11th to  th e  l e f t  o f  the  9 th ,  but tak in g  h i s  p o s it io n  in  l in e  he 
was f a t a l l y  wounded, and Major John McNeil succeeded to  th e  command, 
Towson moved h is  p iec e s  forw ard on th e  road to  th e  r ig h t  o f Leaven­
w o rth 's  22nd.
According to  S c o tt,  # io  conversed w ith th e  B r i t i s h  commander 
a f t e r  the  w ar, R ia l l  exclaimed a t  t h i s  moment: "Nhy, th e se  a re
reg u la rs '."  P a r t o f S c o t t 's  b rig ad e  was wearing m i l i t i a  gray owing 
to  th e  shortage  o f b lu e  c lo th ,  and, i f  S c o t t 's  Memoirs can be t ru s te d ,  
R ia l l  a t  f i r s t  thought th a t  "noth ing  b u t a body o f B uffalo  m il i t ia "  
was deploying  to  face  h is  v e te ra n s , American aplomb under f i r e ,  which 
c o n tra s te d  so sh a rp ly  w ith prev ious American b eh av io r, had tak en  him 
by s u rp r is e .  The in c id e n t  was sweet revenge f o r  th e  Americans and
3 ?S co tt to  A dj. Gen., Jy  15, Reg. L tr s .  Reed., RG 10? 
(NA); N arra tiv e  o f Je su p , Documentary H is to ry  (ed . C ruikshank), 
I I ,  474.
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Both s id e s  completed t h e i r  b a t t l e  d isp o s i tio n s  a t  about the  
same tim e—th e  B r i t i s h  s l ig h t ly  in  th e  lea d —and R ia l l  im m ediately 
d ire c te d  th e  Royal Scots and th e  100th to  advance a g a in s t th e  American 
l in e ,  A space o f  perhaps le s s  th an  300 yards sep ara ted  th e  opposing 
fo rc e s—as S c o tt s a id , "a l i t t l e  beyond th e  e f f e c tiv e  range o f  m usketry." 
S co tt r e c a l le d  t h a t  a t  t h i s  moment he saw th e  o p p o rtu n ity  to  make 
amends fo r  th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  day befo re  (Ju ly  4)> h is  b rig ad e  had been 
unable to  "e n g ra ft i t s  name, by a d e c is iv e  v ic to ry ,"  He then  rode 
along th e  l in e  y e l l in g :  "Let us make a  new an n iv e rsa ry  fo r  o u rse lv e sI
E a r l i e r ,  Wien th e  e n ti r e  F i r s t  Brigade had c le a red  th e  b rid g e , 
S co tt o rdered  I'lajor Thomas J e su p 's  25th Regiment to  th e  extreme l e f t ,  
th e re  " to  be governed by c ircu m stan ces ,"  I t  was in  th e  re a r  o f  
M cN eil's 11th when Jesup n o ticed  th a t  " th e  enemy g r e a t ly  outnumbered 
us in  th e  f ie ld " —th e  advancing B r i t i s h  l in e  overlapped McNeil on h is  
l e f t ,  Jesup le d  th e  25th  in  column tow ard th e  woods a long a d i r t  
road p a r a l le l  to  th e  c re e k . At about th e  same moment. P o r te r 's  
routed  men raced  ac ro ss  th e  creek  headed fo r  camp, th re a te n in g  to  
e:jq30se th e  American l e f t  flan k  to  B r i t i s h  sk irm ish e rs . The Lincoln 
M il i t ia  and some In d ian s  took p o s it io n s  behind fences and f a l l e n  oak 
logs in  th e  woods on R i a l l 's  extreme r ig h t .  The l ig h t  tro o p s  formed 
on the  meadow in  f ro n t o f  th e  r ig h t  f la n k  o f th e  100th, Jesup regarded
^ "In 1815, in  commemoration o f  th e  B a ttle  o f  Chippewa, th e  
War Department ordered  th a t  th e  uniform  o f  th e  cad e ts  a t  th e  M ilita ry  
Academy be th e r e a f t e r  o f  th e  g ray  c lo th  worn by th e  1 st Brigade on 
Ju ly  5, 1814." E l l i o t t ,  W infield  S c o t t , 165, The standard  q u o tatio n  
o f  R i a l l 's  exclam ation i s :  "Those a re  r e g u la rs ,  by God!"
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th e  s i tu a t io n  as extrem ely dangerous.
As J e su p 's  25th moved in  column tow ard the  woods, th e  B r i t i s h  
l in e  approached McNeil and Leavenworth through the  t a l l  g ra s s .  S c o tt,  
l ik e  Jesup, observed th a t  th e  Royals and 100th outflanked  McNeil on 
h is  le f t ,^ ^  The reason  was n o t, a s  Jesup supposed, t h a t  " th e  enemy 
g r e a t ly  outnumbered u s ."  Counting a l l  re g u la rs  on th e  f i e ld ,  the 
s id e s  were about e q u a l. The B r i t i s h  t o t a l  was 1,430, and th e  Ameri­
can , 1 ,3 2 0 .^  The 970 men o f  the  9 th ,  22nd, and 1 1 th , however, faced  
h a rd ly  more th an  850 men o f th e  Royals and 100th, whose l ig h t  companies 
were d etached . But in  a two-deep l i n e ,  th ese  B r i t i s h  u n its  p resen ted  
a f ro n t  o f 425 men. Three-deep, th e  American l in e  was only 325 men 
vn.de. In  a d d it io n , th e  th re e  6-pounders on th e  r ig h t  o f th e  100th, 
th e  l ig h t  tro o p s  in  f ro n t ,  and the K ing 's in  rese rv e  made th e  B r i t i s h  
l in e  o f  b a t t l e  appear wider and h ea v ie r  than  i t  a c tu a l ly  was.
To co u n terp o ise  th e  B r i t i s h  advantage, S co tt d ire c te d  McNeil 
to  en large th e  in te r v a l  between h is  11th and Leavenworth's 9 th  and, 
in  th e  p ro ce ss , throw  h is  l e f t  wing forvmrd. McNeil p robably  accom­
p lish e d  th e  movement through a  l e f t  ob lique march—made famous by 
F red erick  th e  Great— and f in a l ly  a r ig h t  W ieel.^^ The maneuver weis
^ % a rra t iv e  o f  Jesup, Documentary H is to ry  (e d . Cruikshank),
I I ,  474.
. . . bes id es  th e  in v is ib le  fo rce  [ i . e .  th e  l ig h t  tro o p s] 
th a t  had ju s t  driven  P o r te r  and the m i l i t i a  ou t of th e  wood." S c o tt, 
Memoirs. I ,  130; S c o tt to  A dj. Gen., Jy  15, Reg. L t r s .  Reed., RG 107 (NA).
^^Dnammond's m arginal note i n  R ia ll  to  Drummond, Jy 6 , C 684,
RG 8 ( fag) ;  Adams, H is to ry  o f  th e  United S t a te s . V III, 35, 42.
^ % c o tt  to  A dj. Gen., Jy 15, Reg. L t r s .  Reed., RG 107 (NA).
The maneuver i s  described  in  Règlement. I ,  214-15, 305-307.
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e n t i r e ly  su c c e ss fu l.  The l e f t  o f th e  11th overlapped th e  r ig h t  o f  
th e  advancing 100th a t  a s l i g h t  angle a c ro ss  i t s  f ro n t . Facing th e  
Hoyal S co ts, Leavenworth's b a tta l io n s  were p a r a l le l  to  th e  a tta c k ,
"The b a tta l io n s  o f Leavenworth and McNeil thus formed," S co tt h a p p ily  
observed, "po in ted  t o  an obtuse  angle i n  the  c e n tre  o f th e  p la in ,  with 
a wide i n te r v a l  between them, t h a t  made up fo r  d e fic ie n c y  o f n u m b ers ."^  
Jesup a t  l a s t  completed h is swing to  th e  l e f t .  Crashing 
th rough  a fence  se p ara tin g  th e  meadow and th e  d i r t  road , th e  25th  
sped forward p as t M cNeil's 11th to  deploy  only seventy yard s  from the  
r ig h t  wing o f  th e  100th , but fac in g  th e  B r i t i s h  sk irm ish e rs  on th e  
lO O th 's r ig h t  and f r o n t , F o r  th e  second tim e since  th e  opening o f 
th e  engagement, f l i a l l  was su rp r ise d  a t  th e  ra p id  and o rd e r ly  move­
ments o f American u n i ts  under f i r e .  I n  h is  m a t te r -o f - fa c t  account of 
th e  b a t t l e ,  one sen tence stands out f o r  i t s  h in t  of astonishm ent;
"The Enemy moved a v e ry  heavy column tow ards th e  fro n t o f  h is  l e f t ,  
which deployed with th e  g re a te s t  r e g u la r i ty  and opened a  heavy f i r e ," ^ ^  
Jesup , however, found th e  sk irm ish e rs ' f i r e  too  deadly and h is  
p o s it io n  u n ten ab le . Convinced th a t  " th e  fo rtu n e  o f th e  day depended 
upon d is lo d g in g  the  enemy's r ig h t  from i t s  s tro n g  p o s it io n ,"  he 
decided  " th a t  i t  could be e ffe c te d  o n ly  by a rap id  and determ ined 
movement," He to ld  h i s  men to  cease f i r i n g —in  o rder t o  save tim e 
and avoid  confusion—and charge. Unequal to  a massed form ation , th e  
B r i t i s h  sk irm ishers im m ediately withdrew toward th e  woods and th e
^M em oirs. I ,  131,
^^N arrative o f  Jesup , Documentary H is to ry  (ed, C ru ikshank),  
I I ,  474-75,
46,'To Drummond, Jy  6, C 684, HG 8 (PAG),
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Lincoln  M il i t i a ,  Jesup was somewhat su rp r ise d  and l a t e r  commented 
t h a t  Americans would never have su rrendered  such a s tro n g  p o s it io n  so 
e a s i l y .  Captain D an ie l Katchum and th e  l ig h t  company o f th e  25th f i l e d  
o f f  a f t e r  them to  p rev en t a  r a l l y ,
By th e  tim e R ia ll  had sp o tted  Jesu p ' s column movement, th e  
two main l in e s  had probably  approached one an o th er to  w ith in  about 
100 yards, th e  B r i t i s h  h a l t in g  p e rio d ic a l ly  to  f i r e  and th e  Americans 
answ ering. With Jesup  and McNeil on th e  l e f t ,  th e  American co n fig u ra ­
t i o n  resem bled H ann iba l's  deployment a t  Cannae, Sensing th e  danger, 
R ia l l  o rdered  th e  K ing 's  Regiment, which was now some d is ta n c e  in  th e  
r e a r ,  to  move forw ard and form  on th e  r ig h t  o f  the  100th, He sim ul­
tan eo u sly  d ire c te d  th e  Royal Scots and the  100th to  charge, b u t i t  
th re a te n e d  to  c a rry  them dangerously  in to  th e  jaws o f  th e  c re sc e n t­
shaped American lin e ,^ ®
Towson, meanwhile, dueled w ith  the  B r i t i s h  b a t te ry  on th e  ro ad . 
At f i r s t  i t  appeared th a t  th e  s u p e rio r  weight o f  th e  B r i t i s h  p ieces  
would overwhelm Towson's l ig h t  guns, fo r  e a r ly  in  th e  a c tio n  he lo s t  
th e  how itzer and se v e ra l  o f  i t s  crew . F in a lly , American marksman­
s h ip ,  rap id  d e liv e ry , and a  b i t  o f lu ck  to ld .  Towson's rem aining 
guns d isa b le d  one B r i t i s h  24-pounder and th en  s tru c k  th e i r  ammunition 
wagon. The r e s u l t in g  exp losion  s ile n c ed  th e  e n ti r e  b a tte ry ,  Towson 
th e n  tu rn ed  h is  p iec e s  on th e  charg ing  B r i t i s h  in fa n try ,  e n filad in g  
t h e i r  l in e  w ith  c a n is te r .  By th i s  tim e th e  Americans were b rin g in g
^^Campaign on th e  N iagara, Jesu p  P apers, Box 11; N arrativ e   _______
o f Jesup , Documentary H is to ry  (ed , C ru ikshank), I I ,  474.
^ H i a l l  to  Drummond, Jy  6, RG 8 (PAC),
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a g re a t  d ea l o f  f i r e  t o  bear on the  enemy l in e ,  S c o t t 's  b rigade  had 
ju s t  rece iv ed  a d d it io n a l  support from th re e  12-pounders d ire c te d  by 
C aptains Thomas B iddle and John Ü itc h ie ,  which Brown had p o sitio n ed  
in  th e  gap between McNeil and Leavenworth.^^
In  th e  face  o f  w ith erin g  c ro s s f ir e  th e  B r i t i s h  charge ground 
to  a h a l t ,  A s ta t io n a ry  f i r e f i g h t  ensued a t  s ix ty  p aces , S co tt 
ex u lted  in  th e  scene; "The f i r e  of th e s e  corps ( in c lu d in g  th e  a r t i l ­
l e ry )  produced a prod ig ious e f f e c t  on th e  enemy's ran k s . That o f  
Major M cNeil's was th e  most e f f e c t iv e  from th e  oblique p o s it io n  which 
h is  corps ju d ic io u s ly  occup ied ,"  J e su p 's  25 th , reo rgan ized  a f t e r  
d isp e rs in g  th e  sk irm ish e rs , wheeled a c ro ss  th e  f lan k  o f  th e  100th and 
opened f i r e  in to  i t s  f ro n t  and r e a r ,  fo rc in g  p a r t  o f i t  to  r e t i r e  be­
hind th e  p ro te c tio n  o f  a  fen ce . Thus a s s i s te d ,  McNeil th rew  h is  l e f t  
wing a g a in s t  th e  f la n k  o f  th e  rem ainder o f  th e  100th, vdiich a lso  be­
gan to  y ie ld  ground. On th e  r ig h t ,  Leavenworth advanced fo r th e  k ill ,^ ®  
His l i n e  wavering and a r t i l l e r y  im m obilized, R ia l l  o rdered  a 
r e t r e a t .  The K ing 's had f a i le d  to  reach  th e  f ro n t  b e fo re  th e  bugle 
sounded. Some segments o f th e  opposing l in e s  were c lo s e ly  engaged— 
te n  paces according  to  one account—bu t th e  B r i t i s h  r e t i r e d  b e fo re  
bayonets c r o s s e d , J u d g i n g  from Towson's volume o f f i r e  (120 rounds).
^^Hindman to  A dj, Gen., n .d , ,  and I'lackonochie t o  Glascow, 
Aug 19, Documentary H is to ry  (ed , C ruikshank), I ,  44, 49J S co tt t o  
Adj. G en., Jy  15, Reg, L trs .  R eed ., RG 107 (NA); Brown's memoranda. 
Brown's Documents (ed. C ruikshank), 76,
^^Scott to  A dj, Gen., Jy  15, Reg, L trs ,  Reed,, RG 107 (NA); 
N arra tiv e  o f Jesup , Documentary H is to ry  (ed . C ruikshank), I I ,  
474-75,
Joseph B ak er 's  Memory Book, (G) M il i t i a ,  MG 24, (PAC),
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l e s s  th an  one hour had e lapsed  s in ce  th e  F i r s t  Brigade had c le a red  
th e  b r id g e ,
The d e fea t was no r o u t .  Though outnumbered du rin g  th e  l a s t  
f i r e f i g h t ,  th e  B r i t i s h  had m aintained th e i r  ground f o r  an a p p rec iab le  
perio d  o f  tim e . The r e t r e a t  was o rd e r ly  u n t i l  they  approached th e  
Chippavja and broke in to  a ru n , S c o tt  pursued, but th e  K ing 's and 
l ig h t  tro o p s  covered the r e t r e a t ,  and R ia ll  c rossed  th e  r iv e r  s a fe ly .
Complete v ic to ry  escaped th e  Americans, because Broim had 
been d i la to ry  in  c a l l in g  up h is  r e s e rv e , R ip le y 's  Second B rigade. 
A f te r  crushing back to  camp a t  R ia l l ' s approach and o rd erin g  S c o t t 's  
b rig ad e  forw ard . Brown had in s t ru c te d  Ripley to  hold h i s  p o s i t io n ,  fo r  
he feared  a  l ig h t  in fa n try  a tta c k  th rough  th e  woods upon the  r e a r  o f 
th e  encampment. He then  rode to  th e  f ro n t ,  'While l in in g  up B id d le 's  
and R i tc h ie 's  a r t i l l e r y  between McNeil and Leavenworth, he sp o tte d  
P o r te r 's  f le e in g  v o lu n te e rs  s p i l l in g  out o f th e  woods. A fter o rd e r ­
in g  C aptain  Samuel H arris  to  r a l l y  th e  m i l i t i a  w ith h i s  dragoons.
Brown went to  Jesup to  a s se s s  the  s i tu a t io n .  The B r i t i s h  charge had 
j u s t  f a i l e d ,  and Jesup  was p reparing  to  advance a g a in s t th e  100th.
Once on th e  spot Brown recognized th e  o p p o rtu n ity  fo r  an 
enveloping movement. He se n t a message to  R ip ley , d i re c tin g  him to  
make a sweep to  th e  l e f t  th rough th e  woods and f a l l  upon the  r e a r  of 
th e  B r i t i s h  r ig h t  wing. But to  accom plish th e  envelopment, R ip le y 's
^^American o f f ic e r  t o  a f r i e n d ,  Jy 7 , Documentary H is to ry  (ed. 
C ru ikshank), I ,  49. A good gun crew could f i r e  2 rounds per m inute 
p e r  l ig h t  gun. E sp o sito  and B itin g , " In tro d u c tio n ,"  Napoleonic 
Wars, n .p .
^ % c o tt  to  A dj. G en., Jy 15, Reg. L t r s .  Reed., RG 10? (NA); 
R ia l l  to  Drummond, Jy  6, C 684 (PAC).
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b rig ad e  in a d v e r te n tly  took  a c ir c u ito u s  ro u te , and by th e  tim e th e  
men waded th rough  ch in -h ig h  c reek  water and tru d g ed  through swampy 
ground, th e  b a t t l e  was over and th e  B r i t i s h  had won th e  s a fe ty  o f  
Chippawa. Brown l a t e r  blamed th e  f a i lu r e  o f th e  envelopment on 
R ip ley , adding fu e l  to  th e  developing r i f t  between h im self and 
R ip ley ,
Viewing th e  carnage a f t e r  th e  b a t t l e .  C aptain  Joseph Baker
o f th e  Pennsylvania v o lu n te e rs  was su rp r ise d , b u t p leased , to  f in d
th e  ground strew n w ith  so many bodies o f  th e  "Red coated Gentry. 
B r i t i s h  dead, wounded, and m issing  to ta le d  515. The 100th and Royals 
a lone  lo s t  432—a tes tim ony  to  th e  s te a d in ess  o f  B r i t i s h  re g u la rs  and 
th e  r e s i l i e n c y  o f th e  t h in  red  l i n e .  American c a s u a l t i e s  in  t h i s  
count o f dead , w rith in g , gasping men to ta le d  328. The r a t i o  o f dead 
was 148 B r i t i s h  to  60 Americans, The percen tages  o f  k i l l e d  and 
wounded re g u la r  in fa n t ry  to  th o se  engaged were 31 fo r  th e  B r i t i s h  and 
20 fo r  the  A m e r i c a n s .A l th o u g h  on a much sm a lle r  s c a le ,  th e  com­
b ined  p ercen tage o f 25 ranked w ith  th o se  o f  th e  b a t t l e s  o f  Z orndorff
Eylau (33^), Borodino (28%), Ghickaraauga (27%), and S p o tts y l-
van ia  ( 16%).
^%rown to  Armstrong, Jy  7, Reg. L trs .  R eed ., RG 107 (NA); 
Brown's memoranda. Brown's Documents (ed . C ruikshank), 75-76; N iles  * 
Weekly R e g is te r . VI, 13 Aug 1814, 403.
5%lemory Book, (G) M il i t i a ,  MG 24 (PAC),
^^Return o f th e  K ille d , Wounded and M issing of th e  Right 
D iv is io n , Jy  5, C 684, RG 8 (PAC); Report o f  th e  K ille d , Wounded and 
M issing o f th e  L eft D iv is io n , Documentary H is to ry  (ed. C ruikshank),
I ,  43 .
5?The p ercen tag es  fo r  a l l  b a t t l e s  but Chippawa a re  from C y r i l  
F a l ls ,  A Hundred Years o f  War. 1850-1950. C o l l ie r  Books (New York,
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The preponderance o f  B r i t i s h  c a s u a l t ie s  was due to  th e  American 
c r o s s f i r e ,  Towson's c a n is te r ,  and th e  su p e rio r  number o f Americans 
engaged, B r i t i s h  a r t i l l e r y  and m usketry no doubt shared in  i n f l i c t i n g  
186 c a s u a l t ie s  upon th e  9 th , 22nd, and 11th, Although m ainly engaged 
w ith  sk irm ish e rs , th e  25th l o s t  ?6 men. In  th e  end, th e  American 
v ic to ry  was due to  su p e rio r  a r t i l l e r y  and su p e rio r  m o b ility , wMch 
had enabled Sco tt to  b rin g  su p e rio r  weight t o  bear upon th e  B r i t i s h  
f la n k s  «
H ia ll  m ight have fa re d  b e t t e r  had he waited to  rece iv e  an 
American a tta c k  w ith  h is  t h in  red  l in e  supported by sk irm ish e rs  and 
a r t i l l e r y .  But he could not have known th a t  S c o t t ’s  b rigade would 
maneuver so w e ll, and p robably  expected to  pounce on th e  Americans 
vrtiile in  a  s ta te  o f  confusion . Committing h im se lf to o  e a r ly  to  a 
charge , H ia l l  prevented th e  K ing 's Regiment from p a r t i c ip a t in g  in  th e  
b a t t l e .
Brown ju b i la n t ly  proclaim ed th a t  Chippawa was "the f i r s t  v ic ­
to ry  th a t  has been gained over th e  enemy on a  p l a i n , I t  was, but 
th e  v ic to ry  won had been a n ea r th in g .  As P o r te r  noted  l a t e r  in  th e  
month. Brown had r e a l ly  been "lucky" in  rep u ls in g  R i a l l 's  a t ta c k ,
He had not posted  guards on th e  road o r  reco n n o ite red  th e  B r i t i s h  
camp, and was only forewarned o f R i a l l 's  approach through P o r te r 's  
a c c id e n ta l  c o l l i s io n  with th e  Lincoln M il i t i a .  R e flec tin g  on th e  
b a t t l e  some years l a t e r ,  Jesup w rote; "We were a l l  young s o ld ie rs .
^®To Armstrong, Jy 10, Reg. L tr s .  R eed., RG 107 (NA),
I ,  101.
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and th e  wonder should be, not th a t  we b lundered , but th a t  we d id  not 
b lunder more, and th a t  ou r ta le n te d  and v e te ra n  enemy should have out 
b lundered us."^® N either Brown n o r Scott had done much more th an  g ive 
i n i t i a l  d ire c t io n  to  th e  u n i ts  and moral and psycho log ical s tre n g th  
to  th e  tro o p s . This was due, not on ly  to  th e  r a p id i ty  o f th e  a c tio n , 
bu t th e  chaos and u n c o n tro l la b i l i ty  in h eren t in  a l l  b a t t l e s . T h e  
reg im en ta l and company commanders, employing men read y  and a b le  to  
respond to  what was asked o f  them, had more to  do w ith  the  v ic to ry  
than  Brown and S c o tt.  With le s s  a b le  tro o p s and o f f i c e r s ,  c e r ta in ly .  
Brown would have su ffe red  a  h u m ilia tin g  d e fe a t .  Luck, and th e  t r a in ­
ing  rece iv ed  a t  B uffalo , could be c re d ite d  w ith  the  success, "Small 
a s  the  a f f a i r  was, and unim portant in  m il i t a ry  r e s u l t s , "  w rote Henry 
Adams, " i t  gave to  the  United S ta te s  army a  c h a ra c te r  and p r id e  i t  
had never before  possessed ,
T o lstoy"s View o f  H is to ry . Mentor Books (New York, 1957), 84. 
^% is to ry  o f  th e  United S ta te s .  V II I ,  45.
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CHAPTER V I I I .
"FOR GOD'S SAKE LET ME SEE YOU"
During th e  next two days th e  Americans bu ried  th e  dead o f  
b o th  s id e s  and moved th e  wounded to  th e  h o s p ita l  a t  B u ffa lo , On 
F riday , th e  e ig h th . Brown s e n t  R ipley along an  o ld  tim ber road 
through th e  woods t o  flank  R i a l l 's  s tro n g  p o s it io n  behind the  Chippawa 
R iv e r, b u t R ia ll  decided  to  withdraw t o  Fort George. H is 1,000 men 
were too few, he f e l t ,  to  defend h is  r ig h t  and f ro n t  a t  th e  same 
tim e . F rid ay  n ig h t and S atu rday  m orning, th e  F i r s t  and Second B r i ­
gades cro ssed  th e  Chippawa i n  b o a ts—R ia ll  had destroyed  th e  b r id g e . 
Brown began p u rsu it  in  the  a fte rn o o n , leav in g  a l l  h is  baggage a t  
Chippawa and tak in g  only a few  days p ro v is io n s  in  haversacks. He 
hoped th a t  R ia l l  would give b a t t l e  i f  p ressed  hard  enough, but R ia l l  
had no in te n t io n  o f  f ig h tin g  aga in  u n t i l  help a rr iv e d .  He v/as a l ­
read y  ensconced in  F o rt George vAien th e  Left D iv isio n  reached 
Queenston, seven m ile s  above th e  f o r t .
Brown decided to  f o r t i f y  the  town, r e s t  th e  men, and w ait fo r  
Chauncey to  a rr iv e  w ith  h is  f l e e t .  At th e  tim e i t  was probably a  
w ise d e c is io n , but a s  i t  tu rn e d  out. Brown spen t much o f  th e  next 
f i f te e n  days gazing from Queenston H eights a t  th e  blue w aters o f  
Lake O n ta rio , looking fo r th e  s a i l s  t h a t  never came. A n tic ip a tin g  a 
d e lay  in  Chauncey's a r r i v a l ,  he wrote Gaines and ordered  him to  send 
f iv e  18-pounders and a l l  th e  rif lem en  a t  the  h a rb o r on bateaux to
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th e  Genesee depo t. The few heavy cannon Brown had w ith him were 
inadequate  t o  perm it a  s ieg e  o f  F ort George o r i t s  quick red u c tio n .^
I t  was now Ju ly  10. Chauncey* s two new sh ip s , th e  S u perio r 
and th e  Mohawk, were ready to  s a i l .  The S u p erio r was la r g e r  and more 
powerful th an  Yeo’s P rin ce  liegent by 130 to n s  and e ig h t guns. The 
Mohavdc was h ea v ie r  th an  th e  P rin cess  C h a r lo tte  by 135 to n s  and equal 
to  h e r  in  firep o w er. Chauncey's whole f l e e t  o f  e ig h t v e s se ls  o u t­
gunned Yeo's e ig h t v e s se ls  251 to  216, topped them in  b roadside m etal 
3 ,352 pounds to  2 ,874, outweighed them 5,941 to n s  to  4 ,756 , and o u t-  
manned them 1,870 men to  1 ,620 ,^  But Chauncey p ro c ra s tin a te d , even 
though he had promised Brown, Jo n es, Armstrong, and Madison th a t  he 
would s a i l  by J u ly  1 His o f f i c i a l  excuse was t h a t  th e  Mohavfe was 
not o u t f i t t e d  w ith h e r b locks and ironwork u n t i l  Ju ly  24, and by 
th en  he was i l l  and unable to  tak e  th e  f l e e t  onto th e  la k e ,^  Chauncey 
may have been re lu c ta n t  to  leav e  Sackets Harbor, because he re c a l le d  
th a t  Wien he had s a i le d  w ith D earborn 's  fo rce  toward York in  A p r i l,
^Brown to  Armstrong, Jy  6 and 16, Reg. L tr s .  R eed ., RG 107 (NA); 
Brown's memoranda. Brown's Documents (ed , C ruikshank), 76-79; R ia l l  
to  Drummond, Jy  8 and 9 , C 684, RG 8 (PAC). B ak er 's  Memory Book,
(G) M il i t i a ,  MG 24 (PAC).
^Theodore R oosevelt, The Naval War o f  1812 (New York, 1882), 
354-57; Mahan, Sea Power, I I ,  304; Brown's Documents (ed , C ruikshank), 
42-43.
^Armstrong to  Brown, Je  10, 20, and 22, M ilita ry  Book, RG 107 
(NA); Gaines t o  Armstrong, Je 23, Reg. L tr s .  R eed ., RG 107 (NA); 
Chauncey to  Jo n es, Je 15 and 24 and Aug 10, C a p ta in s ' L e t te r s ,  RG 45; 
Brown to  Chauncey, Je  21, enc. Brown to  Armstrong, Je 22, Unreg.
L tr s ,  Reed., RG 107 (NA); Chauncey to  Brown, Je  25, Brown's Documents 
(ed . C ruikshank), 40,
^fo Jones, Aug 19, C ap ta in s ' L e t te r s ,  RG 45 (NA), Jones 
d ism issed  bo th  as v a l id  excuses. See Mahan, Sea Power. I I ,  300,
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1813, P rév o st and ïeo  had tak en  advantage o f  h is  absence to  a tta c k  
h i s  base . He e^qpressed t h i s  fe a r  on 15 June 1814; " I f  we should be 
o b liged  to  v i s i t  th e  upper p a r t  o f th e  lak e , th e  enemy would a v a i l  
h im se lf o f  th e  absence o f o u r f l e e t ,  make a push a t  t h i s  p la c e , and 
, . . c a rry  and d es tro y  a l l  th e  nava l and m il i t a ry  s to r e s ." ^  But he 
knew h is  f e a r s  were exaggera ted ,^  A pparen tly , the  r e a l  reason th a t  h< 
delayed s a i l in g  was because he regarded  h is  prime ta s k  to  be t h a t  o f 
f ig h tin g  a  naval b a t t l e  w ith  Yeo, r a th e r  th an  th a t  o f  supp o rtin g  the  
army th rough  blockade or l o g i s t i c  a s s i s ta n c e ,^
Chauncey's p ro c ra s tin a tio n  gave the  B r i t i s h  th e  o p p o rtu n ity  
th e y  crav ed . On J u ly  10 Drummond, knowing re in fo rcem en ts  from Mon­
t r e a l  were on t h e i r  way to  K ingston and f in d in g  Chauncey s t i l l  a t  
Sackets H arbor, s e n t  o rders to  York f o r  the  G lengarry Light In fa n try  
and th e  Regiment De V fa ttev ille  to  proceed to  B u rlin g to n , He p u t the  
8 9 th  Regiment, th en  a t  K ingston, on th e  road to  York and p laced  two 
f la n k  companies o f  th e  104th on a  standby fo o tin g . By Ju ly  15 a  
f l o t i l l a  o f  ba teaux , two o f  Yeo's schooners, and two o f  h is  b r ig s .
^To Jones, C ap ta in s ' L e t te r s ,  RG 45 (NA).
^Drummond a t  t h is  tim e es tim ated  he would need from 5,000 to
7 ,000 men to  a tta c k  Sackets Harbor, He had 2,000 on J u ly  10, and th e
82nd Regiment, on th e  way to  re in fo rc e  him, had not y e t  reached Corn­
w a ll,  Drummond to  P rév o st, Jy  7, 10, and 13, C 684, RG 8 (PAC), 
Chauncey knew the  K ingston g a rr iso n  was "very  sm all, " and Gaines was 
co n fid en t he could defend th e  harbor w ithout Chauncey* s sh ips o r  
s a i l o r s ,  Gaines t o  Armstrong, Jy 13, Reg, L t r s ,  R eed ,, RG 107 (NA); 
Armstrong to  G aines, Je 16, M ilita ry  Book, RG 107 (NA),
^Yeo had decided  to  r e t i r e  in to  Kingston h arb o r ivhen Chauncey 
s a i le d  whether o r n o t the  Mbhai^ had a l l  her b locks and ironw ork, 
Drummond to  P ré v o st, Jy  15, C 684, RG 8 (PAC); Drummond to  P rév o st,
Je  4 , Yeo to  Drummond, Je 3 , Drummond to  Yeo, Je  6, C 683, RG 8 (PAC),
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th e  S ta r  and C harw ell. were on t h e i r  way to  York w ith  s o re ly  needed 
su p p lie s  o f f lo u r ,  po rk , and ammunition. Yeo s a l l i e d  f o r th  from 
Kingston w ith  th e  r e s t  o f  h is  f l e e t  on th e  seven teen th  and blockaded 
S acke ts Harbor,®
Vftiile Chauncey w aited p a t ie n t ly  f o r  h is  la b o re rs  t o  put 
f i t t i n g s  on th e  Mohawk. Brown w aited  in  *'p a in fu l suspense” fo r  th e  
f l e e t .  On J u ly  13 he wrote th e  commodore; "For God's sake l e t  me see 
you. S ir  James w il l  n o t f ig h t ;  , . . V/e have between us th e  command 
o f a  s u f f i c i e n t  means t o  conquer Upper Canada w ith in  two months, i f  
th e re  i s  a prompt and zealous c o o p e ra tio n  and a vigorous a p p lic a tio n  
o f th e s e  means. Now i s  th e  tim e  before  th e  enemy can be g r e a t ly  
rein fo rced!'^
W ithin Fort George R ia l l  c o r r e c t ly  guessed from American i n ­
a c t i v i t y  th a t  Brown was w aiting  fo r  Chauncey to  d e l iv e r  more b a t t e r ­
ing  guns. F earing  an a tta c k  was imminent, he decided  to  remove p a r t  
o f h i s  fo rc e , march westward, g a th e r  more tro o p s , hang on Brown's 
l e f t  f la n k , and thus com plicate  b esieg in g  o p e ra t io n s . On th e  t h i r ­
te e n th  he emerged from th e  f o r t  w ith 800 men, lea v in g  700 in s id e ,  and 
rendezvoused w ith  600 more a t  Twenty M ile Creek. Four hundred men o f  
th e  G lengarry L ight In fa n try  were on t h e i r  way from  York and were 
n ea rin g  th e  Creek, and th e  m i l i t i a  o f th e  London D i s t r i c t  and those  
o f th e  L incoln u n its  were assem bling. Brown had m issed h i s  chance
Drummond to  P ré v o st, Jy  10, 13, 15, and 16, 0 684, RO 8 (PAC); 
Gaines to  Armstrong, J y  20, Reg. L trs .  R eed ., RG 107 (NA); anonymous 
l e t t e r  to  Armstrong, J y  20, in  Armstrong, N o tices, I I ,  237-38.
^Enc. Chauncey to  Jones, Aug 10, C a p ta in s ' L e t te r s ,  RG 45 (NA).
^ ^R ia ll  to  Drummond, Jy  12, Documentary H is to ry  (ed . C ruikshank),
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of in v e s t in g  F o rt George and tra p p in g  R ia l l  w ith in  i t .  Omniously, 
the  B r i t i s h  were m o biliz ing  more men and equipment more q u ick ly  th an  
the  in v ad e rs . The o ffen s iv e  momentum was g rin d in g  to  a h a l t ,  and 
th e  i n i t i a t i v e  was p assing  to  th e  B r i t i s h ,
Brown lea rn ed  o f  R i a l l 's  d e p a rtu re  from th e  f o r t  on th e  fo u r­
te e n th . At a co u n c il o f  war th e  g en e ra l o f f ic e r s  debated what th ey  
should do. A l l  agreed th a t  w ithout a s u f f ic ie n t  b a tte r in g  t r a i n  o r 
Chauncey's a id ,  a s ieg e  was out o f  th e  q u es tio n . An investm ent, i f  
extended over a  f a i r l y  long p e rio d  o f tim e , would r e s u l t  in  th e  expo­
sure o f  th e  L e f t D iv is io n 's  r e a r  to  R i a l l 's  growing fo rc e s . Moreover, 
even i f  Fort George could be tak e n , i t  vrould leav e  B r i t i s h  f ie ld  
fo rc e s  untouched, give them tim e to  recover from th e  shock o f Chippawa, 
and o n ly  r e s u l t  in  th e  cap tu re  o f  a post along th e  r iv e r  which Brown 
regarded  as i n s ig n if ic a n t  in  l ig h t  o f  h i s  la rg e r  aims: th e  d e s tru c ­
tio n  o f  th e  Right D iv isio n  and th e  occupation  o f  B urling ton  H eigh ts, 
R ip ley  recommended a n ig h t march toward R i a l l 's  camp and an a t ta c k  
a t  r e v e i l l e ,  " I f  we a tta c k ed  R ia l l  and broke him dovm b efo re  he 
could be r e in fo rc e d ,"  R ip ley  argued , " th e  p en in su la  was w ith in  our 
power," P o r te r  sided  >n.th R ip ley , But fo r  unexplained reaso n s.
Brown r e je c te d  R ip le y 's  suggested b l i t z  even though he agreed  w ith 
h is  a n a ly s is .  In s te a d , he decided to  t r y  S c o t t 's  id ea : fe ig n  an in ­
vestm ent on th e  f o r t ,  and hope i t  would goad R ia l l  to  come to  i t s  
support and f i g h t .  Perhaps Brown b e liev ed  he would m omentarily sp o t 
Chauncey, but th e  r e je c t io n  o f R ip le y 's  p lan  was probably  a m istake 
—R i a l l 's  canp was only  about tw enty  m iles  away and he was outnumbered
I ,  61; Jy  12, S e le c t  B r i t i s h  Documents (ed . Wood), I I I ,  F t ,  I ,  133; 
Jy 15, C 684, RG 8 (PAC),
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Between th e  f i f te e n th  and n iiie teen th  P o r te r 's  v o lu n tee rs  and 
B r i t i s h  m i l i t i a  fought s e v e ra l  minor sk irm ishes, b u t th e  American 
m i l i t i a  o n ly  succeeded in  tu rn in g  th e  e n ti r e  po p u latio n  a g a in s t them. 
They p lundered whatever th e y  cou ld , and on th e  n in e teen th  burned 
t h i r t y  o r  f o r ty  houses in  th e  hamlet o f S t .  Davids. Subsequently , 
every American fo rag ing  p a r ty  was f i r e d  upon and took c a s u a l t i e s .
On the  tw e n tie th  th e  L eft D iv ision  broke camp, destroyed  the  works 
a t  Queenston, moved no rth , and encamped nea r Fort George. R ia l l ,  
apprehensive o f h i s  rea r  and wary o f  American s tre n g th , f a i le d  to  
show. On th e  tw enty-second Brown withdrew t o  Queenston. He was run­
n ing  sh o rt  o f su p p lie s  and becoming apprehensive about h is  own l in e  
o f  communications.  ̂̂
At Queenston on th e  fo llow ing day, Brovm rece iv ed  a d isp a tc h  
from Gaines th a t  Yeo's blockade vra.s p reven ting  the d ep a rtu re  o f  the  
f l o t i l l a  o f  rif lem en  and guns. Gaines a lso  expressed h is  ignorance 
o f  Chauncey's in tended s a i l in g  tim e , fo r  th e  commodore was confined 
to  bed w ith  fev er and re fu sed  to  perm it a subord ina te  to  assume com­
mand, D espairing  o f  immediate a id  from Chauncey, Brown decided on
F acts R e la tin g  to  th e  Campaign on th e  Niagara 1B14. comp. 
R ip ley  (Boston, 1815), 7 -8 . H erea fte r  c ite d  a s  (R ip le y 's )  F a c ts .
S tone, L ife  o f  G eneral Jacob Brown, 89, 184-86; Brown to  Armstrong,
J y  23, Reg, L trs ,  Reed., RG 107 (NA); R ia ll  to  Drummond, Jy 20 , C 684, 
RG 8 (PAC); R ia ll  to  Drummond, Jy 21 , Documentary H is to ry  (ed , Cruik­
shank), I ,  78.
^^R ia ll to  Drummond, Jy 19, and Tucker to  R ia l l ,  Jy 15, C 684, 
RG 8 (PAC); Maj. McFarland (U.S. 23rd I n f .)  t o  h is  w ife , n .d . ,  and 
P o r te r  to  Brown, Jy  16, Documentary H isto ry  (ed . C ruikshank), I ,  73, 
68-69; Brovm to  Armstrong, Jy  23, Reg. L trs .  Reed., RG 107 (NA); 
Brown's memoranda. Brown's Documents (ed. C ruikshank), 79; (R ip le y 's )  
F a c ts . 8; S tone, L ife  o f G eneral Jacob Brown. 186.
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th e  tw en ty -fo u rth  to  re tu rn  to  Chippawa, His prim e concern was 
s e c u r i ty  o f  communications, b u t th e  w ithdraw al was necessary  in  any 
case to  resu p p ly  th e  L eft D iv is io n . Brown hoped R ia l l  would fo llow  
th e  w ithdraw al and th u s  b ring  on a b a t t l e .  Yet he was beginning  to  
f e e l  th e  p ressu re  o f circum stances and th e  in creasin g  d esp ara ten ess  
o f  th e  s i tu a t io n .  He even e n te r ta in e d  th e  no tio n  o f drawing su p p lie s  
from S ch lo sse r  ( th e  depot ac ro ss  the r iv e r  from Chippawa), disencum­
b e rin g  th e  d iv is io n  o f  excess baggage, and making a  d i re c t  and rap id  
march on B urling ton—i f  R ia ll  were not drawn in to  b a t t l e  befo re  th e  
march began.
The jo y  o f Chippawa was wearing th in .  The b a t t l e  had only 
been a  P y rrh ic  v ic to ry  fo r  th e  Am ericans. Their c a s u a l t i e s ,  though 
few er than th e  B r i t i s h ,  had been heavy. The dead and wounded re g u la rs  
were not rep la c ed , w hile the  B r i t i s h  R ight D iv isio n  was rec e iv in g  
sm all but t im e ly  re in fo rcem en ts . R ia l l ,  having tak en  th e  measure o f  
th e  enemy and learn ed  h i s  le s so n , had eluded Brown, and now help was 
n ea r—almost a s  Drummond had p lanned in  March. Obviously d i s t r e s s e d .  
Brown n e v e rth e le ss  took  in s p ir a t io n  from the  "sublim e co u n try  & 
scenery—th e  f a l l s  o f  Niagara—th e  only th in g  th a t  compares i s  the  
noble co n te s t o f  g a l la n t  men on th e  f i e ld  o f b a t t l e ,  s tru g g lin g  fo r  
th e  c o u n try 's  g lo ry ." ^^
P a r t ly  by d esig n  and p a r t l y  by chance, th e  B r i t i s h  were soon 
to  provide Brown w ith an  o p p o rtu n ity  fo r  b a t t l e .  In  the l a t e  n ig h t
^%rown to  Armstrong, J y  25, Brown's Documents (ed . C ruikshank), 
51 ; Brown's memoranda, ib id . . 79.
^%'o a  f r ie n d , n .d . (sometime a f t e r  th e  b a t t l e  o f  Chippavja), 
quoted in  S tone , L ife  o f  G eneral Jacob Brown. 89.
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22:3
o f Ju ly  24 R ia l l  sen t a sm all body o f l ig h t  tro o p s under L ieutenant 
Colonel Pearson to  fo llow  Brown's withdrav^al to  Chippawa, At 3:00 P.M. 
Pearson took up p o s it io n s  w ith in  th re e  m iles o f th e  American camp a t  
th e  ju n c tio n  o f Lundy's Lane and th e  Portage Road. At daybresdc on 
the  tw e n ty - f if th ,  Drummond a rr iv e d  by b r ig  a t  Fort George eager to  
assume th e  o ffe n s iv e . H is plan was to  a ttem pt to  throw  Brown o f f -  
balance by a sm all d iv ers io n a ry  s t r i k e  on th e  American s id e  o f  the  
r iv e r ,  vdiile he jo in ed  R ia l l  w ith rein fo rcem ents and moved to  th e  
a ttack ,, He o rdered  L ieutenant C olonel J ,  G. P. Tucker to  tak e  500 
men up th e  r ig h t  bank o f th e  N iagara and a t ta c k  th e  American post a t  
Lewiston, o p p o site  Queenston, and he sent L ieu tenan t Colonel Joseph 
M orrison w ith th e  89th and detachments o f th e  Royals and K ing 's  up 
th e  l e f t  bank to  jo in  R ia l l .  N either Drummond nor R ia l l ,  however, 
expected to  engage th e  Americans sooner than  the  tw e n ty -s ix th . Al­
though R ia l l  jo in e d  Pearson sometime during  th e  day, th e  r e s t  o f  h is  
d iv is io n  commanded by Colonel H ercules S co tt d id  not leave Twelve 
Mile Creek u n t i l  th e  a fte rn o o n , and they  cou ld  not be expected to  
a rr iv e  a t  Lundy's Lane b e fo re  evening. Drummond and M orrison had an 
eq u a lly  long march o f n e a r ly  f i f t e e n  mi l es ahead o f  them on a  warm 
summer day . ̂  ^
E arly  in  th e  a fte rn o o n  Driommond h a lte d  M orrison 's column a t  
Queenston to  r e s t  th e  men and to  w a it fo r  Tucker to  reach Lewiston.
The a c t i v i t y  a t  Queenston and th e  movement o f  B r i t i s h  boa ts up the
Harvey t o  Tucker and to  R ia l l ,  Jy  23, C 684, RG 8 (PAC). Drummond 
l e f t  Kingston about the  seven teen th  and rode by horseback to  York.
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r iv e r  a le r te d  th e  Americans a t  Levdston, however, and they  had evacu­
a ted  th e  town b e fo re  Tucker a r r iv e d .  Around 4:00 P.M ., a f t e r  Tucker 
crossed  to  Queenston, Drummond resumed th e  march to  Lundy's Lane w ith 
a t o t a l  o f  about 800 men o f  a l l  ran k s .
In  th e  course  o f  th e  morning th e  Americans became aware o f 
B r i t i s h  movements, but th e  in te l l ig e n c e  was sketchy . Brown rece ived  
re p o r ts  o f  B r i t i s h  tro o p s near Lundy's Lane and o f a  "considerab le  
fo rce" marching toward S ch lo sse r . Apprehensive o f th e  v u ln e ra b il i ty  
o f  th e  S ch lo sser depot and f e a r fu l  th a t  th e  enemy would a tta c k  i t  in  
fo rc e . Brown c a lc u la te d  t h a t  th e  most e ff e c tiv e  way o f  " r e c a llin g  him 
from t h i s  o b jec t was to  p u t th e  army in  m otion towards Queenston," 
and th e re b y  th re a te n  th e  B r i t i s h  l in e  o f communications. O ther than 
remain a t  Chippavra., Brown had no a l t e r n a t iv e .  He lacked  enough boa ts 
e i th e r  to  c a rry  adequate numbers o f  troops acro ss  th e  r iv e r  t o  pro­
t e c t  S ch lo sse r o r  to  t r a n s f e r  th e  su p p lie s  from th e re  to  Chippawa.^
At about 5:00 P.M. Brown ordered  S c o tt  to  o rganize  th e  F i r s t  
Brigade and proceed to  Queenston on th e  Portage Hoad, S c o t t 's  move­
ment had a  dual purpose: to  d iv e r t  th e  B r i t i s h  from th e i r  probable 
aim on th e  r ig h t  bank o f th e  r iv e r ,  and to  c o lle c t  and communicate 
in te l l ig e n c e  about B r i t i s h  s tre n g th  on th e  l e f t  bank. Brown s p e c i f i ­
c a l ly  in s t ru c te d  S co tt to  req u est rein fo rcem ent should he encounter a 
s tro n g  B r i t i s h  fo rc e .  W ithin tw enty  m inutes th e  F i r s t  B rigade, 1,200
 ̂Drummond to  P rév o st, Jy  27, ib id .
^^P orter to  Tompkins, Jy 29, Documentary H is to ry  (ed . Cruik­
shank), I ,  105; Leavenworth to  R ip ley , 15 Jan  1815, Report o f  O dell, 
(R ip le y 's )  F a c ts . 19, 33j Brown's memoranda. Brown's Documents (ed , 
C ruikshank), 80; N arrativ e  o f  Jesup , quoted in  C harles J .  I n g e r s o ll ,  
H is to r ic a l  Sketch o f  the  Second War . . . (P h ila d e lp h ia , 1845), I I ,  106,
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s tro n g , c ro ssed  th e  Chippawa b rid g e  w ith  Towson's a r t i l l e r y  company 
and a l l  o f  th e  dragoons. Everyone was sp o ilin g  f o r  a f ig h t .  Brown 
expressed  th e  American a t t i tu d e :  " I f  he were i n  th e  f ie ld  on th e
Canada s id e  o f  th e  s t r a i t  our o n ly  b u s in ess  was to  meet and f ig h t  him 
w ithout lo s s  o f tim e , as  . . . [ I ]  had alm ost ceased  to  hope fo r  coop­
e ra t io n  o r re in fo rcem ent from any quarter."^®
The B r i t i s h  p ick e t a t  t ir s .  W ilson 's  ta v e rn  near th e  f a l l s  
sp o tte d  S c o t t 's  m arching column sh o r t ly  befo re  6 :00  P.M. and rep o rted  
t o  R ia l l ,  He only had 800 men o f  the  G lengarry E ight In fa n try ,  th e  
Embodied M il i t i a ,  and th e  Incorpora ted  M il i t i a ,  w ith  two l ig h t  p iec e s  
o f  a r t i l l e r y ,  and he decided to  r e t r e a t .  Messages went o u t to  i n s t r u c t  
H ercules S c o tt  to  rev e rse  h is  march and to  inform  Drummond o f  the 
American advance, Drummond was a  "few m iles" away when he rece iv ed  
th e  message, and he quickened h i s  pace t o  observe th e  scene fo r 
h im se lf,^  ^
I4rs. Wilson t o ld  S co tt on h is  a r r i v a l  a t  th e  tav e rn  th a t  a 
la r g e  B r i t i s h  force was in  th e  a re a , S c o tt d ism issed  th e  in fo rm a tio n  
a s  p a r t i s a n ,  fe e l in g  she was t ry in g  to  f r ig h te n  him o f f .  He was 
unaware o f Drummond's a r r iv a l  from York, and he doubted t h a t  R ia ll  
co u ld  m ain tain  a la rg e  force  a t  Lundy's Lane and s t i l l  have sent a 
s tro n g  fo rce  up th e  r ig h t  bank o f  the  r iv e r .  The B r i t i s h  tro o p s 
ahead o f him, he reasoned, cou ld  only be an ob serv a tio n  p a r ty ,  and
Brown's memoranda. Brown's Documents (e d . C ruikshank), 
79-80; Brown to  Armstrong, Aug 7 , ib id . .  57; N arra tiv e  o f  Jesup , in  
I n g e r s o ll ,  H is to r ic a l  Sketch . I I ,  106; S treng th  o f  the  American Army, 
Jy  25, (R ip le y 's )  F a c ts .  Ap p .
^^Drummond t o  P rév o st, Jy  27, 0 684, RG 8 (PAC); H ercules 
S c o tt  to  Jajnes S c o tt, Aug 12, (F ) M ilita ry  and Naval F ig u re s , MG 24 
(PAC); Leavenworth t o  R ipley, 15 Jan 1815, (R ip le y 's )  F a c ts . 20.
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he sen t an a ide  t o  Brown w ith  h is  a p p ra is a l  o f  th e  s i tu a t io n  and o f 
h is  in te n t io n  to  a tta c k .  W ithout b o th erin g  to  rec o n n o ite r , he con­
tin u ed  th e  march o f  th e  F i r s t  B rigade " in  quick  t im e ."  About h a lf  a 
m ile down the  ro ad  th e  column en te red  a b e l t  o f c h estn u t t r e e s .
S l ig h t ly  over a m ile  from th e  Niagara H iver, Lundy's Lane 
rose o v e r a low h i l l ,  s k ir t e d  th e  grounds o f  a cem etery and church 
on th e  summit, and f e l l  to  in te r s e c t  th e  Portage Road. The h i l l  was 
f i f t y  f e e t  h igh , sloped v e ry  g e n tly  on th e  south and west and a  l i t t l e  
more s te e p ly  on th e  n o rth  and e a s t .  F a i r ly  dense woods covered the  
area  between th e  Portage Hoad and th e  gorge o f  the  r iv e r  one m ile 
away. The P ortage Hoad approached Lundy's Lane from th e  so u th e a s t, 
and h a l f  a m ile from th e  lan e  i t  p en e tra te d  through a  th in  b e l t  o f 
ch estn u t fo re s t  to  emerge in to  th e  c le a r in g  about 750 yards from the  
top  o f  th e  h i l l .^ ^
Drummond was o f a  d i f f e re n t  mind th an  H ia ll .  He had caught 
up to  M o rriso n 's  column j u s t  as i t  had reached the  la n e .  Counter­
manding H ia l l 's  o rd er to  r e t r e a t ,  he d isp a tch ed  an o th er message to  
Hercules Scott t o  rush  to  th e  scen e , and se n t th e  G lengarry L igh t 
In fa n try  and th e  Embodied M il i t ia  in  and n e a r  the  ch estn u t woods to  
form a  sk irm ish in g  sc reen ,
^^Gruikshank, B a t t le  o f Lundy's Lane. 22; N arra tiv e  o f  Jesup, 
in  I n g e r s o ll ,  H is to r ic a l  S ketch . I I ,  106; S c o t t,  Memoirs. I ,  139.
(London, 1852), I ,  86; "N iagara F a l ls ,  Ontario-New York" (S cale  1 : 
25 ,000), Army Survey E stab lishm ent, Hoyal Canadian Engineers (1963); 
Sketch o f  Action . . . ,  Map V l/4 0 ?-N iag ara-l8 l4 , 14ap D iv isio n , (PAC).
^^Sketch o f  A ction , I-lap V l/407-N iagara-1814, (PAC); Drummond 
to  P ré v o st, Jy  27 , C 684, HG 8 (PAC).
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S c o tt h a lte d  th e  march when th e  sk irm ish ers  f i r e d  on h is  
advance company. He r e c a l le d  th e  9 th  Regiment, which had been f la n k ­
ing  th e  column on th e  l e f t ,  and placed i t  in  th e  lea d . He sent Jesup 
and th e  25th in to  th e  woods on th e  r ig h t  w ith o rd ers  to  seek and 
a tta c k  th e  enemy's l e f t ,  but to  be "governed by c ircum stances."  The 
9 th , 22nd, and 11th th en  resumed th e  march.
Drummond had ju s t  formed h is  l in e  behind th e  c r e s t  o f th e  h i l l .  
The Incorpora ted  l l i l i t i a  and th e  K ing 's detachment were in  the  t h in  
woods e a st o f  th e  Portage Road. The a r t i l l e r y —two 24-pounders, two 
6-pounders, and one 5 .5  how itzer—were on th e  to p  o f th e  h i l l  to  th e  
r ig h t  and f ro n t  o f  th e  church. About 150 yards i n  th e  r e a r  o f  th e  
guns, he l in e d  up th e  Royals, th e  l ig h t  company o f  th e  4 1 s t,  and th e  
8 9 th . The sk irm ish e rs—a f t e r  break ing  co n tac t w ith  th e  F i r s t  B rigade 
—formed to  th e  r ig h t  and f ro n t  o f Drummond's l i n e .  His whole fo rc e  
to ta le d  1,600 men,^^
Near su n se t, about 7:30 P.M., th e  F i r s t  Brigade emerged from 
th e  woods and came under th e  f i r e  o f th e  h i l l - t o p  b a t t e r i e s  and n e a rly  
500 sk irm ish e rs . S c o tt could see most o f  th e  B r i t i s h  fo rc e  now, b u t 
decided i t  was too  l a t e  to  withdraw. "Form l in e  to  th e  f ro n t ,"  he 
o rd ered , as th e  lead  regim ent c lea red  th e  t r e e s .  The b rig ad e  deployed 
toward th e  l e f t  by companies and attem pted  to  form a l in e  about 400
^^N arra tive  o f  Jesup, in  In g e r s o ll ,  H is to r ic a l  Sketch . I I ,  
106-107J Leavenworth to  R ip ley , 15 Jan 1815. (R ip le y 's )  F a c ts . 20.
^Drummond to  P rév o st, Jy  27, G 684, RG 8 (PAC). Canadian 
h is to r ia n s  have underestim ated  th e  number o f B r i t i s h  guns, but th e  
o f f i c i a l  B r i t i s h  map c le a r ly  shows 5 on th e  h i l l ,  p lus th e  2 H ercules 
S c o tt brought l a t e r .  Sketch o f  A ction , I4ap Vl/407-N iagara-1814, 
(PAG).
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yards from th e  h i l l ,  w ith  th e  11th  on th e  l e f t ,  th e  22nd in  th e  c e n te r ,  
and th e  9 th on th e  r i g h t .  F ire  from th e  sk irm ish e rs  and a r t i l l e r y  was 
ex trem ely  heavy, and some of th e  p latoons o f  the  11th  and 22nd broke 
ranks and ran  f o r  th e  t r e e s  in  t h e i r  r e a r .  Ju n io r and non-commissioned 
o f f ic e r s  r a l l i e d  most o f  th e  men and reform ed l i n e .  Some s tr a g g le r s  
jo in ed  the  c o lo rs  o f th e  9 th , The regim ents to g e th e r  to ta le d  800 men, 
but th e y  were f a l l in g  a t  a  rap id  r a te .  T h eir own f i r e  was in e f f e c t iv e  
and th e  B r i t i s h  lo s t  few men, Towson could  not b r in g  h is  two 6- 
pounders to  b e a r  on th e  B r i t i s h  a r t i l l e r y .  For th e  next hour the  b r i ­
gade stood i t s  ground, rece iv ed  grape and c a n is te r ,  and b ea t o f f  the  
a tta c k s  o f sk irm ish e rs ,^ ^
J e su p 's  f lan k in g  movement probably prevented Drummond from 
throw ing forw ard h is  vdiole l in e  to  a n n ih i la te  the  Americans, He had 
taken  th e  25th along a narrow p a th  through th e  woods and f a l l e n  upon 
the B r i t i s h  l e f t  f lan k . His s u rp r ise  emergence from the t r e e s  caused 
the  In co rp o ra ted  l l i l i t i a  and th e  K ing 's to  withdraw without f i r in g  a 
sh o t. I t  was g e tt in g  d a rk , and th e  in fo rm tio n  th a t  Drummond had a 
la rg e  reserv e  d issuaded Jesup from advancing f a r th e r .  For th e  next 
hour th e  25th hung on th e  B r i t i s h  l e f t ,  f i r e d  d e s u lto r i ly  a t  th e  89 th , 
and w orried  Drummond s u f f i c i e n t ly  to  p rev en t him from d e stro y in g  the  
o th er American reg im en ts , R ia l l ,  who had been wounded near th e  fro n t 
of th e  B r i t i s h  l in e ,  b lundered in to  Je su p 's  regim ent on th e  way to  th e
Documentary H is to ry  (!ed . C ruikshank), I ,  111; Leavenworth to  R ipley, 
15 Jan  1815, (R ip le y 's )  F a c ts . 20; T r ia l  o f  Capt. B lake, quoted in  
W ilkinson, Memoirs. I ,  687-89; N a rra tiv e  o f  Jesup, i n  In g e r s o ll ,  
H is to r ic a l  S k e tch . I I ,  107, Had Towson been able t o  rep lace  th e  
how itzer lo s t  a t  Chippawa?
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r e a r  and f e l l  c a p tiv e ,^ ^
The Americans a t  Chippawa had heard  th e  rep o rt o f  m usketry 
i n  th e  d is ta n c e  n ear su n se t, and the camp had become the  scene o f 
fe v e r is h  a c t i v i t y  a s  B ipley and P o rte r  h u r rie d ly  organized  th e i r  b r i ­
gades fo r  a c tio n . The boom o f  cannon and the crescendo o f  musketry 
some m inutes l a t e r  convinced a l l  th a t  S c o tt was engaged i n  a major 
b a t t l e .  Brown rushed im m ediately to  Lundy's Lane with h i s  s ta f f .  
R ip ley  marched from th e  camp around 8 :00  P.M. w ith  about 800 o f f ic e r s  
and men and th e  o th e r  a r t i l l e r y  companies. P o r te r  followed s h o r t ly  
a f t e r  w ith 300 v o lu n te e rs . Seven hundred and f i f t y  men were l e f t  a t  
Chippawa " to  p ro te c t th e  camp."^^
V/hen R ipley a rr iv e d  s h o r t ly  a f t e r  8:30 P.M ., S c o t t 's  b rigade  
gave th re e  th an k fu l ch eers . S u lfu r ic  smoke hung over th e  dark , wind­
l e s s  f i e l d .  Only th e  shadows o f  men and tre e s  and the  b laz e s  from 
m uskets and cannon were d isc e rn ib le .  In  th e  darkness most o f  the  
m usketry had ceased, b u t shot and s h e ll  from th e  cannon continued to  
f a l l  on th e  F i r s t  B rigade. M ajor W illiam  McRee, th e  c h ie f  eng ineer, 
came to  Brovm and to ld  him th a t  th e  hi l l  and th e  B r i ti sh  b a tte ry  had 
to  be taken  o r  the  vdiole d iv is io n  vrould have to  r e t r e a t .  Brown agreed
^^N arrative  o f  Jesup, in  I n g e r s o ll ,  H is to r ic a l  Sketch . I I ,
107; Drummond to  P ré v o st, Jy  27 , C 684, RG 8 (PAC).
^^S treng th  o f  American Army, (R ip le y 's )  F a c ts . App.; Brown to  
Armstrong, Aug 7, Brovm's Documents (ed . Ci’u ikshank), 58; P o r te r  t o  
Tompkins, Jy  29, Documentary H is to ry  (ed , Cruikshank), I ,  103, By 
m utual agreement and th e  consent o f B r i t i s h  and American o f f i c e r s ,  th e  
In d ian s  had l e f t  th e  s e rv ice  o f  t h e i r  a l l i e s .  About 50 In d ian s , how­
e v e r ,  re tu rn ed  to  th e  Left D iv isio n  a f t e r  the  b a t t l e  of Lundy's Lane. 
P o r te r  had h igh  p ra is e  fo r t h e i r  f ig h tin g  performance. P o r te r  to  
S tone , 26 May 1840, Documentary H isto ry  (ed . C ruikshank), I ,
358-68.
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and sen t a message to  R ip ley  to  advance f a r th e r  on the road  and storm  
th e  h i l l .  R ip ley  had a lre a d y  seen th e  n e c e s s i ty  o f  th e  move and had 
advanced about 100 yards on th e  road p as t S c o t t 's  b rigade in  order 
to  deploy h is  regim ents fo r  a charge—th e  1 s t,  th e  21st (w ith  de tach­
ments o f  th e  17th and 1 9 th ), and th e  23rd Regiments. Growing impa­
t i e n t ,  Brown rode to  Colonel î iL lle r  o f th e  21st and to ld  him to  a s sa u l t  
th e  b a t te ry .  " I t  s h a l l  be done. S i r ,"  was M il le r 's  misquoted re p ly .
The 1 st Regiment formed in  l in e  and advanced in  f ro n t  o f th e  
B r i t i s h  guns. But th e  f i r e  o f th e  b a t te ry  and o f th e  detachment o f  
th e  4 1 s t th a t  came to  i t s  support was to o  g rea t f o r  th e  150 men o f th e  
1 s t,  and th e i r  l in e  broke. The advance, however, had served th e  pur­
pose o f  d i s t r a c t in g  th e  a t t e n tio n  o f th e  defenders o f  th e  guns.^^ In  
th e  sem i-darkness o f  th e  n igh t th e  B r i t i s h  d id  not see M ille r  lead  
th e  2 1 st to  th e  r ig h t  o f  th e  b a t te ry ,  advance behind th e  cover o f  th e  
r a i l  fence of th e  cem etery, and approach w ith in  t h i r t y - f iv e  fe e t  o f th e  
guns. The men o f th e  2 1 s t,  M il le r  r e c a l le d ,  "could see t h e i r  slow- 
matches and t h e i r  p o r t - f i r e s  burn ing  and read y ."  He had h is  men r e s t  
t h e i r  muskets on th e  fen ce , aim, and f i r e .^ ^  The 21st th en  bowled 
th e  fence over, charged th e  B r i t i s h  manning th e  guns, and "wrested 
th e  Sponges out o f  t h e i r  hands and took every p iec e . This put a s to p  
to  th a t  p a rt o f  th e  n o i s e . H i l l e r ' s  men captured  about t h i r t y
^%he t r a d i t i o n  i s  th a t  M ille r  s a id ,  " I ' l l  t r y ,  s i r . "  Brown 
to  Armstrong, Aug 9 , Brown's Documents (ed , C ruikshank), 58-59; 
S tatem ent o f I4acDonald. (R ip le y 's )  F a c ts . 11.
^^Statem ent o f MacDonald, (R ip le y 's )  F a c ts . 11-13. The 1 st 
Regiment a rr iv e d  a t  Chippawa in  th e  morning o f J u ly  25.
^^To [ ? ] ,  Jy 28, Documentary H is to ry  (ed . C ruikshank), I ,  105.
B ak er's  Memory Book, (G) M il i t i a ,  1® 24 (PAC).
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a r t i l l e r i s t s  and im prisoned them in  th e  church, b u t ju s t  a s  he 
a lig n e d  the  regim ent i n  th e  a r t i l l e r y  p a rk , th e  B r i t i s h  4 1 s t  gave a  
v o lle y  and charged w ith  bayonets ready. The 21st re tu rn ed  th e  f i r e  
and h a lte d  th e  B r i t i s h  advance. But once and tw ice  more th e  41st 
came on. The l in e s  were so c lo se  " th a t  th e  b laze  o f  , ,  ,  guns 
c ro ssed  each o th er"  and some men fought hand-to-hand.^^
The 23rd , in  th e  meantime, had marched northward in  column 
along th e  P ortage koad and tu rn e d  onto Lundy's Lane, Approaching 
w ith in  150 y a rd s  o f th e  h i l l ,  th e  r ig h t  wing o f th e  B r i t i s h  89th, 
which was now p u llin g  back from th e  p ressu re  of J e su p 's  2 5 th  and 
B id d le 's  a r t i l l e r y ,  f i r e d  on th e  column o f  the  2 3 rd , The Americans 
f a l te r e d  and f e l l  back f i f t y  o r  s ix ty  y a rd s . But Ripley rode up, 
reformed the  column, and led  i t  down th e  la n e . As th e  23rd approached 
the  c e n te r  o f  th e  h i l l ,  R ipley could see a  sheet o f  f i r e  between th e  
American 21st and th e  B r i t i s h  4 1 s t ,  and he guessed th a t  M ille r  had 
tak en  th e  h i l l  and was f ig h tin g  o f f  B r i t i s h  a t ta c k e r s .  Turning th e  
column s l i g h t ly  to  th e  r ig h t ,  he drove i n  th e  l e f t  o f th e  41 s t ,  and 
the  f i r in g  ceased .
There ^fas a b r i e f  l u l l  i n  the  f ig h t in g  a s  both s id e s  rece iv ed  
rein fo rcem ents and redeployed. The 1 st Regiment climbed th e  h i l l  and 
jo in ed  the 2 1 s t and 2 3 rd , R ip ley  formed h is  b rig ad e  in to  l in e  in  th e  
re a r  o f  the  cap tu red  B r i t i s h  b a t te ry .  P o r te r 's  300 men had come onto  
th e  f i e l d  as th e  Second Brigade stormed th e  h i l l ,  and now he led  them
3 % Iille r  to  [ ? ] ,  Jy 28, Documentary H is to ry  (ed. C jm ikshank), 
I ,  105-106.
^ % ilk in so n . Memoirs. I ,  704; Statem ent o f  MacDonald, 
(R ip le y 's )  F a c ts .  13.
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to  th e  l e f t  o f  R ip le y 's  l in e .  Brovm t o ld  Jesup t o  form h i s  regim ent
on th e  r ig h t  o f  the  Second B rig ad e , Hindman brought up h i s  a r t i l l e r y
companies. The Americans were on the  h i l l  and a c ro ss  th e  lane  v d th  
t h e i r  backs toward th e  spray  o f  th e  f a l l s  a m ile away. From l e f t  to  
r ig h t  they  were in  t h i s  o rd er: P o r te r 's  Third B rigade, R i tc h ie 's  two 
12-pounders, th e  1 s t,  th e  2 1 s t,  Towson's two 6-pounders, th e  23rd , th e  
25 th , and B id d le 's  two 12-pounders on th e  extreme r ig h t  a t  th e  ju n c tio n  
o f th e  lane and th e  ro ad . S c o tt formed a  co n so lid a ted  b a tta l io n  o u t
o f th e  rem ains o f  the  9 th , 1 1 th , and 22nd (400 to  600 men) and le d  i t
a c ro ss  th e  f i e l d  toward th e  w est, h a lt in g  about 100 yards in  the  r e a r  
o f P o r te r 's  b r ig a d e .
Very s h o r t ly  a f t e r  R ip le y 's  b rig ad e  cap tu red  th e  B r i t i s h  guns. 
Colonel H ercules S co tt a rr iv ed  on the  f i e l d  w ith 1,200 men o f th e  103rd, 
the  f la n k  companies o f  th e  104th, a detachment o f  th e  K in g 's , a d e tach ­
ment o f  the  R oyals, some m i l i t i a ,  and two 6-pounders. S c o tt  had been 
a t  Twelve I-Iile Greek d u rin g  th e  m orning. In  th e  a fte rn o o n  he rece iv ed  
a message from R ia l l  o rd erin g  him to  march to  Lundy's Lane. W ithin 
th re e  m iles o f  h is  d e s tin a tio n  he rece iv ed  an o th er message in s t ru c t in g  
him to  tu rn  back . R etrac in g  h i s  s tep s  fo u r  m ile s , a t h i r d  messenger 
overtook him and to ld  him to  jo in  th e  b a t t l e  th en  rag in g . A fter 
covering  a t o t a l  d is ta n c e  of tw en ty  m ile s ,  S co tt and h is  men reached 
Lundy's Lane s h o r t ly  a f t e r  9:00 P.M.
^^Statem ent o f  MacDonald, and Leavenworth to  R ip ley , 15 
Jan 1815, (R ip le y 's )  F a c ts .  13# 22-23; Brown to  Armstrong, Aug 7, 
Brown's Documents (ed . C ruikshank), 59-60; N arra tiv e  o f McMullen, 
Documentary H is to ry , ( e d . C ruikshank), I I ,  374-75; N arra tiv e  o f 
Jesup , in  In g e r s o ll ,  H is to r ic a l  S ketch . I I ,  107.
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Drummond prolonged h i s  r ig h t  w ith  th e  103rd and the  flanlc 
companies o f  th e  104th. The G len g a rrie s , th e  Embodied M il i t i a ,  a 
detachment o f  the  K in g 's , and a detachment o f  th e  Royals formed in  
t h e i r  r e a r .  His o r ig in a l  l in e  had f a l l e n  back about 200 yards from 
th e  to p  of th e  h i l l ,  Hercules S c o t t 's  two 6-pounders and the  de tach ­
ment o f th e  4 1 st were on th e  extreme l e f t ;  th e  89th , th e  Incorpora ted  
M il i t i a ,  and a  detachment o f th e  K in g 's , on th e  r ig h t  o f  th e  4 1 s t,  
faced  th e  guns o f Towson,^^
Drummond's fo rc e  numbered alm ost 2,800 men. I t  could not 
have su ffe red  many c a s u a l t ie s  during th e  f i r s t  p a r t  o f  th e  b a t t l e .
Only th e  4 1 s t had been c lo s e ly  engaged with th e  Americans, and th e  
G len g arries  and the  Embodied M il it ia  had lo s t  on ly  a r e l a t i v e ly  few 
men,^^ The L eft D iv isio n  to ta le d  about 2 ,000, su b tra c tin g  th e  lo sse s  
o f th e  F i r s t  B r i g a d e , T h e  f ro n t  o f  th e  B r i t i s h  l in e  was w ider than  
th e  American l in e  by a  few hundred y a rd s , but could n o t p r o f i t  by th e  
advantage. Although th e  moon shone, hazy darkness enveloped th e  f i e ld ,  
and n e ith e r  s id e  could  c le a r ly  see th e  o th e r . The B r i t i s h  were unaware 
th ey  outnumbered th e  Americans and flanked  t h e i r  l in e ,  and th ey  thought 
in  f a c t  th a t  th e  c o n tra ry  was th e  c a se . Moreover, near confusion 
re ig n ed : th e  l in e s  were d iso rd e rly ;  dead bodies strew n over th e  f ie ld
35Drummond to  P révost, Jy  27, C 684, RG 8 (PAC); Sketch o f 
A ction , Map V l/40?-N iagara-l814 , (PAG); Cruikshank, B a ttle  o f  Lundy's 
Lane. 26-27,
^^Return o f th e  K ille d , Wounded, and M issing, Jy  25, 0 695A, 
RG 8 (PAC).
^"^Return o f th e  K il le d , Wounded, and M issing, Jy  25, in  
W illiam  James, A Full and C orrec t Account o f th e  M ilita ry  Occurences 
, , . , (London, 1818), I I ,  App, 33, 448. The c a s u a l t ie s  o f  th e  
9 th , 11th, and 22nd f o r  th e  e n t i r e  b a t t l e  were 386, o r  50^.
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and fences and hedges caused men to  stumble and f a l l ;  f i f t y  muskets 
d ischarged  in to  th e  b lackness could seem a s  1,000 to  s o ld ie rs  fumb­
lin g  t h e i r  way over th e  f i e l d .  A ll  Drummond could do was to  send h is  
l in e  up th e  h i l l  to  re tak e  th e  guns.
On th e  l e f t  o f th e  American l in e  th e re  was d e su lto ry  f ir in g  
between P o r te r 's  v o lu n tee rs  and detachm ents o f  th e  B r i t i s h  103rd,
104th ,  and Royals. P r iv a te  Alexander McMu l l en from Cumberland County, 
Pennsylvania, was w ith them . When he got t o  h is  p o s it io n  on th e  l e f t  
o f  R ip le y 's  l in e  w ith  h is  comrades. P o rte r  to ld  them: "Show your­
se lv es  men and a s s i s t  your b re th re n !"  Ju s t  then  "showers o f  musket 
b a l l s  came over o u r heads l ik e  a sweeping h a i l  s to rm ,"  as i f  in  answer 
to  P o r te r 's  c a l l .  The v o lu n tee rs  re tu rn ed  th e  f i r e  fo r  a few minutes 
u n t i l  th e  o f f ic e r s  to ld  them to  cease  f i r in g  and advance. McMullen 
and th e  o th ers  were out o f  ammunition, and th e  advance was postponed 
i n  o rder to  d i s t r ib u te  c a r tr id g e s  and f l i n t s  along th e  l in e .  This 
done, th e  "brave b rig a d e , blackened w ith powder, marched forw ard . , ,  
over th e  dead and dying who were l i t e r a l l y  i n  heaps." The b rig ad e  had 
t o  pass through a th ic k e t  and climb an o ld  fence , vdiich d iso rd e red  
th e  l i n e .  The B r i t i s h  were a few yards away; "a d e a th - lik e  s ile n c e  
f o r  a few moments p re v a ile d , and b o th  arm ies stood s t i l l . "  A B r i t i s h  
o f f ic e r  y e lle d  and asked i f  th e  Americans were su rren d e rin g . McMullen's 
l ie u te n a n t  answered th a t  th e  v o lu n tee rs  "never would s u rre n d e r,"  Both 
s id e s  began f i r in g  aga in , b u t th e  d iso rd e red  l in e  o f  v o lu n tee rs  responded 
w ith  i r r e g u la r  v o lle y s  and f le d  back over th e  fence. They h a lte d  a f t e r  
running about 100 yards and reform ed in to  l i n e .  The B r i t i s h  pursued, 
b u t N icholas and th e  1st came to  th e  support o f  th e  v o lu n te e rs  and
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drove th e  B r i t i s h  back w ith  se v e ra l v o lley s
In  th e  meantime, th e  B r i t i s h  charged th e  c e n te r  and r ig h t  of 
R ip le y 's  l in e .  Soon a f t e r  both l in e s  had formed, follow ing th e  a r r i ­
v a l  o f re in fo rcem en ts , th e  103rd, th e  Royals, the  K in g 's , th e  In co r­
porated  M il i t i a ,  th e  89th , and th e  4 1 s t advanced upon R ip le y 's  b r i ­
gade and Je su p 's  2 5 t h . T h e  B r i t i s h  came on slow ly; a l l  was q u ie t 
and the muskets were made ready . The Americans could b a re ly  see  
them in  th e  d a rk n ess , and in  o rder t h a t  h is  men could tak e  aim , Rip­
le y  to ld  them to  rese rv e  f i r e  u n t i l  th ey  would f i r s t  see the f la s h  
from B r i t i s h  m uskets. The B r i t i s h  l in e  was w ith in  t h i r t y  f e e t  o f  
J e s u p '3 25 th , and s ix ty  f e e t  o f R ip le y 's  b rig a d e , when i t  gave i t s  
f i r s t  v o lle y . The Americans answered, aiming a t  th e  glowing b u tto n s  
on the  red  c o a ts .  Hindman's b a t t e r i e s  f ir e d  grape and c a n is te r  in to  
B r i t i s h  ran k s , b u t th e  l in e s  were to o  c lo se , and th e  f i r e  d isa b le d  
o n ly  a few men a t  a  tim e. The B r i t i s h  over-compensated fo r  th e  
h e ig h t o f  th e  h i l l  and aimed too h ig h ; many o f  t h e i r  sh o ts  flew  over 
t h e  heads o f  th e  Am ericans, F ire  f ig h tin g  continued  f o r  about tw enty 
m inutes. "Our tro o p s  took d e lib e ra te  aim," Jesup remembered, "and 
o u r f i r e  was so t e r r i b l e ,  t h a t  in  a  few m inutes h is  l in e  re c o i le d — 
th en  b roke, and o f f ic e r s  and men f le d  from th e  f ie ld ."
During th e  q u ie t o f  th e  next t h i r t y  m inutes th e  Americans 
res to ck ed  t h e i r  pouches w ith  c a r tr id g e s  and red ressed  t h e i r  l in e ;  
c a r t r id g e s  were scarce  and some were taken  from the  b od ies o f  th e
^^M arrative o f McMullen, Documentary H isto ry  (ed . C ruikshank),
I I ,  375.
^^Drummond to  P ré v o st, Jy 27 , C 684, RG 8 (PAG); Brown's 
memoranda. Brown's Documents (ed . C ru ikshank), 83.
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dead and wounded ly in g  on th e  f i e l d . B r o v m  in tended  to  defend and 
occupy th e  h i l l  u n t i l  daybreak, fo r  i t  was th e  b e s t p o s it io n  in  th e  
a re a ,  V/hen riipley asked him whether th e  cap tu red  a r t i l l e r y  should 
be removed from th e  f i e ld .  Brown d ism issed  th e  id ea , because he f e l t  
t h e r e  were m atters  o f  more im portance to  a tte n d  to .  He thought h is  
d iv is io n  cou ld  hold th e  ground,
The B r i t i s h  l in e  ag a in  began to  advance. The Americans could 
h e a r  the  d i s ta n t  shou ts o f " h a l t ,  d r e s s ,  f o rw a rd !" ^  H ipley rode to  
Brown and remarked th a t  now was the  c r i t i c a l  moment, and he asked 
t h a t  S co tt be ordered  to  come to  h is  su p p o rt. Knowing th a t  th e  F i r s t  
B rigade was in  a s h a tte re d  c o n d itio n . Brown h e s ita te d  t o  comply w ith 
t h e  re q u e s t .  But he subm itted , rode to  S c o tt, and ordered  him to  ad­
vance.
S c o tt  to ld  Leavenworth to  march the co n so lid a ted  b a tta l io n  to  
th e  top o f  th e  h i l l  and form a second l in e .  Leavenworth led  them to  
th e  re a r  o f  th e  cap tu red  B r i t i s h  guns and formed a l in e  near th e  
church behind the 23rd and th e  2 1 s t, By th is  tim e th e  B r i t i s h  were 
about th ir t .y  yards away and f i r in g  had begun. S co tt rode up to  th e  
c o n so lid a te d  b a tta l io n  and shouted; "Are th ese  troops prepared fo r  
th e  charge?" W ithout w aiting  fo r  an answer, he added; "Yes, I  know, 
th e y  a re  prepared  f o r  an y th in g !" S c o tt formed a  c lo se  column and
^ N a r ra t iv e  o f  Jesup, in  I n g e r s o ll ,  H is to r ic a l  Sketch. I I ,  107.
Brown's memoranda. Brown's Documents (ed , C ruikshank), 84; 
Statem ent o f  Hs-cDonald, (R ip le y ' s ) F a c ts . 13.
^ S c o t t ,  Memoirs, I ,  143,
^%rown to  Armstrong, Aug 7, Brown's Documents (ed . C ruik­
shank), 60.
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ordered ; "Fonvard and charge, my brave f e l l o w s ," ^  S co tt ■wanted to  
tu rn  th e  l e f t  o f  th e  B r i t i s h  l in e  and get in  i t s  r e a r .  But on pass­
in g  th e  church a  B r i t i s h  v o lle y  crashed  in to  the  moving column, fo rc in g  
i t  to  emerge from th e  American l in e  between Towson' s guns and the  21 s t  
a t  an ang le  toivard th e  l e f t ,  and th e  column veered re c k le s s ly  onward 
in  the  confusion  and darkness. Not knowing which tro o p s  were in  
t h e i r  f ro n t ,  th e  21 st f i r e d  b roadside in to  S c o t t 's  column, "which 
produced a  t e r r i b l e  ca rn ag e ,"  C aptain  Pentland  o f th e  22nd Regiment 
thought " i t  was absurd to  suppose t h a t  any men engaged as long as we 
had been, w ithout water and n ea rly  exhausted , could stand  such a f i r e , "  
The column co llap sed  and th e  men f le d  to  a p a th  running p e rp en d icu la r  
to  Lundy's Lane on the  l e f t  o f P o r te r 's  b rig ad e . But S co tt again  
formed th e  men in  c lo se  column and le d  them to  a ch arg e . This time he 
wanted to  tu rn  th e  extreme r ig h t  o f  th e  B r i t i s h  l i n e .  The column 
advanced only  a sh o rt d is ta n c e  when th e  detachm ents o f  th e  103rd  and 
104th  f i r e d ;  S co tt was h i t  in  the  shou lder, and a number o f o th e r  
o f f ic e r s  were wounded. The column pushed p a s t the  r ig h t  o f th e  103rd 
and 104th  only to  f in d  th a t  more B r i t i s h  were in  t h e i r  r e a r .  Scott 
tu rn ed  h is  column around and led  them to  th e  l e f t  o f  P o r te r 's  volun­
t e e r s ,  where th ey  formed in  l in e .  Then abandoning th e  co nso lida ted  
b a tta l io n  to  Leavenworth, S co tt rode o f f  to  jo in  J e su p 's  25th on the  
o th e r  end o f th e  f i e l d ,
^ ^ u o te d  in  Leavenworth to  R ip ley , 15 Jan 1815, (R ip le y 's )  
F a c ts . 23 ,
^^ Ib id , ;  1-îaj. Pent land  to  W ilkinson, I 6 Dec 1816, in  W ilkin­
son, Memoirs, I ,  726,
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For th e  p a s t  t h i r t y  o r  more minutes R ip le y 's  b rigade  and the  
25th  had been f ig h t in g  o f f  th e  second B r i t i s h  charge. C aptain Baker 
o f  the  v o lu n te e rs  b e liev ed  " th e  m usketry exceeded anyth ing  ever 
heard on th e  c o n t i n e n t , T h e  l in e s  were g e n e ra lly  about t h i r t y  
yards a p a r t ,  but th e y  were alm ost fo rm less; a t  some p o in ts  th e  l in e s  
met and men fought hand-to-hand, "For h a lf  an hour," Jesup s a id ,
" th e  b laz e  from th e  muskets o f  the  two l in e s  m ingled. American 
a r t i l l e r y  was le s s  e f f e c t iv e  than i t  had been e a r l i e r .  Rocket b a r­
rag es  had blown up some ammunition c a is so n s , and Hindman's companies 
were sh o rt o f ammunition, Towson l o s t  one o f  h is  guns and a l l  bu t 
two o f i t s  men,^® The 1 st and the  23rd gave ground, th e n  r a l l i e d ;  
th e  21st stood firm ,^ ^  On th e  r ig h t  Jesup formed h is  l in e  in  a  s in g le  
rank , fo r  he had o n ly  about 200 men l e f t ,  and he needed a  w ider f ro n t .  
The confusion  o f th e  moment and th e  fre n z ie d  f i r in g  o f  th e  men probably  
saved many l iv e s .
The B r i t i s h  had th e  w orst o f  i t ,  and t h e i r  bug le  sounded a 
r e t r e a t ;  th e  f i r in g  ceased . I t  was 11:00 P.M. "The th ic k e s t  and most 
im penetrab le  darkness p re v a ile d . A l l  was s t i l l  and no th ing  v/as , . , 
heard but th e  groans o f th e  wounded and d y i n g . B o d i e s  lay  o ver the
^4'Iemory Book, (G) M il i t i a ,  MG 24 (PAG),
4?N arra tiv e  o f  Jesup , in  I n g e r s o ll ,  H is to r ic a l  S ketch, I I ,  107,
^®Dr. E. L, A llen t o  h is  b ro th e r ,  Jy 26, N ile s ' Weekly R e g is te r . 
V I, 13 Aug 1814, 413-14.
^^Statem ent o f  l^acDonald, (R ip le y 's )  F a c ts , 14,
^^Leavenworth to  R ip ley , 15 Jan  1815, (R ip le y 's )  F a c ts , 24; 
Sawyer to  a  f r ie n d , Aug 19, Documentary H is to ry  (ed , C ru ikshank),
I ,  111.
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f i e l d ;  red  and g ray  and b lu e  co a ts  were p i le d  on to p  o f one a n o th e r, 
th re e -d e e p  in  some p lac e s . Near Towson's b a tte ry  th e  mangled ca r­
c a sse s  o f  s ix ty  o r  seventy  horses " d is f ig u re d  the  scene .
Brown met w ith  McRee and Wood, and i t  was t h e i r  consensus 
t h a t  " v ic to ry  was complete" and th e  B r i t i s h  would n o t a tta c k  ag a in . 
Brown was b leed in g  from a wound in  h is  th ig h ,  and he wanted to  re tu rn  
t o  camp. He rode to  Jesup and asked fo r S c o tt  to  g ive him th e  command 
o f  th e  d iv is io n .  But S co tt had been wounded again i n  th e  sh o u ld er, 
w h ile  w ith th e  25th  during th e  B r i t i s h  charge , and he had l e f t  the  
f i e l d .  The command thus devolved on R ip ley , but Brown rode away 
w ithout in form ing him,^^
On h is  own a u th o r i ty  R ip ley  had decided  in  th e  meantime to  
remove th e  cap tu red  a r t i l l e r y  to  th e  American camp. He sen t a req u est 
t o  P o r te r  f o r  v o lu n te e rs  to  haul th e  a r t i l l e r y  o f f  th e  f i e l d .  P o r te r  
complied and sent R ipley some o f h i s  men. Mcl-Iullen was one o f  them.
He marched w ith  h i s  comrades from th e  l e f t  o f  th e  l in e  to  th e  top  o f  
th e  h i l l .  He could never fo rg e t  th e  p e r i l  o f  th e  moment: "This was
one o f th e  most t ry in g  moments o f my l i f e .  Being warm during  the  
engagement I  had opened my v e s t  and s h i r t  c o l l a r ,  and now th e  n igh t 
a i r  c h il le d  me. D eath, th e  common l o t  o f a l l  mankind, i s  g e n e ra lly  
fea re d  th e  n ea re r  i t  approaches u s , I  f e l t  my s i tu a t io n  to  be an 
aw fu l one, and I  d id  s in c e re ly  wish th a t  th e  B r i t i s h  army , , ,
51D r, B u ll t o  C?j, Jy  31, Documentary H is to ry  (ed, C ru ik - 
shank), 104,
^%rown to  Armstrong, Aug 7. Brown' s Documents (ed , C ru ik - 
shank), 6 l ,
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might not come . . .  to  commence th e  engagement a g a i n . M o s t  o f  
th e  h o rses  were dead, and th e re  were no d rag -ro p es. The v o lu n tee rs  
a ttem pted  to  manhandle th e  B r i t i s h  guns and remove them from th e  
p a rk , but th ey  soon gave up th e  s tru g g le , fo r  a l l  were fa tig u ed  and 
t h i r s t y  and t h e i r  faces stung w ith  powder b urns. They refu sed  to  
work anymore.
A fte r  th e  f i r in g  had stopped, Leavenworth had tak e n  th e  con­
s o lid a te d  b a t ta l io n  to  th e  r ig h t  o f  th e  l in e  and jo ined  Jesup . To­
g e th e r  th ey  had l e s s  th an  300 men. Both had been im pressed by th e  
e x te n t o f  th e  B r i t i s h  l in e  during  th e  charges and b e liev ed  th ey  were 
f a r  outnumbered. They fea re d  th a t  i f  th e  B r i t i s h  would advance 
ag a in , th e  American l in e  would be flanked  on th e  l e f t .  They knew 
th a t  th e  men were exhausted and needed w ater, b u t f e l t  t h a t  i t  would
be hazardous to  re f r e sh  them on th e  f i e l d .  Agreeing t h a t  the  d iv i ­
s io n  should r e tu rn  to  th e  camp a t  Ghippawa, Leavenworth went to  
R ip ley  and to ld  him o f t h e i r  view s, lih i le  th ey  were in  co n v e rsa tio n , 
a  m essenger rode up w ith o rd ers  from Brown fo r  R ipley to  c o lle c t  the  
wounded and th e  a r t i l l e r y  and march back to  camp.^^ I t  was only  
a f t e r  having r id d en  p a r t  o f  the  way to  camp th a t  Brown decided to
r e t r e a t .  On th e  road he saw sco res  o f exhausted men stum bling about
looking  fo r  w a te r, and concluded i t  would be b e s t  fo r  th e  d iv is io n  to  
re tu rn  to  Ghippawa to  r e f r e s h  and reo rg an ize  i t s e l f .
^^N arra tive  o f  McMullen, Documentary H is to ry  (ed , Cruikshank),
I I ,  376,
^^A llen to  h is  b ro th e r ,  Jy  26, N ile s ' Weekly R e g is te r . VI,
13 Aug 1814, 414.
^^Leavenworth to  R ip ley , 15 Jan 1815, (R ip le y 's )  F a c ts . 24-25,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
241
The wounded were put in  the  wagons t h a t  Brown had p rev io u sly  
ordered from Ghippawa. Hindman had a lre a d y  hauled away th e  American 
a r t i l l e r y ,  ta k in g  a B r i t i s h  6-pounder t o  rep lace  th e  one Towson had 
l o s t .  The rem ains o f th e  d iv is io n  were formed and marched to  camp; 
the  v o lu n te e rs  le d  th e  way, and the  re g u la rs  covered th e  r e t r e a t ,
A sm all p a rty  remained to  guard th e  B r i t i s h  guns.^^ Drummond's troops 
must have been in  an e q u a lly  d iso rg a n iz e d  and exhausted s ta t e .  But 
once th e  Left D iv isio n  withdrew, a B r i t i s h  fo rc e  o f  unknown s iz e  
charged the  h i l l  and re to o k  th e  guns.^"^
When R ip ley  a rr iv e d  a t  camp between 1:00 and 2 :00  A.M., Brown 
ordered  him to  reo rg an ize  and re f re sh  th e  d iv is io n  and re tu rn  t o  the  
f ie ld  o f  b a t t l e  befo re  daybreak. R ip ley  was to  be "governed by c i r ­
cum stances," b u t h is  main ta sk  was to  b r in g  back the  B r i t i s h  a r t i l l e r y .  
Ripley l e f t  Ghippawa a t  su n rise  with about 1,000 men. H alf a m ile  
down th e  Portage Road he h a lte d  h is  column and sen t two p la toons 
ahead t o  reco n n o ite r  th e  ground. They found th e  B r i t i s h  occupying 
a low h i l l  about one m ile  south o f  Lundy's Lane. L ieutenant Samuel 
Tappan, vrfio le d  one o f  th e  p la to o n s , rep o r ted  t h a t  the  B r i t i s h  "p o s i­
tio n  was commanding, h i s  flan k s  w ell covered , h i s  c e n te r  im penetrable ,
. . . and i t  would . . .  have been an a c t  of rashness b o rd erin g  on 
in s a n i ty  to  have attem pted  an a tta c k  on a  v e te ra n  foe, p o ssess in g
every advantage „58
^^Brown's memoranda. Brown's Documents (ed . Gruikshank), 85.
^'^Hindman's s ta tem en t, (R ip le y 's )  F a c ts . 43-44. Hindman had 
gone back fo r th e  B r i t i s h  guns and then  lea rn ed  o f  t h e i r  re c a p tu re . 
There a r e  few B r i t i s h  accounts o f  the  b a t t l e .  Had Drummond g iven  up 
th e  f ig h t?  Drummond n ev er adm itted  he had lo s t  th e  h i l l .
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R ipley re tu rn ed  t o  Ghippawa l a t e  in  th e  morning. Brown had 
gone to  B uffalo t o  recover from h is  wound, and R ip ley  now commanded 
th e  L eft D iv is io n , t o ta l in g  1,344 e f f e c t iv e s .  The r e s t  o f th e  d iv i ­
sion  was occupied in  t ra n sp o rt in g  th e  p r iso n e rs  and th e  v/ounded to  
Buffalo and the h o s p ita l  a t  W illia m sv ille ; some 200 " s tra g g le rs "  
crossed  th e  Niagara w ith th e  w o u n d e d ,D u r in g  th e  a fte rn o o n  o f the  
tw e n ty -s ix th  R ip ley  broke camp and r e t r e a te d  to  Fort E r ie ,  He judged 
th a t  though the  Ghippawa R iver was a form idable m il i ta ry  o b s ta c le  i f  
defended w ith a s u f f ic ie n t  number o f  tro o p s , Drummond could e a s i ly  
surmount i t ,  j u s t  as the  L e ft D iv ision  had when f l i a l l  once defended 
i t . “
The Left D iv isio n  had lo s t  861 men in  th e  b a t t l e  o f Lundy's 
Lane—171 k i l l e d ,  571 wounded, and 110 m issing . Out o f  th ese  t o ta l s  
th e re  were 20 o f f ic e r s  and NCO's dead , 17 m issing , and 93 wounded, 
in c lu d in g  Brown and S c o tt, B r i t i s h  c a s u a l t ie s  were 84 k i l l e d ,  559 
wounded, 193 m issing , and 42 p r is o n e rs .  The t o t a l  o f  878 was h igher 
than  th e  American t o t a l ,  b u t Drummond had l o s t  fewer o f f ic e r s  and 
NCO's; o n ly  5 were dead, 45 wounded, and 10 m issing. There were 
f a r  more wounded and f a r  few er dead in  the  B r i t i s h  ra n k s , because 
many o f th e  Americans had used buckshot in  t h e i r  m uskets in s te a d  o f 
th e  s tandard  b a ll ,^ ^  The De V /a ttev ille  and 4 1 st Regiments jo in ed  
Drummond on August 1, in creasin g  th e  s ize  o f  h is  f i e l d  force t o  3,150.
Return o f  American lo s s e s ,  in  James, M l i ta r y  Occurences.
I I ,  448; Return o f  B r i t i s h  lo s s e s ,  G 695A, RG 8 (PAG), The b a t t l e  was 
a ls o  known as th e  b a t t l e  o f  Niagara and the  b a t t l e  o f  B ridgew ater,
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The g a rriso n s  in  the  f o r t s  were i n t a c t , O n  Ju ly  31 R ip ley ’s t o t a l  
e ff e c tiv e  fo rc e  numbered about 2 ,200.^^
The L e ft D iv ision  was n u m erica lly  in capab le  o f  co n tinu ing  the 
campaign. Brown had to  convalesce a t  W illiam sv ille  u n t i l  September, 
and S c o tt was so se v e re ly  wounded th a t  he could not f ig h t  fo r  th e  
r e s t  o f  the war. There was b i t t e rn e s s  between Brovm and R ipley ,
Brown was fu rio u s  th a t  R ipley had not re tu rn ed  to  Lundy's Lane on 
the  morning o f  th e  tw e n ty -s ix th , but had subsequently  r e t r e a te d  to  
Fort E r ie ,  In  h is  re p o r t  o f th e  b a t t l e  to  Armstrong, he openly 
questioned  R ip le y 's  sense o f  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  and "moral courage," On 
Ju ly  26 he wrote to  Gaines a t  Sackets Harbor and ordered  him to  come 
to  th e  f r o n t ie r  and rep la c e  R ip ley  as th e  commander o f  th e  Left D iv i­
s io n ,
The Niagara campaign o f  1814 had f a i l e d  owing to  th e  absence 
o f adequate l o g i s t i c a l  support from Chauncey, His p ro c ra s tin a tio n  
had l e f t  Brown s tranded  in  th e  pen in su la  and enabled Drummond to  
re in fo rc e  R ia l l  by Lake O ntario , Brown had been unablp to  e x p lo it 
th e  Ghippawa v ic to ry ,  because, lack in g  re in fo rcem ents , guns, and 
naval a s s is ta n c e ,  he could not make good h is  lo s s e s ,  tak e  Fort George, 
and secure  h is  communications. The b a t t l e  o f Lundy's Lane had r e ­
su lte d  from Brovm's desp era te  re a c t io n  to  Drummond's f e in t  a g a in s t h is  
supply depo ts, Chauncey should have been ca sh ie re d , b u t Madison and
^^James, M l i ta r y  Occurences. I I ,  161-62,
^^Adams, H is to ry  o f  th e  United S ta te s ,  V III , 69,
^^Brown's memoranda. Brown's Documents (ed . C ruikshank), 86,
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Brown, n a tu ra l ly  a g g re ss iv e , was fe ro c io u s  in  h i s  p r iv a te  
and pub lic  c r i t ic i s m  o f  Chauncey. His an im osity  had been b u ild in g  
s in c e  he had begun to  suspect Chauncey's commitment to  h e lp  th e  army 
in  June.^^  But th e re  was something to  be sa id  fo r  Chauncey's r e p ly :  
"Was i t  f r ie n d ly  o r j u s t  o r honorable , . . .  to  in fe r  t h a t  I  had 
pledged m yself to  meet you on a  p a r t i c u la r  day a t  th e  head of th e  
Lake, fo r  th e  purpose o f co o p e ra tio n , and in  case  of d i s a s t e r  to  your 
army, thus to  tu rn  • . . resentm ent from you, who a re  a lo n e  re sp o n s ib le , 
upon me, who could n o t by any p o s s ib i l i ty  have p reven ted , or re ta rd e d  
even , your discom fiture?"^ '^  Chauncey could , o f  course , have done 
more than  j u s t  "re ta rd ed "  Brown's d isc o m fitu re , bu t Brown was respon­
s ib l e ,  and Armstrong shared th e  r e s p o n s ib il i ty ,  fo r  having invaded 
b e fo re  Chauncey s a i le d .  The com bination of Brown's ag g ress iv en ess  
and Chauncey's cau tio n  had been f a t a l ,  fo r  Lundy's Lane, th e  d i r e c t  
r e s u l t  o f  t h a t  com bination, had marked th e  d e fe a t  o f th e  major American 
o ffen s iv e  o f  1814. VJhat follow ed was a n tic l im a c t ic ,  b u t i t  conformed 
to  a  f a m ilia r  p a tte rn .
^^Brown to  Armstrong, Je  7 and 22 and Jy  25, Brown's Docu­
ments (ed. C ru ikshank), 27-28, 39, 51.
^"^Quoted in  Adams, H is to ry  o f  th e  United S ta te s  = V III, 81 .
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"PLAY OF CHIVALRY"
In  Ju ly  Madison became more a c tiv e  a s  Gommander-in-Ghief— 
f o r  a few weeks. H is r e a l iz a t io n  th a t  lack  o f  cooperation  between 
Chauncey and Brown had s e r io u s ly  hampered o ffe n s iv e  o p e ra tio n s  on th e  
N iagara f ro n t  caused th e  P resid en t t o  q u estio n  A rm strong's performance 
a s  S e c re ta ry  o f War. On J u ly  18 he req u ested  a l l  War Department c o rre ­
spondence w ith  Brown reg ard in g  th e  Cabinet ' s plan o f  campaign. Nine 
days l a t e r  Madison thought he d iscovered  an o th e r of A rm strong 's f a i l ­
in g s :  " I t  does n o t ap p ear,"  he wrote th e  S e c re ta ry , " th a t  Iz a rd ,
though th e  sen io r  o f f ic e r  o f  the  d i s t r i c t ,  has been made acquain ted  
w ith  the  p lan  of o p e ra tio n s  under Brown, o r t h a t  any correspondence 
e x is t s  between th o se  o f f ic e r s ," ^  Drummond had been a b le  to  match 
Brown's s tre n g th  i n  th e  p en insu la  because o f  Chauncey's p ro c ra s tin a ­
t i o n ,  and a ls o  because the  B r i t i s h  had moved troops and su p p lie s  up 
th e  S t. Lawrence to  K ingston. The C abinet, aware o f  th e  l a t t e r  danger, 
had provided  fo r a two-pronged movement o f I z a r d 's  R igh t D iv ision  
a g a in s t  M ontreal and th e  l in e  o f th e  S t .  Lawrence. But by m id-Ju ly  
Iz a rd  was s t i l l  a t  P la ttsb u rg .
A c tu a lly , Armstrong had sen t th e  p lan  to  Iza rd  on June 11, 
and Izard  had rece iv ed  i t  th i r te e n  days l a t e r .  On June 21, in  con-
^L e tte r s  and Other W ritings (Congress e d .) .  I l l ,  412-13.
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fo rra ity  w ith  th e  C a b in e t's  p lan , he had fu r th e r  in s tru c te d  Iza rd  to  
send an en g ineer to  th e  S t .  Lawrence B iver in  o rd er to  determ ine th e  
most fav o rab le  p o in t fo r  c o n s tru c tin g  a post a long th e  B r i t i s h  l in e  
o f  comm unications.^ But when Armstrong informed Madison o f  th e se  
l e t t e r s ,  th e  P resid en t n e v e rth e le ss  noted th a t  the  S e c re ta ry  had s t i l l  
been rem iss , because he had n o t in s t ru c te d  Brown and Iza rd  to  open a 
correspondence. Armstrong, I4adison f e l t ,  had f a i le d  t o  encourage 
coopera tion  between commanders and had assumed too  much command au- 
r fo r  h im se lf .^
Armstrong deserved th e  cen su re , bu t he was as  much th e  v ic tim  
o f th e  command system and of slow communications as were th e  m il i t a ry  
commanders. The es tab lish m en t o f a correspondence between Iza rd  and 
Brown in  June and th e  g ran tin g  o f a d d it io n a l  d is c r e t io n a ry  a u th o r i ty  
would have m attered  l i t t l e .  Anxious t o  c ro ss  th e  r iv e r  by th e  end o f 
June, Brown had a lre a d y  decided to  invade on th e  grounds th a t  h is  
o ffe n s iv e  would a id  I z a r d 's  o p e ra tio n s!  The b a s ic  cause o f o ffe n s iv e  
non-cooperation  was th e  absurd Cabinet plan  o f  campaign. I t  had been 
based on a m isc a lc u la tio n  o f l o g i s t i c a l  support and manpower, vdiich 
subsequen tly  led  Armstrong and Brown to  re v ise  th e  p lan  o f  campaign 
fo r  N iagara and had prevented  Izard  from moving on tim e .
On tak in g  command o f th e  Bight D iv isio n  in  May, Izard  had 
found i t  in  a  d ep lo rab le  c o n d itio n . W ilk in so n 's  and Hampton's move­
ments in  inclem ent w eather du rin g  th e  f a l l  and w in ter had produced
^ ( I z a rd 's )  O f f ic ia l  Correspondence. 33-34, 43-44.
^M adison's no te  on Arrastroi 
W ritings (Congress e d ,) .  I I I ,  413.
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s ic k n e ss , d e s e r t io n , and reduced e f f e c tiv e  s tre n g th . In  2>lay a minor 
epidemic o f  sm allpox s tru c k . As l a t e  as June 1 th e re  were o n ly  s ix ty  
ho rses  f i t  fo r  s e rv ic e  fo r  th e  dragoons, f o r ty  fo r  th e  l ig h t  a r t i l l e r y ,  
and s ix  f o r  the  Q u a rte rm a s ter 's  Departm ent, No funds were on hand 
e i th e r  f o r  th e  q u a rte rm a s te rs  or f o r  th e  r e c r u i t s ,  who began to  a rr iv e  
i n  m id-June, The tro o p s had not rece iv ed  t h e i r  pay f o r  s ev era l months, 
c lo th in g  was c h ro n ic a lly  s h o r t ,  and th e  s t a f f  o f f ic e r s  had been la x  
i n  t h e i r  d u ty  reg a rd in g  t r a in in g  and d i s c ip l in e .  Some t ra in in g  had 
been undertaken b e fo re  I z a r d 's  a r r i v a l ,  bu t Iza rd  complained th a t  i t  
had been f i t f u l  and unsystem atic—d if f e r e n t  d r i l l  books had been used, 
Iza rd  was f in a l ly  ab le  to  i n s t i t u t e  a program o f  t r a in in g  under Steu­
b e n 's  B lue Book in  June, b u t i t  was n o t e n t i r e ly  s u c ce ss fu l, because 
most o f  th e  o f f ic e r s  were a s  raw as  th e  r e c r u i t s ,  W ilkinson and 
Hampton had p erm itted  la rg e  numbers o f  long-term  o f f i c e r  fu rlo u g h s, 
some o f th e  b est o f f ic e r s  had re s ig n e d , some had been tra n s fe r r e d  to  
o th e r  a re a s  o f th e  f r o n t ie r ,  and s e v e ra l  f a i l e d  to  re p o r t  w ith t h e i r  
regim ents vrtien c a l le d  to  P l a t t  sburg. Many r e c r u i t s ,  whose comrades 
had d e se r ted  en ro u te  to  P la ttsb u rg , d e se r ted  a f t e r  a r r iv in g ,  because 
o f f i c e r s ,  in  o rd er to  impose d is c ip l in e  and make up f o r  lo s t  t im e , 
p e rso n a lly  beat them .
N eith er Armstrong n o r Iza rd  was ab le  to  determ ine th e  ex act 
number o f  e f f e c t iv e  troops on hand u n t i l  l a t e  June, The in sp e c to r  had 
been rem iss in  h i s  duty, and the s t a t i s t i c s ,  when compiled, included  
i n  th e  count o f th o se  "p rese n t and absen t"  la rg e  numbers of t ro o p s  
whose companies were elsevdiere on th e  f r o n t ie r ,^  From May to  August
^See A rrastrong-lzard  correspondence from May t o  Ju ly , ( I z a r d 's )  
O f f ic ia l  Correspondence. 2 -5 9 .
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I z a rd  was p reoccupied  w ith o rg a n iz a tio n , supply , and such small b u t 
tim e-consum ing m atte rs  as removing "a g rea t number" o f Negro r e c r u i t s  
from  the New England regim ents and p lac in g  " th e se  people" in  la b o r  
d e t a i l s .  T h e ir  presence in  t h e  l in e  regim ents had been a  "g reat 
annoyance . . . [ to ]  th e  o f f ic e r s  and s o ld ie rs ." ^
Had Armstrong and Jones—on a s se s s in g  th e  s i tu a t io n  a t  Niagara 
and P la t t  sburg—decided  to  recommend postponement of th e  o ffe n s iv e , 
th en  co o p era tio n  might have been e ff e c te d .  Had 14adison chosen to  
e x e rc ise  h is  f u l l  powers, r a th e r  than withdraw from th e  im plem entation 
s ta g e  o f th e  p lan , a s  was h is  want, he might have forced  c o o p era tio n .
On J u ly  27, soon a f t e r  th e  P re s id e n tia l  chiding o f  Armstrong, 
a l e t t e r  from Izard  (d ated  J u ly  19) a rr iv e d  in  W ashington, in  which 
he expressed h is  concern fo r  th e  success o f Brown's o p e ra tio n s : " I
look  with some uneasiness to  th e  westward. Should any a cc id en t occur 
in  t h a t  q u a r te r ,  ought I  not move to  th e  S t. Lawrence, and th re a te n  
th e  re a r  o f  K ingston?"^ Armstrong, c a re fu l  in  responding , f i r s t  r e ­
quested  I fed iso n 's  ad v ic e , and th e  P resid en t c u r t l y  re p l ie d  (Ju ly  30) 
t h a t  by a l l  means, Iza rd  should be g ran ted  the d is c re t io n a ry  a u th o r i ty  
to  do what he saw f i t . '^  On August 2—w ith  sketchy  u n o f f ic ia l  re p o r ts  
o f th e  b a t t l e  o f Lundy's Lane ju s t  in —Armstrong d ire c te d  Izard  t o  
move h is  d iv is io n  to  Sackets Harbor, cooperate w ith  Chauncey, and 
a t t a c k  K ingston from th e  r e a r .  Bearing I-iadison's admonitions in  
mind, Armstrong p o in te d ly  emphasized th e  d isc re tio n a ry  c h a ra c te r  o f
^ Iza rd  to  Armstrong, Jy  3> i b id . , 46-47.
^To Arm strong, ib id . . 55-56.
^ L e tte rs  and O ther W ritings (Congress e d . ) .  I l l ,  414.
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h is  d i re c t iv e  and encouraged Iza rd  to  open a correspondence w ith 
Chauncey.®
Ten days l a t e r ,  a f t e r  reading  more War Department correspond­
ence, liadison expressed h is  d i s s a t is f a c t io n  w ith A rm strong 's re p ly  to  
Iz a rd , p r im a rily  because the  o rd ers  were too  s p e c i f ic .  Any a ttem pt to  
d i r e c t  combined o p e ra tio n s  from Washington, he to ld  th e  S e c re ta ry , 
"w ith  p a r t i c u la r  in s t ru c t io n s  founded th ereo n , must be inadequatej th e  
p lan s  and movements on th e  l in e s  must depend on th e  vary ing  s tre n g th  
and movements o f  th e  enengr, . ,  . and a s  th e  in s t ru c t io n s  may be inap­
p l ic a b le  b e fo re  th ey  a r r iv e ."  The tim e lag  involved in  channeling 
communications between th e  w idely sep ara ted  commanders a t  N iagara, 
S ackets Harbor, and P la ttsb u rg  through Washington was so g rea t a s  to  
ren d e r the  p ro cess  im p ra c tica b le . Madison had ra th e r  b e la te d ly  d i s ­
covered one o f  th e  b a s ic  problems co n fro n tin g  th e  government in  con­
d u c tin g  the  w ar,^
N e ith e r Armstrong nor I&dison understood th e  o th e r .  Madison 
b e liev ed  the  b e s t command p o lic y  would be to  g ive complete d is c re t io n ­
a ry  a u th o r i ty  to  the  commanders in  the  f i e ld ,  who, a c tin g  in  c o n c e r t, 
could best respond to  B r i t i s h  th r e a ts .  No o p e ra tio n a l o rd ers  o f  any 
k in d , he seemed to  be say ing , should emanate from Washington. Arm-
°Armstrong to  Iza rd , Jy  27, enc. same to  same, Aug 2, ( I z a r d 's )  
O f f ic ia l  Correspondence, 61-65. I t  appears th a t  Armstrong wrote th e  
l e t t e r  on August 2 b u t dated i t  Ju ly  27 in  o rd er to  dem onstrate t o  
Madison th a t  he had thought o f  a  westward movement b efo re  hearing  from 
Iz a rd , Iza rd  never rece iv ed  th e  " o r ig in a l"  J u ly  27 l e t t e r .  Armstrong 
claim ed the J u ly  27 l e t t e r  had been l o s t  in  th e  m ails and thus se n t a 
"copy" o f i t  on August 2 . He may have been t r u t h f u l .
^ L e tte rs  and Other W ritings (Congress e d . ) .  I l l ,  416. Madi­
son had requested  a d d it io n a l  War Department correspondence on August 
10. I b id . .  415-16.
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s tro n g  b e liev ed  he could on ly  encourage cooperation  between commanders 
i f  he o ffe re d  them a l te rn a t iv e  courses o f a c t io n .  But d e sp ite  t h e i r  
d i f f e r in g  view s, why tlad ison’ s c r i t ic i s m  of Armstrong? Izard  had 
asked # ie th e r  he should a tta c k  K ingston, and Armstrong had in s t ru c te d  
him, on th e  advice o f  Madison, to  do so , using  such language a s  " I  
throw  th ese  h in ts  f o r  your c o n s id e ra tio n "  and "should you make t h i s  
movement."
For a l l  o f  M adison's new a c tiv ism , he was s t i l l  a  weak 
Gommander-in-Ghief. He seemed to  be fe ig n in g  an  image o f  a c t i v i t y  
and confidence under th e  s t r e s s  o f a  c o lla p s in g  n o rth ern  o ffen s iv e  
and mounting B r i t i s h  d ip lom atic  and m il i t a ry  p re s su re . "The Execu­
t i v e , "  S e ru r ie r  noted  on J u ly  20, "shows h im self calm to  m ain tain  con­
fid e n c e , and up to  now he has s u c c e e d e d . B u t  Madison lacked th a t  
q u a li ty  demanded o f g re a t wartime le a d e rs  which one h is to r ia n  has 
c a lle d  "c h a ra c te r"—th e  m ental s tre n g th , moral power, and force o f  
w i l l  needed a t  d e c is iv e  moments to  dominate whatever even t or c r i s i s  
emerged. Madison blamed Armstrong f o r  n o rth e rn  f a i lu re s  and was 
d i s s a t i s f ie d  w ith  A rm strong 's most rec e n t d i r e c t iv e s ,  b u t  he lacked  
th e  courage, o r th e  ru th le s s n e s s ,  to  fo rc e  him out of o f f i c e .  He 
ac te d  as a schoolm aster, as one who regarded  h i s  fu n c tio n  to  be t h a t  
o f  d is c ip lin in g  m isbehaving su b o rd in a te s  and teach in g  them  the p roper
^^Quoted in  B ran t, James Madison. VI, 277.
S outh ," IVhy th e  North Won th e  C iv il  War, ed. David Donald, C o llie r  
Books (New York, 1962), 35. See a ls o ,  h is  M cClellan. Sherman and 
Grant (New Brunswick, 1962).
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n o rth e rn  war e f f o r t  h im se lf , he t r i e d  to  improve m atte rs  by c r i t i c i z i n g  
Armstrong a f t e r  th e  f a c t .  M adison's answer to  no rth e rn  problems was 
to  g ra n t  g r e a te r  a u th o r i ty  to  th e  g e n e ra ls .  But th e  answer was no 
s o lu t io n .
In h i s  l a s t  d i re c t iv e  on no rth e rn  s tra te g y  fo r  th e  r e s t  o f th e  
year (August 16 ) ,  Madison to ld  Armstrong t h a t  i t  ought to  be a t  th e  
d is c re t io n  o f  th e  commander a t  F o rt E r ie  t o  c ross th e  N iagara , G aines, 
who th e n  commanded th e  f o r t ,  had w r itte n  on August 7 regard ing  the  
p l ig h t  o f th e  army, and Armstrong had a p p a re n tly  asked Madison what 
o rd ers  to  send ,^^  But Brovm, th e  commander over G aines, had a lread y  
i r r e t r ie v a b ly  committed th e  L e ft D iv isio n  to  the  defense  o f  Fort E r ie ,  
R ip ley  had recommended w ithdraw al to  B uffalo  on J u ly  26, b u t to  Brown 
th e  su g g estio n  was a n o th e r example o f R ip le y 's  la c k  o f m oral courage.
He -wanted to  defend th e  f o r t  and m ain tain  a  bridgehead on Canadian 
s o i l .^ ^  At th e  tim e i t  was a f u t i l e  g e s tu re  o f d e te rm in a tio n .
Brown's stro n g  urge to  r e t r ie v e  n a tio n a l  honor and achieve m il i ta ry  
success had b rought him to  Fort E r ie ,  and now th a t  urge kep t him 
th e r e .  But what d id he hope to  accom plish? J u s t i f i c a t io n  f o r  h is  
p rev ious a c tio n s?  No one regarded  the  m aintenance o f  Fort E r ie  as 
very s ig n i f ic a n t  m i l i t a r i l y  o r p o l i t i c a l l y ,  and Brown did n o t e3q)ect 
la rg e  sca le  re in fo rcem en t: " I can be b u t very anxious fo r  th e  u ltim a te
(Congress e d . ) .  I l l ,  417-19.
^%Iadison to  Armstrong, Aug 16, i b i d . , 420; Gaines t o  Arm­
s tro n g , Aug 7 , Documentary H is to ry  (ed , C ruikshank), I ,  122-23.
^^row n to  Armstrong, Aug 1, Brovm's Documents (ed , C ruikshank),
54.
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f a t e  o f t h i s  army, , , . I  doubt v ery  much i f  a  p a r a l le l  can be 
found fo r  th e  s ta t e  o f  th in g s  e x is t in g  upon t h i s  f r o n t ie r ,  A g a lla n t  
l i t t l e  Army s tru g g lin g  w ith th e  Enemies o f t h e i r  Country and devoting  
them selves fo r  i t s  Honor and i t s  s a fe ty ,  l e f t  by th a t  Country t o  
s tru g g le  a lo n e  w ith in  s ig h t & w ith in  h e a rin g ,"  When Drummond brought 
h i s  array up and besieged  th e  f o r t  on August 3> th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  
w ithdraw al had van ished , fo r  th e  shortage  o f b o a ts  prevented a  c ro s s ­
in g  of th e  r iv e r  i n  th e  p resence o f th e  enemy, On August 5 Chauncey 
appeared o f f  M ississauga P o in t,  but th e  Left D iv ision  was trap p ed  
w ith in  i t s  works.
Vtlhether Armstrong d ire c te d  o p e ra tio n s  from Washington o r  the  
commanders d ire c te d  o p e ra tio n s  them selves would in  th e  end produce th e  
same r e s u l t s —in ap p lica b le  p lan s . No one, f o r  example, could have 
a n tic ip a te d  I z a r d 's  cu rious response on August 11 to  th e  r e c e ip t  o f 
A rm strong 's l e t t e r  o f  the  second. S ince w ritin g  on J u ly  19 Iza rd  had 
marched th e  Right D iv isio n  n o r th  to  Chazy and confirm ed previous i n t e l ­
lig e n c e  o f  B r i t i s h  p rep a ra tio n s  fo r  an  imminent in v asio n  up th e  l in e  
o f  Lake Champlain, Large re in fo rcem en ts , he was now c e r ta in ,  had 
r e c e n t ly  a r r iv e d  a t  M ontreal, and he doubted th e  wisdom o f  a w est­
ward movement. N ev e rth e less , he w rote Armstrong: " I  w i l l  make th e
movement you d i re c t  , . , ; b u t I  s h a l l  do i t  w ith  . , , c e r ta in ty  
t h a t  every th ing  in  t h i s  v i c in i ty ,  b u t th e  l a t e ly  e re c ted  works a t  
P l a t t  sburg and Cumberland Head, w i l l  i n  le s s  th a n  th re e  days a f t e r  
my d e p a rtu re , be i n  th e  p o ssession  o f  th e  e n e m y , I z a r d  was a
^^To Armstrong, Aug 19, ib id , , 67-68,
^ ^ ( Iz a rd 's )  O f f ic ia l  Correspondence. 65-66,
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superb a d m in is tra t iv e  o f f ic e r  vdio had molded th e  R ight D iv ision  in to  
a  conçietent fo rce  i n  only a few weeks, but he was u n w illing  t o  accept 
th e  d isc re tio n a ry  a u th o r i ty  vdiich Armstrong had g ran ted . Before 
w aitin g  f o r  a r e p ly , he l e f t  P la ttsb u rg  on August 29 w ith  over 4,000 
re g u la rs  on a rem arkable 400-m ile journey  th a t  would e v e n tu a lly  lead  
to  N iagara . In  th e  process he follow ed a roundabout ro u te  to  S ackets 
Harbor v ia  Schenectady, He had been s u f f i c i e n t ly  d e c is iv e  to  d isc a rd  
Arm strong’s suggested ro u te  o f  march up th e  banks o f th e  S t. Lawrence, 
because i t  would have taken  him through th e  rugged Ghateaugay f o re s t ,  
vAiere a column o f march s tru n g  out f o r  m iles i n  the  woods would have 
been v u ln erab le , he f e l t ,  to  a f la n k  a tta c k ,^  ^
As Iza rd  tu n ie d  h is  back on P la ttsb u rg ,  P révost led  h i s  army 
from M ontreal in to  American t e r r i t o r y  toward P la t t  sb u rg . A l i t t l e  
over a month b e fo re , P révost had rece iv ed  Lord B a th u rs t 's  l e t t e r  of 
June 3 o u tlin in g  B r i t i s h  government s tr a te g y  fo r  1814, B ath u rs t had 
d i re c te d  P révost t o  secure two o b jec tiv e s  a s  soon as  13,000 re g u la r  
re in fo rcem ents from Europe, vdio were a lre a d y  on tra n s p o r ts ,  reached 
M ontreal: (1) "g ive  immediate p ro te c tio n "  t o  th e  Canadas by d es tro y ­
in g  Sackets Harbor and th e  nava l b ases  on Lakes E rie  and Champlain; 
and (2) "o b ta in  , ,  . u ltim a te  s e c u r i ty  to  His I4 a je s ty 's  Possessions 
i n  America" by m ain tain ing  F o rt Niagara and occupying D e tro it  and the 
Michigan T e r r i to ry ,  B r i t i s h  p o lic y  go a ls  in  th e  n o r th  were to  pro­
t e c t  th e  Canadas and to  " re s to re "  D e tro i t  and Michigan to  the  In d ia n s ,^ ' 
The note marked a s h i f t  in  B r i t i s h  s tr a te g y  from th e  defen siv e  to  the
^^Izard  to  Armstrong, Aug 23 and 28, and Sept 1 , i b id , ,  72-75,
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o ffe n s iv e , and i t  rep re se n te d  the  n o rth e rn  a sp ec t o f  t h e i r  o v e ra l l  
in te n t io n  to  p ro secu te  th e  war v ig o ro u sly  u n t i l  th e  United S ta te s  
agreed to  th e  fo llow ing  demands; new Canadian and In d ian  boundariesj 
relinqu ishm en t o f  claim s t o  th e  F lo rid a s  and th e  P a c if ic  Northwest 
c o a s t ; ex c lu sio n  o f  Americans from th e  Grand Banks f is h e r i e s ;  banning 
o f  American tra d e  w ith  th e  West and East In d ie s ;  and c ess io n  o f  New 
O rleans.
P révost chose P l a t t  sburg r a th e r  th an  Sackets Harbor a s  h is  
prime o b je c tiv e . Growing supply sho rtag es  i n  th e  West prevented  even 
th e  sending o f a few rein fo rcem en ts to  K ingston, much le s s  th e  launch­
in g  o f an o ffe n s iv e  ag a in s t Sackets Harbor. Four reg im en ts, in tended  
f o r  K ingston but unable to  go th e r e ,  had to  remain a t  M ontreal. More­
o v e r, Yeo had not a s  yet completed h i s  new s h ip , th e  100-gun S t .  Law­
re n c e . b u t was blockaded i n  p o r t.  P la ttsb u rg ,  on th e  o th er hand, 
corresponded to  B a th u rs t 's  d i r e c t iv e  reg ard in g  the  d e s tru c tio n  o f  any 
American "advanced p o s itio n "  on Lake Champlain; and th e  v d llin g n ess  
o f  Vermont r e s id e n ts  to  su pp ly  th e  B r i t i s h  Army would perm it an  o ffen ­
s iv e  deep in to  American t e r r i t o r y .  Two f a c to r s ,  however, tem p o rarily  
delayed  th e  o ffe n s iv e :  th e  l a s t  o f  th e  tro o p s  from Europe d id  not
a r r iv e  u n t i l  August 17, and work had p rogressed  slow ly  on th e  con­
s tr u c t io n  o f  the  C onfiance, th e  l a t e s t  a d d it io n  to  t h e  B r i t i s h  Cham­
p la in  f l e e t ,  because Yeo had fu n n elled  naval per, u n n e l, s to r e s ,  and 
guns to  Kingston f o r  h is  m onster s h ip .  In  t h e  l a s t  week o f August 
P révost marched h i s  m agn ificen t army o f  10,000 out o f  Lower
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Armstrong had d iscotinted re p o r ts  o f  growing B r i t i s h  s tre n g th  
in  M ontreal ju s t  a s  he had d iscoun ted  warnings o f  an  a tta c k  on Wash­
in g to n . Unlike Madison, who understood and favored symbolic b a t t l e ,  
Armstrong doubted th e  B r i t i s h  would a tta c k  so s t r a te g i c a l ly  unimpor­
t a n t  a t a r g e t  a s  th e  c a p i t a l .  He pooh-poohed r e p o r ts  o f th e  a r r i v a l  
o f  s u b s ta n t ia l  re in fo rcem en ts  in  th e  Canadas, because of h is  e x p e ri­
ence in  th e  past w ith  exaggerated  e s tim a te s  o f  B r i t i s h  s tre n g th  in  
th e  n o r th . The few B r i t i s h  tro o p s vdio had a rr iv ed  in  M ontreal, he 
b e lie v e d , would p robably  go westward. By mid-August th e  s tr a te g ic  
conception  which Armstrong had been developing s in c e  as  e a r ly  as 1813 
had f u l ly  m atured: " I  b e lie v e  , , , th a t  i f  you a r e  not in  co n d itio n
t o  cut your way t o  M ontreal d i r e c t l y  the  b e t t e r  p o lic y  fo r  us  w il l  
be to  c a r ry  the  war westward. By doing so you compel the  Enemy to  
g iv e  much o f h is  fo rc e  to  th e  p ro te c tio n  o f  h is  w ater communication. 
You ren d e r h is  su b s is ten c e  more p reca rio u s  & you dep riv e  him o f  th e  
b e n e f i ts  groidjig o u t o f h i s  commercial in te rco u rse  w ith  Vermont,
He explained  h is  s tr a te g y  to  Izard  on August 12 and r e i t e r a te d  th e  
advantages o f an a tta c k  a g a in s t  K ingston, But he a ls o  noted th a t  
should th e  B r i t i s h  follow  I z a r d 's  movement to  K ingston, he should 
embark on Chauncey's f l e e t ,  land n e a r  B urling ton , and crush Drum­
mond's fo rc e  in  th e  pen in su la  between the  p in ce rs  o f  th e  R ight and
^% itsm an . In c re d ib le  War o f  1812. 215-19; Adams, H is to ry  
o f  the  U nited S ta te s .  V III ,  91-94.
64-65, See a ls o , Armstrong to  Iz a rd , Aug 12, ( I z a r d 's )  O f f ic ia l  
Correspondence. 70 ,
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Left D iv is io n s . Iza rd  was a lre a d y  on th e  march by th e  tim e he r e ­
ceived  th e  l e t t e r .  On August 16, inform ing Brown o f I z a r d 's  move­
ment, Armstrong sen t h is  l a s t  message to  th e  f r o n t ie r ,
H is to r ian s  o f te n  blame both Armstrong and Iza rd  fo r  th e  
abandonment o f  P la ttsb u rg  in  th e  face o f  th e  enemy, Armstrong, how­
ev er, was h a rd ly  to  blame, f o r  no one in  Washington was aware o f  
P ré v o s t 's  p re p a ra tio n s , I z a r d 's  l a s t  warning reached th e  c a p i t a l  too  
l a t e  to  a f f e c t  th e  course  o f  ev en ts . As l a t e  a s  August 16 I4adison— 
in  v io la t io n  o f  h is  own in s t ru c t io n s —d ire c te d  th e  S e c re ta ry  to  o rder 
Iza rd  " to  move a l l  t h a t  can be spared from Champlain to  S a c k e tt 's  
Harbor" in  o rd er to  "make th e  p lace se cu re ,"  and to  have him send th e  
rem ainder, about 2 ,000, to  F ort E rie  "and be ready f o r  any o ffe n s iv e  
o p e ra tio n  concerted  w ith  C h a u n c e y , M a d i s o n  had ap p a re n tly  fo rg o t­
ten  t h a t  Armstrong had a lre a d y  ordered Izard  t o  a tta c k  K ingston, 
Whether Armstrong to ld  Madison o f h is  l a t e s t  d i re c t iv e  regard ing  
Niagara (August 12) i s  u n c e rta in , b u t in  any c ase , Iz a rd , Armstrong, 
and Madison had a l l  come to  th e  same con clu sio n s—Iza rd  a g a in s t h is  
b e t te r  judgment, and Armstrong and Ifedison in  ignorance o f n o rth ern  
developm ents. The l a t e s t  news from th e  f r o n t ie r  was Brown's o f f i c i a l  
re p o r t  on th e  b a t t l e  o f  Lundy's Lane, which a rr iv e d  on August l 6 , ^  
The b a t t l e ,  S e ru r ie r  rep o r ted , had re s to re d  th e  arm y's confidence 
and stren g th en ed  American re s o lv e ,',2 5
^^Brown's Documents (ed , C ruikshank), 63-65,
^^ L e tte rs  and Other W ritings (Congress e d ,) .  I I I ,  420,
^A rm strong to  Brown, Aug 16, Brown's Documents (ed , C ruikshank), 69,
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Three days l a t e r ,  however, th e  B r i t i s h  land ing  a t  B enedict, 
Maryland, th rew  th e  government in to  confusion , and i t  v i r t u a l l y  ceased 
to  fu n c tio n . Public anger over the  Bladensburg d e fea t and the  burning 
o f Washington (August 24-25) focused p r im a ri ly  on Armstrong, and on 
August 29 Madison asked fo r h i s  r e s ig n a tio n .^ ^  Monroe assumed th e  
d u tie s  o f S e c re ta ry  o f  War on September 4 , bu t by the  tim e  the  govern­
ment began to  fu n c tio n  again , Iza rd  was nearing  S ackets Harbor and the  
b a t t l e  of P la ttsb u rg  had been won. Although Iz a rd  had l e f t  o n ly  3,000 
re g u la rs  to  guard P la ttsb u rg , Captain Thomas Macdonough's v ic to ry  over 
the  B r i t i s h  Champlain f l e e t  on September 11 fo rced  P rév o st to  r e t r e a t  
in to  Lower Canada, W ithout n av a l c o n tro l  o f th e  lak e , he could not
hope to  m ain tain  h is  army on American s o i l , 27
For a  period  o f  a l i t t l e  more th an  two months ( l a t e  August 
to  e a r ly  November) o p e ra tio n s  on the  n o rth e rn  f r o n t ie r  conformed to  
M adison's command p o lic y —th e  f ie ld  and naval commanders, in  c o n c e r t, 
determ ined s tr a te g y .  With th e  excep tion  o f th e  d efen siv e  v ic to ry  a t  
P la ttsb u rg , th e  r e s u l ts  were d isa p p o in tin g . Iz a rd  a rr iv e d  befo re  
S ackets Harbor in  m id-September, but in  s p ite  o f  Chauncey's command 
of th e  lake and the  weakness o f  K in g sto n 's  d e fen ses , he gave l i t t l e  
co n s id e ra tio n  to  an a t t a c k ,  A rm strong 's suggestions had c a lle d  fo r  
a c ro ss in g  o f  th e  S t ,  Lawrence R iver n ea r Ogdensburg on bo a ts  p ro ­
vided by Chauncey, From Ogdensburg Iz a rd  could e i th e r  b lock  B r i t i s h  
communications between M ontreal and K ingston o r advance on Kingston
^^ Ib id , . 3 1 3 -1 4 .
'^Prévost to  Bath 
(ed. Wood), I I I ,  P t .  I ,  350-53.
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in  concert w ith  a seaward a t ta c k  by th e  f l e e t .  When Chauncey informed 
Iz a rd  th a t  no sm all b o a ts  were a v a ila b le ,  he tu rn ed  h i s  a t t e n tio n  from 
Kingston to  th e  next a l t e rn a t iv e  provided by Armstrong—th e  p in ce r  
movement in  th e  p en in su la . The r e c e ip t  o f an ea rn est p le a  from Brown 
f o r  a s s is ta n c e ,  w r i t te n  on September 10, persuaded Iz a rd  to  tak e  th e  
d ig h t D iv isio n  to  N iagara .
The war on th e  N iagara had assumed a c h a ra c te r  which presaged 
C iv il  War and World Vfer I  b a t t l e s .  Immobile arm ies, each  incapab le  
o f  d es tro y in g  th e  o th e r ,  were dug in  behind entrenchm ents conducting 
a war o f a t t r i t i o n ,  w ith  th e  edge going to  th e  defense . In  th e  f ig h t ­
in g , the  c a s u a l t ie s  were h ig h , but everyone fought b rav e ly —th e  B r i t i s h  
and Canadians, th e  In d ian s , th e  American v o lu n te e rs  and re g u la rs ,  and 
th e  b a t ta l io n  o f rif lem en  who had f in a l ly  a r r iv e d  a t  B u ffa lo .
Chauncey's command o f  Lake O ntario  caused Drummond to  encounter 
a l l  th e  problems o f th e  o ffe n s iv e  w ithout n av a l su p p o rt. Henry Adams 
f a u l t s  Drummond fo r  b es ieg in g  Fort E r ie  ra th e r  than  s tr ik in g  w ith  h is  
vdiole fo rce  a t  American communications across th e  N i a g a r a . B u t  th e  
re tire m en t o f  Yeo in to  K ingston had s e r io u s ly  r e s t r i c te d  h is  m o b ility , 
d elayed  th e  a r r i v a l  o f  reinforcem ents from K ingston, re ta rd e d  th e  flow 
o f  su p p lie s , and p revented  th e  removal o f  " th e  exhausted Corps, th e  
d isa b le d  and th e  s ic k "  from th e  Niagara f r o n t i e r . O t h e r  h is to r ia n s .
^ % zard  to  Chauncey, Aug 11 and Sept 16, to  Brown, Sept 13 
and 17, ( I z a r d 's )  O f f ic ia l  Correspondence. 77-78, 81-82, 84-85, 88-89. 
In  accordance w ith th e  Cabinet p lan , Chauncey rece iv ed  o rders i n  June 
to  b u ild  15 armed ro w -g a lley s . A pparently  th e y  were n o t b u i l t .  
Chauncey to  Brown, Je  25, Brown's Documents (e d . C ruikshank), 41»
^^H isto ry  o f  th e  United S ta te s . V III, 67-68,
30prevost to  B a th u rs t, Aug 14 and 27, C.O. 42/157, I'D 11 (PAC).
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no tab ly  Canadian ones, c r i t i c i z e  Drummond's la c k a d a is ic a l  p u rsu it  o f  
iiip le y  to  Fort E rie ,^^  But follow ing th e  b a t t l e  o f  Lundy's Lane, 
Drummond's d iv is io n  was a s  d iso rgan ized  and stunned as th e  L eft D iv i­
s io n , and h is  advance was delayed u n t i l  th e  dead o f  both s id e s  were 
b u r ie d , th e  Regiment De W atte v ille  a r r iv e d , and th e  s h a tte re d  re g i­
ments reo rgan ized  and re fre sh e d . In  th e  meantime, R ipley was ab le  to  
s tre n g th e n  th e  f o r t i f i c a t io n s  o f  th e  f o r t .
On August 15, fo llow ing a two-day bombardment, Drummond sen t 
h i s  men a g a in s t  th e  American works w ithout f l i n t s  i n  th e  f i r e lo c k s ,  
recommending "a f r e e  use o f  th e  B a y o n e t . B u t  th e  a tta c k  f a i l e d ,  
and the  B r i t i s h  l o s t  alm ost 900 c a s u a l t ie s  t o  th e  American t o t a l  o f  
84 . Reinforcem ents were c a lle d  up to  rep la c e  th e  tro o p s  l o s t ,  and th e  
s ie g e  con tinued . On August 29 a B r i t i s h  s h e l l  exploded in  G a in es 's  
q u a r te rs ,  wounding th e  g e n e ra l se v e re ly  and fo rc in g  Brown, who had 
n o t f u l l y  recovered  from h is  wound, to  resume command o f th e  Left 
D iv is io n .
By th e  beginning  o f  September Drummond began to  contem plate 
a  s tr a te g ic  w ithdraw al to  Ghippawa in  o rd er to  sh o rten  h is  l in e  o f 
communications. The "unhealthy  Season" was approaching ( i t  ra in ed  
alm ost in c e s s a n tly ) ,  many o f  h is  men were s ic k ,  and he was so sh o rt 
o f  ammunition th a t  he had to  r e s t r i c t  th e  bombardment o f F o rt E r ie  
f o r  days a t  a  tim e ,^ ^  But ho—and th e  tro o p s—persevered  and even 
s ta r te d  c o n s tru c tio n  o f a n o th e r b a tte ry  to  b ea r on an exposed p a rt  o f
^^Hitsman, In c re d ib le  War o f  1812. 200.
^^Arrangement fo r  th e  a t ta c k ,  Aug 14, C 685, RG 8 (PAG). 
^%rummond to  P rév o st, Sept 11, i b id .
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American d e fen ses . I t  was a t  t h i s  po in t th a t  Brown wrote Iza rd ; " I  
w i l l  no t conceal from you th a t  I  co n sid e r th e  f a t e  o f t h i s  army v e ry  
d o u b tfu l, u n less  speedy r e l i e f  i s  a ffo rd e d j and my opin ion  i s ,  t h a t  
th e  w ise st course w il l  be to  e f f e c t  a ju n c tio n "  a t  B u ffa lo ,^^
Chauncey and Iz a rd  completed p rep a ra tio n s  fo r  embarking th e  
fligh t D iv isio n  on September 17, b u t four days o f  v io le n t  storm s and 
west winds p revented  d e p a rtu re , Iza rd  lea rn ed  in  th e  meantime th a t  
Chauncey's command o f th e  lake would be s h o r t - l iv e d ,  fo r  Yeo was 
expected to  emerge from Kingston v ery  s h o r t ly  w ith  th e  S t .  Lawrence, 
The in fo rn a tio n , i n  a d d it io n  to  Brown's p le a ,  precluded  th e  planned 
p in ce r  movement i n  the  p en in su la , because Iza rd  f e l t  th a t  he might 
be l e f t  stran d ed  should Chauncey be fo rced  to  r e t i r e  in to  p o r t .  The 
o n ly  course  o f a c tio n  l e f t ,  he f e l t ,  was t o  jo in  Brown w ith in  Fort 
E r ie  and advance a g a in s t Drummond from th e  south w ith  th e  combined 
s tre n g th  o f  t h e i r  two d iv is io n s ,
Brown, meanwhile, knowing th a t  h e lp  was on th e  way and 
a g a in s t th e  adv ice  o f h is  fe llow  o f f i c e r s ,  n e v e rth e le ss  planned a 
s o r t i e  from th e  f o r t  in  o rd er to  d e s tro y  th e  B r i t i s h  b a t t e r i e s  "and 
roughly handle th e  b rigade  upon d u ty , b e fo re  th o se  in  re se rv e  could  
be brought in to  a c tio n ,"  On September 17 th e  v o lu n te e rs , r e g u la rs ,  
and In d ian s  s tru c k .  They succeeded in  c ap tu rin g  two b a t t e r i e s  and 
p a r t  o f  th e  t h i r d  befo re  th e  B r i t i s h  r a l l i e d ,  but Brown l o s t  79 
k i l l e d ,  216 wounded, and 216 m iss in g . The B r i t i s h  lo ss  was much
^^Sept 10, ( I z a r d 's )  O f f ic ia l  Correspondence. 86, 
^^Izard  t o  Monroe, Sept 17 and 18, ib id . . 88-90,
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g r e a te r —115 k i l l e d ,  1?6 wounded, and 315 m issing ,
At n igh t on September 21 Drummond withdrew to  Ghippawa.
D esp ite  th e  im pression  Brown had made, th e  s o r t i e  had probably  been 
re c k le s s ,  f o r  Drummond was p rep a rin g  to  r e t r e a t  in  any case , and th e  
b a t t l e  had weakened the  L e f t D iv isio n . On September 27 th e  Right 
D iv isio n  reached B atav ia  and by O ctober 13 th e  army, under th e  command 
o f  the  s e n io r  o f f i c e r ,  I z a rd , marched from F o rt E r ie  toward Drummond’s 
works behind  the  Ghippawa, Near S t r e e t 's  Greek, vdiere the  Niagara 
campaign had begun, Izard  p resen ted  h is  army o f 5 ,500 re g u la rs  and 
800 v o lu n tee rs  fo r  b a t t l e .  But Drummond, w ith  only  2,500 e f f e c t iv e s ,  
re fu se d  to  f ig h t  th e  Americans, who in  the  p a s t y e a r  had dem onstrated 
t h e i r  m e t t le .  Three days l a t e r ,  a f t e r  p a tie n tly  w aitin g  f o r  Drummond 
t o  give b a t t l e ,  Iz a rd  lea rn ed  th a t  Chauncey had r e t i r e d  in to  p o r t.  
Three months b e fo re . Brown had been in  e x a c tly  th e  _ame p o s it io n  and 
had decided to  tu rn  R ia ll  ’ s p o s i t io n ,  Iz a rd , however, regarded  such 
a  movement as f u t i l e  w ithout naval a s s is ta n c e  in  th e  campaign vdiich 
would ensue. Cold weather was approaching and Yeo commanded th e  la k e ;  
I z a rd  decided  to  r e t r e a t  t o  B u ffa lo , blow up Fort E r ie ,  and pu t h is  
t ro o p s  in  w in ter  quarters,^"^
^ ^ro w n  to  Monroe, Sept 29, Documentary H is to ry  (ed , G niik- 
shank). I ,  211-214; De V Jattev ille  t o  Drummond, Sept 19, S e le c t  B r i t i s h  
Documents (ed . Wood), I I I ,  P t .  I ,  195-99.
^^Adams, H is to ry  o f  th e  U nited S t a te s . V III , 113-19. Supply 
was s t i l l  a  problem, Iza rd  complained about weapons' m alfunctions, 
i n s u f f ic i e n t  a r t i l l e r y ,  and g en e ra l d iso rg a n iz a t io n , Monroe com­
p la in e d  about th e  shortage  o f  funds in  the  Q uarterm aster Departm ent, 
Brown complained about poor c lo th in g  and sh o es. In  December Brown 
k e p t the  2 5 th  Regiment a t  S ackets Harbor r a th e r  th an  send them home, 
because he thought i t  "im proper to  expose them  to  t h e  view o f  the  
p ro p er people  o f C onnecticu t in  t h e i r  old c lo th s ."  ItoKee, "Serv ice 
o f  Supply" (4 th  P ap e r) , 31-32; Brown to  Monroe, Dec 29, Reg, L trs ,  
R eed ., RG 10? (NA),
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Madison was res ig n ed  to  th e  f a c t :  " Izard  has . . .  o ffe red
b a t t l e  to  Drummond, which he does no t accep t, and vAiich i t  seems 
cannot be fo rced  on him w ithout th e  r is k  o f re inforcem ents now t r a n s -  
poirtable to  him. The most t h a t  can f a i r l y  be hoped fo r  by us i s ,
t h a t  the  campaign may end where i t  is."^®  F o rt E rie  was blown up on
November 5, and as one h is to r ia n  commented, th e  1814 o ffe n s iv e  ended 
w ith  a whimper and a  bang.^9 iza rd  res ig n ed  from th e  array. He had 
l e f t  P la ttsb u rg  when he was most needed; he had avoided a weakened 
Kingston vdien i t  could  have been tak en ; and he had a rr iv e d  a t  Port 
E r ie  when Brown had a lre a d y  d riven  Drummond back to  th e  Ghippawa.
In ap p ro p r ia te  use o f  th e  n av ies on th e  lak es  had decided th e  
f a t e  o f th e  American 1814 o f fe n s iv e . C ontrary  to  what one stu d en t o f  
th e  war concluded, su c ce ss fu l o ffe n s iv e s  were p o ss ib le  on th e  f r o n t ie r  
i n  s p i te  o f  th e  o b s ta c le s  which n a tu re  p r e s e n t e d . I n  1813 th e  key
to  v ic to ry  i n  th e  Northwest had been naval c o n tro l  o f  Lake E r ie .  In
1814 the  key to  v ic to ry  might have been the  com bination o f th e  f ig h t­
ing  q u a l i t ie s  o f  th e  Left and Right D iv isio n s  w ith n aval c o n tro l o f 
Lakes E rie  and O n ta rio . Human mis judgment r a th e r  th an  n a tu re  had 
produced th e  f a i l u r e .
H is to r ian s  have c r i t ic i z e d  American s tr a te g y  in  1814 because 
i t  was d ire c te d  a g a in s t  w estern  r a th e r  than  e a s te rn  o b je c t iv e s .  Un­
doubtedly , K ingston should have been th e  o b jec t o f a  supreme m il i ta ry
3®To J e ffe rs o n , Oct 23, L e tte r s  and O ther W ritings (Congress 
e d .) ,  11, 591.
3 9co les, War o f  1812. 163.
^ ^ l i t e .  The Je ffe rs o n ia n s . 216.
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e f f o r t ,  though M ontreal was out o f  th e  q u e s tio n . The weakness o f  
American s tr a te g y ,  however, was not so much th e  choice o f  the  Niagara 
p en in su la  as th e  prime o b je c t iv e , but r a th e r  th e  f a i lu r e  to  a d ju s t  
ends and means to  th e  t a s k ,  p lu s  th e  breakdown in  im plem entation. Any 
conquest in  1814 would have p laced  th e  United S ta te s  in  a  b e t t e r  bar­
gain ing  p o s it io n ,  and had the  pen in su la  been conquered i n  1814, i t  
was u n lik e ly  t h a t  th e  B r i t i s h  could have re taken  i t .  P ré v o st ' s  t o t a l  
re g u la r  e f f e c t iv e  fo rce  in  th e  Canadas by the  end of th e  year came to  
29,000, but he was unable to  send a s u b s ta n t ia l  number o f  tro o p s  west 
o f  M ontreal due to  th e  acu te  supply  problems which a f f l i c t e d  th e  
B r i t i s h  even more than  th e  Americans. The com pletion o f  two monstrous 
sh ip s , th e  Ghippawa and th e  New O rleans, a t  Sackets Harbor by th e  
spring  o f  1815 would have prevented  th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f a  B r i t i s h  o ffen ­
s iv e  a g a in s t th e  harbor o r  th e  N iagara p e n i n s u l a . I n  l a t e  October 
th e  new American commander a t  D e tro i t ,  Duncan McArthur, took 650 
mounted men a c ro ss  th e  S t .  C la ir  Hiver on a tw en ty -four day r a id  th a t  
c a rr ie d  them a l l  th e  way to  th e  Grand R iver n ear B u rling ton . They 
destroyed  most o f  the  f lo u r  m il ls  in  w estern  Upper Canada, f u r th e r  
lim ite d  B r i t i s h  supply in  the  p e n in su la , and e f f e c t iv e ly  secured 
D e tro it  and Michigan from  B r i t i s h  a tta c k .  Although the Lake Huron 
e x p e d itio n , which had s a i le d  from D e tro it  on J u ly  3» had fa i le d  to  
rec a p tu re  Mackinac, th e  A naricans remained in  undisputed  c o n tro l o f 
th e  w estern  l a k e s . ^
^ I b i d . , 327; G ilp in , War in  th e  Northwest, 256-57.
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W illiam  Leete Stone, a  F e d e ra l is t  au th o r and a f r ie n d  o f  P e ter 
B, P o r te r  and Jacob Brown, bemoaned th e  f a c t  t h a t  the  L e f t  and R ight 
D iv isio n s  had n o t been combined to  se v er the  S t .  Lawrence l in e  o f  com­
m unications, b u t th a t  bo th  had been se n t to  an a re a  where they  could  
give no advantage. The g lo ry  won a t  Chippawa, Lundy’s Lane, and Fort 
E r ie , had b lin d ed  the  p ub lic  t o  th e  f a c t  o f  d e fe a t ,  "We l ik e  th e  
B r i t i s h  considered  war a s  a p la y  o f c h iv a lry , r a th e r  th a n  a p o l i t i c a l  
engine, and in  th e  b r i l l i a n c y  o f  su ccess fu l b a t t l e s  fo rg o t  th a t  th ey  
produced no r e s u l t s , B u t  th e s e  b a t t l e s  d id have co n cre te  r e s u l t s .  
They c o n tr ib u te d  to  th e  fu lf il lm e n t  o f  one o f th e  most inçx jrtan t aims 
in  th e  war; th e  re s to ra t io n  o f  " n a tio n a l  c h a ra c te r"  and " n a tio n a l 
honor" and, in c id e n tly ,  th e  awakening o f  American na tio n a lism . During 
th e  w orst weeks o f  1814, when i t  seemed th a t  th e  n e g o tia tio n s  a t  Ghent 
would c o lla p se  and th e  B r i t i s h  would pursue th e  war r e l e n t l e s s ly ,  
Madison took so la c e  in  th e  "sp len d id  v ic to r ie s "  o f  Brown, S c o tt, and 
Gaines on th e  Niagara f ro n t ,  "vdiich have gained fo r  th e se  heroes , . , 
th e  most unfading l a u r e ls ,  having trium phan tly  t e s te d  th e  p ro g ress iv e  
d is c ip l in e  o f th e  American s o ld ie ry , have taugh t th e  enemy th a t  th e  
longer he p r o tr a c ts  h is  h o s t i le  e f f o r ts  th e  more c e r ta in  and d e c is iv e  
w il l  be h is  f i n a l  d isc o m fitu re , " ^  In  September and O ctober, as 
Madison abandoned lo n g -s tan d in g  American dip lom atic  demands en masse 
to  s e t t l e  fo r  s ta tu s  quo ante  bellum . th e  ad m in is tra tio n  t r i e d  t o  
gear f o r  a p ro tra c te d  war by proposing a co n sc r ip tio n  b i l l  to  Congress
43LLfe o f  G eneral Jacob Brown. 179. S tone f e l t  th ese  were 
R ip le y 's  th o u g h ts ,
^ i x t h  Annual Message, Sept 20, W ritings (ed. H unt), V I I I ,
308.
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t h a t  to o k  th e  performance o f re g u la rs  in to  a c c o u n t , C o n g r e s s m a n  
In g e r s o ll ,  w ritin g  many y e a rs  l a t e r ,  f e l t  t h a t  Brown's " jo u s ts  on th e  
banks o f  th e  N iagara . . .  tau g h t Great B r i ta in  to  resp ec t th e  United 
S ta te s  more e f f e c tu a l ly  and le s s  p a in fu l ly  than  . . . [C anada's] con­
quest would have done," dim inished  B r i t i s h  m il i t a ry  and d ip lom atic  
confidence, helped  p ro te c t  th e  A tla n tic  c o a s t ,  and m orally  s tre n g th ­
ened th e  American army.
By February 1815 th e  "g lo rio u s"  b a t t l e s  o f  th e  N iagara penin­
s u la ,^ ^  s e t  next to  the  b r i l l i a n t  d e fen siv e  v ic to r ie s  a t  P la ttsb u rg .  
F o rt McHenry, and New O rleans, served  to  r e s to re  American p rid e  and 
confidence com pletely . B efore th e  T reaty  o f  Ghent reached W ashington, 
Monroe was p lanning  a m assive o ffe n s iv e  a g a in s t  M ontreal, f u l l y  con­
f id e n t  t h a t  th e  U nited S ta te s  could  expel th e  29,000 B r i t i s h  re g u la rs  
from North America, and "break  th e  B r i t i s h  power th e r e ,  to  th e  utmost 
p ra c t ic a b le  extent."^*^ The Reverend Alexander McLeod proclaim ed th a t  
th e  war was "a c o n te s t no t only t o  prevent th e  r e c o lo n iz a t io n  o f th ese  
s ta t e s ,  b u t a lso  i n  th e  Providence o f  God fo r  ex tending th e  p r in c ip le s  
o f  rep re s e n ta tiv e  democracy—the  b le s s in g s  o f  l ib e r ty ,  and th e  r ig h ts  
o f  self-governm en t, among th e  c o lo n ies  o f Europe."^® The pessim ism
^^B rant, James Madison. VI, 333, 337.
^^See I n g e r s o l l 's  r e f le c t io n s  on th e  m il i ta ry ,  d ip lo m atic , 
p o l i t i c a l ,  and s o c ia l  e f f e c ts  o f th e  1814 campaign in  H is to r ic a l  
Ske tch . I I ,  109-14.
^?To Brown, 10 Feb 1815, C o n fid en tia l and U n o ff ic ia l L e tte r s  
S en t, RG 10? (NA); B rant, James Madison. VI, 366, fn .  4 , 565; S tacey , 
"An American P la n ,"  348-58.
^®Quoted i n  P e rk in s , Prologue to  War. 426. "L ater in  th e  war 
. . .  many Americans, in clu d in g  Madison and Monroe, were tem pted by th e  
dream o f  in co rp o ra tin g  Canada in to  th e  U nited S ta te s ."  I b id . . fn . 17, 
427.
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o f  1814 had been transfo rm ed  in to  th e  confidence and am bitions o f  1812.
Peace was n e v e rth e le s s  welcomed, and though conquest had n o t been
ach ieved , Madison wished th e  war to  be remembered a s  a su ccess .
I t  has been waged w ith  a success which i s  th e  n a tu ra l  
r e s u l t  o f  th e  wisdom o f  th e  l e g i s la t iv e  c o u n c ils , o f  
th e  p a tr io tis m  o f th e  peop le , o f  th e  pub lic  s p i r i t  o f  
th e  m i l i t i a ,  and o f  th e  v a lo r  o f th e  m il i t a ry  and n av a l 
fo rc e s  of th e  co u n try . Peace, a t  aU. tim es a  b le s s in g , 
i s  p e c u lia r ly  welcome, th e re fo re ,  a t  a  period  when th e  
causes o f th e  war have ceased to  o p e ra te , vdien the  
Government has dem onstrated th e  e ff ic ie n c y  o f  i t s  
powers o f  d e fen se , and vdien th e  n a tio n  can rev iew  i t s  
conduct w ithout r e g r e t  and w ithout r e p r o a c h . 49
In  a  sense  i t  had been "planned" t h i s  way. D espairing o f  
conquest i n  1814, Madison had e f f e c tu a l ly  abandoned the  war as a 
" p o l i t i c a l  engine" to  achieve e s s e n t ia l  demands, and h is  s tr a te g y  was 
in ten d ed  to  sa lvage n a tio n a l  p re s t ig e .  In  h is  p e rso n a l d ea lin g s  w ith  
Armstrong o r  S e ru r ie r  or F e d e ra l is ts ,  he had s tr iv e n  to  m ain tain  an 
a i r  o f  p ro p r ie ty , r e c t i tu d e ,  and c o n f i d e n c e , B r o w n  and S co tt had 
been th e  p e rfe c t  g e n e ra ls  to  lead  th e  o ffe n s iv e , f o r  in  s p i te  o f  th e  
odds, th ey  had cro ssed  in to  Canada, wearing sp e c ia l  sashes and epau­
l e t t e s ,  eager " to  remove th e  d isg ra c e  vrtiich former d e fe a ts  and d i s a s ­
t e r s  had a tta c h ed  to  our arm s." The unsuccessfu l b u t g lo ry -p roducing  
o ffe n s iv e  b a t t l e s ,  and th e  su c ce ss fu l and e q u a lly  g lo rio u s  defen siv e  
b a t t l e s ,  re s to re d  American p rid e  and p laced  the  coun try  on th e  road 
to  fu tu re  m il i t a ry ,  d ip lo m atic , and naval p o lic y . West P o in t and th e
49Quoted i n  B ran t, James Madison. VI, 369. 
^ ° Ib id ,.  288, 313-14, 343.
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r e g u la rs  came to  th e  fo re  in  th e  United S ta te s  krmy under Calhoun, 
and th e  s t i l l - b o r n  c h ild , m an ifest d e s tin y , managed to  grow to  
m atu r ity  i n  the  postw ar y e a rs .
^^The most permanent m il i t a ry  leg acy  of th e  War o f  1812 
stemmed from  the b a t t l e s  o f  Chippawa and Lundy's Lane r a th e r  than  from 
New O rlean s . W eigley, H is to ry  o f th e  U.S. Army. 117-72.
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